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authorMarc Horowitz <marc@mit.edu>1996-07-22 20:49:46 +0000
committerMarc Horowitz <marc@mit.edu>1996-07-22 20:49:46 +0000
commitedf8b4d8a6a665c2aa150993cd813ea6c5cf12e1 (patch)
tree6c2974a97b448c040fa4a31708ec5e02f187526c /src/lib/rpc/auth_gssapi.c
parent013bb1391582ed9e653ae706e398ddb8d08cfcc9 (diff)
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this commit includes all the changes on the OV_9510_INTEGRATION and
OV_MERGE branches. This includes, but is not limited to, the new openvision admin system, and major changes to gssapi to add functionality, and bring the implementation in line with rfc1964. before committing, the code was built and tested for netbsd and solaris. git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@8774 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/rpc/auth_gssapi.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/rpc/auth_gssapi.c901
1 files changed, 901 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/auth_gssapi.c b/src/lib/rpc/auth_gssapi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ffe96d18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/auth_gssapi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,901 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 OpenVision Technologies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * $Header$
+ *
+ * $Log$
+ * Revision 1.23 1996/07/22 20:39:39 marc
+ * this commit includes all the changes on the OV_9510_INTEGRATION and
+ * OV_MERGE branches. This includes, but is not limited to, the new openvision
+ * admin system, and major changes to gssapi to add functionality, and bring
+ * the implementation in line with rfc1964. before committing, the
+ * code was built and tested for netbsd and solaris.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.22.4.1 1996/07/18 04:18:29 marc
+ * merged in changes from OV_9510_BP to OV_9510_FINAL1
+ *
+ * Revision 1.22.2.1 1996/06/20 23:35:31 marc
+ * File added to the repository on a branch
+ *
+ * Revision 1.22 1996/06/05 20:56:16 bjaspan
+ * memset bindings to zero before use
+ *
+ * Revision 1.21 1996/05/12 06:11:38 marc
+ * renamed lots of types: u_foo to unsigned foo, and foo32 to rpc_foo32. This is to make autoconfiscation less painful.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.20 1995/12/13 14:02:45 grier
+ * Longs to ints for Alpha
+ *
+ * Revision 1.19 1995/10/31 16:36:00 bjaspan
+ * GS reported this bug. When talking to a 1.1 server, the server will
+ * not fail indicating the version is wrong because it never checks the
+ * version; it just responds with call_res.version 1. So we have to
+ * deal. Oops.
+ *
+ * It's amazing what can fall through the cracks when most of the
+ * development team is fired..
+ *
+ * Revision 1.18 1995/10/31 16:07:06 bjaspan
+ * fix from grier
+ *
+ * Revision 1.17 1995/08/24 21:06:26 bjaspan
+ * set acceptor channel bindings
+ *
+ * Revision 1.16 1995/08/23 20:27:37 bjaspan
+ * [secure-rpc/3392] add channel bindinds to the rpc
+ *
+ * Revision 1.15 1995/05/08 22:32:01 marc
+ * change call_arg.version from 1 to 2 to indicate the new client is in use.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.14 1995/03/22 22:05:20 jik
+ * Reorder the auth_ops structure, to agree with the order of the version of
+ * this library in the GK source tree. I chose to reorder this one rather
+ * than reorder the GK tree because Barry says that the order in the GK tree
+ * makes more sense.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.13 1994/10/27 12:39:02 jik
+ * [secure-rpc/2808: add credential versioning]
+ *
+ * Sandbox:
+ *
+ * [secure-rpc/2808] add version field to client creds
