diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c | 571 |
1 files changed, 571 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c b/src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..81e43f128f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,571 @@ +/* + * kadmin/v4server/kadm_server.c + * + * Copyright 1988 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. + * + * For copying and distribution information, please see the file + * <mit-copyright.h>. + * + * Kerberos administration server-side subroutines + */ + + +#include <mit-copyright.h> + +#include "k5-int.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include <sys/time.h> +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include <time.h> +#endif +#else +#include <time.h> +#endif + +#ifdef OVSEC_KADM +#include <com_err.h> +#include <kadm5/admin.h> +#include <kadm5/chpass_util_strings.h> +#include <krb5/kdb.h> +extern void *ovsec_handle; +#endif + +#include <kadm.h> +#include <kadm_err.h> + +extern krb5_context kadm_context; +int fascist_cpw = 0; /* Be fascist about insecure passwords? */ + +#ifdef OVSEC_KADM +char pw_required[] = "The version of kpasswd that you are using is not compatible with the\nOpenV*Secure V4 Administration Server. Please contact your security\nadministrator.\n\n"; + +#else /* !OVSEC_KADM */ + +char bad_pw_err[] = + "\007\007\007ERROR: Insecure password not accepted. Please choose another.\n\n"; + +char bad_pw_warn[] = + "\007\007\007WARNING: You have chosen an insecure password. You may wish to\nchoose a better password.\n\n"; + +char check_pw_msg[] = + "You have entered an insecure password. You should choose another.\n\n"; + +char pw_blurb[] = +"A good password is something which is easy for you to remember, but that\npeople who know you won't easily guess; so don't use your name, or your\ndog's name, or a word from the dictionary. Passwords should be at least\n6 characters long, and may contain UPPER- and lower-case letters,\nnumbers, or punctuation. A good password can be:\n\n -- some initials, like \"GykoR-66\" for \"Get your kicks on Rte 66.\"\n -- an easily pronounced nonsense word, like \"slaRooBey\" or \"krang-its\"\n -- a mis-spelled phrase, like \"2HotPeetzas\" or \"ItzAGurl\"\n\nPlease Note: It is important that you do not tell ANYONE your password,\nincluding your friends, or even people from Athena or Information\nSystems. Remember, *YOU* are assumed to be responsible for anything\ndone using your password.\n"; + +#endif /* OVSEC_KADM */ + +/* from V4 month_sname.c -- was not part of API */ +/* + * Given an integer 1-12, month_sname() returns a string + * containing the first three letters of the corresponding + * month. Returns 0 if the argument is out of range. + */ + +static char *month_sname(n) + int n; +{ + static char *name[] = { + "Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May","Jun", + "Jul","Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec" + }; + return((n < 1 || n > 12) ? 0 : name [n-1]); +} + +/* from V4 log.c -- was not part of API */ + +/* + * krb_log() is used to add entries to the logfile (see krb_set_logfile() + * below). Note that it is probably not portable since it makes + * assumptions about what the compiler will do when it is called + * with less than the correct number of arguments which is the + * way it is usually called. + * + * The log entry consists of a timestamp and the given arguments + * printed according to the given "format". + * + * The log file is opened and closed for each log entry. + * + * The return value is undefined. + */ + +/* static char *log_name = KRBLOG; */ +/* KRBLOG is in the V4 klog.h but may not correspond to anything installed. */ +static char *log_name = KADM_SYSLOG; + +static void krb_log(format,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a0) + char *format; + char *a1,*a2,*a3,*a4,*a5,*a6,*a7,*a8,*a9,*a0; +{ + FILE *logfile; + time_t now; + struct tm *tm; + + if ((logfile = fopen(log_name,"a")) == NULL) + return; + + (void) time(&now); + tm = localtime(&now); + + fprintf(logfile,"%2d-%s-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d ",tm->tm_mday, + month_sname(tm->tm_mon + 1),tm->tm_year, + tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec); + fprintf(logfile,format,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a0); + fprintf(logfile,"\n"); + (void) fclose(logfile); + return; +} + + +/* +kadm_ser_cpw - the server side of the change_password routine + recieves : KTEXT, {key} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE + acl : caller can change only own password + +Replaces the password (i.e. des key) of the caller with that specified in key. +Returns no actual data from the master server, since this is called by a user +*/ +kadm_ser_cpw(dat, len, ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + krb5_int32 keylow, keyhigh; + char pword[MAX_KPW_LEN]; + int no_pword = 0; + des_cblock newkey; + int status, stvlen = 0; + int retval; + extern int kadm_approve_pw(); +#ifdef OVSEC_KADM + ovsec_kadm_principal_ent_t princ_ent; + ovsec_kadm_policy_ent_t pol_ent; + krb5_principal user_princ; + char msg_ret[1024], *time_string, *ptr; + const char *msg_ptr; + krb5_int32 now; + time_t until; +#endif + + /* take key off the stream, and change the database */ + + if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keyhigh, 0, len)) < 0) + return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + stvlen += status; + if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keylow, stvlen, len)) < 0) + return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + stvlen += status; + if ((stvlen = stv_string(dat, pword, stvlen, sizeof(pword), len)) < 0) { + no_pword++; + pword[0]='\0'; + } + stvlen += status; + + keylow = ntohl(keylow); + keyhigh = ntohl(keyhigh); + memcpy((char *)(((krb5_int32 *)newkey) + 1), (char *)&keyhigh, 4); + memcpy((char *)newkey, (char *)&keylow, 4); + +#ifdef OVSEC_KADM + /* we don't use the client-provided key itself */ + keylow = keyhigh = 0; + memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey)); + + if (no_pword) { + krb_log("Old-style change password request from '%s.