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author | Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> | 2008-09-26 12:42:45 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> | 2008-09-26 12:42:45 -0400 |
commit | 18c6c616e07ec4fcd27108d87b6f02280d9687d6 (patch) | |
tree | becebe3ddb8a3426837139f4a87b9397929f092b /utils/statd/monitor.c | |
parent | 4ac04d76dc0fffe48313d6a16b4ca9b44c135818 (diff) | |
download | nfs-utils-18c6c616e07ec4fcd27108d87b6f02280d9687d6.tar.gz nfs-utils-18c6c616e07ec4fcd27108d87b6f02280d9687d6.tar.xz nfs-utils-18c6c616e07ec4fcd27108d87b6f02280d9687d6.zip |
rpc.statd: eliminate --secure_statd
Clean up: Remove RESTRICTED_STATD to help make IPv6 changes simpler.
We keep the code behind RESTRICTED_STATD, and toss anything that is
compiled out when it is set.
RESTRICTED_STATD was added almost 10 years ago in response to CERT
CERT CA-99.05, which addresses exposures in rpc.statd that might allow
an attacker to take advantage of buffer overflows in rpc.statd while it
is running in privileged mode.
These days, I can't think of a reason why anyone would want to run
rpc.statd without setting RESTRICTED_STATD. In addition, I don't
think rpc.statd is ever tested without it.
Removing RESTRICTED_STATD will get rid of some address storage and
comparison issues that will make IPv6 support simpler. Plus it will
make our test matrix smaller!
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'utils/statd/monitor.c')
-rw-r--r-- | utils/statd/monitor.c | 34 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/utils/statd/monitor.c b/utils/statd/monitor.c index 5d4aa49..d300338 100644 --- a/utils/statd/monitor.c +++ b/utils/statd/monitor.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ notify_list * rtnl = NULL; /* Run-time notify list. */ #define LINELEN (4*(8+1)+SM_PRIV_SIZE*2+1) -#ifdef RESTRICTED_STATD /* * Reject requests from non-loopback addresses in order * to prevent attack described in CERT CA-99.05. @@ -48,16 +47,6 @@ caller_is_localhost(struct svc_req *rqstp) } return 1; } -#else /* RESTRICTED_STATD */ -/* - * No restrictions for remote callers. - */ -static int -caller_is_localhost(struct svc_req *rqstp) -{ - return 1; -} -#endif /* RESTRICTED_STATD */ /* * Services SM_MON requests. @@ -81,7 +70,6 @@ sm_mon_1_svc(struct mon *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp) result.res_stat = STAT_FAIL; result.state = -1; /* State is undefined for STAT_FAIL. */ -#ifdef RESTRICTED_STATD /* 1. Reject any remote callers. * Ignore the my_name specified by the caller, and * use "127.0.0.1" instead. @@ -107,28 +95,6 @@ sm_mon_1_svc(struct mon *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp) goto failure; } -#if 0 - This is not usable anymore. Linux-kernel can be configured to use - host names with NSM so that multi-homed hosts are handled properly. - NeilBrown 15mar2007 - - /* 3. mon_name must be an address in dotted quad. - * Again, specific to the linux kernel lockd. - */ - if (!inet_aton(mon_name, &mon_addr)) { - note(N_WARNING, - "Attempt to register host %s (not a dotted quad)", - mon_name); - goto failure; - } -#endif -#else - if (!(hostinfo = gethostbyname(my_name))) { - note(N_WARNING, "gethostbyname error for %s", my_name); - goto failure; - } else - my_addr = *(struct in_addr *) hostinfo->h_addr; -#endif /* * Check hostnames. If I can't look them up, I won't monitor. This * might not be legal, but it adds a little bit of safety and sanity. |