+ *
+ * change to use GSS_ERROR &c macros; I don't think this is correct
+ * =============================================================================
+ *
+ * Revision 1.14 1994/10/26 20:03:46 bjaspan
+ * [secure-rpc/2808] add version field to client creds
+ *
+ * Revision 1.13 1994/04/07 16:12:06 jik
+ * The second argument to xdr_opaque_auth is struct auth *, not struct
+ * auth.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.12 1993/12/08 21:42:43 bjaspan
+ * use AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS macro, reindent
+ *
+ * Revision 1.11 1993/12/06 21:21:03 bjaspan
+ * debugging levels
+ *
+ * Revision 1.10 1993/11/18 23:13:07 bjaspan
+ * add some function comments
+ *
+ * Revision 1.9 1993/11/15 19:50:03 bjaspan
+ * redefine AUTH_REFRESH to take the error message as an argument, and
+ * change auth_gssapi_refresh to increment the seq_num on REJECTEDVERF
+ *
+ * Revision 1.8 1993/11/12 02:31:59 bjaspan
+ * set rpc_createerr as appropriate
+ *
+ * Revision 1.7 1993/11/03 21:21:02 bjaspan
+ * fix seq_num handling in cases of errors and retransmission
+ *
+ * Revision 1.6 1993/11/01 19:55:20 bjaspan
+ * display gss_major and gss_minor, and unstatic auth_gssapi_debug
+ *
+ * Revision 1.5 1993/10/28 22:07:33 bjaspan
+ * create_default takes char *, use seq_num in args/results
+ *
+ * Revision 1.4 1993/10/26 21:11:53 bjaspan
+ * working
+ *
+ * Revision 1.3 1993/10/21 19:01:09 bjaspan
+ * added auth_gssapi_destroy, cleaned up a few things
+ *
+ * Revision 1.2 1993/10/19 03:10:58 bjaspan
+ * snapshot: GSS-API working in hacked up state, not seal/unseal
+ *
+ */
+
+#if !defined(lint) && !defined(__CODECENTER__)
+static char *rcsid = "$Header$";
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/errno.h>
+
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+
+#include <rpc/rpc.h>
+#include <rpc/auth_gssapi.h>
+
+#ifdef __CODECENTER__
+#define DEBUG_GSSAPI 1
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_GSSAPI
+int auth_debug_gssapi = DEBUG_GSSAPI;
+#define L_PRINTF(l,args) if (auth_debug_gssapi >= l) printf args
+#define PRINTF(args) L_PRINTF(99, args)
+#define AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(args) \
+ if (auth_debug_gssapi) auth_gssapi_display_status args
+#else
+#define PRINTF(args)
+#define L_PRINTF(l, args)
+#define AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(args)
+#endif
+
+static void auth_gssapi_nextverf();
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_marshall();
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_validate();
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_refresh();
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_wrap();
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_unwrap();
+static void auth_gssapi_destroy();
+
+static bool_t marshall_new_creds();
+
+static struct auth_ops auth_gssapi_ops = {
+ auth_gssapi_nextverf,
+ auth_gssapi_marshall,
+ auth_gssapi_validate,
+ auth_gssapi_refresh,
+ auth_gssapi_destroy,
+ auth_gssapi_wrap,
+ auth_gssapi_unwrap,
+};
+
+/*
+ * the ah_private data structure for an auth_handle
+ */
+struct auth_gssapi_data {
+ bool_t established;
+ CLIENT *clnt;
+ gss_ctx_id_t context;
+ gss_buffer_desc client_handle;
+ rpc_u_int32 seq_num;
+ int def_cred;
+
+ /* pre-serialized ah_cred */
+ unsigned char cred_buf[MAX_AUTH_BYTES];
+ rpc_u_int32 cred_len;
+};
+#define AUTH_PRIVATE(auth) ((struct auth_gssapi_data *)auth->ah_private)
+
+extern struct rpc_createerr rpc_createerr;
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_create_default
+ *
+ * Purpose: Create a GSS-API style authenticator, with default
+ * options, and return the handle.
+ *
+ * Effects: See design document, section XXX.
