From 6a2f1603522016c980560ee9abb9140f727dc828 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Justin M. Forbes" Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 11:50:46 -0600 Subject: kernel-5.16.5-0 * Tue Feb 01 2022 Justin M. Forbes [5.16.5-0] - Linux v5.16.5 rebase - ath11k: add support for WCN6855 hw2.1 (Baochen Qiang) Resolves: rhbz# Signed-off-by: Justin M. Forbes --- patch-5.16-redhat.patch | 1979 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1979 insertions(+) create mode 100644 patch-5.16-redhat.patch (limited to 'patch-5.16-redhat.patch') diff --git a/patch-5.16-redhat.patch b/patch-5.16-redhat.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cfe95dace --- /dev/null +++ b/patch-5.16-redhat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1979 @@ + Makefile | 4 + + arch/arm/Kconfig | 4 +- + arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 +- + arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h | 1 + + arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c | 5 + + arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 4 + + arch/x86/kernel/resource.c | 23 +++- + arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 22 ++-- + crypto/rng.c | 73 +++++++++++- + drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c | 8 ++ + drivers/acpi/irq.c | 17 ++- + drivers/acpi/scan.c | 9 ++ + drivers/ata/libahci.c | 18 +++ + drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c | 15 +++ + drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 16 ++- + drivers/char/random.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++ + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 124 +++++++++++++++------ + drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 38 +++++++ + drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 64 ----------- + drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 19 ++++ + drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c | 124 ++++++++++++--------- + drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 22 ++++ + drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.c | 53 +++++++++ + drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.h | 1 + + drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/mhi.c | 1 + + drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c | 16 ++- + drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 22 +++- + drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c | 19 ++-- + drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 4 + + drivers/pci/quirks.c | 24 ++++ + drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 7 ++ + include/linux/efi.h | 22 ++-- + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 + + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 + + include/linux/random.h | 7 ++ + include/linux/rmi.h | 1 + + include/linux/security.h | 5 + + include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h | 1 + + kernel/module_signing.c | 9 +- + net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 3 + + net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 43 ++++++- + scripts/tags.sh | 2 + + security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 6 +- + security/lockdown/Kconfig | 13 +++ + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + + security/security.c | 6 + + tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh | 5 +- + 48 files changed, 815 insertions(+), 193 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index 2f0e5c3d9e2a..d71b7646e438 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ $(if $(filter __%, $(MAKECMDGOALS)), \ + PHONY := __all + __all: + ++# Set RHEL variables ++# Use this spot to avoid future merge conflicts ++include Makefile.rhelver ++ + # We are using a recursive build, so we need to do a little thinking + # to get the ordering right. + # +diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig +index c2724d986fa0..8063dcef65f7 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig +@@ -1479,9 +1479,9 @@ config HIGHMEM + If unsure, say n. + + config HIGHPTE +- bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" if EXPERT ++ bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" + depends on HIGHMEM +- default y ++ default n + help + The VM uses one page of physical memory for each page table. + For systems with a lot of processes, this can use a lot of +diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig +index c4207cf9bb17..9e440657f15e 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig +@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ endchoice + + config ARM64_FORCE_52BIT + bool "Force 52-bit virtual addresses for userspace" +- depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52 && EXPERT ++ depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52 + help + For systems with 52-bit userspace VAs enabled, the kernel will attempt + to maintain compatibility with older software by providing 48-bit VAs +@@ -1277,6 +1277,7 @@ config XEN + config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER + int + default "14" if ARM64_64K_PAGES ++ default "13" if (ARCH_THUNDER && !ARM64_64K_PAGES) + default "12" if ARM64_16K_PAGES + default "11" + help +diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h +index 