this commit includes all the changes on the OV_9510_INTEGRATION and

OV_MERGE branches.  This includes, but is not limited to, the new openvision
admin system, and major changes to gssapi to add functionality, and bring
the implementation in line with rfc1964.  before committing, the
code was built and tested for netbsd and solaris.

git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@8774 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970

1 files changed, 571 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c b/src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..81e43f128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
+/*
+ * kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c
+ *
+ * Copyright 1988 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ *
+ * For copying and distribution information, please see the file
+ * <mit-copyright.h>.
+ *
+ * Kerberos administration server-side subroutines
+ */
+
+
+#include <mit-copyright.h>
+
+#include "k5-int.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+#else
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OVSEC_KADM
+#include <com_err.h>
+#include <kadm5/admin.h>
+#include <kadm5/chpass_util_strings.h>
+#include <krb5/kdb.h>
+extern void *ovsec_handle;
+#endif
+
+#include <kadm.h>
+#include <kadm_err.h>
+
+extern krb5_context kadm_context;
+int fascist_cpw = 0;		/* Be fascist about insecure passwords? */
+
+#ifdef OVSEC_KADM
+char pw_required[] = "The version of kpasswd that you are using is not compatible with the\nOpenV*Secure V4 Administration Server.  Please contact your security\nadministrator.\n\n";
+
+#else /* !OVSEC_KADM */
+ 
+char bad_pw_err[] =
+	"\007\007\007ERROR: Insecure password not accepted.  Please choose another.\n\n";
+
+char bad_pw_warn[] =
+	"\007\007\007WARNING: You have chosen an insecure password.  You may wish to\nchoose a better password.\n\n";
+
+char check_pw_msg[] =
+	"You have entered an insecure password.  You should choose another.\n\n";
+
+char pw_blurb[] =
+"A good password is something which is easy for you to remember, but that\npeople who know you won't easily guess; so don't use your name, or your\ndog's name, or a word from the dictionary.  Passwords should be at least\n6 characters long, and may contain UPPER- and lower-case letters,\nnumbers, or punctuation.  A good password can be:\n\n   -- some initials, like \"GykoR-66\" for \"Get your kicks on Rte 66.\"\n   -- an easily pronounced nonsense word, like \"slaRooBey\" or \"krang-its\"\n   -- a mis-spelled phrase, like \"2HotPeetzas\" or \"ItzAGurl\"\n\nPlease Note: It is important that you do not tell ANYONE your password,\nincluding your friends, or even people from Athena or Information\nSystems.  Remember, *YOU* are assumed to be responsible for anything\ndone using your password.\n";
+
+#endif /* OVSEC_KADM */
+
+/* from V4 month_sname.c --  was not part of API */
+/*
+ * Given an integer 1-12, month_sname() returns a string
+ * containing the first three letters of the corresponding
+ * month.  Returns 0 if the argument is out of range.
+ */
+
+static char *month_sname(n)
+    int n;
+{
+    static char *name[] = {
+        "Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May","Jun",
+        "Jul","Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec"
+    };
+    return((n < 1 || n > 12) ? 0 : name [n-1]);
+}
+
+/* from V4 log.c --  was not part of API */
+
+/*
+ * krb_log() is used to add entries to the logfile (see krb_set_logfile()
+ * below).  Note that it is probably not portable since it makes
+ * assumptions about what the compiler will do when it is called
+ * with less than the correct number of arguments which is the
+ * way it is usually called.
+ *
+ * The log entry consists of a timestamp and the given arguments
+ * printed according to the given "format".
+ *
+ * The log file is opened and closed for each log entry.
+ *
+ * The return value is undefined.
+ */
+
+/* static char *log_name = KRBLOG; */
+/* KRBLOG is in the V4 klog.h but may not correspond to anything installed. */
+static char *log_name = KADM_SYSLOG; 
+
+static void krb_log(format,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a0)
+    char *format;
+    char *a1,*a2,*a3,*a4,*a5,*a6,*a7,*a8,*a9,*a0;
+{
+    FILE *logfile;
+    time_t now;
+    struct tm *tm;
+
+    if ((logfile = fopen(log_name,"a")) == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    (void) time(&now);
+    tm = localtime(&now);
+
+    fprintf(logfile,"%2d-%s-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d ",tm->tm_mday,
+            month_sname(tm->tm_mon + 1),tm->tm_year,
+            tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec);
+    fprintf(logfile,format,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a0);
+    fprintf(logfile,"\n");
+    (void) fclose(logfile);
+    return;
+}
+
+
+/* 
+kadm_ser_cpw - the server side of the change_password routine
+  recieves    : KTEXT, {key}
+  returns     : CKSUM, RETCODE
+  acl         : caller can change only own password
+
+Replaces the password (i.e. des key) of the caller with that specified in key.
