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+Network Working Group J. Klensin
+Request for Comments: 3071 February 2001
+Category: Informational
+
+
+ Reflections on the DNS, RFC 1591, and Categories of Domains
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+ This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
+ not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
+ memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
+
+Abstract
+
+ RFC 1591, "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation", laid out the
+ basic administrative design and principles for the allocation and
+ administration of domains, from the top level down. It was written
+ before the introduction of the world wide web (WWW) and rapid growth
+ of the Internet put significant market, social, and political
+ pressure on domain name allocations. In recent years, 1591 has been
+ cited by all sides in various debates, and attempts have been made by
+ various bodies to update it or adjust its provisions, sometimes under
+ pressures that have arguably produced policies that are less well
+ thought out than the original. Some of those efforts have begun from
+ misconceptions about the provisions of 1591 or the motivation for
+ those provisions. The current directions of the Internet Corporation
+ for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and other groups who now
+ determine the Domain Name System (DNS) policy directions appear to be
+ drifting away from the policies and philosophy of 1591. This
+ document is being published primarily for historical context and
+ comparative purposes, essentially to document some thoughts about how
+ 1591 might have been interpreted and adjusted by the Internet
+ Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and ICANN to better reflect today's
+ world while retaining characteristics and policies that have proven
+ to be effective in supporting Internet growth and stability. An
+ earlier variation of this memo was submitted to ICANN as a comment on
+ its evolving Top-level Domain (TLD) policies.
+
+
+
+
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+Klensin Informational [Page 1]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ RFC 1591 [1] has been heavily discussed and referenced in the last
+ year or two, especially in discussions within ICANN and its
+ predecessors about the creation, delegation, and management of top-
+ level domains. In particular, the ICANN Domain Name Supporting
+ Organization (DNSO), and especially its ccTLD constituency, have been
+ the home of many discussions in which 1591 and interpretations of it
+ have been cited in support of a variety of sometimes-contradictory
+ positions. During that period, other discussions have gone on to try
+ to reconstruct the thinking that went into RFC 1591. Those in turn
+ have led me and others to muse on how that original thinking might
+ relate to some of the issues being raised. 1591 is, I believe, one
+ of Jon Postel's masterpieces, drawing together very different
+ philosophies (e.g., his traditional view that people are basically
+ reasonable and will do the right thing if told what it is with some
+ stronger mechanisms when that model is not successful) into a single
+ whole.
+
+ RFC 1591 was written in the context of the assumption that what it
+ described as generic TLDs would be bound to policies and categories
+ of registration (see the "This domain is intended..." text in
+ section 2) while ccTLDs were expected to be used primarily to support
+ users and uses within and for a country and its residents. The
+ notion that different domains would be run in different ways --albeit
+ within the broad contexts of "public service on behalf of the
+ Internet community" and "trustee... for the global Internet
+ community"-- was considered a design feature and a safeguard against
+ a variety of potential abuses. Obviously the world has changed in
+ many ways in the seven or eight years since 1591 was written. In
+ particular, the Internet has become more heavily used and, because
+ the design of the world wide web has put domain names in front of
+ users, top-level domain names and registrations in them have been
+ heavily in demand: not only has the number of hosts increased
+ dramatically during that time, but the ratio between registered
+ domain names and physical hosts has increased very significantly.
+
+ The issues 1591 attempted to address when it was written and those we
+ face today have not changed significantly in principle. But one
+ alternative to present trends would be to take a step back to refine
+ it into a model that can function effectively today. Therefore, it
+ may be useful to try to reconstruct 1591's principles and think about
+ their applicability today as a model that could continue to be
+ applied: not because it is historically significant, but because many
+ of its elements have proven to work reasonably well, even in
+ difficult situations. In particular, for many domains (some in
+ 1591's "generic" list and others in its "country code" category) the
+ notion of "public service" --expected then to imply being carried out
+
+
+
+Klensin Informational [Page 2]
+
+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
+
+
+ at no or minimal cost to the users, not merely on a non-profit
+ basis-- has yielded to profitability calculations. And, in most of
+ the rest, considerations of at least calculating and recovering costs
+ have crept in. While many of us feel some nostalgia for the old
+ system, it is clear that its days are waning if not gone: perhaps the
+ public service notions as understood when 1591 was written just don't
+ scale to rapid internet growth and very large numbers of
+ yregistrations.