3f8ee257f9aa..3ab92feb6241 100644 +--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h ++++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ int ipl_report_add_component(struct ipl_report *report, struct kexec_buf *kbuf, + unsigned char flags, unsigned short cert); + int ipl_report_add_certificate(struct ipl_report *report, void *key, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); ++bool ipl_get_secureboot(void); + + /* + * DIAG 308 support +diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c +index 5ad1dde23dc5..b6192d58eed3 100644 +--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c ++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c +@@ -2216,3 +2216,8 @@ int ipl_report_free(struct ipl_report *report) + } + + #endif ++ ++bool ipl_get_secureboot(void) ++{ ++ return !!ipl_secure_flag; ++} +diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +index 225ab2d0a4c6..6a06cde25ca2 100644 +--- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -963,6 +964,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) + + log_component_list(); + ++ if (ipl_get_secureboot()) ++ security_lock_kernel_down("Secure IPL mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX); ++ + /* Have one command line that is parsed and saved in /proc/cmdline */ + /* boot_command_line has been already set up in early.c */ + *cmdline_p = boot_command_line; +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c b/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c +index 9b9fb7882c20..9ae64f9af956 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c +@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ + // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -23,11 +24,31 @@ static void resource_clip(struct resource *res, resource_size_t start, + res->start = end + 1; + } + ++/* ++ * Some BIOS-es contain a bug where they add addresses which map to ++ * system RAM in the PCI host bridge window returned by the ACPI _CRS ++ * method, see commit 4dc2287c1805 ("x86: avoid E820 regions when ++ * allocating address space"). To avoid this Linux by default excludes ++ * E820 reservations when allocating addresses since 2010. ++ * In 2019 some systems have shown-up with E820 reservations which cover ++ * the entire _CRS returned PCI host bridge window, causing all attempts ++ * to assign memory to PCI BARs to fail if Linux uses E820 reservations. ++ * ++ * Ideally Linux would fully stop using E820 reservations, but then ++ * the old systems this was added for will regress. ++ * Instead keep the old behavior for old systems, while ignoring the ++ * E820 reservations for any systems from now on. ++ */ + static void remove_e820_regions(struct resource *avail) + { +- int i; ++ int i, year = dmi_get_bios_year(); + struct e820_entry *entry; + ++ if (year >= 2018) ++ return; ++ ++ pr_info_once("PCI: Removing E820 reservations from host bridge windows\n"); ++ + for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) { + entry = &e820_table->entries[i]; + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +index e04f5e6eb33f..8015e3d2dc9a 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -929,6 +930,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) + if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) + efi_init(); + ++ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot); ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT ++ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) ++ security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX); ++#endif ++ + dmi_setup(); + + /* +@@ -1094,19 +1102,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) + /* Allocate bigger log buffer */ + setup_log_buf(1); + +- if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { +- switch (boot_params.secure_boot) { +- case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled: +- pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n"); +- break; +- case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled: +- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); +- break; +- default: +- pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n"); +- break; +- } +- } ++ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot); + + reserve_initrd(); + +diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c +index fea082b25fe4..50a9d040bed1 100644 +--- a/crypto/rng.c ++++ b/crypto/rng.c +@@ -11,14 +11,17 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +-#include + #include + + #include "internal.h" +@@ -224,5 +227,73 @@ void crypto_unregister_rngs(struct rng_alg *algs, int count) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_rngs); + ++static ssize_t crypto_devrandom_read(void __user *buf, size_t buflen) ++{ ++ u8 tmp[256]; ++ ssize_t ret; ++ ++ if (!buflen) ++ return 0; ++ ++ ret = crypto_get_default_rng(); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ for (;;) { ++ int err; ++ int i; ++ ++ i = min_t(int, buflen, sizeof(tmp)); ++ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, tmp, i); ++ if (err) { ++ ret = err; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ++ ret = -EFAULT; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ buflen -= i; ++ buf += i; ++ ret += i; ++ ++ if (!buflen) ++ break; ++ ++ if (need_resched()) { ++ if (signal_pending(current)) ++ break; ++ schedule(); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ crypto_put_default_rng(); ++ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static const struct random_extrng crypto_devrandom_rng = { ++ .extrng_read = crypto_devrandom_read, ++ .owner = THIS_MODULE, ++}; ++ ++static int __init crypto_rng_init(void) ++{ ++ if (fips_enabled) ++ random_register_extrng(&crypto_devrandom_rng); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static void __exit crypto_rng_exit(void) ++{ ++ random_unregister_extrng(); ++} ++ ++late_initcall(crypto_rng_init); ++module_exit(crypto_rng_exit); ++ + MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Random Number Generator"); +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c +index 0edc1ed47673..782e2f399af2 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c +@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ static int apei_hest_parse(apei_hest_func_t func, void *data) + if (hest_disable || !hest_tab) + return -EINVAL; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 ++ /* Ignore broken firmware */ ++ if (!strncmp(hest_tab->header.oem_id, "HPE ", 6) && ++ !strncmp(hest_tab->header.oem_table_id, "ProLiant", 8) && ++ MIDR_IMPLEMENTOR(read_cpuid_id()) == ARM_CPU_IMP_APM) ++ return -EINVAL; ++#endif ++ + hest_hdr = (struct acpi_hest_header *)(hest_tab + 1); + for (i = 0; i < hest_tab->error_source_count; i++) { + len = hest_esrc_len(hest_hdr); +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/irq.c b/drivers/acpi/irq.c +index c68e694fca26..146cba5ae5bc 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/irq.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/irq.c +@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx { + unsigned int index; + unsigned long *res_flags; + struct irq_fwspec *fwspec; ++ bool skip_producer_check; + }; + + /** +@@ -201,7 +202,8 @@ static acpi_status acpi_irq_parse_one_cb(struct acpi_resource *ares, + return AE_CTRL_TERMINATE; + case ACPI_RESOURCE_TYPE_EXTENDED_IRQ: + eirq = &ares->data.extended_irq; +- if (eirq->producer_consumer == ACPI_PRODUCER) ++ if (!ctx->skip_producer_check && ++ eirq->producer_consumer == ACPI_PRODUCER) + return AE_OK; + if (ctx->index >= eirq->interrupt_count) { + ctx->index -= eirq->interrupt_count; +@@ -236,8 +238,19 @@ static acpi_status acpi_irq_parse_one_cb(struct acpi_resource *ares, + static int acpi_irq_parse_one(acpi_handle handle, unsigned int index, + struct irq_fwspec *fwspec, unsigned long *flags) + { +- struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx ctx = { -EINVAL, index, flags, fwspec }; ++ struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx ctx = { -EINVAL, index, flags, fwspec, false }; + ++ /* ++ * Firmware on arm64-based HPE m400 platform incorrectly marks ++ * its UART interrupt as ACPI_PRODUCER rather than ACPI_CONSUMER. ++ * Don't do the producer/consumer check for that device. ++ */ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64)) { ++ struct acpi_device *adev = acpi_bus_get_acpi_device(handle); ++ ++ if (adev && !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(adev), "APMC0D08")) ++ ctx.skip_producer_check = true; ++ } + acpi_walk_resources(handle, METHOD_NAME__CRS, acpi_irq_parse_one_cb, &ctx); + return ctx.rc; + } +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/scan.c b/drivers/acpi/scan.c +index 25d9f04f1995..c2fa1e98fb28 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/scan.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/scan.c +@@ -1732,6 +1732,15 @@ static bool acpi_device_enumeration_by_parent(struct acpi_device *device) + if (!acpi_match_device_ids(device, ignore_serial_bus_ids)) + return false; + ++ /* ++ * Firmware on some arm64 X-Gene platforms will make the UART ++ * device appear as both a UART and a slave of that UART. Just ++ * bail out here for X-Gene UARTs. ++ */ ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64) && ++ !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "APMC0D08")) ++ return false; ++ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resource_list); + acpi_dev_get_resources(device, &resource_list, + acpi_check_serial_bus_slave, +diff --git a/drivers/ata/libahci.c b/drivers/ata/libahci.c +index f76b8418e6fb..350e52fccc30 100644 +--- a/drivers/ata/libahci.c ++++ b/drivers/ata/libahci.c +@@ -690,6 +690,24 @@ int ahci_stop_engine(struct ata_port *ap) + tmp &= ~PORT_CMD_START; + writel(tmp, port_mmio + PORT_CMD); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 ++ /* Rev Ax of Cavium CN99XX needs a hack for port stop */ ++ if (dev_is_pci(ap->host->dev) && ++ to_pci_dev(ap->host->dev)->vendor == 0x14e4 && ++ to_pci_dev(ap->host->dev)->device == 0x9027 && ++ midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(), ++ MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_BRCM, BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN), ++ MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0), ++ MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, MIDR_REVISION_MASK))) { ++ tmp = readl(hpriv->mmio + 0x8000); ++ udelay(100); ++ writel(tmp | (1 << 26), hpriv->mmio + 0x8000); ++ udelay(100); ++ writel(tmp & ~(1 << 26), hpriv->mmio + 0x8000); ++ dev_warn(ap->host->dev, "CN99XX SATA reset workaround applied\n"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* wait for engine to stop. This could be as long as 500 msec */ + tmp = ata_wait_register(ap, port_mmio + PORT_CMD, + PORT_CMD_LIST_ON, PORT_CMD_LIST_ON, 1, 500); +diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c +index bbf7029e224b..cf7faa970dd6 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c ++++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c +@@ -215,6 +215,21 @@ static int __init scan_for_dmi_ipmi(void) + { + const struct dmi_device *dev = NULL; + ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 ++ /* RHEL-only ++ * If this is ARM-based HPE m400, return now, because that platform ++ * reports the host-side ipmi address as intel port-io space, which ++ * does not exist in the ARM architecture. ++ */ ++ const char *dmistr = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME); ++ ++ if (dmistr && (strcmp("ProLiant m400 Server", dmistr) == 0)) { ++ pr_debug("%s does not support host ipmi\n", dmistr); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* END RHEL-only */ ++#endif ++ + while ((dev = dmi_find_device(DMI_DEV_TYPE_IPMI, NULL, dev))) + dmi_decode_ipmi((const struct dmi_header *) dev->device_data); + +diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +index c59265146e9c..caa8458edde2 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c ++++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + + #define IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "39.2" +@@ -5422,8 +5423,21 @@ static int __init ipmi_init_msghandler_mod(void) + { + int rv; + +- pr_info("version " IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "\n"); ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 ++ /* RHEL-only ++ * If this is ARM-based HPE m400, return now, because that platform ++ * reports the host-side ipmi address as intel port-io space, which ++ * does not exist in the ARM architecture. ++ */ ++ const char *dmistr = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME); + ++ if (dmistr && (strcmp("ProLiant m400 Server", dmistr) == 0)) { ++ pr_debug("%s does not support host ipmi\n", dmistr); ++ return -ENOSYS; ++ } ++ /* END RHEL-only */ ++#endif ++ pr_info("version " IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "\n"); + mutex_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex); + rv = ipmi_register_driver(); + mutex_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex); +diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c +index a27ae3999ff3..dc4e136adb08 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/random.c ++++ b/drivers/char/random.c +@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -349,6 +350,11 @@ + + /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ + ++/* ++ * Hook for external RNG. ++ */ ++static const struct random_extrng __rcu *extrng; ++ + /* + * Configuration information + */ +@@ -482,6 +488,9 @@ static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; + module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); + MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); + ++static const struct file_operations extrng_random_fops; ++static const struct file_operations extrng_urandom_fops; ++ + /********************************************************************** + * + * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle +@@ -1880,6 +1889,13 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) + return mask; + } + ++static __poll_t ++extrng_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) ++{ ++ /* extrng pool is always full, always read, no writes */ ++ return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; ++} ++ + static int + write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) + { +@@ -1983,7 +1999,58 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) + return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync); + } + ++static int random_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) ++{ ++ const struct random_extrng *rng; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ rng = rcu_dereference(extrng); ++ if (rng && !try_module_get(rng->owner)) ++ rng = NULL; ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ ++ if (!rng) ++ return 0; ++ ++ filp->f_op = &extrng_random_fops; ++ filp->private_data = rng->owner; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int urandom_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) ++{ ++ const struct random_extrng *rng; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ rng = rcu_dereference(extrng); ++ if (rng && !try_module_get(rng->owner)) ++ rng = NULL; ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ ++ if (!rng) ++ return 0; ++ ++ filp->f_op = &extrng_urandom_fops; ++ filp->private_data = rng->owner; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int extrng_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) ++{ ++ module_put(filp->private_data); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static ssize_t ++extrng_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) ++{ ++ return rcu_dereference_raw(extrng)->extrng_read(buf, nbytes); ++} ++ + const struct file_operations random_fops = { ++ .open = random_open, + .read = random_read, + .write = random_write, + .poll = random_poll, +@@ -1994,6 +2061,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = { + }; + + const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { ++ .open = urandom_open, + .read = urandom_read, + .write = random_write, + .