+ */
+AUTH *auth_gssapi_create_default(CLIENT *clnt, char *service_name)
+{
+ AUTH *auth;
+ OM_uint32 gssstat, minor_stat;
+ gss_buffer_desc input_name;
+ gss_name_t target_name;
+
+ input_name.value = service_name;
+ input_name.length = strlen(service_name) + 1;
+
+ gssstat = gss_import_name(&minor_stat, &input_name,
+ gss_nt_service_name, &target_name);
+ if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("parsing name", gssstat,
+ minor_stat));
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ auth = auth_gssapi_create(clnt,
+ &gssstat,
+ &minor_stat,
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ target_name,
+ GSS_C_NULL_OID,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+
+ gss_release_name(&minor_stat, &target_name);
+ return auth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_create
+ *
+ * Purpose: Create a GSS-API style authenticator, with all the
+ * options, and return the handle.
+ *
+ * Effects: See design document, section XXX.
+ */
+AUTH *auth_gssapi_create(CLIENT *clnt,
+ OM_uint32 *gssstat,
+ OM_uint32 *minor_stat,
+ gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
+ gss_name_t target_name,
+ gss_OID mech_type,
+ int req_flags,
+ OM_uint32 time_req,
+ gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
+ int *ret_flags,
+ OM_uint32 *time_rec)
+{
+ AUTH *auth, *save_auth;
+ struct auth_gssapi_data *pdata;
+ struct gss_channel_bindings_struct bindings, *bindp;
+ struct sockaddr_in laddr, raddr;
+ enum clnt_stat callstat;
+ struct timeval timeout;
+ int init_func;
+
+ auth_gssapi_init_arg call_arg;
+ auth_gssapi_init_res call_res;
+ gss_buffer_desc *input_token, isn_buf;
+
+ memset(&rpc_createerr, 0, sizeof(rpc_createerr));
+
+ /* this timeout is only used if clnt_control(clnt, CLSET_TIMEOUT) */
+ /* has not already been called.. therefore, we can just pick */
+ /* something reasonable-sounding.. */
+ timeout.tv_sec = 30;
+ timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+
+ auth = NULL;
+ pdata = NULL;
+
+ auth = (AUTH *) malloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ pdata = (struct auth_gssapi_data *) malloc(sizeof(*pdata));
+ if (auth == NULL || pdata == NULL) {
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+ rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memset((char *) auth, 0, sizeof(*auth));
+ memset((char *) pdata, 0, sizeof(*pdata));
+
+ auth->ah_ops = &auth_gssapi_ops;
+ auth->ah_private = (caddr_t) pdata;
+
+ /* initial creds are auth_msg TRUE and no handle */
+ marshall_new_creds(auth, TRUE, NULL);
+
+ /* initial verifier is empty */
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_flavor = AUTH_GSSAPI;
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_base = NULL;
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_length = 0;
+
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established = FALSE;
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->clnt = clnt;
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->def_cred = (claimant_cred_handle ==
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
+
+ /* don't assume the caller will want to change clnt->cl_auth */
+ save_auth = clnt->cl_auth;
+ clnt->cl_auth = auth;
+
+ /* start by trying latest version */
+ call_arg.version = 3;
+
+try_new_version:
+ /* set state for initial call to init_sec_context */
+ input_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ init_func = AUTH_GSSAPI_INIT;
+
+ if (call_arg.version == 3) {
+ if (clnt_control(clnt, CLGET_LOCAL_ADDR, &laddr) == FALSE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: CLGET_LOCAL_ADDR failed"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (clnt_control(clnt, CLGET_SERVER_ADDR, &raddr) == FALSE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: CLGET_SERVER_ADDR failed"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memset(&bindings, 0, sizeof(bindings));
+ bindings.application_data.length = 0;
+ bindings.initiator_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET;
+ bindings.initiator_address.length = 4;
+ bindings.initiator_address.value = &laddr.sin_addr.s_addr;
+
+ bindings.acceptor_addrtype = GSS_C_AF_INET;
+ bindings.acceptor_address.length = 4;
+ bindings.acceptor_address.value = &raddr.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ bindp = &bindings;
+ } else {
+ bindp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset((char *) &call_res, 0, sizeof(call_res));
+
+next_token:
+ *gssstat = gss_init_sec_context(minor_stat,
+ claimant_cred_handle,
+ &AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context,
+ target_name,
+ mech_type,
+ req_flags,
+ time_req,
+ bindp,
+ input_token,
+ actual_mech_type,
+ &call_arg.token,
+ ret_flags,
+ time_rec);
+
+ if (*gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && *gssstat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("initializing context", *gssstat,
+ *minor_stat));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* if we got a token, pass it on */
+ if (call_arg.token.length != 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * sanity check: if we received a signed isn in the last
+ * response then there *cannot* be another token to send
+ */
