summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c')
-rw-r--r--src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c328
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 328 deletions
diff --git a/src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c b/src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c
index 755314338..c4212b302 100644
--- a/src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c
+++ b/src/appl/bsd/kcmd.c
@@ -90,16 +90,10 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include "k5-int.h"
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-#include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
-#endif
#include "defines.h"
extern krb5_context bsd_context;
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-extern Key_schedule v4_schedule;
-#endif
#define START_PORT 5120 /* arbitrary */
@@ -140,27 +134,8 @@ static char *store_ptr = storage;
static int twrite(int, char *, size_t, int);
static int v5_des_read(int, char *, size_t, int),
v5_des_write(int, char *, size_t, int);
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-static int v4_des_read(int, char *, size_t, int),
- v4_des_write(int, char *, size_t, int);
-static C_Block v4_session;
-static int right_justify;
-#endif
static int do_lencheck;
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-extern int
-krb_sendauth(long options, int fd, KTEXT ticket,
- char *service, char *inst, char *realm,
- unsigned KRB4_32 checksum,
- MSG_DAT *msg_data,
- CREDENTIALS *cred,
- Key_schedule schedule,
- struct sockaddr_in *laddr,
- struct sockaddr_in *faddr,
- char *version);
-#endif
-
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
typedef sigset_t masktype;
#else
@@ -631,133 +606,6 @@ kcmd(sock, ahost, rport, locuser, remuser, cmd, fd2p, service, realm,
}
-
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-int
-k4cmd(sock, ahost, rport, locuser, remuser, cmd, fd2p, ticket, service, realm,
- cred, schedule, msg_data, laddr, faddr, authopts, anyport)
- int *sock;
- char **ahost;
- unsigned int rport;
- char *locuser, *remuser, *cmd;
- int *fd2p;
- KTEXT ticket;
- char *service;
- char *realm;
- CREDENTIALS *cred;
- Key_schedule schedule;
- MSG_DAT *msg_data;
- struct sockaddr_in *laddr, *faddr;
- long authopts;
- int anyport;
-{
- int s;
- masktype oldmask;
- struct sockaddr_in sockin, from;
- char c;
- int lport = START_PORT;
- int rc;
- char *host_save;
- int status;
- int addrfamily = AF_INET;
-
- block_urgent(&oldmask);
- if (kcmd_connect (&s, &addrfamily, &sockin, *ahost, &host_save, rport, &lport, laddr) == -1) {
- restore_sigs(&oldmask);
- return -1;
- }
- *ahost = host_save;
- /* If realm is null, look up from table */
- if ((realm == NULL) || (realm[0] == '\0')) {
- realm = krb_realmofhost(host_save);
- }
- lport--;
- status = setup_secondary_channel(s, fd2p, &lport, &addrfamily, &from,
- anyport);
- if (status)
- goto bad;
-
- /* set up the needed stuff for mutual auth */
- *faddr = sockin;
-
- status = krb_sendauth(authopts, s, ticket, service, *ahost,
- realm, (unsigned long) getpid(), msg_data,
- cred, schedule, laddr, faddr, "KCMDV0.1");
- if (status != KSUCCESS) {
- fprintf(stderr, "krb_sendauth failed: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(status));
- status = -1;
- goto bad2;
- }
- (void) write(s, remuser, strlen(remuser)+1);
- (void) write(s, cmd, strlen(cmd)+1);
-
-reread:
- if ((rc=read(s, &c, 1)) != 1) {
- if (rc==-1) {
- perror(*ahost);
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,"rcmd: bad connection with remote host\n");
- }
- status = -1;
- goto bad2;
- }
- if (c != 0) {
- /* If rlogind was compiled on SunOS4, and it somehow
- got the shared library version numbers wrong, it
- may give an ld.so warning about an old version of a
- shared library. Just ignore any such warning.
- Note that the warning is a characteristic of the
- server; we may not ourselves be running under
- SunOS4. */
- if (c == 'l') {
- char *check = "d.so: warning:";
- char *p;
- char cc;
-
- p = check;
- while (read(s, &c, 1) == 1) {
- if (*p == '\0') {
- if (c == '\n')
- break;
- } else {
- if (c != *p)
- break;
- ++p;
- }
- }
-
- if (*p == '\0')
- goto reread;
-
- cc = 'l';
- (void) write(2, &cc, 1);
- if (p != check)
- (void) write(2, check, (unsigned) (p - check));
- }
-
- (void) write(2, &c, 1);
- while (read(s, &c, 1) == 1) {
- (void) write(2, &c, 1);
- if (c == '\n')
- break;
- }
- status = -1;
- goto bad2;
- }
- restore_sigs(&oldmask);
- *sock = s;
- return (KSUCCESS);
- bad2:
- if (lport)
- (void) close(*fd2p);
- bad:
- (void) close(s);
- restore_sigs(&oldmask);
- return (status);
-}
-#endif /* KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT */
-
-
static int
setup_socket (struct sockaddr *sa, GETSOCKNAME_ARG3_TYPE len)
{
@@ -937,25 +785,6 @@ void rcmd_stream_init_krb5(in_keyblock, encrypt_flag, lencheck, am_client,
abort();
}
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-void rcmd_stream_init_krb4(session, encrypt_flag, lencheck, justify)
- C_Block session;
- int encrypt_flag;
- int lencheck;
- int justify;
-{
- if (!encrypt_flag) {
- rcmd_stream_init_normal();
- return;
- }
- do_lencheck = lencheck;
- right_justify = justify;
- input = v4_des_read;
- output = v4_des_write;
- memcpy(v4_session, session, sizeof(v4_session));
-}
-#endif
-
int rcmd_stream_read(fd, buf, len, sec)
int fd;
register char *buf;
@@ -1011,7 +840,6 @@ static int v5_des_read(fd, buf, len, secondary)
nstored = 0;
}
- /* See the comment in v4_des_read. */
while (1) {
cc = krb5_net_read(bsd_context, fd, &c, 1);
/* we should check for non-blocking here, but we'd have
@@ -1150,162 +978,6 @@ static int v5_des_write(fd, buf, len, secondary)
}
-
-#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
-
-static int
-v4_des_read(fd, buf, len, secondary)
-int fd;
-char *buf;
-size_t len;
-int secondary;
-{
- int nreturned = 0;
- krb5_ui_4 net_len, rd_len;
- int cc;
- unsigned char c;
-
- if (nstored >= len) {
- memcpy(buf, store_ptr, len);
- store_ptr += len;
- nstored -= len;
- return(len);
- } else if (nstored) {
- memcpy(buf, store_ptr, nstored);
- nreturned += nstored;
- buf += nstored;
- len -= nstored;
- nstored = 0;
- }
-
- /* We're fetching the length which is MSB first, and the MSB
- has to be zero unless the client is sending more than 2^24
- (16M) bytes in a single write (which is why this code is used
- in rlogin but not rcp or rsh.) The only reasons we'd get
- something other than zero are:
- -- corruption of the tcp stream (which will show up when
- everything else is out of sync too)
- -- un-caught Berkeley-style "pseudo out-of-band data" which
- happens any time the user hits ^C twice.
