/* * MIT Kerberos KDC database backend for FreeIPA * * Authors: Simo Sorce * * Copyright (C) 2011 Simo Sorce, Red Hat * see file 'COPYING' for use and warranty information * * This program is free software you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program. If not, see . */ #include "ipa_kdb.h" #include #include "util/time.h" #include "gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h" static char *user_pac_attrs[] = { "objectClass", "uid", "cn", "gidNumber", "krbPrincipalName", "krbCanonicalName", "krbTicketPolicyReference", "krbPrincipalExpiration", "krbPasswordExpiration", "krbPwdPolicyReference", "krbPrincipalType", "krbLastPwdChange", "krbPrincipalAliases", "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", "krbLastFailedAuth", "krbLoginFailedCount", "krbLastAdminUnlock", "krbTicketFlags", "ipaNTSecurityIdentifier", "ipaNTLogonScript", "ipaNTProfilePath", "ipaNTHomeDirectory", "ipaNTHomeDirectoryDrive", NULL }; char *deref_search_attrs[] = { "memberOf", NULL }; static char *memberof_pac_attrs[] = { "gidNumber", "ipaNTSecurityIdentifier", NULL }; #define SID_SUB_AUTHS 15 static int string_to_sid(char *str, struct dom_sid *sid) { unsigned long val; char *s, *t; int i; memset(sid, '\0', sizeof(struct dom_sid)); s = str; if (strncasecmp(s, "S-", 2) != 0) { return EINVAL; } s += 2; val = strtoul(s, &t, 10); if (s == t || !t || *t != '-') { return EINVAL; } s = t + 1; sid->sid_rev_num = val; val = strtoul(s, &t, 10); if (s == t || !t) { return EINVAL; } sid->id_auth[2] = (val & 0xff000000) >> 24; sid->id_auth[3] = (val & 0x00ff0000) >> 16; sid->id_auth[4] = (val & 0x0000ff00) >> 8; sid->id_auth[5] = (val & 0x000000ff); for (i = 0; i < SID_SUB_AUTHS; i++) { switch (*t) { case '\0': /* no (more) subauths, we are done with it */ sid->num_auths = i; return 0; case '-': /* there are (more) subauths */ s = t + 1;; break; default: /* garbage */ return EINVAL; } val = strtoul(s, &t, 10); if (s == t || !t) { return EINVAL; } sid->sub_auths[i] = val; } if (*t != '\0') { return EINVAL; } sid->num_auths = i; return 0; } /** * @brief Takes a user sid and removes the rid. * The sid is changed by this function, * the removed rid is returned too. * * @param sid A user/group SID * @param rid The actual RID found. * * @return 0 on success, EINVAL otherwise. */ static int sid_split_rid(struct dom_sid *sid, uint32_t *rid) { if (sid->num_auths == 0) { return EINVAL; } sid->num_auths--; *rid = sid->sub_auths[sid->num_auths]; sid->sub_auths[sid->num_auths] = 0; return 0; } static krb5_error_code ipadb_fill_info3(struct ipadb_context *ipactx, LDAPMessage *lentry, TALLOC_CTX *memctx, struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3) { LDAP *lcontext = ipactx->lcontext; LDAPDerefRes *deref_results = NULL; struct dom_sid sid; gid_t prigid = -1; time_t timeres; char *strres; int intres; int ret; ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_int(lcontext, lentry, "gidNumber", &intres); if (ret) { /* gidNumber is mandatory */ return ret; } prigid = intres; info3->base.logon_time = 0; /* do not have this info yet */ info3->base.logoff_time = -1; /* do not force logoff */ /* TODO: is krbPrinciplaExpiration what we want to use in kickoff_time ? * Needs more investigation */ #if 0 ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_time_t(lcontext, lentry, "krbPrincipalExpiration", &timeres); switch (ret) { case 0: unix_to_nt_time(&info3->base.acct_expiry, timeres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.acct_expiry = -1; break; default: return ret; } #else info3->base.kickoff_time = -1; #endif ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_time_t(lcontext, lentry, "krbLastPwdChange", &timeres); switch (ret) { case 0: unix_to_nt_time(&info3->base.last_password_change, timeres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.last_password_change = 0; break; default: return ret; } /* TODO: from pw policy (ied->pol) */ info3->base.allow_password_change = 0; info3->base.force_password_change = -1; /* FIXME: handle computer accounts they do not use 'uid' */ ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "uid", &strres); if (ret) { /* uid is mandatory */ return ret; } info3->base.account_name.