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authorTom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>2021-05-28 14:10:51 -0400
committerTom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>2021-05-28 14:10:51 -0400
commitd862ddb8d783202dcab3601cdbc3775509a70597 (patch)
treee7ea6a6d79f9e4769f7fcb0c0c909992954a2423
parentaab8b17e94c447561a402bc7508b73fd8ee712e5 (diff)
parent163a0d7e2cbdbdf26d90ac8d30c0495b814f3245 (diff)
downloadu-boot-d862ddb8d783202dcab3601cdbc3775509a70597.tar.gz
u-boot-d862ddb8d783202dcab3601cdbc3775509a70597.tar.xz
u-boot-d862ddb8d783202dcab3601cdbc3775509a70597.zip
Merge tag 'efi-2021-07-rc4-2' of https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for efi-2021-07-rc4-2 Simplify configuration using HASH functions Fix Coverity warnings related to EFI TCG2 protocol Enable PE/COFF image measurement
-rw-r--r--common/Kconfig.boot1
-rw-r--r--include/efi_loader.h6
-rw-r--r--include/efi_tcg2.h9
-rw-r--r--include/tpm-v2.h18
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--lib/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/Kconfig5
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c62
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c214
9 files changed, 285 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/common/Kconfig.boot b/common/Kconfig.boot
index 3c6e77d099..89a3161f1f 100644
--- a/common/Kconfig.boot
+++ b/common/Kconfig.boot
@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE
select RSA_VERIFY
select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
select FIT_FULL_CHECK
- select HASH_CALCULATE
help
This option enables signature verification of FIT uImages,
using a hash signed and verified using RSA. If
diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h
index 522696d635..0a9c82a257 100644
--- a/include/efi_loader.h
+++ b/include/efi_loader.h
@@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void);
efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void);
/* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */
efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void);
+/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */
+efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+ struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
+ struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info);
/* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */
int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc,
const char *if_typename, int diskid,
@@ -886,6 +890,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void);
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size);
+
bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp,
WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len);
diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h
index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644
--- a/include/efi_tcg2.h
+++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
#define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
+#include <efi_api.h>
#include <tpm-v2.h>
#define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \
@@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event {
u8 event[];
} __packed;
+struct uefi_image_load_event {
+ efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory;
+ u64 image_length_in_memory;
+ u64 image_link_time_address;
+ u64 length_of_device_path;
+ struct efi_device_path device_path[];
+};
+
struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability {
u8 size;
struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version;
diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h
index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644
--- a/include/tpm-v2.h
+++ b/include/tpm-v2.h
@@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice;
#define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B)
#define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C)
+/*
+ * event types, cf.
+ * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0"
+ * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019
+ */
+#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002)
+#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003)
+#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004)
+#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005)
+#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006)
+#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007)
+#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008)
+#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009)
+#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0)
+
/* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */
struct tpms_tagged_property {
u32 property;
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index d675ab1d82..15019d2c65 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -439,9 +439,6 @@ config CRC32C
config XXHASH
bool
-config HASH_CALCULATE
- bool
-
endmenu
menu "Compression Support"
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 0835ea292c..b4795a62a0 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)ACPIGEN) += acpi/
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MD5) += md5.o
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA) += rsa/
-obj-$(CONFIG_HASH_CALCULATE) += hash-checksum.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_HASH) += hash-checksum.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA1) += sha1.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA256) += sha256.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA512_ALGO) += sha512.o
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index 98845b8ba3..6242caceb7 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE
depends on EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK
depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
+ select HASH
select SHA256
select RSA
select RSA_VERIFY
@@ -174,7 +175,6 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
select PKCS7_VERIFY
select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
- select HASH_CALCULATE
select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
default n
help
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL
select SHA512_ALGO
select SHA384
select SHA512
+ select HASH
help
Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware
of the platform.
@@ -335,6 +336,7 @@ config EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD
config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
bool "Enable EFI secure boot support"
depends on EFI_LOADER
+ select HASH
select SHA256
select RSA
select RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
@@ -344,7 +346,6 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
select PKCS7_VERIFY
- select HASH_CALCULATE
select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
default n
help
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index fe1ee198e2..bcd57f7fcc 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -303,6 +303,38 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
}
/**
+ * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image
+ * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size: size of @efi binary
+ *
+ * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates
+ * the image buffer.
+ *
+ * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails.