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, +@@ -2002,9 +2070,31 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { + .llseek = noop_llseek, + }; + ++static const struct file_operations extrng_random_fops = { ++ .open = random_open, ++ .read = extrng_read, ++ .write = random_write, ++ .poll = extrng_poll, ++ .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, ++ .fasync = random_fasync, ++ .llseek = noop_llseek, ++ .release = extrng_release, ++}; ++ ++static const struct file_operations extrng_urandom_fops = { ++ .open = urandom_open, ++ .read = extrng_read, ++ .write = random_write, ++ .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, ++ .fasync = random_fasync, ++ .llseek = noop_llseek, ++ .release = extrng_release, ++}; ++ + SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, + unsigned int, flags) + { ++ const struct random_extrng *rng; + int ret; + + if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE)) +@@ -2020,6 +2110,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, + if (count > INT_MAX) + count = INT_MAX; + ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ rng = rcu_dereference(extrng); ++ if (rng && !try_module_get(rng->owner)) ++ rng = NULL; ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ ++ if (rng) { ++ ret = rng->extrng_read(buf, count); ++ module_put(rng->owner); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ + if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) { + if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) + return -EAGAIN; +@@ -2329,3 +2431,16 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) + add_device_randomness(buf, size); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); ++ ++void random_register_extrng(const struct random_extrng *rng) ++{ ++ rcu_assign_pointer(extrng, rng); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_register_extrng); ++ ++void random_unregister_extrng(void) ++{ ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(extrng, NULL); ++ synchronize_rcu(); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_unregister_extrng); +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +index c02ff25dd477..d860f8eb9a81 100644 +--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile ++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP) += fake_map.o + obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL) += efibc.o + obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST) += test/ + obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER) += dev-path-parser.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += secureboot.o + obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o + obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE) += rci2-table.o + obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE) += embedded-firmware.o +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +index 7de3f5b6e8d0..95b1c35b347c 100644 +--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c ++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include + +@@ -851,40 +852,101 @@ int efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr) + } + #endif + ++struct efi_error_code { ++ efi_status_t status; ++ int errno; ++ const char *description; ++}; ++ ++static const struct efi_error_code efi_error_codes[] = { ++ { EFI_SUCCESS, 0, "Success"}, ++#if 0 ++ { EFI_LOAD_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Load Error"}, ++#endif ++ { EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, -EINVAL, "Invalid Parameter"}, ++ { EFI_UNSUPPORTED, -ENOSYS, "Unsupported"}, ++ { EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE, -ENOSPC, "Bad Buffer Size"}, ++ { EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, -ENOSPC, "Buffer Too Small"}, ++ { EFI_NOT_READY, -EAGAIN, "Not Ready"}, ++ { EFI_DEVICE_ERROR, -EIO, "Device Error"}, ++ { EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED, -EROFS, "Write Protected"}, ++ { EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES, -ENOMEM, "Out of Resources"}, ++#if 0 ++ { EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Volume Corrupt"}, ++ { EFI_VOLUME_FULL, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Volume Full"}, ++ { EFI_NO_MEDIA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No Media"}, ++ { EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Media changed"}, ++#endif ++ { EFI_NOT_FOUND, -ENOENT, "Not Found"}, ++#if 0 ++ { EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Access Denied"}, ++ { EFI_NO_RESPONSE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No Response"}, ++ { EFI_NO_MAPPING, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No mapping"}, ++ { EFI_TIMEOUT, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Time out"}, ++ { EFI_NOT_STARTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Not started"}, ++ { EFI_ALREADY_STARTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Already started"}, ++#endif ++ { EFI_ABORTED, -EINTR, "Aborted"}, ++#if 0 ++ { EFI_ICMP_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "ICMP Error"}, ++ { EFI_TFTP_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "TFTP Error"}, ++ { EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Protocol Error"}, ++ { EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Incompatible Version"}, ++#endif ++ { EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, -EACCES, "Security Policy Violation"}, ++#if 0 ++ { EFI_CRC_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "CRC Error"}, ++ { EFI_END_OF_MEDIA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "End of Media"}, ++ { EFI_END_OF_FILE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "End of File"}, ++ { EFI_INVALID_LANGUAGE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Invalid Languages"}, ++ { EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Compromised Data"}, ++ ++ // warnings ++ { EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Unknown Glyph"}, ++ { EFI_WARN_DELETE_FAILURE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Delete Failure"}, ++ { EFI_WARN_WRITE_FAILURE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Write Failure"}, ++ { EFI_WARN_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Buffer Too Small"}, ++#endif ++}; ++ ++static int ++efi_status_cmp_bsearch(const void *key, const void *item) ++{ ++ u64 status = (u64)(uintptr_t)key; ++ struct efi_error_code *code = (struct efi_error_code *)item; ++ ++ if (status < code->status) ++ return -1; ++ if (status > code->status) ++ return 1; ++ return 0; ++} ++ + int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status) + { +- int err; +- +- switch (status) { +- case EFI_SUCCESS: +- err = 0; +- break; +- case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER: +- err = -EINVAL; +- break; +- case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES: +- err = -ENOSPC; +- break; +- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR: +- err = -EIO; +- break; +- case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED: +- err = -EROFS; +- break; +- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: +- err = -EACCES; +- break; +- case EFI_NOT_FOUND: +- err = -ENOENT; +- break; +- case EFI_ABORTED: +- err = -EINTR; +- break; +- default: +- err = -EINVAL; +- } ++ struct efi_error_code *found; ++ size_t num = sizeof(efi_error_codes) / sizeof(struct efi_error_code); + +- return err; ++ found = bsearch((void *)(uintptr_t)status, efi_error_codes, ++ sizeof(struct efi_error_code), num, ++ efi_status_cmp_bsearch); ++ if (!found) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ return found->errno; ++} ++ ++const char * ++efi_status_to_str(efi_status_t status) ++{ ++ struct efi_error_code *found; ++ size_t num = sizeof(efi_error_codes) / sizeof(struct efi_error_code); ++ ++ found = bsearch((void *)(uintptr_t)status, efi_error_codes, ++ sizeof(struct efi_error_code), num, ++ efi_status_cmp_bsearch); ++ if (!found) ++ return "Unknown error code"; ++ return found->description; + } + + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(efi_mem_reserve_persistent_lock); +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000000..de0a3714a5d4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c +@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ ++/* Core kernel secure boot support. ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* ++ * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled. ++ */ ++void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) ++{ ++ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { ++ switch (mode) { ++ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled: ++ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n"); ++ break; ++ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled: ++ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags); ++ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); ++ break; ++ default: ++ pr_warn("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n", ++ mode); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++} +diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c +index 311eee599ce9..2460c6bd46f8 100644 +--- a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c ++++ b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c +@@ -322,19 +322,12 @@ static int rmi_input_event(struct hid_device *hdev, u8 *data, int size) + { + struct rmi_data *hdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); + struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = hdata->xport.rmi_dev; +- unsigned long flags; + + if (!