Drop six orphaned patches

Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>

6 files changed, 0 insertions, 626 deletions

diff --git a/0001-Correct-warning-with-gcc9.patch b/0001-Correct-warning-with-gcc9.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a5e94230..000000000
--- a/0001-Correct-warning-with-gcc9.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 0de1315ee843713bafb9a59bc040a024f688c62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:56:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Correct warning with gcc9
-
-Suggested from Arnd
-
-Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/module.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
-index 8fa38d3e7538..f2a24b59cca4 100644
---- a/include/linux/module.h
-+++ b/include/linux/module.h
-@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void);
- #define module_init(initfn)					\
- 	static inline initcall_t __maybe_unused __inittest(void)		\
- 	{ return initfn; }					\
--	int init_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#initfn)));
-+	int init_module(void) __attribute__((cold, alias(#initfn)));
- 
- /* This is only required if you want to be unloadable. */
- #define module_exit(exitfn)					\
- 	static inline exitcall_t __maybe_unused __exittest(void)		\
- 	{ return exitfn; }					\
--	void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#exitfn)));
-+	void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((cold, alias(#exitfn)));
- 
- #endif
- 
--- 
-2.20.1
-
diff --git a/Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch b/Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ebabac62e..000000000
--- a/Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
-From 6b6203b92cfb457a0669a9c87a29b360405bffc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
-Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 10/20] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
- when in Secure Boot mode
-
-UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
-only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
-require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
-that enforces this automatically when enabled.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
----
- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
- arch/x86/Kconfig                      | 11 ++++++
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 +-
- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  6 ++++
- include/linux/module.h                |  6 ++++
- kernel/module.c                       |  7 ++++
- 7 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
---- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
- 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
- 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
- 				(below)
-+1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
-+1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
- 1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
- 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
- 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
-diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index bada636d1065..d666ef8b616c 100644
---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
-+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -1786,6 +1786,17 @@ config EFI_MIXED
- 
- 	   If unsure, say N.
- 
-+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
-+	def_bool n
-+	depends on EFI
-+	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
-+	---help---
-+	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
-+	  firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain
-+	  use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed.
-+	  Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement
-+	  when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
-+
- config SECCOMP
- 	def_bool y
- 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index cc69e37548db..ebc85c1eefd6 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
- #include <asm/efi.h>
- #include <asm/setup.h>
- #include <asm/desc.h>
-+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
- 
- #include "../string.h"
- #include "eboot.h"
-@@ -537,6 +538,67 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params)
- 	efi_call_early(free_pool, pci_handle);
- }
- 
-+static int get_secure_boot(void)
-+{
-+	u8 sb, setup;
-+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
-+	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+
-+	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
-+
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (sb == 0)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+
-+	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
-+				&setup);
-+
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (setup == 1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol
-+ */
-+static efi_status_t setup_gop(struct screen_info *si, efi_guid_t *proto,
-+			      unsigned long size)
-+{
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+	void **gop_handle = NULL;
-+
-+	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
-+				size, (void **)&gop_handle);
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return status;
-+
-+	status = efi_call_early(locate_handle,
-+				EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL,
-+				proto, NULL, &size, gop_handle);
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		goto free_handle;
-+
-+	if (efi_early->is64)
-+		status = setup_gop64(si, proto, size, gop_handle);
-+	else
-+		status = setup_gop32(si, proto, size, gop_handle);
-+
-+free_handle:
-+	efi_call_early(free_pool, gop_handle);
-+	return status;
-+}
-+
- static efi_status_t