+ if (call_res.signed_isn.length != 0) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: unexpected token from init_sec\n"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: calling GSSAPI_INIT (%d)\n", init_func));
+
+ memset((char *) &call_res, 0, sizeof(call_res));
+ callstat = clnt_call(clnt, init_func,
+ xdr_authgssapi_init_arg, &call_arg,
+ xdr_authgssapi_init_res, &call_res,
+ timeout);
+ gss_release_buffer(minor_stat, &call_arg.token);
+
+ if (callstat != RPC_SUCCESS) {
+ struct rpc_err err;
+
+ clnt_geterr(clnt, &err);
+ if (callstat == RPC_AUTHERROR &&
+ (err.re_why == AUTH_BADCRED || err.re_why == AUTH_FAILED)
+ && call_arg.version >= 1) {
+ L_PRINTF(1, ("call_arg protocol "
+ "version %d rejected, trying %d.\n",
+ call_arg.version, call_arg.version-1));
+ call_arg.version--;
+ goto try_new_version;
+ } else {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: GSSAPI_INIT (%d) failed, stat %d\n",
+ init_func, callstat));
+ }
+
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else if (call_res.version != call_arg.version &&
+ !(call_arg.version == 2 && call_res.version == 1)) {
+ /*
+ * The Secure 1.1 servers always respond with version
+ * 1. Thus, if we just tried a version >=3, fall all
+ * the way back to version 1 since that is all they
+ * understand
+ */
+ if (call_arg.version > 2 && call_res.version == 1) {
+ L_PRINTF(1, ("Talking to Secure 1.1 server, "
+ "using version 1.\n"));
+ call_arg.version = 1;
+ goto try_new_version;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: invalid call_res vers %d\n",
+ call_res.version));
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else if (call_res.gss_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("in response from server",
+ call_res.gss_major,
+ call_res.gss_minor));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: GSSAPI_INIT (%d) succeeded\n", init_func));
+ init_func = AUTH_GSSAPI_CONTINUE_INIT;
+
+ /* check for client_handle */
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle.length == 0) {
+ if (call_res.client_handle.length == 0) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: expected client_handle\n"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: got client_handle %d\n",
+ *((rpc_u_int32 *)call_res.client_handle.value)));
+
+ GSS_DUP_BUFFER(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle,
+ call_res.client_handle);
+
+ /* auth_msg is TRUE; there may be more tokens */
+ marshall_new_creds(auth, TRUE,
+ &AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle);
+ }
+ } else if (!GSS_BUFFERS_EQUAL(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle,
+ call_res.client_handle)) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: got different client_handle\n"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* check for token */
+ if (call_res.token.length==0 && *gssstat==GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: expected token\n"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else if (call_res.token.length != 0) {
+ if (*gssstat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: got unexpected token\n"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ /* assumes call_res is safe until init_sec_context */
+ input_token = &call_res.token;
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: got new token\n"));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check for isn */
+ if (*gssstat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (call_res.signed_isn.length == 0) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_created: expected signed isn\n"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: processing signed isn\n"));
+
+ /* don't check conf (integ only) or qop (accpet default) */
+ *gssstat = gss_unseal(minor_stat,
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context,
+ &call_res.signed_isn,
+ &isn_buf, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (*gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("unsealing isn",
+ *gssstat, *minor_stat));
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else if (isn_buf.length != sizeof(rpc_u_int32)) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: gss_unseal gave %d bytes\n",
+ isn_buf.length));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num = (rpc_u_int32)
+ ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32*)isn_buf.value));
+ *gssstat = gss_release_buffer(minor_stat, &isn_buf);
+ if (*gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("releasing unsealed isn",
+ *gssstat, *minor_stat));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: isn is %d\n",
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num));
+
+ /* we no longer need these results.. */
+ xdr_free(xdr_authgssapi_init_res, &call_res);
+ }
+ } else if (call_res.signed_isn.length != 0) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: got signed isn, can't check yet\n"));
+ }
+
+ /* results were okay.. continue if necessary */
+ if (*gssstat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: not done, continuing\n"));
+ goto next_token;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Done! Context is established, we have client_handle and isn.
