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authorMarkus Roberts <Markus@reality.com>2010-01-03 19:04:29 -0800
committerJames Turnbull <james@lovedthanlost.net>2010-01-05 17:11:33 +1100
commit6111ba80f2c6f6d1541af971f565119e6e03d77d (patch)
treef5d4cc4bed29258ef0ce99822a7cfc184b5252db /lib
parente7d98ccbc0021bace65dd8525e730462947e5049 (diff)
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Fix for temporary file security whole
We create temporary files in /tmp/ with predictable names. These could be used by an attacker to DoS a box by setting a symlink to some other file (say, /etc/shadow) and waiting for us to overwrite it. The minimalistic solution employed by this patch is to wrap all such file writing with a paranoid wrapper that: 1) Check to see if the target exists 2) Issues a warning if it was a symlink 3) Deletes it 4) Waits (0.1 seconds if it was a file, 5 seconds if it was a symlink) 5) Opens the file with EXCL, which will fail if the file has come back. If this succeeds (as it normally will) it has exactly the same semantics as the original code (a must, as we are right at a release boundary). However, under no circumstances will it follow a preexisting symlink (the operating system guarantees this with EXCL) so the danger of an exploit has been converted into the possibility of a failure, with an appropriate warning.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rwxr-xr-xlib/puppet/daemon.rb4
-rw-r--r--lib/puppet/network/server.rb2
-rw-r--r--lib/puppet/rails/benchmark.rb2
-rw-r--r--lib/puppet/util.rb22
-rw-r--r--lib/puppet/util/reference.rb9
5 files changed, 32 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/lib/puppet/daemon.rb b/lib/puppet/daemon.rb
index 16b1f80d2..0f538fe44 100755
--- a/lib/puppet/daemon.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/daemon.rb
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ class Puppet::Daemon
$stderr.reopen $stdout
Puppet::Util::Log.reopen
rescue => detail
- File.open("/tmp/daemonout", "w") { |f|
+ Puppet.err "Could not start %s: %s" % [Puppet[:name], detail]
+ Puppet::Util::secure_open("/tmp/daemonout", "w") { |f|
f.puts "Could not start %s: %s" % [Puppet[:name], detail]
}
- Puppet.err "Could not start %s: %s" % [Puppet[:name], detail]
exit(12)
end
end
diff --git a/lib/puppet/network/server.rb b/lib/puppet/network/server.rb
index f21254be9..01a55df36 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/network/server.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/network/server.rb
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ class Puppet::Network::Server
$stderr.reopen $stdout
Puppet::Util::Log.reopen
rescue => detail
- File.open("/tmp/daemonout", "w") { |f|
+ Puppet::Util.secure_open("/tmp/daemonout", "w") { |f|
f.puts "Could not start %s: %s" % [Puppet[:name], detail]
}
raise "Could not start %s: %s" % [Puppet[:name], detail]
diff --git a/lib/puppet/rails/benchmark.rb b/lib/puppet/rails/benchmark.rb
index c33b2fb1e..1fbd011e9 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/rails/benchmark.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/rails/benchmark.rb
@@ -64,6 +64,6 @@ module Puppet::Rails::Benchmark
data = {}
end
data[branch] = $benchmarks
- File.open(file, "w") { |f| f.print YAML.dump(data) }
+ Puppet::Util.secure_open(file, "w") { |f| f.print YAML.dump(data) }
end
end
diff --git a/lib/puppet/util.rb b/lib/puppet/util.rb
index 3752a6dac..e2df5c339 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/util.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/util.rb
@@ -407,6 +407,28 @@ module Util
end
module_function :memory, :thinmark
+
+ def secure_open(file,must_be_w,&block)
+ raise Puppet::DevError,"secure_open only works with mode 'w'" unless must_be_w == 'w'
+ raise Puppet::DevError,"secure_open only requires a block" unless block_given?
+ Puppet.warning "#{file} was a symlink to #{File.readlink(file)}" if File.symlink?(file)
+ if File.exists?(file) or File.symlink?(file)
+ wait = File.symlink?(file) ? 5.0 : 0.1
+ File.delete(file)
+ sleep wait # give it a chance to reappear, just in case someone is actively trying something.
+ end
+ begin
+ File.open(file,File::CREAT|File::EXCL|File::TRUNC|File::WRONLY,&block)
+ rescue Errno::EEXIST
+ desc = File.symlink?(file) ? "symlink to #{File.readlink(file)}" : File.stat(file).ftype
+ puts "Warning: #{file} was apparently created by another process (as"
+ puts "a #{desc}) as soon as it was deleted by this process. Someone may be trying"
+ puts "to do something objectionable (such as tricking you into overwriting system"
+ puts "files if you are running as root)."
+ raise
+ end
+ end
+ module_function :secure_open
end
end
diff --git a/lib/puppet/util/reference.rb b/lib/puppet/util/reference.rb
index 7526e6566..93542df28 100644
--- a/lib/puppet/util/reference.rb
+++ b/lib/puppet/util/reference.rb
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ class Puppet::Util::Reference
def self.pdf(text)
puts "creating pdf"
- File.open("/tmp/puppetdoc.txt", "w") do |f|
+ Puppet::Util.secure_open("/tmp/puppetdoc.txt", "w") do |f|
f.puts text
end
rst2latex = %x{which rst2latex}
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ class Puppet::Util::Reference
end
rst2latex.chomp!
cmd = %{#{rst2latex} /tmp/puppetdoc.txt > /tmp/puppetdoc.tex}
+ Puppet::Util.secure_open("/tmp/puppetdoc.tex","w") do |f|
+ # If we get here without an error, /tmp/puppetdoc.tex isn't a tricky cracker's symlink
+ end
output = %x{#{cmd}}
unless $? == 0
$stderr.puts "rst2latex failed"
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ class Puppet::Util::Reference
puts "Creating markdown for #{name} reference."
dir = "/tmp/" + Puppet::PUPPETVERSION
FileUtils.mkdir(dir) unless File.directory?(dir)
- File.open(dir + "/" + "#{name}.rst", "w") do |f|
+ Puppet::Util.secure_open(dir + "/" + "#{name}.rst", "w") do |f|
f.puts text
end
pandoc = %x{which pandoc}
@@ -190,7 +193,7 @@ class Puppet::Util::Reference
end
def trac
- File.open("/tmp/puppetdoc.txt", "w") do |f|
+ Puppet::Util.secure_open("/tmp/puppetdoc.txt", "w") do |f|
f.puts self.to_trac
end