+Returns no actual data from the master server, since this is called by a user
+*/
+kadm_ser_cpw(dat, len, ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+    krb5_int32 keylow, keyhigh;
+    char pword[MAX_KPW_LEN];
+    int no_pword = 0;
+    des_cblock newkey;
+    int status, stvlen = 0;
+    int	retval;
+    extern int kadm_approve_pw();
+#ifdef OVSEC_KADM
+    ovsec_kadm_principal_ent_t princ_ent;
+    ovsec_kadm_policy_ent_t pol_ent;
+    krb5_principal user_princ;
+    char msg_ret[1024], *time_string, *ptr;
+    const char *msg_ptr;
+    krb5_int32 now;
+    time_t until;
+#endif
+
+    /* take key off the stream, and change the database */
+
+    if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keyhigh, 0, len)) < 0)
+	return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR);
+    stvlen += status;
+    if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keylow, stvlen, len)) < 0)
+	return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR);
+    stvlen += status;
+    if ((stvlen = stv_string(dat, pword, stvlen, sizeof(pword), len)) < 0) {
+	no_pword++;
+	pword[0]='\0';
+    }
+    stvlen += status;
+
+    keylow = ntohl(keylow);
+    keyhigh = ntohl(keyhigh);
+    memcpy((char *)(((krb5_int32 *)newkey) + 1), (char *)&keyhigh, 4);
+    memcpy((char *)newkey, (char *)&keylow, 4);
+
+#ifdef OVSEC_KADM
+    /* we don't use the client-provided key itself */
+    keylow = keyhigh = 0;
+    memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey));
+
+    if (no_pword) {
+	 krb_log("Old-style change password request from '%s.%s@%s'!",
+		 ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+	 *outlen = strlen(pw_required)+1;
+	 if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) {
+	      strcpy(*datout, pw_required);
+	 } else {
+	      *outlen = 0;
+	 }
+	 return KADM_INSECURE_PW;
+    }
+		     
+    if (krb5_build_principal(kadm_context, &user_princ,
+			     strlen(ad->prealm),
+			     ad->prealm,
+			     ad->pname,
+			     *ad->pinst ? ad->pinst : 0, 0))
+	 /* this should never happen */
+	 return KADM_NOENTRY;
+
+    *outlen = 0;
+
+    if (retval = krb5_timeofday(kadm_context, &now)) {
+	 msg_ptr = error_message(retval);
+	 goto send_response;
+    }
+
+    retval = ovsec_kadm_get_principal(ovsec_handle, user_princ,
+				      &princ_ent);
+    if (retval != 0) {
+	 msg_ptr = error_message(retval);
+	 goto send_response;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * This daemon necessarily has the modify privilege, so
+     * ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal will allow it to violate the
+     * policy's minimum lifetime.  Since that's A Bad Thing, we need
+     * to enforce it ourselves.  Unfortunately, this means we are
+     * duplicating code from both ovsec_adm_server and
+     * ovsec_kadm_chpass_util().