+ */
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established = TRUE;
+
+ marshall_new_creds(auth, FALSE,
+ &AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle);
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: done. client_handle %#x, isn %d\n\n",
+ *((rpc_u_int32 *)AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle.value),
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num));
+
+ /* don't assume the caller will want to change clnt->cl_auth */
+ clnt->cl_auth = save_auth;
+
+ return auth;
+
+ /******************************************************************/
+
+cleanup:
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_create: bailing\n\n"));
+
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth))
+ auth_gssapi_destroy(auth);
+ else if (auth)
+ free(auth);
+ auth = NULL;
+
+ /* don't assume the caller will want to change clnt->cl_auth */
+ clnt->cl_auth = save_auth;
+
+ if (rpc_createerr.cf_stat == 0)
+ rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_AUTHERROR;
+
+ return auth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: marshall_new_creds
+ *
+ * Purpose: (pre-)serialize auth_msg and client_handle fields of
+ * auth_gssapi_creds into auth->cred_buf
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ *
+ * auth (r/w) the AUTH structure to modify
+ * auth_msg (r) the auth_msg field to serialize
+ * client_handle (r) the client_handle field to serialize, or
+ * NULL
+ *
+ * Returns: TRUE if successful, FALSE if not
+ *
+ * Requires: auth must point to a valid GSS-API auth structure, auth_msg
+ * must be TRUE or FALSE, client_handle must be a gss_buffer_t with a valid
+ * value and length field or NULL.
+ *
+ * Effects: auth->ah_cred is set to the serialized auth_gssapi_creds
+ * version 2 structure (stored in the cred_buf field of private data)
+ * containing version, auth_msg and client_handle.
+ * auth->ah_cred.oa_flavor is set to AUTH_GSSAPI. If cliend_handle is
+ * NULL, it is treated as if it had a length of 0 and a value of NULL.
+ *
+ * Modifies: auth
+ */
+static bool_t marshall_new_creds(auth, auth_msg, client_handle)
+ AUTH *auth;
+ bool_t auth_msg;
+ gss_buffer_t client_handle;
+{
+ auth_gssapi_creds creds;
+ XDR xdrs;
+
+ PRINTF(("marshall_new_creds: starting\n"));
+
+ creds.version = 2;
+
+ creds.auth_msg = auth_msg;
+ if (client_handle)
+ GSS_COPY_BUFFER(creds.client_handle, *client_handle)
+ else {
+ creds.client_handle.length = 0;
+ creds.client_handle.value = NULL;
+ }
+
+ xdrmem_create(&xdrs, AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->cred_buf,
+ MAX_AUTH_BYTES, XDR_ENCODE);
+ if (! xdr_authgssapi_creds(&xdrs, &creds)) {
+ PRINTF(("marshall_new_creds: failed encoding auth_gssapi_creds\n"));
+ XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->cred_len = xdr_getpos(&xdrs);
+ XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
+
+ PRINTF(("marshall_new_creds: auth_gssapi_creds is %d bytes\n",
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->cred_len));
+
+ auth->ah_cred.oa_flavor = AUTH_GSSAPI;
+ auth->ah_cred.oa_base = (char *) AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->cred_buf;
+ auth->ah_cred.oa_length = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->cred_len;
+
+ PRINTF(("marshall_new_creds: succeeding\n"));
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_nextverf
+ *
+ * Purpose: None.
+ *
+ * Effects: None. Never called.