+ */
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size)
+{
+ size_t new_efi_size;
+ void *new_efi;
+
+ /*
+ * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
+ * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) {
+ new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8);
+ new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
+ if (!new_efi)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(new_efi, efi, *efi_size);
+ *efi_size = new_efi_size;
+ return new_efi;
+ } else {
+ return efi;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
* efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image
* @efi: Pointer to image
* @len: Size of @efi
@@ -561,7 +593,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
void *new_efi = NULL;
u8 *auth, *wincerts_end;
- size_t new_efi_size, auth_size;
+ size_t auth_size;
bool ret = false;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
@@ -569,21 +601,11 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
return true;
- /*
- * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
- * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
- */
- if (efi_size & 0x7) {
- new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL;
- new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
- if (!new_efi)
- return false;
- memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size);
- efi = new_efi;
- efi_size = new_efi_size;
- }
+ new_efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size);
+ if (!new_efi)
+ return false;
- if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, &regs, &wincerts,
+ if (!efi_image_parse(new_efi, efi_size, &regs, &wincerts,
&wincerts_len)) {
EFI_PRINT("Parsing PE executable image failed\n");
goto err;
@@ -725,7 +747,8 @@ err:
efi_sigstore_free(dbx);
pkcs7_free_message(msg);
free(regs);
- free(new_efi);
+ if (new_efi != efi)
+ free(new_efi);
EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
@@ -891,6 +914,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
goto err;
}
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL)
+ /* Measure an PE/COFF image */
+ if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle,
+ loaded_image_info))
+ log_err("PE image measurement failed\n");
+#endif
+
/* Copy PE headers */
memcpy(efi_reloc, efi,
sizeof(*dos)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
index 39074f7547..1319a8b378 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@
#include <efi_loader.h>
#include <efi_tcg2.h>
#include <log.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
#include <version.h>
#include <tpm-v2.h>
+#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
#include <u-boot/sha1.h>
#include <u-boot/sha256.h>
#include <u-boot/sha512.h>
@@ -403,6 +405,9 @@ static int tpm2_get_pcr_info(struct udevice *dev, u32 *supported_pcr,
size_t i;
int tpm_ret;
+ *supported_pcr = 0;
+ *active_pcr = 0;
+ *pcr_banks = 0;
memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
ret = tpm2_get_capability(dev, TPM2_CAP_PCRS, 0, response, 1);
if (ret)
@@ -481,7 +486,7 @@ out:
static efi_status_t __get_active_pcr_banks(u32 *active_pcr_banks)
{
struct udevice *dev;
- u32 active, supported, pcr_banks;
+ u32 active = 0, supported = 0, pcr_banks = 0;
efi_status_t ret;
int err;
@@ -708,6 +713,183 @@ out:
}
/**
+ * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash
+ *
+ * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size: size of @efi binary
+ * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+ struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list)
+{
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL;
+ size_t wincerts_len;
+ struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL;
+ void *new_efi = NULL;
+ u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ efi_status_t ret;
+ u32 active;
+ int i;
+
+ new_efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size);
+ if (!new_efi)
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+
+ if (!efi_image_parse(new_efi, efi_size, &regs, &wincerts,
+ &wincerts_len)) {
+ log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n");
+ ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ digest_list->count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) {
+ u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg;
+
+ if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg)))
+ continue;
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA1:
+ hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA256:
+ hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA384:
+ hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA512:
+ hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ default:
+ EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg);
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg;
+ memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg));
+ digest_list->count++;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (new_efi != efi)
+ free(new_efi);
+ free(regs);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image
+ *
+ * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size: size of @efi binary
+ * @handle: loaded image handle
+ * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+ struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
+ struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image)
+{
+ struct tpml_digest_values digest_list;
+ efi_status_t ret;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size;
+ struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event;
+ struct efi_device_path *device_path;
+ u32 device_path_length;
+ IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos;
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
+ struct efi_handler *handler;
+
+ ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (handle->image_type) {
+ case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:
+ pcr_index = 4;
+ event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION;
+ break;
+ case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER:
+ pcr_index = 2;
+ event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+ break;
+ case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER:
+ pcr_index = 2;
+ event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header,
+ &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path,
+ &handler));
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface);
+ device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path);
+ if (device_path_length > 0) {
+ /* add end node size */
+ device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path);
+ }
+ event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length;
+ image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size);
+ if (!image_load_event)
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+
+ image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (uintptr_t)efi;
+ image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size;
+ image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length;
+
+ dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi;
+ nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew);
+ if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt;
+
+ image_load_event->image_link_time_address =
+ nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
+ } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ image_load_event->image_link_time_address =
+ nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
+ } else {
+ ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (device_path_length > 0) {
+ memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path,
+ device_path_length);
+ }
+
+ ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list,
+ event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event);
+
+out:
+ free(image_load_event);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
* efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events
*
* @this: TCG2 protocol instance
@@ -758,24 +940,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags,
/*
* if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not
* corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with
- * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash"
- * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature
+ * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash"
+ * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature
* Format"
- * Not supported for now
*/
if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) {
- ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
- pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index;
- event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type;
+ ret = efi_check_pe((void *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash,
+ data_to_hash_len, (void **)&nt);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash,
+ data_to_hash_len, &digest_list);
+ } else {
+ ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash,
+ data_to_hash_len, &digest_list);
+ }
- ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash,
- data_to_hash_len, &digest_list);
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
+ pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index;
+ event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type;
+
ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list);
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
@@ -900,7 +1090,7 @@ static efi_status_t create_specid_event(struct udevice *dev, void *buffer,
struct tcg_efi_spec_id_event *spec_event;
size_t spec_event_size;
efi_status_t ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
- u32 active, supported;
+ u32 active = 0, supported = 0;
int err;
size_t i;