diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'secure-boot-20121210.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | secure-boot-20121210.patch | 1421 |
1 files changed, 1421 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/secure-boot-20121210.patch b/secure-boot-20121210.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..019f2a0f --- /dev/null +++ b/secure-boot-20121210.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1421 @@ +From 200186e8567f6ee91cc1a72496a47ba992d6a820 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 01/19] Secure boot: Add new capability + +Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not +be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code. +The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability +and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial +capability set if required. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +index ba478fa..7109e65 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +@@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data { + + #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36 + +-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND ++/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */ ++ ++#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37 ++ ++#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL + + #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) + +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 3e49bf943b4fe0cc7e543e90f7f4a46e9f1927d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 02/19] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments + +Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from +userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause +arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can +potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ + drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++- + drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +index f39378d..1db1e74 100644 +--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c ++++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +@@ -546,6 +546,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj, + loff_t init_off = off; + u8 *data = (u8*) buf; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (off > dev->cfg_size) + return 0; + if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { +@@ -852,6 +855,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, + resource_size_t start, end; + int i; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) + if (res == &pdev->resource[i]) + break; +@@ -959,6 +965,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, + loff_t off, size_t count) + { ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); + } + +diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c +index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644 +--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c ++++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c +@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof + int size = dp->size; + int cnt; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (pos >= size) + return 0; + if (nbytes >= size) +@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ + int ret = 0; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + switch (cmd) { + case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: + ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); +@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) + struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; + int i, ret; + +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + + /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */ +diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c +index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644 +--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c ++++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c +@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, + u32 dword; + int err = 0; + +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + + dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn); +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 981648fc5ed3b1681d33b508541cb6f749ad49fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 03/19] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot + environments + +IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration +registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register +space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock +it down by default. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++-- + drivers/char/mem.c | 3 +++ + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on) + + if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) + return -EINVAL; +- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) ++ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))) + return -EPERM; + + /* +@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs) + return -EINVAL; + /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ + if (level > old) { +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + } + regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12); +diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c +index 0537903..47501fc 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/mem.c ++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c +@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + unsigned long i = *ppos; + const char __user * tmp = buf; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count)) + return -EFAULT; + while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) { +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 6148856150e49b14758011637e85d14c24e3edac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 04/19] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method + +It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context +under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary +access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, + struct acpi_table_header table; + acpi_status status; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (!(*ppos)) { + /* parse the table header to get the table length */ + if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 63800055d3fe3666bd429d39fee5be83a99e6606 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 05/19] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface + +We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a +given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to +be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the +kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c +index c0e9ff4..3c10167 100644 +--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c ++++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c +@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data) + int err; + u32 retval = -1; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval); + + if (err < 0) +@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) + int err; + u32 retval = -1; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param, + &retval); + +@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) + union acpi_object *obj; + acpi_status status; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID, + 1, asus->debug.method_id, + &input, &output); +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From cacfc9a562c89f0f9c2d9fa8c7ad2b4d90abb0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 06/19] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups + +Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel +to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c +index 47501fc..8817cdc 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/mem.c ++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c +@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + unsigned long copied; + void *ptr; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count)) + return -EFAULT; + +@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ + int err = 0; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { + unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count, + (unsigned long)high_memory - p); +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 87912773b97ee7970b0532ddc9a53cf5f7d98d69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 07/19] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will + switch on Secure Boot mode + +This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset +in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from. This works on +any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++++++ + kernel/cred.