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authorNalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>2013-05-28 17:47:00 -0400
committerNalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>2013-05-28 18:18:23 -0400
commite98d94d2bc328a01051b88cda4793fd851f29f89 (patch)
treeb22073467076b1768e40fda933a8819a3cd54c14
parent9b1daaef434792b0cc6b4c2699036afe6fd9ea5b (diff)
downloadkrb5-e98d94d2bc328a01051b88cda4793fd851f29f89.tar.gz
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krb5-e98d94d2bc328a01051b88cda4793fd851f29f89.zip
Add proposed fix for handling AS client clock skew
In addition to basing the contents of an encrypted-timestamp preauth data item on the server's idea of the current time, go ahead and do the same for the times in the request.
-rw-r--r--krb5-1.11.2-skew1.patch115
-rw-r--r--krb5-1.11.2-skew2.patch144
-rw-r--r--krb5.spec8
3 files changed, 267 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/krb5-1.11.2-skew1.patch b/krb5-1.11.2-skew1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7dc919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/krb5-1.11.2-skew1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+>From 8f6d12bae1a0f1d274593c4a06dfa5948aa61418 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 08:38:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] krb5: Refator duplicate code for setting the AS REQ nonce
+
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+index 828b0fb..1058112 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+@@ -650,6 +650,34 @@ cleanup:
+ return code;
+ }
+
++static krb5_error_code
++update_req_before_encoding(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx)
++{
++ krb5_error_code code = 0;
++ unsigned char random_buf[4];
++ krb5_data random_data;
++
++ /*
++ * RFC 6113 requires a new nonce for the inner request on each try. It's
++ * permitted to change the nonce even for non-FAST as well.
++ */
++ random_data.length = 4;
++ random_data.data = (char *)random_buf;
++ code = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &random_data);
++ if (code != 0)
++ goto cleanup;
++
++ /*
++ * See RT ticket 3196 at MIT. If we set the high bit, we may have
++ * compatibility problems with Heimdal, because we (incorrectly) encode
++ * this value as signed.
++ */
++ ctx->request->nonce = 0x7fffffff & load_32_n(random_buf);
++
++cleanup:
++ return code;
++}
++
+ /**
+ * Throw away any state related to specific realm either at the beginning of a
+ * request, or when a realm changes, or when we start to use FAST after
+@@ -664,8 +692,6 @@ restart_init_creds_loop(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ krb5_pa_data **padata)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code code = 0;
+- unsigned char random_buf[4];
+- krb5_data random_data;
+ krb5_timestamp from;
+
+ if (ctx->preauth_to_use) {
+@@ -693,18 +719,10 @@ restart_init_creds_loop(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+- /* Set the request nonce. */
+- random_data.length = 4;
+- random_data.data = (char *)random_buf;
+- code = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &random_data);
+- if (code !=0)
++ code = update_req_before_encoding(context, ctx);
++ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+- /*
+- * See RT ticket 3196 at MIT. If we set the high bit, we may have
+- * compatibility problems with Heimdal, because we (incorrectly) encode
+- * this value as signed.
+- */
+- ctx->request->nonce = 0x7fffffff & load_32_n(random_buf);
++
+ krb5_free_principal(context, ctx->request->server);
+ ctx->request->server = NULL;
+
+@@ -1188,28 +1206,16 @@ init_creds_step_request(krb5_context context,
+ {
+ krb5_error_code code;
+ krb5_boolean got_real;
+- char random_buf[4];
+- krb5_data random_data;
+
+ if (ctx->loopcount >= MAX_IN_TKT_LOOPS) {
+ code = KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+- /*
+- * RFC 6113 requires a new nonce for the inner request on each try. It's
+- * permitted to change the nonce even for non-FAST so we do here.
+- */
+- random_data.length = 4;
+- random_data.data = (char *)random_buf;
+- code = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &random_data);
+- if (code !=0)
++
++ code = update_req_before_encoding(context, ctx);
++ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+- /*
+- * See RT ticket 3196 at MIT. If we set the high bit, we may have
+- * compatibility problems with Heimdal, because we (incorrectly) encode
+- * this value as signed.
+- */
+- ctx->request->nonce = 0x7fffffff & load_32_n(random_buf);
++
+ krb5_free_data(context, ctx->inner_request_body);
+ ctx->inner_request_body = NULL;
+ code = encode_krb5_kdc_req_body(ctx->request, &ctx->inner_request_body);
+--
+1.8.1.4
+
diff --git a/krb5-1.11.2-skew2.patch b/krb5-1.11.2-skew2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5063bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/krb5-1.11.2-skew2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+>From 51ab359d7cc6643cfd4fac28def2e1c756553201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 08:44:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] krb5: Fix ticket start and end time to respect skew
+
+Since the kerberos protocol uses timestamp rather than duration deltas
+for its starttime, endtime, and renewtime KDC AS REQ fields, we have
+to calculate these with respect to the offsets we know about received
+from the server.
+
+Leverage the unauthenticated server time we received during preauth when
+calculating these these timestamps from the duration deltas we use
+in our krb5 api and tools.
+
+In order to do this we have to update certain fields of the AS REQ
+each time we encode it for sending to the KDC.