- setup_uga32(void **uga_handle, unsigned long size, u32 *width, u32 *height)
- {
-@@ -1094,6 +1156,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
- 	else
- 		setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
- 
-+	sanitize_boot_params(boot_params);
-+
-+	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot();
-+
- 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
- 
- 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-index c18ce67495fa..2b3e5427097b 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ struct boot_params {
- 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
- 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
- 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
--	__u8  _pad5[3];					/* 0x1ec */
-+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
-+	__u8  _pad5[2];					/* 0x1ed */
- 	/*
- 	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
- 	 *
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index bbfbca5fea0c..d40e961753c9 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1160,6 +1160,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
- 
- 	io_delay_init();
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
-+	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
-+		enforce_signed_modules();
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
- 	 */
-diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
-index 05bd6c989a0c..32327704e18d 100644
---- a/include/linux/module.h
-+++ b/include/linux/module.h
-@@ -260,6 +260,12 @@ extern const typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table		\
- 
- struct notifier_block;
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+extern void enforce_signed_modules(void);
-+#else
-+static inline void enforce_signed_modules(void) {};
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
- 
- extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */
-diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
-index cb864505d020..cb1f1da69bf4 100644
---- a/kernel/module.c
-+++ b/kernel/module.c
-@@ -4285,6 +4285,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+void enforce_signed_modules(void)
-+{
-+	sig_enforce = true;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- bool secure_modules(void)
- {
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
--- 
-2.9.3
-
diff --git a/efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch b/efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c44010322..000000000
--- a/efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From a8883aff32f1e15b65e210462804aa2a9ab9a0b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 13/20] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
-
-UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
-for use with efi_enabled.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++
- include/linux/efi.h     | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index d40e961753c9..b93183336674 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1162,7 +1162,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
- 	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
-+		set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
- 		enforce_signed_modules();
-+		pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- 	}
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index ce943d5accfd..5af91b58afae 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
- #define EFI_ARCH_1		7	/* First arch-specific bit */
- #define EFI_DBG			8	/* Print additional debug info at runtime */
- #define EFI_NX_PE_DATA		9	/* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
-+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		10	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
- /*
--- 
-2.9.3
-
diff --git a/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch b/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 761a66ff7..000000000
--- a/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From d687d79620ea20511b2dbf77e74fdcf4d94981f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 12/20] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
-
-A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
-images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
-MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set.  Given that the
-user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
-secure boot mode if that variable is set.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
----
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index ebc85c1eefd6..50e027f388d8 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -540,8 +540,9 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params)
- 
- static int get_secure_boot(void)
- {
--	u8 sb, setup;
-+	u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
- 	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
-+	u32 attr;
- 	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- 	efi_status_t status;
- 
-@@ -565,6 +566,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void)
- 	if (setup == 1)
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	/* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode.  If so, and the variable
-+	 * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
-+	 */
-+	var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+				L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
-+				&moksbstate);
-+
-+	/* If it fails, we don't care why.  Default to secure */
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
-+		if (moksbstate == 1)
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.9.3
-
