first public release of samba4 code

(This used to be commit b0510b5428b3461aeb9bbe3cc95f62fc73e2b97f)

1 files changed, 784 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source4/auth/pass_check.c b/source4/auth/pass_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..88b82e34746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/auth/pass_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,784 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Password checking
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+   
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* this module is for checking a username/password against a system
+   password database. The SMB encrypted password support is elsewhere */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
+static fstring this_user;
+#if !defined(WITH_PAM) 
+static fstring this_salt;
+static fstring this_crypted;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+
+#include <afs/stds.h>
+#include <afs/kautils.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************
+check on AFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL afs_auth(char *user, char *password)
+{
+	long password_expires = 0;
+	char *reason;
+
+	/* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
+	/* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-)               */
+	setpag();
+	if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral
+	    (KA_USERAUTH_VERSION + KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG, user, (char *)0,	/* instance */
+	     (char *)0,		/* cell */
+	     password, 0,	/* lifetime, default */
+	     &password_expires,	/*days 'til it expires */
+	     0,			/* spare 2 */
+	     &reason) == 0)
+	{
+		return (True);
+	}
+	DEBUG(1,
+	      ("AFS authentication for \"%s\" failed (%s)\n", user, reason));
+	return (False);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+
+#include <dce/dce_error.h>
+#include <dce/sec_login.h>
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
+ <muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
+ old code :
+
+  - Server credentials may expire
+  - Client credential cache files have wrong owner
+  - purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
+
+ This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
+ still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
+******************************************************************/
+
+sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
+int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
+
+/*******************************************************************
+check on a DCE/DFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL dfs_auth(char *user, char *password)
+{
+	error_status_t err;
+	int err2;
+	int prterr;
+	signed32 expire_time, current_time;
+	boolean32 password_reset;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
+	sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
+	unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+	gid_t egid;
+
+	if (dcelogin_atmost_once)
+		return (False);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
+	/*
+	 * We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
+	 * matches that stored in the local password file.. 
+	 * Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
+	 */
+
+	if (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, this_salt), this_crypted))
+	{
+		return (False);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	time(&current_time);
+
+	if (expire_time < (current_time + 60))
+	{
+		struct passwd *pw;
+		sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
+
+		sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+				    (sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok)
+		{
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+			return (False);
+		}
+
+		sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok)
+		{
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n",
+				  dce_errstr));
+
+			return (False);
+		}
+
+		sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
+				     (unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
+				     sec_c_key_version_none,
+				     (void **)&key, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok)
+		{
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n",
+				  pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+
+			return (False);
+		}
+
+		sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
+					       &password_reset, &auth_src,
+					       &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok)
+		{
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0,
+			      ("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n",
+			       pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+		}
+
+		sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
+		if (err != error_status_ok)
+		{
+			dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+			DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)user,
+				     sec_login_no_flags,
+				     &my_dce_sec_context, &err) == 0)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+			  user, dce_errstr));
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+			    (sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+		return (False);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. I'd like to change these to call something like change_to_user()
+	 * instead but currently we don't have a connection
+	 * context to become the correct user. This is already
+	 * fairly platform specific code however, so I think
+	 * this should be ok. I have added code to go
+	 * back to being root on error though. JRA.