+
+ In particular, some ccTLDs have advertised for registrations outside
+ the designated countries (or other entities), while others have made
+ clear decisions to allow registrations by non-nationals. These
+ decisions and others have produced protests from many sides,
+ suggesting, in turn, that a recategorization is in order. For
+ example, we have heard concerns by governments and managers of
+ traditional, "public service", in-country, ccTLDs about excessive
+ ICANN interference and fears of being forced to conform to
+ internationally-set policies for dispute resolution when their
+ domestic ones are considered more appropriate. We have also heard
+ concerns from registrars and operators of externally-marketed ccTLDs
+ about unreasonable government interference and from gTLD registrars
+ and registries about unreasonable competition from aggressively
+ marketed ccTLDs. The appropriate distinction is no longer between
+ what RFC 1591 described as "generic" TLDs (but which were really
+ intended to be "purpose-specific", a term I will use again below) and
+ ccTLDs but among:
+
+ (i) true "generic" TLDs, in which any registration is acceptable
+ and, ordinarily, registrations from all sources are actively
+ promoted. This list currently includes (the formerly purpose-
+ specific) COM, NET, and ORG, and some ccTLDs. There have been
+ proposals from time to time for additional TLDs of this variety in
+ which, as with COM (and, more recently, NET and ORG) anyone
+ (generally subject only to name conflicts and national law) could
+ register who could pay the fees.
+
+ (ii) purpose-specific TLDs, in which registration is accepted only
+ from organizations or individuals meeting particular
+ qualifications, but where those qualifications are not tied to
+ national boundaries. This list currently includes INT, EDU, the
+ infrastructure domain ARPA, and, arguably, the specialized US
+ Government TLDs MIL and GOV. There have been proposals from time
+ to time for other international TLDs of this variety, e.g., for
+ medical entities such as physicians and hospitals and for museums.
+ ICANN has recently approved several TLDs of this type and
+ describes them as "sponsored" TLDs.
+
+
+
+
+
+Klensin Informational [Page 3]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
+
+
+ (iii) Country domains, operated according to the original
+ underlying assumptions of 1591, i.e., registrants are largely
+ expected to be people or other entities within the country. While
+ external registrations might be accepted by some of these, the
+ country does not aggressively advertise for such registrations,
+ nor does anyone expect to derive significant fee revenue from
+ them. All current domains in this category are ccTLDs, but not
+ all ccTLDs are in this category.
+
+ These categories are clearly orthogonal to the association between
+ the use of the IS 3166-1 registered code list [2] and two-letter
+ "country" domain names. If that relationship is to be maintained
+ (and I believe it is desirable), the only inherent requirement is
+ that no two-letter TLDs be created except from that list (in order to
+ avoid future conflicts). ICANN should control the allocation and
+ delegation of TLDs using these, and other, criteria, but only
+ registered 3166-1 two letter codes should be used as two-letter TLDs.
+
+2. Implications of the Categories
+
+ If we had adopted this type of three-way categorization and could
+ make it work, I believe it would have presented several opportunities
+ for ICANN and the community more generally to reduce controversies
+ and move forward. Of course, there will be cases where the
+ categorization of a particular domain and its operating style will
+ not be completely clear-cut (see section 3, below). But having ICANN
+ work out procedures for dealing with those (probably few) situations
+ appears preferable to strategies that would tend to propel ICANN into
+ areas that are beyond its competence or that might require
+ significant expansion of its mandate.
+
+ First, the internally-operated ccTLDs (category iii above) should not
+ be required to have much interaction with ICANN or vice versa. Once
+ a domain of this sort is established and delegated, and assuming that
+ the "admin contact in the country" rule is strictly observed, the
+ domain should be able to function effectively without ICANN
+ intervention or oversight. In particular, while a country might
+ choose to adopt the general ICANN policies about dispute resolution
+ or name management, issues that arise in these areas might equally
+ well be dealt with exclusively under applicable national laws. If a
+ domain chooses to use ICANN services that cost resources to provide,
+ it should contribute to ICANN's support, but, if it does not, ICANN
+ should not presume to charge it for other than a reasonable fraction
+ of the costs to ICANN of operating the root, root servers, and any
+ directory systems that are generally agreed upon to be necessary and
+ in which the domain participates.
+
+
+
+
+
+Klensin Informational [Page 4]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
+
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+ By contrast, ccTLDs operated as generic domains ought to be treated
+ as generic domains. ICANN dispute resolution and name management
+ policies and any special rules developed to protect the Internet
+ public in multiple registrar or registry situations should reasonably
+ apply.
+
+3. Telling TLD types apart
+
+ If appropriate policies are adopted, ccTLDs operated as generic
+ domains (category (i) above) and those operated as country domains
+ (category (iii) above) ought to be able to be self-identified. There
+ are several criteria that could be applied to make this
+ determination. For example, either a domain is aggressively seeking
+ outside registrations or it is not and either the vast majority of
+ registrants in a domain are in-country or they are not. One could
+ also think of this as the issue of having some tangible level of
+ presence in the jurisdiction - e.g., is the administrative contact
+ subject, in practical terms, to the in-country laws, or are the
+ registration rules such that it is reasonably likely that a court in
+ the jurisdiction of the country associated with the domain can
+ exercise jurisdiction and enforce a judgment against the registrant.
