diff options
author | Tim Potter <tpot@samba.org> | 2000-07-06 06:57:22 +0000 |
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committer | Tim Potter <tpot@samba.org> | 2000-07-06 06:57:22 +0000 |
commit | cfc7266a7b5e3cb0170b48d121677434c7443c3d (patch) | |
tree | ed505d8d2701ffbaa5449af37a9559de0a750a16 /source3/lib/util_seaccess.c | |
parent | d01839e49ec6858c3b0929ad6038a3ff62ac4271 (diff) | |
download | samba-cfc7266a7b5e3cb0170b48d121677434c7443c3d.tar.gz samba-cfc7266a7b5e3cb0170b48d121677434c7443c3d.tar.xz samba-cfc7266a7b5e3cb0170b48d121677434c7443c3d.zip |
Rewrite of se_access_check() function. Added comments and fixed a bunch of
bugs. I think there is a problem though with the permissions granted when
SEC_RIGHTS_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED is passed as the permissions requested.
(This used to be commit 27d821913c87dddd44a0690f4b191c9d2445817e)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/lib/util_seaccess.c')
-rw-r--r-- | source3/lib/util_seaccess.c | 476 |
1 files changed, 287 insertions, 189 deletions
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c b/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c index 028b876fa7..f9cfcb835b 100644 --- a/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c +++ b/source3/lib/util_seaccess.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ Unix SMB/Netbios implementation. Version 2.0 Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000. + Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000. This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -24,256 +25,353 @@ extern int DEBUGLEVEL; -static uint32 acegrant(uint32 mask, uint32 *acc_req, uint32 *acc_grant, uint32 *acc_deny) +/* Call winbindd to convert uid to sid */ + +BOOL winbind_uid_to_sid(uid_t uid, DOM_SID *sid) { - /* maximum allowed: grant what's in the ace */ - if ((*acc_req) == SEC_RIGHTS_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) - { - (*acc_grant) |= mask & ~(*acc_deny); - } - else - { - (*acc_grant) |= (*acc_req) & mask; - (*acc_req) &= ~(*acc_grant); + struct winbindd_request request; + struct winbindd_response response; + int result; + + if (!sid) return False; + + /* Initialise request */ + + ZERO_STRUCT(request); + ZERO_STRUCT(response); + + request.data.uid = uid; + + /* Make request */ + + result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_UID_TO_SID, &request, &response); + + /* Copy out result */ + + if (result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + string_to_sid(sid, response.data.sid.sid); + } else { + sid_copy(sid, &global_sid_NULL); } - if ((*acc_req) == 0x0) - { - return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + return (result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS); +} + +/* Call winbindd to convert uid to sid */ + +BOOL winbind_gid_to_sid(gid_t gid, DOM_SID *sid) +{ + struct winbindd_request request; + struct winbindd_response response; + int result; + + if (!sid) return False; + + /* Initialise request */ + + ZERO_STRUCT(request); + ZERO_STRUCT(response); + + request.data.gid = gid; + + /* Make request */ + + result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_GID_TO_SID, &request, &response); + + /* Copy out result */ + + if (result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + string_to_sid(sid, response.data.sid.sid); + } else { + sid_copy(sid, &global_sid_NULL); } - return NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; + + return (result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS); } -static uint32 acedeny(uint32 mask, uint32 *acc_req, uint32 *acc_grant, uint32 *acc_deny) +/* Process an access allowed ACE */ + +static BOOL ace_grant(uint32 mask, uint32 *acc_desired, uint32 *acc_granted) { - /* maximum allowed: grant what's in the ace */ - if ((*acc_req) == SEC_RIGHTS_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) - { - (*acc_deny) |= mask & ~(*acc_grant); + uint32 matches; + + /* If there are any matches in the ACE mask and desired access, + turn them off in the desired access and on in the granted + mask. */ + + if (*acc_desired == SEC_RIGHTS_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) { + matches = mask; + *acc_desired = mask; + } else { + matches = mask & *acc_desired; } - else - { - if ((*acc_req) & mask) - { - return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; - } -#if 0 - (*acc_deny) |= (*acc_req) & mask; - (*acc_req) &= ~(*acc_deny); -#endif + + if (matches) { + *acc_desired = *acc_desired & ~matches; + *acc_granted = *acc_granted | matches; } - if ((*acc_req) == 0x0) - { - return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + return *acc_desired == 0; +} + +/* Process an access denied ACE */ + +static BOOL ace_deny(uint32 mask, uint32 *acc_desired, uint32 *acc_granted) +{ + uint32 matches; + + /* If there are any matches in the ACE mask and the desired access, + all bits are turned off in the desired and granted mask. */ + + if (*acc_desired == SEC_RIGHTS_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) { + matches = mask; + } else { + matches = mask & *acc_desired; + } + + if (matches) { + *acc_desired = *acc_granted = 0; } - return NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; + + return *acc_desired == 0; } -static