+	 */
+
+	egid = getegid();
+
+	set_effective_gid(pw->pw_gid);
+	set_effective_uid(pw->pw_uid);
+
+	if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)user,
+				     sec_login_no_flags,
+				     &my_dce_sec_context, &err) == 0)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+			  user, dce_errstr));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+			    (sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
+	passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
+	passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
+	passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *) password;
+
+	sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
+				    &passwd_rec, &password_reset,
+				    &auth_src, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,
+		      ("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
+		       user, dce_errstr));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network)
+	{
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
+	}
+
+	sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,
+		      ("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
+		       user, dce_errstr));
+
+		sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+			    (sec_login_passwd_t *) & pw, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(0, ("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
+		  user, sys_getpid()));
+
+	DEBUG(3, ("DCE principal: %s\n"
+		  "          uid: %d\n"
+		  "          gid: %d\n",
+		  pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
+	DEBUG(3, ("         info: %s\n"
+		  "          dir: %s\n"
+		  "        shell: %s\n",
+		  pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
+
+	sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0, ("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	set_effective_uid(0);
+	set_effective_gid(0);
+
+	DEBUG(0,
+	      ("DCE context expires: %s", asctime(localtime(&expire_time))));
+
+	dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
+	return (True);
+
+      err:
+
+	/* Go back to root, JRA. */
+	set_effective_uid(0);
+	set_effective_gid(egid);
+	return (False);
+}
+
+void dfs_unlogin(void)
+{
+	error_status_t err;
+	int err2;
+	unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+	sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+	if (err != error_status_ok)
+	{
+		dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+		DEBUG(0,
+		      ("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
+		       sys_getpid(), dce_errstr));
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
+****************************************************************************/
+static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password, char *salt1, char *crypted)
+{
+#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
+	char salt[3];
+	int i;
+
+	StrnCpy(salt, salt1, 2);
+	crypted += 2;
+
+	for (i = strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
+		char *p = crypt(password, salt) + 2;
+		if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
+			return (0);
+		password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
+		crypted += strlen(p);
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for OSF1
+****************************************************************************/
+static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password, char *salt1)
+{
+	static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
+	char *p1;
+	char *p2 = password;
+	char salt[3];
+	int i;
+	int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+	if (strlen(password) % AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS)
+		parts++;
+
+	StrnCpy(salt, salt1, 2);
+	StrnCpy(result, salt1, 2);
+	result[2] = '\0';
+
+	for (i = 0; i < parts; i++) {
+		p1 = crypt(p2, salt);
+		strncat(result, p1 + 2,
+			AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH - strlen(p1 + 2) - 1);
+		StrnCpy(salt, &result[2 + i * AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS], 2);
+		p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+	}
+
+	return (result);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS string_combinations2(char *s, int offset, NTSTATUS (*fn) (const char *),
+				 int N)
+{
+	int len = strlen(s);
+	int i;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+#ifdef PASSWORD_LENGTH
+	len = MIN(len, PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+#endif
+
+	if (N <= 0 || offset >= len)
+		return (fn(s));
+
+	for (i = offset; i < (len - (N - 1)); i++) {
+		char c = s[i];
+		if (!islower(c))
+			continue;
+		s[i] = toupper(c);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status = string_combinations2(s, i + 1, fn, N - 1),NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
+			return (nt_status);
+		}
+		s[i] = c;
+	}
+	return (NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with up to N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS string_combinations(char *s, NTSTATUS (*fn) (const char *), int N)
+{
+	int n;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	for (n = 1; n <= N; n++)
+		if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status = string_combinations2(s, 0, fn, n), NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD))
+			return nt_status;
+	return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of password checking routine
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS password_check(const char *password)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+	return smb_pam_passcheck(this_user, password);
+#else
+
+	BOOL ret;
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+	if (afs_auth(this_user, password))
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+#endif /* WITH_AFS */
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+	if (dfs_auth(this_user, password))
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+#endif /* WITH_DFS */
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+	
+	ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password, this_salt),
+		      this_crypted) == 0);
+	if (!ret) {
+		DEBUG(2,
+		      ("OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
+		ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, this_salt), this_crypted) == 0);
+	}
+	if (ret) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+	
+#endif /* OSF1_ENH_SEC */
+	
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+	ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, this_salt), this_crypted) == 0);
+	if (ret) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+        } else {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+	
+#endif /* ULTRIX_AUTH */
+	
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+	ret = (linux_bigcrypt(password, this_salt, this_crypted));
+        if (ret) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+#endif /* LINUX_BIGCRYPT */
+	
+#if defined(HAVE_BIGCRYPT) && defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(USE_BOTH_CRYPT_CALLS)
+	
+	/*
+	 * Some systems have bigcrypt in the C library but might not
+	 * actually use it for the password hashes (HPUX 10.20) is
+	 * a noteable example. So we try bigcrypt first, followed
+	 * by crypt.