+ */
+static void auth_gssapi_nextverf(/*auth*/)
+ /*AUTH *auth;*/
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_marhsall
+ *
+ * Purpose: Marshall RPC credentials and verifier onto xdr stream.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ *
+ * auth (r/w) AUTH structure for client
+ * xdrs (r/w) XDR stream to marshall to
+ *
+ * Returns: boolean indicating success/failure
+ *
+ * Effects:
+ *
+ * The pre-serialized credentials in cred_buf are serialized. If the
+ * context is established, the sealed sequence number is serialized as
+ * the verifier. If the context is not established, an empty verifier
+ * is serialized. The sequence number is *not* incremented, because
+ * this function is called multiple times if retransmission is required.
+ *
+ * If this took all the header fields as arguments, it could sign
+ * them.
+ */
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_marshall(auth, xdrs)
+ AUTH *auth;
+ XDR *xdrs;
+{
+ OM_uint32 minor_stat;
+ gss_buffer_desc out_buf;
+ rpc_u_int32 seq_num;
+
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established == TRUE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_marshall: starting\n"));
+
+ seq_num = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num + 1;
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_marshall: sending seq_num %d\n", seq_num));
+
+ if (auth_gssapi_seal_seq(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context, seq_num,
+ &out_buf) == FALSE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_marhshall: seal failed\n"));
+ }
+
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_base = out_buf.value;
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_length = out_buf.length;
+
+ if (! xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &auth->ah_cred) ||
+ ! xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &auth->ah_verf)) {
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &out_buf);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &out_buf);
+ } else {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_marshall: not established, sending null verf\n"));
+
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_base = NULL;
+ auth->ah_verf.oa_length = 0;
+
+ if (! xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &auth->ah_cred) ||
+ ! xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &auth->ah_verf)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_validate
+ *
+ * Purpose: Validate RPC response verifier from server.
+ *
+ * Effects: See design document, section XXX.
+ */
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_validate(auth, verf)
+ AUTH *auth;
+ struct opaque_auth *verf;
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc in_buf;
+ rpc_u_int32 seq_num;
+
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established == FALSE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_validate: not established, noop\n"));
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_validate: starting\n"));
+
+ in_buf.length = verf->oa_length;
+ in_buf.value = verf->oa_base;
+ if (auth_gssapi_unseal_seq(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context, &in_buf,
+ &seq_num) == FALSE) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_validate: failed unsealing verifier\n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* we sent seq_num+1, so we should get back seq_num+2 */
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num+2 != seq_num) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_validate: expecting seq_num %d, got %d (%#x)\n",
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num + 2, seq_num, seq_num));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_validate: seq_num %d okay\n", seq_num));
+
+ /* +1 for successful transmission, +1 for successful validation */
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num += 2;
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_validate: succeeding\n"));
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_refresh
+ *
+ * Purpose: Attempts to resyncrhonize the sequence number.
+ *
+ * Effects:
+ *
+ * When the server receives a properly authenticated RPC call, it
+ * increments the sequence number it is expecting from the client.
+ * But if the server's response is lost for any reason, the client
+ * can't know whether the server ever received it, assumes it didn't,
+ * and does *not* increment its sequence number. Thus, the client's
+ * next call will fail with AUTH_REJECTEDCRED because the server will
+ * think it is a replay attack.
+ *
+ * When an AUTH_REJECTEDCRED error arrives, this function attempts to
+ * resyncrhonize by incrementing the client's sequence number and
+ * returning TRUE. If any other error arrives, it returns FALSE.
+ */
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_refresh(auth, msg)
+ AUTH *auth;
+ struct rpc_msg *msg;
+{
+ if (msg->rm_reply.rp_rjct.rj_stat == AUTH_ERROR &&
+ msg->rm_reply.rp_rjct.rj_why == AUTH_REJECTEDVERF) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_refresh: rejected verifier, incrementing\n"));
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num++;
+ return TRUE;
+ } else {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_refresh: failing\n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_destroy
+ *
+ * Purpose: Destroy a GSS-API authentication structure.