diff --git a/include-linux-module.h-mark-init-cleanup_module-aliases-as-__cold.patch b/include-linux-module.h-mark-init-cleanup_module-aliases-as-__cold.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f350e6f32..000000000
--- a/include-linux-module.h-mark-init-cleanup_module-aliases-as-__cold.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-From patchwork Wed Jan 23 17:37:07 2019
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
-X-Patchwork-Submitter: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
-X-Patchwork-Id: 1034989
-Return-Path: <SRS0=drEb=P7=vger.kernel.org=linux-kernel-owner@kernel.org>
-Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99])
-	by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7D50C282C0
-	for <linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>; Wed, 23 Jan 2019 17:38:31 +0000 (UTC)
-Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67])
-	by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CE1F20870
-	for <linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>; Wed, 23 Jan 2019 17:38:31 +0000 (UTC)
-Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org;
-	dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com
- header.b="qdRA7oPl"
-Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand
-        id S1726152AbfAWRi3 (ORCPT
-        <rfc822;linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>);
-        Wed, 23 Jan 2019 12:38:29 -0500
-Received: from mail-wm1-f67.google.com ([209.85.128.67]:52719 "EHLO
-        mail-wm1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org
-        with ESMTP id S1725896AbfAWRi3 (ORCPT
-        <rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>);
-        Wed, 23 Jan 2019 12:38:29 -0500
-Received: by mail-wm1-f67.google.com with SMTP id m1so242485wml.2
-        for <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>;
- Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:27 -0800 (PST)
-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
-        d=gmail.com; s=20161025;
-        h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition
-         :user-agent;
-        bh=1joVTuHcQFv5PhIFvZBlpu1jeKwRQi2Ty1HKsqzNx+0=;
-        b=qdRA7oPloipduZyiYE/EECaW/vCZup5EXmE5a1XgE9mc55H+TTPNNRTt44QJbQgbnn
-         wTNksIkBx8Gs0k3pJI9QIDO2J5AipLN8OOoxkPiDIJtAC8buHzQrdTxFG/4Uxw7tRf8X
-         A6PNyuUGr+02itkYIlALzEuDHvZna8yZx0zCeCDXF2IrGt0NBHZVTzz1XfX8LeQlCh9L
-         hleyVdDQnDvwxA7dXqrA4UugXUlEqT8HnIAUdg8+/xubsXOSz9T/22+zc9pZ9uSHm2uq
-         DpO/hgx1e5DONDN8T+sjjKCO0LnJ8Z9ZS0Huf+8W2XH1uxo48jSgXUOsygPQ36+8R/7t
-         ng6Q==
-X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
-        d=1e100.net; s=20161025;
-        h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version
-         :content-disposition:user-agent;
-        bh=1joVTuHcQFv5PhIFvZBlpu1jeKwRQi2Ty1HKsqzNx+0=;
-        b=ZQrXdTIYsCSUGNJS1C0dn+gibvoSHb2o+kcUMGTbH6G2tag3Zy4vnfIcBT0xhmvPLq
-         5pU8jskcufXp0qQ0sivNsBpJYJCbsqqiChoivTs9WC4rxoM5G62Wi0pAZL59fGGDnmyV
-         xjSTkSoxe8CiB+26BDzg52zkynkWC2v0OHgaM7/1lTeTqNxdYIvQ+hC4LXdy40bAP64/
-         JIC1nET+KwewpPHJQc2u87ah4xp6nEjzO/4wTP3CUi4zbZPTU17oH007IAXhObL7JO0r
-         XkRBJAgpcTKexfAJB7HnAUc4KLSv5L5Uz+Z14TusskTuK6njE11PE9GSJ7Z7lqufqJNZ
-         Z4GQ==
-X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukdaW+EjUkHLIrpaLWRYCoF9XYWdpSiPfNnJgu3VB9CW8t9xYlZJ
-        NDU6hJ2AXvnDR+awfdjm6IU=
-X-Google-Smtp-Source: 
- ALg8bN59XklA0HTVEDaLFI+8dguNdipIQWTlgIi23N78PjaLBzniLMXowf2nCpIra7boIidjtFvfYg==
-X-Received: by 2002:a1c:7c05:: with SMTP id x5mr3525198wmc.54.1548265106544;
-        Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:26 -0800 (PST)
-Received: from gmail.com (79.108.96.12.dyn.user.ono.com. [79.108.96.12])
-        by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id
- r77sm74200791wmd.22.2019.01.23.09.38.25
-        (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256);
-        Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:25 -0800 (PST)
-Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 18:37:07 +0100
-From: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
-To: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
-Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
-        Martin Sebor <msebor@gcc.gnu.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-Subject: [PATCH] include/linux/module.h: mark init/cleanup_module aliases as
- __cold
-Message-ID: <20190123173707.GA16603@gmail.com>
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
-Content-Disposition: inline
-User-Agent: elm/2
-Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
-Precedence: bulk
-List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org>
-X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-
-The upcoming GCC 9 release adds the -Wmissing-attributes warnings
-(enabled by -Wall), which trigger for all the init/cleanup_module
-aliases in the kernel (defined by the module_init/exit macros),
-ending up being very noisy.
-
-These aliases point to the __init/__exit functions of a module,
-which are defined as __cold (among other attributes). However,
-the aliases themselves do not have the __cold attribute.
-
-Since the compiler behaves differently when compiling a __cold
-function as well as when compiling paths leading to calls
-to __cold functions, the warning is trying to point out
-the possibly-forgotten attribute in the alias.
-
-In order to keep the warning enabled, we choose to silence
-the warning by marking the aliases as __cold. This is possible
-marking either the extern declaration, the definition, or both.
-In order to avoid changing the behavior of callers, we do it
-only in the definition of the aliases (since those are not
-seen by any other TU).