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, strres); free(strres); ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "cn", &strres); switch (ret) { case 0: info3->base.full_name.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, strres); free(strres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.full_name.string = ""; break; default: return ret; } ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTLogonScript", &strres); switch (ret) { case 0: info3->base.logon_script.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, strres); free(strres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.logon_script.string = ""; break; default: return ret; } ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTProfilePath", &strres); switch (ret) { case 0: info3->base.profile_path.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, strres); free(strres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.profile_path.string = ""; break; default: return ret; } ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTHomeDirectory", &strres); switch (ret) { case 0: info3->base.home_directory.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, strres); free(strres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.home_directory.string = ""; break; default: return ret; } ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTHomeDirectoryDrive", &strres); switch (ret) { case 0: info3->base.home_drive.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, strres); free(strres); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.home_drive.string = ""; break; default: return ret; } info3->base.logon_count = 0; /* we do not have this info yet */ info3->base.bad_password_count = 0; /* we do not have this info yet */ ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTSecurityIdentifier", &strres); if (ret) { /* SID is mandatory */ return ret; } ret = string_to_sid(strres, &sid); free(strres); if (ret) { return ret; } ret = sid_split_rid(&sid, &info3->base.rid); if (ret) { return ret; } ret = ipadb_ldap_deref_results(lcontext, lentry, &deref_results); switch (ret) { LDAPDerefRes *dres; LDAPDerefVal *dval; struct dom_sid gsid; uint32_t trid; gid_t tgid; char *s; int count; case 0: count = 0; for (dres = deref_results; dres; dres = dres->next) { count++; /* count*/ } info3->base.groups.rids = talloc_array(memctx, struct samr_RidWithAttribute, count); if (!info3->base.groups.rids) { ldap_derefresponse_free(deref_results); return ENOMEM; } count = 0; info3->base.primary_gid = 0; for (dres = deref_results; dres; dres = dres->next) { gsid.sid_rev_num = 0; tgid = 0; for (dval = dres->attrVals; dval; dval = dval->next) { if (strcasecmp(dval->type, "gidNumber") == 0) { tgid = strtoul((char *)dval->vals[0].bv_val, &s, 10); if (tgid == 0) { continue; } } if (strcasecmp(dval->type, "ipaNTSecurityIdentifier") == 0) { ret = string_to_sid((char *)dval->vals[0].bv_val, &gsid); if (ret) { continue; } } } if (tgid && gsid.sid_rev_num) { ret = sid_split_rid(&gsid, &trid); if (ret) { continue; } if (tgid == prigid) { info3->base.primary_gid = trid; continue; } info3->base.groups.rids[count].rid = trid; info3->base.groups.rids[count].attributes = SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT; count++; } } info3->base.groups.count = count; ldap_derefresponse_free(deref_results); break; case ENOENT: info3->base.groups.count = 0; info3->base.groups.rids = NULL; break; default: return ret; } if (info3->base.primary_gid == 0) { if (ipactx->wc.fallback_rid) { info3->base.primary_gid = ipactx->wc.fallback_rid; } else { /* can't give a pack without a primary group rid */ return ENOENT; } } /* always zero out, only valid flags are for extra sids with Krb */ info3->base.user_flags = 0; /* netr_UserFlags */ /* always zero out, not used for Krb, only NTLM */ memset(&info3->base.key, '\0', sizeof(info3->base.key)); if (ipactx->wc.flat_server_name) { info3->base.logon_server.