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +index 9776f06..0d6c28d 100644 +--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -2599,6 +2599,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. + Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be + enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads. + ++ secureboot_enable= ++ [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This ++ locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the ++ CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things ++ like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can ++ be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes. ++ + security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot. + If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first + security module asking for security registration will be +diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c +index 48cea3d..3f5be65 100644 +--- a/kernel/cred.c ++++ b/kernel/cred.c +@@ -623,6 +623,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void) + 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + } + ++void __init secureboot_enable() ++{ ++ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); ++ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); ++ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); ++} ++ ++/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ ++static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str) ++{ ++ int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); ++ if (sb_enable) ++ secureboot_enable(); ++ return 1; ++} ++__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt); ++ + /** + * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service + * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From e8ed63dea7cc735fc25dfbfbff680b5ff6dd5df3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 08/19] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when + enabled in firmware + +The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled +and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself +down. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ + arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- + arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 +++ + include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ + 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644 +--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt ++++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning + 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) + 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer + (below) ++1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled ++1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns + 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures + 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table + (array of struct e820entry) +diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +index e87b0ca..260cace 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c ++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +@@ -732,6 +732,36 @@ fail: + return status; + } + ++static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table) ++{ ++ u8 sb, setup; ++ unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); ++ efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; ++ efi_status_t status; ++ ++ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, ++ L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb); ++ ++ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (sb == 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ ++ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, ++ L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, ++ &setup); ++ ++ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (setup == 1) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + /* + * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we + * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create +@@ -1026,6 +1056,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table, + if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE) + goto fail; + ++ boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table); ++ + setup_graphics(boot_params); + + status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool, +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h +index 2ad874c..c7338e0 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h +@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ struct boot_params { + __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ + __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ + __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ +- __u8 _pad6[5]; /* 0x1ec */ ++ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ ++ __u8 _pad6[4]; /* 0x1ed */ + struct setup_header hdr; /* setup header */ /* 0x1f1 */ + __u8 _pad7[0x290-0x1f1-sizeof(struct setup_header)]; + __u32 edd_mbr_sig_buffer[EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX]; /* 0x290 */ +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +index ca45696..800673d 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +@@ -962,6 +962,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) + + io_delay_init(); + ++ if (boot_params.secure_boot) ++ secureboot_enable(); ++ + /* + * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration. + */ +diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h +index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644 +--- a/include/linux/cred.h ++++ b/include/linux/cred.h +@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *); + extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *); + extern void __init cred_init(void); + ++extern void secureboot_enable(void); ++ + /* + * check for validity of credentials + */ +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 139ac33cb367b928546bc04a37ad481dff23b745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 09/19] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure + boot environment + +This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This +could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model. +We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c +index 9eaf708..f94341b 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c +@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp); + acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) + { + #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC +- if (acpi_rsdp) ++ if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return acpi_rsdp; + #endif + +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 62401cc2543e14d4b71a51c98d69a771e2e1ed54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 10/19] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability + +Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux +policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate +capability class. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +index df2de54..70e2834 100644 +--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h ++++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { + { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, + { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, + { "capability2", +- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", +- NULL } }, ++ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", ++ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } }, + { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, + { "tun_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 1a8c4b9afd863e82f6b2f4f5fdaa1d2fa54270e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 11/19] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment + +kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel +to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to +support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable +loading entirely in that situation. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/kexec.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c +index 5e4bd78..dd464e0 100644 +--- a/kernel/kexec.c ++++ b/kernel/kexec.c +@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, + int result; + + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + + /* +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From afd6b432a80c87536d35bca1b7e58b0117f9bdc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:29:46 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 12/19] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove + capability.disable + +Remove the documentation for capability.disable. The code supporting this +parameter was removed with: + + commit 5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27 + Author: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> + Date: Thu Jul 3 20:56:05 2008 +0200 + + security: remove dummy module + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ------ + 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +index 0d6c28d..d9af501 100644 +--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -446,12 +446,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. + possible to determine what the correct size should be. + This option provides an override for these situations. + +- capability.disable= +- [SECURITY] Disable capabilities. This would normally +- be used only if an alternative security model is to be +- configured. Potentially dangerous and should only be +- used if you are entirely sure of the consequences. +- + ccw_timeout_log [S390] + See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. + +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From c2bff8ab14c5cb31e356649de36440c9fc2612ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 13/19] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot + environment + +If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to +protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed +with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for +this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make +this visible within the kernel and force it to be true. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++ + kernel/module.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c +index 3f5be65..a381e27 100644 +--- a/kernel/cred.c ++++ b/kernel/cred.c +@@ -623,11 +623,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void) + 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++extern bool sig_enforce; ++#endif ++ + void __init secureboot_enable() + { + pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); + cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); + cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++ /* Enable module signature enforcing */ ++ sig_enforce = true; ++#endif + } + + /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ +diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c +index 6e48c3a..6d5d2aa 100644 +--- a/kernel/module.c ++++ b/kernel/module.c +@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */ + + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +-static bool sig_enforce = true; ++bool sig_enforce = true; + #else +-static bool sig_enforce = false; ++bool sig_enforce = false; + + static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val, + const struct kernel_param *kp) +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 4f4a721fd5ac763dabbf028f9529549e4202603f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 14/19] Add EFI signature data types, such as are used for + containing hashes, keys and certificates for cryptographic verification. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h +index 337aefb..a01f8a7 100644 +--- a/include/linux/efi.h ++++ b/include/linux/efi.h +@@ -317,6 +317,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules, + #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \ + EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b ) + ++#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \ ++ EFI_GUID( 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 ) ++ ++#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \ ++ EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 ) ++ + typedef struct { + efi_guid_t guid; + u64 table; +@@ -452,6 +458,20 @@ typedef struct { + + #define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR (~0UL) + ++typedef struct { ++ efi_guid_t signature_owner; ++ u8 signature_data[]; ++} efi_signature_data_t; ++ ++typedef struct { ++ efi_guid_t signature_type; ++ u32 signature_list_size; ++ u32 signature_header_size; ++ u32 signature_size; ++ u8 signature_header[]; ++ /* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */ ++} efi_signature_list_t; ++ + /* + * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure: + */ +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From e23cf2e227ea4090d98a06e5c0bd6a89e3414be0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 15/19] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader. X.509 + certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type keys. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 7 +++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/linux/efi.h | 4 ++ + 4 files changed, 119 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +index 6d2c2ea..eb53fc3 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +@@ -35,4 +35,11 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a + public key packet found inside the certificate. + ++config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER ++ bool "EFI signature list parser" ++ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER ++ help ++ This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for ++ X.509 certificates and turning them into keys. ++ + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +index 0727204..cd8388e 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o + + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o + obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o + + # + # X.509 Certificate handling +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..59b859a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c +@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ ++/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/printk.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <linux/efi.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> ++ ++static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; ++ ++/** ++ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates ++ * @data: The data blob to parse ++ * @size: The size of the data blob ++ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to ++ */ ++int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring) ++{ ++ unsigned offs = 0; ++ size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize; ++ ++ pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size); ++ ++ while (size > 0) { ++ efi_signature_list_t list; ++ const efi_signature_data_t *elem; ++ key_ref_t key; ++ ++ if (size < sizeof(list)) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++ memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list)); ++ pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n", ++ offs, ++ list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size, ++ list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size); ++ ++ lsize = list.signature_list_size; ++ hsize = list.signature_header_size; ++ esize = list.signature_size; ++ elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize; ++ ++ if (lsize > size) { ++ pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n", ++ __func__, offs); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ if (lsize < sizeof(list) || ++ lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize || ++ esize < sizeof(*elem) || ++ elsize < esize || ++ elsize % esize != 0) { ++ pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs); ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) { ++ data += lsize; ++ size -= lsize; ++ offs += lsize; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ data += sizeof(list) + hsize; ++ size -= sizeof(list) + hsize; ++ offs += sizeof(list) + hsize; ++ ++ for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) { ++ elem = data; ++ ++ pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs); ++ ++ key = key_create_or_update( ++ make_key_ref(keyring, 1), ++ "asymmetric", ++ NULL, ++ &elem->signature_data, ++ esize - sizeof(*elem), ++ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | ++ KEY_USR_VIEW, ++ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); ++ ++ if (IS_ERR(key)) ++ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", ++ PTR_ERR(key)); ++ else ++ pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s'\n", ++ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); ++ ++ data += esize; ++ size -= esize; ++ offs += esize; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} +diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h +index a01f8a7..44a7faa 100644 +--- a/include/linux/efi.h ++++ b/include/linux/efi.h +@@ -541,6 +541,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime); + extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void); + extern struct efi_memory_map memmap; + ++struct key; ++extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, ++ struct key *keyring); ++ + /** + * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range + * @start: starting kvirt address +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From 766f1838a0151f2367a83720a94a06e3c8fb04f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:29:49 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 16/19] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot + is enabled + +There are a few cases where in-kernel functions may need to know if +Secure Boot is enabled. The added capability check cannot be used as the +kernel can't drop it's own capabilites, so we add a global variable +similar to efi_enabled so they can determine if Secure Boot is enabled. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 +++++- + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++ + include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++ + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +index 800673d..cf8823b 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +@@ -962,8 +962,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) + + io_delay_init(); + +- if (boot_params.secure_boot) ++ if (boot_params.secure_boot) { + secureboot_enable(); ++#ifdef CONFIG_EFI ++ secure_boot_enabled = 1; ++#endif ++ } + + /* + * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration. +diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +index ad44391..d22bfeb 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c ++++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ + int efi_enabled; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_enabled); + ++int secure_boot_enabled; ++ + struct efi __read_mostly efi = { + .mps = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, + .acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, +diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h +index 44a7faa..b5403ae 100644 +--- a/include/linux/efi.h ++++ b/include/linux/efi.h +@@ -578,11 +578,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); + # ifdef CONFIG_X86 + extern int efi_enabled; + extern bool efi_64bit; ++ extern int secure_boot_enabled; + # else + # define efi_enabled 1 ++# define secure_boot_enabled 0 + # endif + #else + # define efi_enabled 0 ++# define secure_boot_enabled 0 + #endif + + /* +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From b50f77a04b997699771c4f4ee1f55dac0cf5dc2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 17/19] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring + +This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that +are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules +and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load. This is +useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + init/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ + kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + kernel/module-internal.h | 3 +++ + kernel/module_signing.c | 14 +++++++++++++- + 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index 6fdd6e3..7a9bf00 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -1602,6 +1602,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE + Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a + key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel. + ++config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST ++ bool "Support for blacklisting module signature certificates" ++ depends on MODULE_SIG ++ help ++ This adds support for keeping a blacklist of certificates that ++ should not pass module signature verification. If a module is ++ signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected. ++ + choice + prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" + depends on MODULE_SIG +diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c +index 767e559..3bfb7ed 100644 +--- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c ++++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c +@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ + #include "module-internal.h" + + struct key *modsign_keyring; ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST ++struct key *modsign_blacklist; ++#endif + + extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[]; + extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[]; +@@ -52,6 +55,20 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void) + if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0) + panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n"); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST ++ modsign_blacklist = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".modsign_blacklist", ++ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), ++ current_cred(), ++ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | ++ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, ++ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); ++ if (IS_ERR(modsign_blacklist)) ++ panic("Can't allocate module signing blacklist keyring\n"); ++ ++ if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_blacklist, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0) ++ panic("Can't instantiate module signing blacklist keyring\n"); ++#endif ++ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h +index 24f9247..51a8380 100644 +--- a/kernel/module-internal.h ++++ b/kernel/module-internal.h +@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@ + */ + + extern struct key *modsign_keyring; ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST ++extern struct key *modsign_blacklist; ++#endif + + extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen); +diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c +index f2970bd..8ab83a6 100644 +--- a/kernel/module_signing.c ++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c +@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks, + static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, + const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len) + { +- key_ref_t key; ++ key_ref_t key, blacklist; + size_t i; + char *id, *q; + +@@ -157,6 +157,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, + + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST ++ blacklist = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_blacklist, 1), ++ &key_type_asymmetric, id); ++ if (!IS_ERR(blacklist)) { ++ /* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist. reject */ ++ pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id); ++ key_ref_put(blacklist); ++ kfree(id); ++ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); ++ } ++#endif ++ + key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, id); + if (IS_ERR(key)) +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From f588bd4beb0fd6993dfc07167df1c904e00f7af6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 18/19] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot + +Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable. +This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring. This +allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction +with signed modules. By importing the public certificate into the 'db' +variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to +load. + +In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed +certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into +the newly introduced module blacklist keyring and forbid any module +signed with those from loading. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++ + init/Kconfig | 9 +++++ + kernel/Makefile | 3 ++ + kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c + +diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h +index b5403ae..bba53e3 100644 +--- a/include/linux/efi.h ++++ b/include/linux/efi.h +@@ -323,6 +323,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules, + #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \ + EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 ) + ++#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \ ++ EFI_GUID( 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f ) ++ ++#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \ ++ EFI_GUID( 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 ) ++ + typedef struct { + efi_guid_t guid; + u64 table; +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index 7a9bf00..51aa170 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -1610,6 +1610,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST + should not pass module signature verification. If a module is + signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected. + ++config MODULE_SIG_UEFI ++ bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI" ++ depends on MODULE_SIG && MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST && EFI ++ select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER ++ help ++ This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules ++ signed with those to be loaded. It will also disallow loading ++ of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable. ++ + choice + prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" + depends on MODULE_SIG +diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile +index 86e3285..12e17ab 100644 +--- a/kernel/Makefile ++++ b/kernel/Makefile +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o + obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o + obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o + obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o + obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o + obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o + obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o +@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o + + $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h + ++$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar ++ + # config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped. + # Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config* + targets += config_data.gz +diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..8c30978 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c +@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/cred.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <linux/efi.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> ++#include "module-internal.h" ++ ++static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size) ++{ ++ efi_status_t status; ++ unsigned long lsize = 4; ++ unsigned long tmpdb[4]; ++ void *db = NULL; ++ ++ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb); ++ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { ++ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!db) { ++ pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); ++ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { ++ kfree(db); ++ db = NULL; ++ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status); ++ } ++out: ++ *size = lsize; ++ return db; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases ++ * */ ++static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) ++{ ++ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; ++ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; ++ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL; ++ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0; ++ int rc = 0; ++ ++ /* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */ ++ if (!secure_boot_enabled) ++ return 0; ++ ++ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); ++ if (!db) { ++ pr_err("Couldn't get db list\n"); ++ rc = -1; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize); ++ if (!mok) { ++ pr_info("Couldn't get MokListRT\n"); ++ } ++ ++ /* Get dbx. It might not exist, so it isn't an error if we can't ++ * get it. ++ */ ++ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize); ++ if (!dbx) { ++ pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list\n"); ++ } ++ ++ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, modsign_keyring); ++ if (rc) ++ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc); ++ ++ if (mok) { ++ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, modsign_keyring); ++ if (rc) ++ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc); ++ } ++ ++ if (dbx) { ++ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize, ++ modsign_blacklist); ++ if (rc) ++ pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc); ++ } ++ ++err: ++ kfree(db); ++ kfree(mok); ++ kfree(dbx); ++ return rc; ++} ++late_initcall(load_uefi_certs); +-- +1.8.0.1 + + +From f910a06d820b4dad2ccd0acdfbc878fff73a3b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 19/19] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment + +There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning +from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model, +so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in +a Secure Boot environment. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 14 +++++++++++++- + kernel/power/main.c | 4 +++- + kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++ + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c +index b26f5f1..f04343b 100644 +--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c ++++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c +@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ int hibernate(void) + { + int error; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { ++ return -EPERM; ++ } ++ + lock_system_sleep(); + /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */ + if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { +@@ -723,7 +727,7 @@ static int software_resume(void) + /* + * If the user said "noresume".. bail out early. + */ +- if (noresume) ++ if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return 0; + + /* +@@ -889,6 +893,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + int i; + char *start = buf; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { ++ buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled"); ++ return buf-start; ++ } ++ + for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) { + if (!hibernation_modes[i]) + continue; +@@ -923,6 +932,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *p; + int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + p = memchr(buf, '\n', n); + len = p ? p - buf : n; + +diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c +index f458238..72580c1 100644 +--- a/kernel/power/main.c ++++ b/kernel/power/main.c +@@ -301,7 +301,9 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + } + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION +- s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); ++ if (capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { ++ s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); ++ } + #else + if (s != buf) + /* convert the last space to a newline */ +diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c +index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644 +--- a/kernel/power/user.c ++++ b/kernel/power/user.c +@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) + struct snapshot_data *data; + int error; + ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) ++ return -EPERM; ++ + lock_system_sleep(); + + if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { +-- +1.8.0.1 + |