%s@%s'!", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); + *outlen = strlen(pw_required)+1; + if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) { + strcpy(*datout, pw_required); + } else { + *outlen = 0; + } + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; + } + + if (krb5_build_principal(kadm_context, &user_princ, + strlen(ad->prealm), + ad->prealm, + ad->pname, + *ad->pinst ? ad->pinst : 0, 0)) + /* this should never happen */ + return KADM_NOENTRY; + + *outlen = 0; + + if (retval = krb5_timeofday(kadm_context, &now)) { + msg_ptr = error_message(retval); + goto send_response; + } + + retval = ovsec_kadm_get_principal(ovsec_handle, user_princ, + &princ_ent); + if (retval != 0) { + msg_ptr = error_message(retval); + goto send_response; + } + + /* + * This daemon necessarily has the modify privilege, so + * ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal will allow it to violate the + * policy's minimum lifetime. Since that's A Bad Thing, we need + * to enforce it ourselves. Unfortunately, this means we are + * duplicating code from both ovsec_adm_server and + * ovsec_kadm_chpass_util(). + */ + if (princ_ent->aux_attributes & OVSEC_KADM_POLICY) { + retval = ovsec_kadm_get_policy(ovsec_handle, + princ_ent->policy, + &pol_ent); + if (retval != 0) { + (void) ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent(ovsec_handle, princ_ent); + msg_ptr = error_message(retval); + goto send_response; + } + + /* make "now" a boolean, true == too soon */ + now = ((now - princ_ent->last_pwd_change) < pol_ent->pw_min_life); + + (void) ovsec_kadm_free_policy_ent(ovsec_handle, pol_ent); + + if(now && !(princ_ent->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) { + (void) ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent(ovsec_handle, princ_ent); + retval = CHPASS_UTIL_PASSWORD_TOO_SOON; + + until = princ_ent->last_pwd_change + pol_ent->pw_min_life; + time_string = ctime(&until); + + if (*(ptr = &time_string[strlen(time_string)-1]) == '\n') + *ptr = '\0'; + + sprintf(msg_ret, error_message(CHPASS_UTIL_PASSWORD_TOO_SOON), + time_string); + msg_ptr = msg_ret; + + goto send_response; + } + } + + (void) ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent(ovsec_handle, princ_ent); + + retval = ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal_util(ovsec_handle, user_princ, + pword, NULL, msg_ret); + msg_ptr = msg_ret; + (void) krb5_free_principal(kadm_context, user_princ); + +send_response: + + retval = convert_ovsec_to_kadm(retval); + + if (retval) { + /* don't send message on success because kpasswd.v4 will */ + /* print "password changed" too */ + *outlen = strlen(msg_ptr)+2; + if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) { + strcpy(*datout, msg_ptr); + strcat(*datout, "\n"); + } else + *outlen = 0; + } + if (retval == KADM_INSECURE_PW) { + krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' tried to use an insecure password in changepw", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); + } +#else /* OVSEC_KADM */ + if (retval = kadm_approve_pw(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, + newkey, no_pword ? 0 : pword)) { + if (retval == KADM_PW_MISMATCH) { + /* + * Very strange!!! This means that the cleartext + * password which was sent and the DES cblock + * didn't match! + */ + (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' sent a password string which didn't match with the DES key?!?", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); + return(retval); + } + if (fascist_cpw) { + *outlen = strlen(bad_pw_err)+strlen(pw_blurb)+1; + if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) { + strcpy((char *) *datout, bad_pw_err); + strcat((char *) *datout, pw_blurb); + } else + *outlen = 0; + (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' tried to use an insecure password in changepw", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); +#ifdef notdef + /* For debugging only, probably a bad idea */ + if (!no_pword) + (void) krb_log("The password was %s\n", pword); +#endif + return(retval); + } else { + *outlen = strlen(bad_pw_warn) + strlen(pw_blurb)+1; + if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) { + strcpy((char *) *datout, bad_pw_warn); + strcat((char *) *datout, pw_blurb); + } else + *outlen = 0; + (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' used an insecure password in changepw", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); + } + } else { + *datout = 0; + *outlen = 0; + } + + retval = kadm_change(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, newkey); + keylow = keyhigh = 0; + memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey)); +#endif /* OVSEC_KADM */ + + return retval; +} + +#ifndef OVSEC_KADM +/* +kadm_ser_add - the server side of the add_entry routine + recieves : KTEXT, {values} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values} + acl : su, sms (as alloc) + +Adds and entry containing values to the database +returns the values of the entry, so if you leave certain fields blank you will + be able to determine the default values they are set to +*/ +int +kadm_ser_add(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + Kadm_vals values, retvals; + int status; + + if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0) + return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + if ((status = kadm_add_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, + &values, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) { + *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout); + retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0; + return KADM_SUCCESS; + } else { + *outlen = 0; + return status; + } +} + +/* +kadm_ser_del - the