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, ipactx->wc.flat_server_name); if (!info3->base.logon_server.string) { return ENOMEM; } } else { /* can't give a pack without Server NetBIOS Name :-| */ return ENOENT; } if (ipactx->wc.flat_domain_name) { info3->base.logon_domain.string = talloc_strdup(memctx, ipactx->wc.flat_domain_name); if (!info3->base.logon_domain.string) { return ENOMEM; } } else { /* can't give a pack without Domain NetBIOS Name :-| */ return ENOENT; } /* we got the domain SID for the user sid */ info3->base.domain_sid = &sid; /* always zero out, not used for Krb, only NTLM */ memset(&info3->base.LMSessKey, '\0', sizeof(info3->base.key)); /* TODO: fill based on objectclass, user vs computer, etc... */ info3->base.acct_flags = ACB_NORMAL; /* samr_AcctFlags */ info3->base.sub_auth_status = 0; info3->base.last_successful_logon = 0; info3->base.last_failed_logon = 0; info3->base.failed_logon_count = 0; /* We do not have it */ info3->base.reserved = 0; /* Reserved */ return 0; } static krb5_error_code ipadb_get_pac(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_pac *pac) { TALLOC_CTX *tmpctx; struct ipadb_e_data *ied; struct ipadb_context *ipactx; LDAPMessage *results = NULL; LDAPMessage *lentry; DATA_BLOB pac_data; krb5_data data; union PAC_INFO pac_info; krb5_error_code kerr; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; ipactx = ipadb_get_context(kcontext); if (!ipactx) { return KRB5_KDB_DBNOTINITED; } ied = (struct ipadb_e_data *)client->e_data; if (ied->magic != IPA_E_DATA_MAGIC) { return EINVAL; } if (!ied->ipa_user) { return 0; } tmpctx = talloc_new(NULL); if (!tmpctx) { return ENOMEM; } memset(&pac_info, 0, sizeof(pac_info)); pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(tmpctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO); if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) { kerr = ENOMEM; goto done; } /* == Search PAC info == */ kerr = ipadb_deref_search(ipactx, ied->entry_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "(objectclass=*)", user_pac_attrs, deref_search_attrs, memberof_pac_attrs, &results); if (kerr) { goto done; } lentry = ldap_first_entry(ipactx->lcontext, results); if (!lentry) { kerr = ENOENT; goto done; } /* == Fill Info3 == */ kerr = ipadb_fill_info3(ipactx, lentry, tmpctx, &pac_info.logon_info.info->info3); if (kerr) { goto done; } /* == Package PAC == */ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(&pac_data, tmpctx, &pac_info, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { kerr = KRB5_KDB_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto done; } kerr = krb5_pac_init(kcontext, pac); if (kerr) { goto done; } data.magic = KV5M_DATA; data.data = (char *)pac_data.data; data.length = pac_data.length; kerr = krb5_pac_add_buffer(kcontext, *pac, KRB5_PAC_LOGON_INFO, &data); done: ldap_msgfree(results); talloc_free(tmpctx); return kerr; } static bool is_cross_realm_krbtgt(krb5_const_principal princ) { if ((princ->length != 2) || (princ->data[0].length != 6) || (strncasecmp(princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", 6) != 0)) { return false; } if (princ->data[1].length == princ->realm.length && strncasecmp(princ->data[1].data, princ->realm.data, princ->realm.length) == 0) { return false; } return true; } static krb5_error_code ipadb_verify_pac(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_const_principal client_princ, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_timestamp authtime, krb5_authdata **tgt_auth_data, krb5_pac *pac) { krb5_authdata **authdata = NULL; krb5_keyblock *srv_key = NULL; krb5_keyblock *priv_key = NULL; krb5_error_code kerr; krb5_ui_4 *buffer_types = NULL; size_t num_buffers; krb5_pac old_pac = NULL; krb5_pac new_pac = NULL; krb5_data data; size_t i; /* find the existing PAC, if present */ kerr = krb5_find_authdata(context, tgt_auth_data, NULL, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, &authdata); if (kerr != 0) { return kerr; } /* check pac data */ if (authdata == NULL || authdata[0] == NULL) { kerr = 0; /* none */ goto done; } if (authdata[1] != NULL) { kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* FIXME: right error ? */ goto done; } kerr = krb5_pac_parse(context, authdata[0]->contents, authdata[0]->length, &old_pac); if (kerr) { goto done; } /* for cross realm trusts cases we need to check the right checksum. * when the PAC is signed by our realm, we can always just check it * passing our realm krbtgt key as the kdc