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From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 18:14:19 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.
For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c
Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.
For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 27c8dab48c07..1ce6d67c07b7 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -821,10 +821,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
return true;
- } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
- kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
- if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
- return true;
}
}
--
2.1.0
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