+	 */
+
+	if (strcmp(bigcrypt(password, this_salt), this_crypted) == 0)
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	else
+		ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, this_salt), this_crypted) == 0);
+	if (ret) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+#else /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT && HAVE_CRYPT && USE_BOTH_CRYPT_CALLS */
+	
+#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+	ret = (strcmp(bigcrypt(password, this_salt), this_crypted) == 0);
+        if (ret) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+#endif /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT */
+	
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
+	DEBUG(1, ("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
+	return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+#else /* HAVE_CRYPT */
+	ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password, this_salt), this_crypted) == 0);
+        if (ret) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+#endif /* HAVE_CRYPT */
+#endif /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT && HAVE_CRYPT && USE_BOTH_CRYPT_CALLS */
+#endif /* WITH_PAM */
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+CHECK if a username/password is OK
+the function pointer fn() points to a function to call when a successful
+match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file 
+return NT_STATUS_OK on correct match, appropriate error otherwise
+****************************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS pass_check(const struct passwd *pass, const char *user, const char *password, 
+		    int pwlen, BOOL (*fn) (const char *, const char *), BOOL run_cracker)
+{
+	pstring pass2;
+	int level = lp_passwordlevel();
+
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+	DEBUG(100, ("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n", user, password));
+#endif
+
+	if (!password)
+		return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+
+	if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords())
+		return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+
+#if defined(WITH_PAM) 
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're using PAM we want to short-circuit all the 
+	 * checks below and dive straight into the PAM code.
+	 */
+
+	fstrcpy(this_user, user);
+
+	DEBUG(4, ("pass_check: Checking (PAM) password for user %s (l=%d)\n", user, pwlen));
+
+#else /* Not using PAM */
+
+	DEBUG(4, ("pass_check: Checking password for user %s (l=%d)\n", user, pwlen));
+
+	if (!pass) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Couldn't find user %s\n", user));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+	}
+
+
+	/* Copy into global for the convenience of looping code */
+	/* Also the place to keep the 'password' no matter what
+	   crazy struct it started in... */
+	fstrcpy(this_crypted, pass->pw_passwd);
+	fstrcpy(this_salt, pass->pw_passwd);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+	{
+		struct spwd *spass;
+
+		/* many shadow systems require you to be root to get
+		   the password, in most cases this should already be
+		   the case when this function is called, except
+		   perhaps for IPC password changing requests */
+
+		spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
+		if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp) {
+			fstrcpy(this_crypted, spass->sp_pwdp);
+			fstrcpy(this_salt, spass->sp_pwdp);
+		}
+	}
+#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
+	{
+		/* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions
+		   instead of get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by
+		   UnixWare 2.x, tested on version
+		   2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
+		uinfo_t uinfo;
+		if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1)
+			ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
+	{
+		struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
+		if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt)
+			fstrcpy(this_crypted, pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPWANAM
+	{
+		struct passwd_adjunct *pwret;
+		pwret = getpwanam(s);
+		if (pwret && pwret->pwa_passwd)
+			fstrcpy(this_crypted, pwret->pwa_passwd);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+	{
+		struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+		DEBUG(5, ("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",
+			  user));
+		mypasswd = getprpwnam(user);
+		if (mypasswd) {
+			fstrcpy(this_user, mypasswd->ufld.fd_name);
+			fstrcpy(this_crypted, mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt);
+		} else {
+			DEBUG(5,
+			      ("OSF1_ENH_SEC: No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",
+			       user));
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+	{
+		AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid(pass->pw_uid);
+		if (ap) {
+			fstrcpy(this_crypted, ap->a_password);
+			endauthent();
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_TRUNCATED_SALT)
+	/* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
+	   won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
+	this_salt[2] = 0;
+#endif
+
+	if (!*this_crypted) {
+		if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("Disallowing %s with null password\n",
+				  this_user));
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+		if (!*password) {
+			DEBUG(3,
+			      ("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",
+			       this_user));
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	}
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_PAM) */
+
+	/* try it as it came to us */
+	nt_status = password_check(password);
+        if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) {
+                if (fn) {
+                        fn(user, password);
+		}
+		return (nt_status);
+	} else if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
+                /* No point continuing if its not the password thats to blame (ie PAM disabled). */
+                return (nt_status);
+        }
+
+	if (!run_cracker) {
+		return (nt_status);
+	}
+
+	/* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
+	 * need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
+	 * client */
+	if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	/* make a copy of it */
+	pstrcpy(pass2, password);
+
+	/* try all lowercase if it's currently all uppercase */
+	if (strhasupper(pass2)) {
+		strlower(pass2);
+		if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = password_check(pass2)) {
+		        if (fn)
+				fn(user, pass2);
+			return (nt_status);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* give up? */
+	if (level < 1) {
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/* last chance - all combinations of up to level chars upper! */
+	strlower(pass2);
+
+ 
+        if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = string_combinations(pass2, password_check, level))) {
+                if (fn)
+			fn(user, pass2);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+        
+	return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}