checksum key (privsvr). * But when a trusted realm passes us a PAC the kdc checksum is * generated with that realm krbtgt key, so we need to use the cross * realm krbtgt to check the 'server' checksum instead. */ if (is_cross_realm_krbtgt(krbtgt->princ)) { /* krbtgt from a trusted realm */ /* FIXME: * We must refuse a PAC that comes signed with a cross realm TGT * where the client pretends to be from our realm. It is an attempt * at getting us to sign fake credentials with the help of a * compromised trusted realm */ /* TODO: Here is where we need to plug our PAC Filtering, later on */ srv_key = krbtgt_key; } else { /* krbtgt from our own realm */ priv_key = krbtgt_key; } kerr = krb5_pac_verify(context, old_pac, authtime, client_princ, srv_key, priv_key); if (kerr) { goto done; } /* extract buffers and rebuilt pac from scratch so that when re-signing * with a different cksum type does not cause issues due to mismatching * signature buffer lengths */ kerr = krb5_pac_init(context, &new_pac); if (kerr) { goto done; } kerr = krb5_pac_get_types(context, old_pac, &num_buffers, &buffer_types); if (kerr) { goto done; } for (i = 0; i < num_buffers; i++) { if (buffer_types[i] == KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM || buffer_types[i] == KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM) { continue; } kerr = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, old_pac, buffer_types[i], &data); if (kerr == 0) { kerr = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, new_pac, buffer_types[i], &data); } krb5_free_data_contents(context, &data); if (kerr) { krb5_pac_free(context, new_pac); goto done; } } *pac = new_pac; done: krb5_free_authdata(context, authdata); krb5_pac_free(context, old_pac); free(buffer_types); return kerr; } static krb5_error_code ipadb_sign_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal client_princ, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_timestamp authtime, krb5_pac pac, krb5_data *pac_data) { krb5_keyblock *right_krbtgt_signing_key = NULL; krb5_key_data *right_krbtgt_key; krb5_db_entry *right_krbtgt = NULL; krb5_principal krbtgt_princ = NULL; krb5_error_code kerr; char *princ = NULL; int ret; /* for cross realm trusts cases we need to sign with the right key. * we need to fetch the right key on our own until the DAL is fixed * to pass us separate check tgt keys and sign tgt keys */ /* We can only ever create the kdc checksum with our realm tgt key. * So, if we get a cross realm tgt we have to fetch our realm tgt * instead. */ if (is_cross_realm_krbtgt(krbtgt->princ)) { ret = asprintf(&princ, "krbtgt/%.*s@%.*s", server->princ->realm.length, server->princ->realm.data, server->princ->realm.length, server->princ->realm.data); if (ret == -1) { princ = NULL; kerr = ENOMEM; goto done; } kerr = krb5_parse_name(context, princ, &krbtgt_princ); if (kerr) { goto done; } kerr = ipadb_get_principal(context, krbtgt_princ, 0, &right_krbtgt); if (kerr) { goto done; } kerr = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, right_krbtgt, -1, -1, 0, &right_krbtgt_key); if (kerr) { goto done; } if (!right_krbtgt_key) { kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto done; } right_krbtgt_signing_key = malloc(sizeof(krb5_keyblock)); if (!right_krbtgt_signing_key) { kerr = ENOMEM; goto done; } kerr = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, right_krbtgt_key, right_krbtgt_signing_key, NULL); if (kerr) { goto done; } } else { right_krbtgt_signing_key = krbtgt_key; } kerr = krb5_pac_sign(context, pac, authtime, client_princ, server_key, right_krbtgt_signing_key, pac_data); done: free(princ); krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_princ); ipadb_free_principal(context, right_krbtgt); if (right_krbtgt_signing_key != krbtgt_key) { krb5_free_keyblock(context, right_krbtgt_signing_key); } return kerr; } krb5_error_code ipadb_sign_authdata(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_const_principal client_princ, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_keyblock *session_key, krb5_timestamp authtime, krb5_authdata **tgt_auth_data, krb5_authdata ***signed_auth_data) { krb5_const_principal ks_client_princ; krb5_authdata *authdata[2] = { NULL, NULL }; krb5_authdata ad; krb5_boolean is_as_req; krb5_error_code kerr; krb5_pac pac = NULL; krb5_data pac_data; /* Prefer canonicalised name from client entry */ if (client != NULL) { ks_client_princ = client->princ; } else { ks_client_princ = client_princ; } is_as_req = ((flags & KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY) != 0); if (is_as_req && (flags & KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC)) { kerr = ipadb_get_pac(context, client, &pac); if (kerr != 0 && kerr != ENOENT) { goto done; } } if (!is_as_req) { kerr = ipadb_verify_pac(context, flags, ks_client_princ, server, krbtgt, server_key, krbtgt_key, authtime, tgt_auth_data, &pac); if (kerr != 0) { goto done; } } if (pac == NULL) { /* No PAC to deal with, proceed */ *signed_auth_data = NULL; kerr = 0; goto done; } kerr = ipadb_sign_pac(context, ks_client_princ, server, krbtgt, server_key, krbtgt_key, authtime, pac, &pac_data); if (kerr != 0) { goto done; } /* put in signed data */ ad.magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA; ad.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC; ad.contents = (krb5_octet *)pac_data.data; ad.length = pac_data.length; authdata[0] = &ad; kerr = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT, &authdata, signed_auth_data); if (kerr != 0) { goto done; } kerr = 0; done: krb5_pac_free(context, pac); return kerr; } static char *get_server_netbios_name(void) { char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; /* NOTE: this is 64, too little ? */ char *p; int ret; ret = gethostname(hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN); if (ret) { return NULL; } /* May miss termination */ hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = '\0'; for (p = hostname; *p; p++) { if (*p == '.') { *p = 0; break; } else { *p = toupper(*p); } } return strdup(hostname); } krb5_error_code ipadb_reinit_mspac(struct ipadb_context *ipactx) { char *dom_attrs[] = { "ipaNTFlatName", "ipaNTFallbackPrimaryGroup", NULL }; char *grp_attrs[] = { "ipaNTSecurityIdentifier", NULL }; krb5_error_code kerr; LDAPMessage *result = NULL; LDAPMessage *lentry; struct dom_sid gsid; char *resstr; int ret; /* clean up in case we had old values around */ free(ipactx->wc.flat_domain_name); ipactx->wc.flat_domain_name = NULL; free(ipactx->wc.fallback_group); ipactx->wc.fallback_group = NULL; ipactx->wc.fallback_rid = 0; kerr = ipadb_simple_search(ipactx, ipactx->base, LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE, "(objectclass=ipaNTDomainAttrs)", dom_attrs, &result); if (kerr == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) { return ENOENT; } else if (kerr != 0) { return EIO; } lentry = ldap_first_entry(ipactx->lcontext, result); if (!lentry) { kerr = ENOENT; goto done; } ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(ipactx->lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTFlatName", &ipactx->wc.flat_domain_name); if (ret) { kerr = ret; goto done; } free(ipactx->wc.flat_server_name); ipactx->wc.flat_server_name = get_server_netbios_name(); if (!ipactx->wc.flat_server_name) { kerr = ENOMEM; goto done; } ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(ipactx->lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTFallbackPrimaryGroup", &ipactx->wc.fallback_group); if (ret && ret != ENOENT) { kerr = ret; goto done; } /* result and lentry not valid any more from here on */ ldap_msgfree(result); result = NULL; lentry = NULL; if (ret != ENOENT) { kerr = ipadb_simple_search(ipactx, ipactx->wc.fallback_group, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "(objectclass=posixGroup)", grp_attrs, &result); if (kerr && kerr != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) { kerr = ret; goto done; } lentry = ldap_first_entry(ipactx->lcontext, result); if (!lentry) { kerr = ENOENT; goto done; } if (kerr == 0) { ret = ipadb_ldap_attr_to_str(ipactx->lcontext, lentry, "ipaNTSecurityIdentifier", &resstr); if (ret && ret != ENOENT) { kerr = ret; goto done; } if (ret == 0) { ret = string_to_sid(resstr, &gsid); if (ret) { kerr = ret; goto done; } ret = sid_split_rid(&gsid, &ipactx->wc.fallback_rid); if (ret) { kerr = ret; goto done; } } } } kerr = 0; done: ldap_msgfree(result); return kerr; }