server side of the del_entry routine + recieves : KTEXT, {values} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values} + acl : su, sms (as alloc) + +Deletes an entry containing values to the database +returns the values of the entry, so if you leave certain fields blank you will + be able to determine the default values they are set to +*/ +kadm_ser_del(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + Kadm_vals values, retvals; + int status; + + if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0) + return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + if ((status = kadm_del_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, + &values, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) { + *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout); + retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0; + return KADM_SUCCESS; + } else { + *outlen = 0; + return status; + } +} + +/* +kadm_ser_mod - the server side of the mod_entry routine + recieves : KTEXT, {values, values} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values} + acl : su, sms (as register or dealloc) + +Modifies all entries corresponding to the first values so they match the + second values. +returns the values for the changed entries +*/ +kadm_ser_mod(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + Kadm_vals vals1, vals2, retvals; + int wh; + int status; + + if ((wh = stream_to_vals(dat, &vals1, len)) < 0) + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; + if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat+wh,&vals2, len-wh)) < 0) + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; + if ((status = kadm_mod_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, &vals1, + &vals2, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) { + *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout); + retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0; + return KADM_SUCCESS; + } else { + *outlen = 0; + return status; + } +} + +/* +kadm_ser_get + recieves : KTEXT, {values, flags} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE, {count, values, values, values} + acl : su + +gets the fields requested by flags from all entries matching values +returns this data for each matching recipient, after a count of how many such + matches there were +*/ +kadm_ser_get(dat,len,ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + Kadm_vals values, retvals; + u_char fl[FLDSZ]; + int loop,wh; + int status; + + if ((wh = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0) + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; + if (wh + FLDSZ > len) + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; + for (loop=FLDSZ-1; loop>=0; loop--) + fl[loop] = dat[wh++]; + if ((status = kadm_get_entry(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, + &values, fl, &retvals)) == KADM_DATA) { + *outlen = vals_to_stream(&retvals,datout); + retvals.key_low = retvals.key_high = 0; + return KADM_SUCCESS; + } else { + *outlen = 0; + return status; + } +} + +/* +kadm_ser_ckpw - the server side of the check_password routine + recieves : KTEXT, {key} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE + acl : none + +Checks to see if the des key passed from the caller is a "secure" password. +*/ +kadm_ser_ckpw(dat, len, ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + krb5_ui_4 keylow, keyhigh; + char pword[MAX_KPW_LEN]; + int no_pword = 0; + des_cblock newkey; + int stvlen = 0,status; + int retval; + extern int kadm_approve_pw(); + + /* take key off the stream, and check it */ + + if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keyhigh, 0, len)) < 0) + return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + stvlen += status; + if ((status = stv_long(dat, &keylow, stvlen, len)) < 0) + return(KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + stvlen += status; + if ((status = stv_string(dat, pword, stvlen, sizeof(pword), len)) < 0) { + no_pword++; + pword[0]='\0'; + } + stvlen += status; + + keylow = ntohl(keylow); + keyhigh = ntohl(keyhigh); + memcpy((char *)(((krb5_int32 *)newkey) + 1), (char *)&keyhigh, 4); + memcpy((char *)newkey, (char *)&keylow, 4); + keylow = keyhigh = 0; + retval = kadm_approve_pw(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, newkey, + no_pword ? 0 : pword); + memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey)); + if (retval) { + *outlen = strlen(check_pw_msg)+strlen(pw_blurb)+1; + if (*datout = (u_char *) malloc(*outlen)) { + strcpy((char *) *datout, check_pw_msg); + strcat((char *) *datout, pw_blurb); + } else + *outlen = 0; + (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' sent an insecure password to be checked", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); + return(retval); + } else { + *datout = 0; + *outlen = 0; + (void) krb_log("'%s.%s@%s' sent a secure password to be checked", + ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm); + } + return(0); +} + +/* +kadm_ser_stab - the server side of the change_srvtab routine + recieves : KTEXT, {values} + returns : CKSUM, RETCODE, {values} + acl : su, sms (as register or dealloc) + +Creates or modifies the specified service principal to have a random +key, which is sent back to the client. The key version is returned in +the max_life field of the values structure. It's a hack, but it's a +backwards compatible hack.... +*/ +kadm_ser_stab(dat, len, ad, datout, outlen) +u_char *dat; +int len; +AUTH_DAT *ad; +u_char **datout; +int *outlen; +{ + Kadm_vals values; + int status; + + if ((status = stream_to_vals(dat, &values, len)) < 0) + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; + status = kadm_chg_srvtab(ad->pname, ad->pinst, ad->prealm, &values); + if (status == KADM_DATA) { + *outlen = vals_to_stream(&values,datout); + values.key_low = values.key_high = 0; + return KADM_SUCCESS; + } else { + *outlen = 0; + return status; + } +} +#endif /* !OVSEC_KADM */ |