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h | 5 +++++
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+index 1058112..694c9b0b 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ update_req_before_encoding(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx)
+ krb5_error_code code = 0;
+ unsigned char random_buf[4];
+ krb5_data random_data;
++ krb5_timestamp from;
++ krb5_int32 unused;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 6113 requires a new nonce for the inner request on each try. It's
+@@ -674,6 +676,28 @@ update_req_before_encoding(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx)
+ */
+ ctx->request->nonce = 0x7fffffff & load_32_n(random_buf);
+
++ code = k5_preauth_get_time(context, &ctx->preauth_rock, TRUE, &ctx->request_time, &unused);
++ if (code != 0)
++ goto cleanup;
++
++ /* Omit request start time in the common case. MIT and Heimdal KDCs will
++ * ignore it for non-postdated tickets anyway. */
++ from = krb5int_addint32(ctx->request_time, ctx->start_time);
++ if (ctx->start_time != 0)
++ ctx->request->from = from;
++ ctx->request->till = krb5int_addint32(from, ctx->tkt_life);
++
++ if (ctx->renew_life > 0) {
++ ctx->request->rtime =
++ krb5int_addint32(from, ctx->renew_life);
++ if (ctx->request->rtime < ctx->request->till) {
++ /* don't ask for a smaller renewable time than the lifetime */
++ ctx->request->rtime = ctx->request->till;
++ }
++ ctx->request->kdc_options &= ~(KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK);
++ } else
++ ctx->request->rtime = 0;
++
+ cleanup:
+ return code;
+ }
+@@ -692,7 +716,6 @@ restart_init_creds_loop(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ krb5_pa_data **padata)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code code = 0;
+- krb5_timestamp from;
+
+ if (ctx->preauth_to_use) {
+ krb5_free_pa_data(context, ctx->preauth_to_use);
+@@ -732,8 +755,6 @@ restart_init_creds_loop(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+- ctx->request_time = time(NULL);
+-
+ code = krb5int_fast_as_armor(context, ctx->fast_state,
+ ctx->opte, ctx->request);
+ if (code != 0)
+@@ -747,23 +768,6 @@ restart_init_creds_loop(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ /* give the preauth plugins a chance to prep the request body */
+ krb5_preauth_prepare_request(context, ctx->opte, ctx->request);
+
+- /* Omit request start time in the common case. MIT and Heimdal KDCs will
+- * ignore it for non-postdated tickets anyway. */
+- from = krb5int_addint32(ctx->request_time, ctx->start_time);
+- if (ctx->start_time != 0)
+- ctx->request->from = from;
+- ctx->request->till = krb5int_addint32(from, ctx->tkt_life);
+-
+- if (ctx->renew_life > 0) {
+- ctx->request->rtime =
+- krb5int_addint32(from, ctx->renew_life);
+- if (ctx->request->rtime < ctx->request->till) {
+- /* don't ask for a smaller renewable time than the lifetime */
+- ctx->request->rtime = ctx->request->till;
+- }
+- ctx->request->kdc_options &= ~(KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK);
+- } else
+- ctx->request->rtime = 0;
+ code = krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(context, ctx->fast_state,
+ ctx->request,
+ &ctx->outer_request_body);
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h b/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h
+index 3326154..83a47c0 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/int-proto.h
+@@ -142,6 +142,11 @@ krb5_preauth_supply_preauth_data(krb5_context context,
+ const char *value);
+
+ krb5_error_code
++k5_preauth_get_time(krb5_context context, krb5_clpreauth_rock rock,
++ krb5_boolean allow_unauth_time, krb5_timestamp *time_out,
++ krb5_int32 *usec_out);
++
++krb5_error_code
+ clpreauth_encrypted_challenge_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver,
+ int min_ver, krb5_plugin_vtable vtable);
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c
+index 747611e..167f611 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c
+@@ -397,6 +397,15 @@ get_preauth_time(krb5_context context, krb5_clpreauth_rock rock,
+ krb5_boolean allow_unauth_time, krb5_timestamp *time_out,
+ krb5_int32 *usec_out)
+ {
++ return k5_preauth_get_time(context, rock, allow_unauth_time,
++ time_out, usec_out);
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++k5_preauth_get_time(krb5_context context, krb5_clpreauth_rock rock,
++ krb5_boolean allow_unauth_time, krb5_timestamp *time_out,
++ krb5_int32 *usec_out)
++{
+ if (rock->pa_offset_state != NO_OFFSET &&
+ (allow_unauth_time || rock->pa_offset_state == AUTH_OFFSET) &&
+ (context->library_options & KRB5_LIBOPT_SYNC_KDCTIME)) {
+--
+1.8.1.4
+
diff --git a/krb5.spec b/krb5.spec
index a56d346..49a7253 100644
--- a/krb5.spec
+++ b/krb5.spec
@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ Patch121: krb5-cccol-primary.patch
Patch122: krb5-1.11.2-gss_transited.patch
Patch123: krb5-1.11.2-empty_passwords.patch
Patch124: krb5-1.11.2-arcfour_short.patch
+Patch125: krb5-1.11.2-skew1.patch
+Patch126: krb5-1.11.2-skew2.patch
# Patches for otp plugin backport
Patch201: krb5-1.11.2-keycheck.patch
@@ -306,6 +308,8 @@ ln -s NOTICE LICENSE
%patch122 -p1 -b .gss_transited
%patch123 -p1 -b .empty_passwords
%patch124 -p1 -b .arcfour_short
+%patch125 -p1 -b .skew1
+%patch126 -p1 -b .skew2
%patch201 -p1 -b .keycheck
%patch202 -p1 -b .otp
@@ -836,6 +840,10 @@ exit 0
in GSS acceptors (RT#7639, #959685)
- backport fix for not being able to pass an empty password to the
get-init-creds APIs and have them actually use it (RT#7642, #960001)
+- add backported proposed fix to use the unauthenticated server time
+ as the basis for computing the requested credential expiration times,
+ rather than the client's idea of the current time, which could be
+ significantly incorrect (#961221)
* Tue May 21 2013 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 1.11.2-6
- pull in upstream fix to start treating a KRB5CCNAME value that begins