diff options
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2008-10-31 17:40:00 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2008-11-01 09:38:48 +1100 |
| commit | 37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf (patch) | |
| tree | d4fa5a124a95d33bf22276429a82822ec8d4810a /security/selinux | |
| parent | 721d5dfe7e516954c501d5e9d0dfab379cf4241a (diff) | |
| download | kernel-crypto-37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf.tar.gz kernel-crypto-37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf.tar.xz kernel-crypto-37dd0bd04a3240d2922786d501e2f12cec858fbf.zip | |
SELinux: properly handle empty tty_files list
SELinux has wrongly (since 2004) had an incorrect test for an empty
tty->tty_files list. With an empty list selinux would be pointing to part
of the tty struct itself and would then proceed to dereference that value
and again dereference that result. An F10 change to plymouth on a ppc64
system is actually currently triggering this bug. This patch uses
list_empty() to handle empty lists rather than looking at a meaningless
location.
[note, this fixes the oops reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=469079]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3e3fde7c1d2..f85597a4d73 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2126,14 +2126,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files) tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { file_list_lock(); - file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); - if (file) { + if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { + struct inode *inode; + /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list); + inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; if (inode_has_perm(current, inode, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { drop_tty = 1; |