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Well everything really, but this is here to add things
which we certainly must not forget:
!!SECURITY!!
We need to come up with some sort of security concept for the
vdagent daemon and the vdagent clients communication.
Yes client_s_ as there can be multiple xorg sessions running
when for example the switch user functionality is used. But we
don't want Bob to be getting access to Alice's clipboard through
vdagent!
One possible option is to ask ConsoleKit who the current Console
owner is and then only send messages to / accept messages from
agents whose unix domain socket has the same uid.
Various things:
-make uinput communication non blocking
-patch xorg driver to allow adding "random" resolutions
-make vdagent xorg client try to add "random" resolutions
-fedora package
-file or syslog logging
-only realloc capabilities array if size changes
Maybe:
-Add support for selections with a target of STRING, which are
ISO Latin-1 strings, which we could support through iconv
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