BOOL check_ace(const SEC_ACE *ace, BOOL is_owner, - const DOM_SID *sid, - uint32 *acc_req, - uint32 *acc_grant, - uint32 *acc_deny, - uint32 *status) +/* Check an ACE against a SID. We return true if the ACE clears all the + permission bits in the access desired mask. This indicates that we have + make a decision to deny or allow access and the status is updated + accordingly. */ + +static BOOL check_ace(SEC_ACE *ace, BOOL is_owner, DOM_SID *sid, + uint32 *acc_desired, uint32 *acc_granted, + uint32 *status) { uint32 mask = ace->info.mask; - if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) - { - /* inherit only is ignored */ + /* Inherit only is ignored */ + + if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) { return False; } - /* only owner allowed write-owner rights */ - if (!is_owner) - { + /* Only owner allowed write-owner rights */ + + if (!is_owner) { mask &= (~SEC_RIGHTS_WRITE_OWNER); } - switch (ace->type) - { - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: - { - /* everyone - or us */ + /* Check the ACE value. This updates the access_desired and + access_granted values appropriately. */ + + switch (ace->type) { + + /* Access allowed ACE */ + + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED: { + + /* Everyone - or us */ + if (sid_equal(&ace->sid, global_sid_everyone) || - sid_equal(&ace->sid, sid)) - { - (*status) = acegrant(mask, acc_req, acc_grant, acc_deny); - if ((*status) != NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO) - { + sid_equal(&ace->sid, sid)) { + + /* Return true if access has been allowed */ + + if (ace_grant(mask, acc_desired, + acc_granted)) { + *status = NT_STATUS_NO_PROBLEMO; return True; } - } + break; } - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: - { - /* everyone - or us */ + + /* Access denied ACE */ + + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED: { + + /* Everyone - or us */ + if (sid_equal(&ace->sid, global_sid_everyone) || - sid_equal(&ace->sid, sid)) - { - (*status) = acedeny(mask, acc_req, acc_grant, acc_deny); - if ((*status) != NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO) - { + sid_equal(&ace->sid, sid)) { + + /* Return false if access has been denied */ + + if (ace_deny(mask, acc_desired, + acc_granted)) { + *status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; return True; } } + break; } - case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_AUDIT: - { - (*status) = NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; - return True; - } + + /* Unimplemented ACE types. These are ignored. */ + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_ALARM: - { - (*status) = NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; - return True; + case SEC_ACE_TYPE_SYSTEM_AUDIT: { + *status = NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + return False; } - default: - { - (*status) = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; - return True; + + /* Unknown ACE type */ + + default: { + *status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + return False; } } + + /* There are still some bits set in the access desired mask that + haven't been cleared by an ACE. More checking is required. */ + return False; } -/*********************************************************************** - checks access_requested rights of user against sd. returns access granted - and a status code if the grant succeeded, error message if it failed. - - the previously_granted access rights requires some explanation: if you - open a policy handle with a set of permissions, you cannot then perform - operations that require more privileges than those requested. pass in - the [previously granted] permissions from the open_policy_hnd call as - prev_grant_acc, and this function will do the checking for you. - ***********************************************************************/ -BOOL se_access_check(const SEC_DESC * sd, const NET_USER_INFO_3 * user, - uint32 acc_req, uint32 prev_grant_acc, - uint32 * acc_grant, - uint32 * status) +/* Check access rights of a user against a security descriptor. Look at + each ACE in the security descriptor until an access denied ACE denies + any of the desired rights to the user or any of the users groups, or one + or more ACEs explicitly grant all requested access rights. See + "Access-Checking" document in MSDN. */ + +BOOL se_access_check(SEC_DESC *sd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int ngroups, + gid_t *groups, uint32 acc_desired, + uint32 *acc_granted, uint32 *status) { - int num_aces; - int num_groups; - DOM_SID usr_sid; - DOM_SID grp_sid; - DOM_SID **grp_sids = NULL; - uint32 ngrp_sids = 0; + DOM_SID user_sid, group_sid; + DOM_SID **group_sids = NULL; BOOL is_owner; - BOOL is_system; - const SEC_ACL *acl = NULL; - uint32 grnt; - uint32 deny; + int i, j, ngroup_sids = 0; + SEC_ACL *acl; + uint8 check_ace_type; - if (status == NULL) - { - return False; - } + if (!status || !acc_granted) return False; - (*status) = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + *status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + *acc_granted = 0; - if (prev_grant_acc == SEC_RIGHTS_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) - { - prev_grant_acc = 0xffffffff; - } - - /* cannot request