+
+ One (fairly non-intrusive) rule ICANN might well impose on all top-
+ level domains is that they identify and publish the policies they
+ intend to use. E.g., registrants in a domain that will use the laws
+ of one particular country to resolve disputes should have a
+ reasonable opportunity to understand those policies prior to
+ registration and to make other arrangements (e.g., to register
+ elsewhere) if that mechanism for dispute resolution is not
+ acceptable. Giving IANA (as the root registrar) incorrect
+ information about the purpose and use of a domain should be subject
+ to challenge, and should be grounds for reviewing the appropriateness
+ of the domain delegation, just as not acting consistently and
+ equitably provides such grounds under the original provisions of RFC
+ 1591.
+
+ In order to ensure the availability of accurate and up-to-date
+ registration information the criteria must be consistent, and
+ consistent with more traditional gTLDs, for all nominally country
+ code domains operating as generic TLDs.
+
+4. The role of ICANN in country domains
+
+ ICANN (and IANA) should, as described above, have as little
+ involvement as possible in the direction of true country [code]
+ domains (i.e., category (iii)). There is no particular reason why
+
+
+
+
+
+Klensin Informational [Page 5]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
+
+
+ these domains should be subject to ICANN regulation beyond the basic
+ principles of 1591 and associated arrangements needed to ensure
+ Internet interoperability and stability.
+
+ ICANN's avoiding such involvement strengthens it: the desirability of
+ avoiding collisions with national sovereignty, determinations about
+ government legitimacy, and the authority of someone purportedly
+ writing on behalf of a government, is as important today as it was
+ when 1591 was written. The alternatives take us quickly from
+ "administration" into "internet governance" or, in the case of
+ determining which claimant is the legitimate government of a country,
+ "international relations", and the reasons for not moving in that
+ particular direction are legion.
+
+5. The role of governments
+
+ The history of IANA strategy in handling ccTLDs included three major
+ "things to avoid" considerations:
+
+ * Never get involved in determining which entities were countries
+ and which ones were not.
+
+ * Never get involved in determining who was, or was not, the
+ legitimate government of a country. And, more generally, avoid
+ deciding what entity --government, religion, commercial,
+ academic, etc.-- has what legitimacy or rights.
+
+ * If possible, never become involved in in-country disputes.
+ Instead, very strongly encourage internal parties to work
+ problems out among themselves. At most, adopt a role as
+ mediator and educator, rather than judge, unless abuses are very
+ clear and clearly will not be settled by any internal mechanism.
+
+ All three considerations were obviously intended to avoid IANA's
+ being dragged into a political morass in which it had (and, I
+ suggest, has) no competence to resolve the issues and could only get
+ bogged down. The first consideration was the most visible (and the
+ easiest) and was implemented by strict and careful adherence (see
+ below) to the ISO 3166 registered Country Code list. If an entity
+ had a code, it was eligible to be registered with a TLD (although
+ IANA was free to apply additional criteria-most of them stated in
+ 1591). If it did not, there were no exceptions: the applicant's only
+ recourse was a discussion with the 3166 Registration Authority (now
+ Maintenance Agency, often known just as "3166/MA") or the UN
+ Statistical Office (now Statistics Bureau), not with IANA.
+
+
+
+
+
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+Klensin Informational [Page 6]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
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+ There are actually five ccTLD exceptions to the strict rules. One,
+ "UK", is historical: it predates the adoption of ISO 3166 for this
+ purpose. The others --Ascension Island, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and
+ Jersey --are arguably, at least in retrospect, just mistakes.
+ Regardless of the historical reasons (about which there has been much
+ speculation), it is almost certainly the case that the right way to
+ handle mistakes of this sort is to acknowledge them and move on,
+ rather than trying to use them as precedents to justify more
+ mistakes.
+
+ This, obviously, is also the argument against use of the "reserved"
+ list (technically internal to the 3166 maintenance activity, and not
+ part of the Standard): since IANA (or ICANN) can ask that a name be
+ placed on that list, there is no rule of an absolute determination by
+ an external organization. Purported countries can come to ICANN,
+ insist on having delegations made and persuade ICANN to ask that the
+ names be reserved. Then, since the reserved name would exist, they
+ could insist that the domain be delegated. Worse, someone could use
+ another organization to request reservation of the name by 3166/MA;
+ once it was reserved, ICANN might be hard-pressed not to do the
+ delegation. Of course, ICANN could (and probably would be forced to)
+ adopt additional criteria other than appearance on the "reserved
+ list" in order to delegate such domains. But those criteria would
+ almost certainly be nearly equivalent to determining which applicants
+ were legitimate and stable enough to be considered a country, the
+ exact decision process that 1591 strove to avoid.