+     */
+    if (princ_ent->aux_attributes & OVSEC_KADM_POLICY) {
+	 retval = ovsec_kadm_get_policy(ovsec_handle,
+					princ_ent->policy,
+					&pol_ent);
+	 if (retval != 0) {
+	      (void) ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent(ovsec_handle, princ_ent);
+	      msg_ptr = error_message(retval);
+	      goto send_response;
+	 }
+
+	 /* make "now" a boolean, true == too soon */
+	 now = ((now - princ_ent->last_pwd_change) < pol_ent->pw_min_life);
+
+	 (void) ovsec_kadm_free_policy_ent(ovsec_handle, pol_ent);
+	 
+	 if(now && !(princ_ent->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) {
+	      (void) ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent(ovsec_handle, princ_ent);
+	      retval = CHPASS_UTIL_PASSWORD_TOO_SOON;
+
+	      until = princ_ent->last_pwd_change + pol_ent->pw_min_life;
+	      time_string = ctime(&until);
+				  
+	      if (*(ptr = &time_string[strlen(time_string)-1]) == '\n')
+		   *ptr = '\0';
+	      
+	      sprintf(msg_ret, error_message(CHPASS_UTIL_PASSWORD_TOO_SOON), 
+		      time_string);
+	      msg_ptr = msg_ret;
+	      
+	      goto send_response;
+	 }
+    }
+
+    (void) ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent(ovsec_handle, princ_ent);
+
+    retval = ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal_util(ovsec_handle, user_princ,
+					      pword, NULL, msg_ret);
+    msg_ptr = msg_ret;
+    (void) krb5_free_principal(kadm_context, user_princ);
+
+send_response:
+
+    retval = convert_ovsec_to_kadm(retval);
+
+    if (retval) {
+	 /* don't send message on success because kpasswd.v4 will */
+	 /* print "password changed" too */
+	 *outlen = strlen(msg_ptr)+2;
+	 if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) {
+	      strcpy(*datout, msg_ptr);
+	      strcat(*datout, "\n");
+	 } else
+	      *outlen = 0;
+    }
+    if (retval == KADM_INSECURE_PW) {
+	 krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' tried to use an insecure password in changepw",
+		 ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+    }
+#else /* OVSEC_KADM */
+    if (retval = kadm_approve_pw(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm,
+			newkey, no_pword ? 0 : pword)) {
+	    if (retval == KADM_PW_MISMATCH) {
+		    /*
+		     * Very strange!!!  This means that the cleartext
+		     * password which was sent and the DES cblock
+		     * didn't match!
+		     */
+		    (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' sent a password string which didn't match with the DES key?!?",
+				   ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+		    return(retval);
+	    }
+	    if (fascist_cpw) {
+		    *outlen = strlen(bad_pw_err)+strlen(pw_blurb)+1;
+		    if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) {
+			    strcpy((char *) *datout, bad_pw_err);
+			    strcat((char *) *datout, pw_blurb);
+		    } else
+			    *outlen = 0;
+		    (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' tried to use an insecure password in changepw",
+				   ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+#ifdef notdef
+		    /* For debugging only, probably a bad idea */
+		    if (!no_pword)
+			    (void) krb_log("The password was %s\n", pword);
+#endif
+		    return(retval);
+	    } else {
+		    *outlen = strlen(bad_pw_warn) + strlen(pw_blurb)+1;
+		    if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) {
+			    strcpy((char *) *datout, bad_pw_warn);
+			    strcat((char *) *datout, pw_blurb);
+		    } else
+			    *outlen = 0;
+		    (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' used an insecure password in changepw",
+				   ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+	    }
+    } else {
+	    *datout = 0;
+	    *outlen = 0;
+    }
+
+    retval = kadm_change(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, newkey);
+    keylow = keyhigh = 0;
+    memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey));
+#endif /* OVSEC_KADM */
+    
+    return retval;
+}
+
+#ifndef OVSEC_KADM
+/*
+kadm_ser_add - the server side of the add_entry routine
+  recieves    : KTEXT, {values}
+  returns     : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values}
+  acl         : su, sms (as alloc)
+
+Adds and entry containing values to the database
+returns the values of the entry, so if you leave certain fields blank you will
+   be able to determine the default values they are set to
+*/
+int
+kadm_ser_add(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+  Kadm_vals values, retvals;
+  int status;
+
+  if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0)
+      return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR);
+  if ((status = kadm_add_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm,
+			      &values, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) {
+      *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout);
+      retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0;
+      return KADM_SUCCESS;
+  } else {
+      *outlen = 0;
+      return status;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+kadm_ser_del - the server side of the del_entry routine
+  recieves    : KTEXT, {values}
+  returns     : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values}
+  acl         : su, sms (as alloc)
+
+Deletes an entry containing values to the database
+returns the values of the entry, so if you leave certain fields blank you will
+   be able to determine the default values they are set to
+*/
+kadm_ser_del(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+  Kadm_vals values, retvals;
+  int status;
+
+  if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0)
+      return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR);
+  if ((status = kadm_del_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm,
+			      &values, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) {
+      *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout);
+      retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0;
+      return KADM_SUCCESS;
+  } else {
+      *outlen = 0;
+      return status;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+kadm_ser_mod - the server side of the mod_entry routine
+  recieves    : KTEXT, {values, values}
+  returns     : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values}
+  acl         : su, sms (as register or dealloc)
+
+Modifies all entries corresponding to the first values so they match the
+   second values.