-
-Suggested-by: Martin Sebor <msebor@gcc.gnu.org>
-Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
----
-Note that an alternative is using the new copy attribute
-introduced by GCC 9 (Martin told me about it, as well as the
-new warning).
-
-What I am concerned about using __copy is that I am not sure
-we should be copying all the attributes (even if some are
-blacklisted by the copy itself), since:
-  - We have unknown-to-GCC attributes (e.g. from plugins).
-  - We wouldn't enjoy the fix for older compilers
-    (e.g. if the fix had an actual impact).
-
-So here I took the conservative approach for the moment,
-and we can discuss/apply whether another solution is best.
-
-Jessica: please review what I explain in the commit message.
-Do we actually want the __cold attribute in the declaration
-as well? If yes, AFAIK, GCC would assume paths that end up
-calling the __init/__exit functions are not meant to be taken
-(but when we are asked to load modules, that is the expected
-path, no?).
-
-I will put this in the compiler-attributes tree and get
-some time in linux-next, unless you want to pick it up!
-
- include/linux/module.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
-index 8fa38d3e7538..c4e805e87628 100644
---- a/include/linux/module.h
-+++ b/include/linux/module.h
-@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void);
- #define module_init(initfn)					\
- 	static inline initcall_t __maybe_unused __inittest(void)		\
- 	{ return initfn; }					\
--	int init_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#initfn)));
-+	int init_module(void) __cold __attribute__((alias(#initfn)));
- 
- /* This is only required if you want to be unloadable. */
- #define module_exit(exitfn)					\
- 	static inline exitcall_t __maybe_unused __exittest(void)		\
- 	{ return exitfn; }					\
--	void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#exitfn)));
-+	void cleanup_module(void) __cold __attribute__((alias(#exitfn)));
- 
- #endif
- 
diff --git a/lib-crc32.c-mark-crc32_le_base-__crc32c_le_base-aliases-as-__pure.patch b/lib-crc32.c-mark-crc32_le_base-__crc32c_le_base-aliases-as-__pure.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2010603f4..000000000
--- a/lib-crc32.c-mark-crc32_le_base-__crc32c_le_base-aliases-as-__pure.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-From patchwork Thu Jan 24 15:44:20 2019
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
-X-Patchwork-Submitter: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
-X-Patchwork-Id: 1035252
-Return-Path: <SRS0=jJS3=QA=vger.kernel.org=linux-kernel-owner@kernel.org>
-Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99])
-	by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95925C282C3
-	for <linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>; Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:44:28 +0000 (UTC)
-Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67])
-	by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6368521872
-	for <linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>; Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:44:28 +0000 (UTC)
-Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org;
-	dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com
- header.b="DEOxuN9k"
-Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand
-        id S1728590AbfAXPo1 (ORCPT
-        <rfc822;linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>);
-        Thu, 24 Jan 2019 10:44:27 -0500
-Received: from mail-wm1-f68.google.com ([209.85.128.68]:37788 "EHLO
-        mail-wm1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org
-        with ESMTP id S1727649AbfAXPo0 (ORCPT
-        <rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>);
-        Thu, 24 Jan 2019 10:44:26 -0500
-Received: by mail-wm1-f68.google.com with SMTP id g67so3548002wmd.2
-        for <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>;
- Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:25 -0800 (PST)
-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
-        d=gmail.com; s=20161025;
-        h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition
-         :user-agent;
-        bh=JeyLhzrsCRzzO/4nbb0LJSQxILVpgC++VcQqugacalc=;
-        b=DEOxuN9kV3A3qQ3ere0UjnfgT3DE1Gc4z/52Qty46F/mbpPja2OkXvtPJ15RK9/h4Z
-         AG1fdkKf/GjCRaBidO9BLWwcoq0uiTV69J0KR0rF67QR9zxgGVEl8fu6s/ZmtKnnIdF4
-         AysPfOHY+/MwlcB6UOzADtS69SDUYTsxDxOfHBj/FjnS7WmNetq8ae17VvRdpd/JEWtE