- The latter is *very* common, as shown by an 'rlogin -x -d'
- using the CNS V4 rlogin. Mark EIchin 1/95
- */
- while (1) {
- cc = krb_net_read(fd, &c, 1);
- if (cc <= 0) return cc; /* read error */
- if (cc == 1) {
- if (c == 0 || !do_lencheck) break;
- }
- }
-
- net_len = c;
- if ((cc = krb_net_read(fd, &c, 1)) != 1) return 0;
- net_len = (net_len << 8) | c;
- if ((cc = krb_net_read(fd, &c, 1)) != 1) return 0;
- net_len = (net_len << 8) | c;
- if ((cc = krb_net_read(fd, &c, 1)) != 1) return 0;
- net_len = (net_len << 8) | c;
-
- /* Note: net_len is unsigned */
- if (net_len > sizeof(des_inbuf)) {
- errno = EIO;
- return(-1);
- }
- /* the writer tells us how much real data we are getting, but
- we need to read the pad bytes (8-byte boundary) */
- rd_len = roundup(net_len, 8);
- if ((cc = krb_net_read(fd, des_inbuf, rd_len)) != rd_len) {
- errno = EIO;
- return(-1);
- }
- (void) pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *) des_inbuf,
- (des_cblock *) storage,
- (int) ((net_len < 8) ? 8 : net_len),
- v4_schedule,
- &v4_session,
- DECRYPT);
- /*
- * when the cleartext block is < 8 bytes, it is "right-justified"
- * in the block, so we need to adjust the pointer to the data
- */
- if (net_len < 8 && right_justify)
- store_ptr = storage + 8 - net_len;
- else
- store_ptr = storage;
- nstored = net_len;
- if (nstored > len) {
- memcpy(buf, store_ptr, len);
- nreturned += len;
- store_ptr += len;
- nstored -= len;
- } else {
- memcpy(buf, store_ptr, nstored);
- nreturned += nstored;
- nstored = 0;
- }
-
- return(nreturned);
-}
-
-static int
-v4_des_write(fd, buf, len, secondary)
-int fd;
-char *buf;
-size_t len;
-int secondary;
-{
- static char garbage_buf[8];
- unsigned char *len_buf = (unsigned char *) des_outpkt;
-
- /*
- * pcbc_encrypt outputs in 8-byte (64 bit) increments
- *
- * it zero-fills the cleartext to 8-byte padding,
- * so if we have cleartext of < 8 bytes, we want
- * to insert random garbage before it so that the ciphertext
- * differs for each transmission of the same cleartext.
- * if len < 8 - sizeof(long), sizeof(long) bytes of random
- * garbage should be sufficient; leave the rest as-is in the buffer.
- * if len > 8 - sizeof(long), just garbage fill the rest.
- */
-
-#ifdef min
-#undef min
-#endif
-#define min(a,b) ((a < b) ? a : b)
-
- if (len < 8) {
- if (right_justify) {
- krb5_random_confounder(8 - len, garbage_buf);
- /* this "right-justifies" the data in the buffer */
- (void) memcpy(garbage_buf + 8 - len, buf, len);
- } else {
- krb5_random_confounder(8 - len, garbage_buf + len);
- (void) memcpy(garbage_buf, buf, len);
- }
- }
- (void) pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *) ((len < 8) ? garbage_buf : buf),
- (des_cblock *) (des_outpkt+4),
- (int) ((len < 8) ? 8 : len),
- v4_schedule,
- &v4_session,
- ENCRYPT);
-
- /* tell the other end the real amount, but send an 8-byte padded
- packet */
- len_buf[0] = (len & 0xff000000) >> 24;
- len_buf[1] = (len & 0xff0000) >> 16;
- len_buf[2] = (len & 0xff00) >> 8;
- len_buf[3] = (len & 0xff);
- if (write(fd, des_outpkt, roundup(len,8)+4) != roundup(len,8)+4) {
- errno = EIO;
- return(-1);
- }
- return(len);
-}
-
-#endif /* KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT */
-
#ifndef HAVE_STRSAVE
/* Strsave was a routine in the version 4 krb library: we put it here
for compatablilty with version 5 krb library, since kcmd.o is linked
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-10-15 08:41:57 +0000