+
+ The other two considerations were more subtle and not always
+ successful: from time to time, both before and after the formal
+ policy shifted toward "governments could have their way", IANA
+ received letters from people purporting to be competent government
+ authorities asking for changes. Some of them turned out later to not
+ have that authority or appropriate qualifications. The assumption of
+ 1591 itself was that, if the "administrative contact in country" rule
+ was strictly observed, as was the rule that delegation changes
+ requested by the administrative contact would be honored, then, if a
+ government _really_ wanted to assert itself, it could pressure the
+ administrative contact into requesting the changes it wanted, using
+ whatever would pass for due process in that country. And the ability
+ to apply that process and pressure would effectively determine who
+ was the government and who wasn't, and would do so far more
+ effectively than any IANA evaluation of, e.g., whether the letterhead
+ on a request looked authentic (and far more safely for ICANN than
+ asking the opinion of any particular other government or selection of
+ governments).
+
+
+
+
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+Klensin Informational [Page 7]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
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+ Specific language in 1591 permitted IANA to adopt a "work it out
+ yourselves; if we have to decide, we will strive for a solution that
+ is not satisfactory to any party" stance. That approach was used
+ successfully, along with large doses of education, on many occasions
+ over the years, to avoid IANA's having to assume the role of judge
+ between conflicting parties.
+
+ Similar principles could be applied to the boundary between country-
+ code-based generic TLDs and country domains. Different countries,
+ under different circumstances, might prefer to operate the ccTLD
+ either as a national service or as a profit center where the
+ "customers" were largely external. Whatever decisions were made
+ historically, general Internet stability argues that changes should
+ not be made lightly. At the same time, if a government wishes to
+ make a change, the best mechanism for doing so is not to involve
+ ICANN in a potential determination of legitimacy (or even to have
+ ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC) try to formally make that
+ decision for individual countries) but for the relevant government to
+ use its own procedures to persuade the administrative contact to
+ request the change and for IANA to promptly and efficiently carry out
+ requests made by administrative contacts.
+
+6. Implications for the current ICANN DNSO structure.
+
+ The arguments by some of the ccTLD administrators that they are
+ different from the rest of the ICANN and DNSO structures are (in this
+ model) correct: they are different. The ccTLDs that are operating as
+ generic TLDs should be separated from the ccTLD constituency and
+ joined to the gTLD constituency. The country ccTLDs should be
+ separated from ICANN's immediate Supporting Organization structure,
+ and operate in a parallel and advisory capacity to ICANN, similar to
+ the arrangements used with the GAC. The DNSO and country TLDs should
+ not be required to interact with each other except on a mutually
+ voluntary basis and, if ICANN needs interaction or advice from some
+ of all of those TLDs, it would be more appropriate to get it in the
+ form of an advisory body like the GAC rather than as DNSO
+ constituency.
+
+7. References
+
+ [1] Postel, J., "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation", RFC
+ 1591, March 1994.
+
+ [2] ISO 3166. ISO 3166-1. Codes for the representation of names of
+ countries and their subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes (1997).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Klensin Informational [Page 8]
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+RFC 3071 Reflections on the DNS and RFC 1591 February 2001
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+8. Acknowledgements and disclaimer
+
+ These reflections have been prepared in my individual capacity and do
+ not necessarily reflect the views of my past or present employers.
+ Several people, including Randy Bush, Theresa Swinehart, Zita Wenzel,
+ Geoff Huston, Havard Eidnes, and several anonymous reviewers, made
+ suggestions or offered editorial comments about earlier versions of
+ this document. Cord Wischhoefer, of the ISO 3166/MA, was also kind
+ enough to look at the draft and supplied some useful details. Those
+ comments contributed significantly to whatever clarity the document
+ has, but the author bears responsibility for the selection of
+ comments which were ultimately incorporated and the way in which the
+ conclusions were presented.
+
+9. Security Considerations
+
+ This memo addresses the context for a set of administrative decisions
+ and procedures, and does not raise or address security issues.
+
+10. Author's Address
+
+ John C. Klensin
+ 1770 Massachusetts Ave, Suite 322
+ Cambridge, MA 02140, USA
+
+ EMail: klensin@jck.com
+
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+11. Full Copyright Statement
+
+ Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2001. All Rights Reserved.
+
+ This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
+ others provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
+ are included on all such copies. However, this document itself may
+ not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice
+ or references to the Internet Society or other Internet
+ organizations, except as required to translate it into languages
+ other than English.
+
+ The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
+ revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
+
+ This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
+ "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
+ TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
+ HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+ Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
+ Internet Society.
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