-         M58OhgBYmckFYuVXQTEEhpm8w6TIefPA5S3r3KeUuXclMeqJ07pU1vJWK7tdTp7sIeAv
-         xYgGq49/NBPkUl4l+LdwVBwp+o6pvUfh2w9zBQW67xZu6rn/j500BV8xdubxQqHTauSM
-         oQPw==
-X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
-        d=1e100.net; s=20161025;
-        h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version
-         :content-disposition:user-agent;
-        bh=JeyLhzrsCRzzO/4nbb0LJSQxILVpgC++VcQqugacalc=;
-        b=twekOdboep908h8e5de5qIQIgDuUrOYeS/p8s5bh3AYpMD9r3CIJtanHSCWnFCsPIw
-         /hesYDvbpVSiQTI1afBap2tw2ugq2aL2Sur2/9BhWE5So2HlVMlN5M6S8ccs6IK6Ldzh
-         +wxWJnq7dnvwbpMLcT3mASpdlEUPTaVTA7AazIssYrIDY9ucJA4vfYUemvvTtKn2tovO
-         lJjVDsOwv7/3P9XphLneTUXTI1ZD9soUX/qpt1m4n4BAme1tHfmbAL4cceRfMf7eFKhh
-         t3iRpkh/6ZHMGw0moeXPkTB+WTDhA7MgsmQA/X6tmPfjfMQsEo+OKRUBtFuuVDY5wzSf
-         eX7Q==
-X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukcM8ZahlKLufK0H1V2XtT0GIN899FyU1V2PJM0+/GfK3XvzMW2n
-        o0kPoin07YrKIK/Zh71qAxI=
-X-Google-Smtp-Source: 
- ALg8bN7upuyKWCD/cTB9FAkdcEyU6dlTStUcg49cEAv640NugO83fRipoQ9X2YGpIogSFxA7BbHmeQ==
-X-Received: by 2002:a1c:bbd6:: with SMTP id l205mr2979576wmf.97.1548344665032;
-        Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:25 -0800 (PST)
-Received: from gmail.com (79.108.96.12.dyn.user.ono.com. [79.108.96.12])
-        by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id
- k128sm80898610wmd.37.2019.01.24.07.44.23
-        (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256);
-        Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:24 -0800 (PST)
-Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 16:44:20 +0100
-From: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
-To: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
-Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
-        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
-        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
-        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
-        Martin Sebor <msebor@gcc.gnu.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-Subject: [PATCH] lib/crc32.c: mark crc32_le_base/__crc32c_le_base aliases as
- __pure
-Message-ID: <20190124154420.GA11471@gmail.com>
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
-Content-Disposition: inline
-User-Agent: elm/2
-Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
-Precedence: bulk
-List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org>
-X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-
-The upcoming GCC 9 release extends the -Wmissing-attributes warnings
-(enabled by -Wall) to C and aliases: it warns when particular function
-attributes are missing in the aliases but not in their target.
-
-In particular, it triggers here because crc32_le_base/__crc32c_le_base
-aren't __pure while their target crc32_le/__crc32c_le are.
-
-These aliases are used by architectures as a fallback in accelerated
-versions of CRC32. See commit 9784d82db3eb ("lib/crc32: make core crc32()
-routines weak so they can be overridden").
-
-Therefore, being fallbacks, it is likely that even if the aliases
-were called from C, there wouldn't be any optimizations possible.
-Currently, the only user is arm64, which calls this from asm.
-
-Still, marking the aliases as __pure makes sense and is a good idea
-for documentation purposes and possible future optimizations,
-which also silences the warning.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
----
-I am picking this up through the compiler-attributes tree
-and putting it into -next along with the other cleanup
-for -Wmissing-attributes (unless some other maintainer wants it).
-
- lib/crc32.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/crc32.c b/lib/crc32.c
-index 45b1d67a1767..4a20455d1f61 100644
---- a/lib/crc32.c
-+++ b/lib/crc32.c
-@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ u32 __pure __weak __crc32c_le(u32 crc, unsigned char const *p, size_t len)
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(crc32_le);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(__crc32c_le);
- 
--u32 crc32_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(crc32_le);
--u32 __crc32c_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(__crc32c_le);
-+u32 __pure crc32_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(crc32_le);
-+u32 __pure __crc32c_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(__crc32c_le);
- 
- /*
-  * This multiplies the polynomials x and y modulo the given modulus.