any more than previously requested access */ - acc_req &= prev_grant_acc; + /* No security descriptor allows all access */ - if (acc_req == 0x0) - { - goto end; - } + if (!sd) { + *status = NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; + *acc_granted = acc_desired; + acc_desired = 0; - /* we must know the owner sid */ - if (sd->owner_sid == NULL) - { - goto end; + goto done; } - (*status) = NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; - - /* create group sid */ - sid_copy(&grp_sid, &user->dom_sid.sid); - sid_append_rid(&grp_sid, user->group_id); + /* If desired access mask is empty then no access is allowed */ - /* create user sid */ - sid_copy(&usr_sid, &user->dom_sid.sid); - sid_append_rid(&usr_sid, user->user_id); + if (acc_desired == 0) { + goto done; + } - /* preparation: check owner sid, create array of group sids */ - is_owner = sid_equal(&usr_sid, sd->owner_sid); - add_sid_to_array(&ngrp_sids, &grp_sids, &grp_sid); + /* We must know the owner sid */ - for (num_groups = 0; num_groups < user->num_groups; num_groups++) - { - sid_copy(&grp_sid, &user->dom_sid.sid); - sid_append_rid(&grp_sid, user->gids[num_groups].g_rid); - add_sid_to_array(&ngrp_sids, &grp_sids, &grp_sid); + if (sd->owner_sid == NULL) { + DEBUG(1, ("no owner for security descriptor\n")); + goto done; } -#ifdef SAMBA_MAIN_DOES_NOT_HAVE_GLOBAL_SID_SYSTEM - /* check for system acl or user (discretionary) acl */ - is_system = sid_equal(&usr_sid, global_sid_system); - if (is_system) - { - acl = sd->sacl; - } - else -#endif - { - acl = sd->dacl; + /* Create user sid */ + + if (!winbind_uid_to_sid(uid, &user_sid)) { + DEBUG(3, ("could not lookup sid for uid %d\n", uid)); } - /* acl must have something in it */ - if (acl == NULL || acl->ace == NULL || acl->num_aces == 0) - { - goto end; + /* Create group sid */ + + if (!winbind_gid_to_sid(gid, &group_sid)) { + DEBUG(3, ("could not lookup sid for gid %d\n", gid)); } - /* - * OK! we have an ACE, it has at least one thing in it, - * we have a user sid, we have an array of group sids. - * let's go! - */ - - deny = 0; - grnt = 0; - - /* check each ace */ - for (num_aces = 0; num_aces < acl->num_aces; num_aces++) - { - const SEC_ACE *ace = &acl->ace[num_aces]; - - /* first check the user sid */ - if (check_ace(ace, is_owner, &usr_sid, &acc_req, - &grnt, &deny, status)) - { - goto end; - } - /* now check the group sids */ - for (num_groups = 0; num_groups < ngrp_sids; num_groups++) - { - if (check_ace(ace, False, grp_sids[num_groups], - &acc_req, &grnt, &deny, status)) - { - goto end; - } + /* Preparation: check owner sid, create array of group sids */ + + is_owner = sid_equal(&user_sid, sd->owner_sid); + add_sid_to_array(&ngroup_sids, &group_sids, &group_sid); + + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { + if (groups[i] != gid && + winbind_gid_to_sid(groups[i], &group_sid)) { + add_sid_to_array(&ngroup_sids, &group_sids, + &group_sid); + } else { + DEBUG(3, ("could not lookup sid for gid %d\n", gid)); } } - if (grnt == 0x0 && (*status) == NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO) - { - (*status) = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + /* ACL must have something in it */ + + acl = sd->dacl; + + if (acl == NULL || acl->ace == NULL || acl->num_aces == 0) { + + /* Checks against a NULL ACL succeed and return access + granted = access requested. */ + + *status = NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; + *acc_granted = acc_desired; + acc_desired = 0; + + goto done; + } + + /* Check each ACE in ACL. We break out of the loop if an ACE is + either explicitly denied or explicitly allowed by the + check_ace2() function. We also check the Access Denied ACEs + before Access allowed ones as the Platform SDK documentation is + unclear whether ACEs in a ACL are necessarily always in this + order. See the discussion on "Order of ACEs in a DACL" in + MSDN. */ + + check_ace_type = SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED; + + check_aces: + + for (i = 0; i < acl->num_aces; i++) { + SEC_ACE *ace = &acl->ace[i]; + BOOL is_group_owner; + + /* Check user sid */ + + if (ace->type == check_ace_type && + check_ace(ace, is_owner, &user_sid, &acc_desired, + acc_granted, status)) { + goto done; + } + + /* Check group sids */ + + for (j = 0; j < ngroup_sids; j++) { + + is_group_owner = sd->grp_sid ? + sid_equal(group_sids[j], sd->grp_sid) : False; + + if (ace->type == check_ace_type && + check_ace(ace, is_group_owner, group_sids[j], + &acc_desired, acc_granted, status)) { + goto done; + } + } + } + + /* Check access allowed ACEs */ + + if (check_ace_type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED) { + check_ace_type = SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED; + goto check_aces; } - else if (acc_grant != NULL) - { - (*acc_grant) = grnt; + + done: + free_sid_array(ngroup_sids, group_sids); + + /* If any access desired bits are still on, return access denied + and turn off any bits already granted. */ + + if (acc_desired) { + *acc_granted = 0; + *status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } -end: - free_sid_array(ngrp_sids, grp_sids); - return (*status) != NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; + return *status == NT_STATUS_NOPROBLEMO; } - |