+returns the values for the changed entries
+*/
+kadm_ser_mod(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+  Kadm_vals vals1, vals2, retvals;
+  int wh;
+  int status;
+
+  if ((wh = stream_to_vals(dat, &vals1, len)) < 0)
+      return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR;
+  if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat+wh,&vals2, len-wh)) < 0)
+      return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR;
+  if ((status = kadm_mod_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, &vals1,
+			       &vals2, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) {
+      *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout);
+      retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0;
+      return KADM_SUCCESS;
+  } else {
+      *outlen = 0;
+      return status;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+kadm_ser_get
+  recieves   : KTEXT, {values, flags}
+  returns    : CKSUM, RETCODE, {count, values, values, values}
+  acl        : su
+
+gets the fields requested by flags from all entries matching values
+returns this data for each matching recipient, after a count of how many such
+  matches there were
+*/
+kadm_ser_get(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+  Kadm_vals values, retvals;
+  u_char fl[FLDSZ];
+  int loop,wh;
+  int status;
+
+  if ((wh = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0)
+      return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR;
+  if (wh + FLDSZ > len)
+      return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR;
+  for (loop=FLDSZ-1; loop>=0; loop--)
+    fl[loop] = dat[wh++];
+  if ((status = kadm_get_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm,
+			      &values, fl, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) {
+      *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout);
+      retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0;
+      return KADM_SUCCESS;
+  } else {
+      *outlen = 0;
+      return status;
+  }
+}
+
+/* 
+kadm_ser_ckpw - the server side of the check_password routine
+  recieves    : KTEXT, {key}
+  returns     : CKSUM, RETCODE
+  acl         : none
+
+Checks to see if the des key passed from the caller is a "secure" password.
+*/
+kadm_ser_ckpw(dat, len, ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+    krb5_ui_4 keylow, keyhigh;
+    char pword[MAX_KPW_LEN];
+    int no_pword = 0;
+    des_cblock newkey;
+    int stvlen = 0,status;
+    int	retval;
+    extern int kadm_approve_pw();
+
+    /* take key off the stream, and check it */
+
+    if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keyhigh, 0, len)) < 0)
+	return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR);
+    stvlen += status;
+    if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keylow, stvlen, len)) < 0)
+	return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR);
+    stvlen += status;
+    if ((status = stv_string(dat, pword, stvlen, sizeof(pword), len)) < 0) {
+	no_pword++;
+	pword[0]='\0';
+    }
+    stvlen += status;
+
+    keylow = ntohl(keylow);
+    keyhigh = ntohl(keyhigh);
+    memcpy((char *)(((krb5_int32 *)newkey) + 1), (char *)&keyhigh, 4);
+    memcpy((char *)newkey, (char *)&keylow, 4);
+    keylow = keyhigh = 0;
+    retval = kadm_approve_pw(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, newkey,
+			no_pword ? 0 : pword);
+    memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey));
+    if (retval) {
+	    *outlen = strlen(check_pw_msg)+strlen(pw_blurb)+1;
+	    if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) {
+		    strcpy((char *) *datout, check_pw_msg);
+		    strcat((char *) *datout, pw_blurb);
+	    } else
+		    *outlen = 0;
+	    (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' sent an insecure password to be checked",
+			   ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+	    return(retval);
+    } else {
+	    *datout = 0;
+	    *outlen = 0;
+	    (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' sent a secure password to be checked",
+			   ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm);
+    }
+    return(0);
+}
+
+/*
+kadm_ser_stab - the server side of the change_srvtab routine
+  recieves    : KTEXT, {values}
+  returns     : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values}
+  acl         : su, sms (as register or dealloc)
+
+Creates or modifies the specified service principal to have a random
+key, which is sent back to the client.  The key version is returned in
+the max_life field of the values structure.  It's a hack, but it's a
+backwards compatible hack....
+*/
+kadm_ser_stab(dat, len, ad, datout, outlen)
+u_char *dat;
+int len;
+AUTH_DAT *ad;
+u_char **datout;
+int *outlen;
+{
+  Kadm_vals values;
+  int status;
+
+  if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0)
+	  return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR;
+  status = kadm_chg_srvtab(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, &values);
+  if (status == KADM_DATA) {
+      *outlen = vals_to_stream(&values,datout);
+      values.key_low = values.key_high = 0;
+      return KADM_SUCCESS;
+  } else {
+      *outlen = 0;
+      return status;
+  }
+}
+#endif /* !OVSEC_KADM */