+ *
+ * Effects: This function destroys the GSS-API authentication
+ * context, and sends a message to the server instructing it to
+ * invokte gss_process_token() and thereby destroy its corresponding
+ * context. Since the client doesn't really care whether the server
+ * gets this message, no failures are reported.
+ */
+static void auth_gssapi_destroy(auth)
+ AUTH *auth;
+{
+ struct timeval timeout;
+ OM_uint32 gssstat, minor_stat;
+ gss_cred_id_t cred;
+ int callstat;
+
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle.length == 0) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: no client_handle, not calling destroy\n"));
+ goto skip_call;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: marshalling new creds\n"));
+ if (!marshall_new_creds(auth, TRUE, &AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle)) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: marshall_new_creds failed\n"));
+ goto skip_call;
+ }
+
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: calling GSSAPI_DESTROY\n"));
+ timeout.tv_sec = 1;
+ timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+ callstat = clnt_call(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->clnt, AUTH_GSSAPI_DESTROY,
+ xdr_void, NULL, xdr_void, NULL, timeout);
+ if (callstat != RPC_SUCCESS)
+ clnt_sperror(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->clnt,
+ "gssapi_destroy: GSSAPI_DESTROY failed");
+
+skip_call:
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: deleting context\n"));
+ gssstat = gss_delete_sec_context(&minor_stat,
+ &AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context,
+ NULL);
+ if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("deleting context", gssstat,
+ minor_stat));
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->def_cred) {
+ cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ gssstat = gss_release_cred(&minor_stat, &cred);
+ if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("deleting default credential",
+ gssstat, minor_stat));
+ }
+
+ if (AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle.length != 0)
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat,
+ &AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->client_handle);
+
+#if 0
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: calling GSSAPI_EXIT\n"));
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established = FALSE;
+ callstat = clnt_call(AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->clnt, AUTH_GSSAPI_EXIT,
+ xdr_void, NULL, xdr_void, NULL, timeout);
+#endif
+
+ free(auth->ah_private);
+ free(auth);
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_destroy: done\n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_wrap
+ *
+ * Purpose: encrypt the serialized arguments from xdr_func applied to
+ * xdr_ptr and write the result to xdrs.
+ *
+ * Effects: See design doc, section XXX.
+ */
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_wrap(auth, out_xdrs, xdr_func, xdr_ptr)
+ AUTH *auth;
+ XDR *out_xdrs;
+ bool_t (*xdr_func)();
+ caddr_t xdr_ptr;
+{
+ OM_uint32 gssstat, minor_stat;
+
+ if (! AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_wrap: context not established, noop\n"));
+ return (*xdr_func)(out_xdrs, xdr_ptr);
+ } else if (! auth_gssapi_wrap_data(&gssstat, &minor_stat,
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context,
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num+1,
+ out_xdrs, xdr_func, xdr_ptr)) {
+ if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("encrypting function arguments",
+ gssstat, minor_stat));
+ return FALSE;
+ } else
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function: auth_gssapi_unwrap
+ *
+ * Purpose: read encrypted arguments from xdrs, decrypt, and
+ * deserialize with xdr_func into xdr_ptr.
+ *
+ * Effects: See design doc, section XXX.
+ */
+static bool_t auth_gssapi_unwrap(auth, in_xdrs, xdr_func, xdr_ptr)
+ AUTH *auth;
+ XDR *in_xdrs;
+ bool_t (*xdr_func)();
+ caddr_t xdr_ptr;
+{
+ OM_uint32 gssstat, minor_stat;
+
+ if (! AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->established) {
+ PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap: context not established, noop\n"));
+ return (*xdr_func)(in_xdrs, xdr_ptr);
+ } else if (! auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(&gssstat, &minor_stat,
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->context,
+ AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)->seq_num,
+ in_xdrs, xdr_func, xdr_ptr)) {
+ if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ AUTH_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_STATUS(("decrypting function arguments",
+ gssstat, minor_stat));
+ return FALSE;
+ } else
+ return TRUE;
+}