(test_bit(RMI_STARTED, &hdata->flags))) + return 0; + +- local_irq_save(flags); +- + rmi_set_attn_data(rmi_dev, data[1], &data[2], size - 2); + +- generic_handle_irq(hdata->rmi_irq); +- +- local_irq_restore(flags); +- + return 1; + } + +@@ -591,56 +584,6 @@ static const struct rmi_transport_ops hid_rmi_ops = { + .reset = rmi_hid_reset, + }; + +-static void rmi_irq_teardown(void *data) +-{ +- struct rmi_data *hdata = data; +- struct irq_domain *domain = hdata->domain; +- +- if (!domain) +- return; +- +- irq_dispose_mapping(irq_find_mapping(domain, 0)); +- +- irq_domain_remove(domain); +- hdata->domain = NULL; +- hdata->rmi_irq = 0; +-} +- +-static int rmi_irq_map(struct irq_domain *h, unsigned int virq, +- irq_hw_number_t hw_irq_num) +-{ +- irq_set_chip_and_handler(virq, &dummy_irq_chip, handle_simple_irq); +- +- return 0; +-} +- +-static const struct irq_domain_ops rmi_irq_ops = { +- .map = rmi_irq_map, +-}; +- +-static int rmi_setup_irq_domain(struct hid_device *hdev) +-{ +- struct rmi_data *hdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); +- int ret; +- +- hdata->domain = irq_domain_create_linear(hdev->dev.fwnode, 1, +- &rmi_irq_ops, hdata); +- if (!hdata->domain) +- return -ENOMEM; +- +- ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&hdev->dev, &rmi_irq_teardown, hdata); +- if (ret) +- return ret; +- +- hdata->rmi_irq = irq_create_mapping(hdata->domain, 0); +- if (hdata->rmi_irq <= 0) { +- hid_err(hdev, "Can't allocate an IRQ\n"); +- return hdata->rmi_irq < 0 ? hdata->rmi_irq : -ENXIO; +- } +- +- return 0; +-} +- + static int rmi_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) + { + struct rmi_data *data = NULL; +@@ -713,18 +656,11 @@ static int rmi_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) + + mutex_init(&data->page_mutex); + +- ret = rmi_setup_irq_domain(hdev); +- if (ret) { +- hid_err(hdev, "failed to allocate IRQ domain\n"); +- return ret; +- } +- + if (data->device_flags & RMI_DEVICE_HAS_PHYS_BUTTONS) + rmi_hid_pdata.gpio_data.disable = true; + + data->xport.dev = hdev->dev.parent; + data->xport.pdata = rmi_hid_pdata; +- data->xport.pdata.irq = data->rmi_irq; + data->xport.proto_name = "hid"; + data->xport.ops = &hid_rmi_ops; + +diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c +index 86a313857b58..dcfc95d0e328 100644 +--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c ++++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -2156,6 +2157,16 @@ static const struct amba_id etm4_ids[] = { + {}, + }; + ++static const struct dmi_system_id broken_coresight[] = { ++ { ++ .matches = { ++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "HPE"), ++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Apollo 70"), ++ }, ++ }, ++ { } /* terminating entry */ ++}; ++ + MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(amba, etm4_ids); + + static struct amba_driver etm4x_amba_driver = { +@@ -2189,6 +2200,11 @@ static int __init etm4x_init(void) + { + int ret; + ++ if (dmi_check_system(broken_coresight)) { ++ pr_info("ETM4 disabled due to firmware bug\n"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + ret = etm4_pm_setup(); + + /* etm4_pm_setup() does its own cleanup - exit on error */ +@@ -2215,6 +2231,9 @@ static int __init etm4x_init(void) + + static void __exit etm4x_exit(void) + { ++ if (dmi_check_system(broken_coresight)) ++ return; ++ + amba_driver_unregister(&etm4x_amba_driver); + platform_driver_unregister(&etm4_platform_driver); + etm4_pm_clear(); +diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c +index 258d5fe3d395..f7298e3dc8f3 100644 +--- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c ++++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c +@@ -182,34 +182,47 @@ void rmi_set_attn_data(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, unsigned long irq_status, + attn_data.data = fifo_data; + + kfifo_put(&drvdata->attn_fifo, attn_data); ++ ++ schedule_work(&drvdata->attn_work); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmi_set_attn_data); + +-static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) ++static void attn_callback(struct work_struct *work) + { +- struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = dev_id; +- struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev); ++ struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = container_of(work, ++ struct rmi_driver_data, ++ attn_work); + struct rmi4_attn_data attn_data = {0}; + int ret, count; + + count = kfifo_get(&drvdata->attn_fifo, &attn_data); +- if (count) { +- *(drvdata->irq_status) = attn_data.irq_status; +- drvdata->attn_data = attn_data; +- } ++ if (!count) ++ return; + +- ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); ++ *(drvdata->irq_status) = attn_data.irq_status; ++ drvdata->attn_data = attn_data; ++ ++ ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(drvdata->rmi_dev); + if (ret) +- rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &rmi_dev->dev, ++ rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &drvdata->rmi_dev->dev, + "Failed to process interrupt request: %d\n", ret); + +- if (count) { +- kfree(attn_data.data); +- drvdata->attn_data.data = NULL; +- } ++ kfree(attn_data.data); ++ drvdata->attn_data.data = NULL; + + if (!kfifo_is_empty(&drvdata->attn_fifo)) +- return rmi_irq_fn(irq, dev_id); ++ schedule_work(&drvdata->attn_work); ++} ++ ++static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) ++{ ++ struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = dev_id; ++ int ret; ++ ++ ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); ++ if (ret) ++ rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &rmi_dev->dev, ++ "Failed to process interrupt request: %d\n", ret); + + return IRQ_HANDLED; + } +@@ -217,7 +230,6 @@ static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) + static int rmi_irq_init(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev) + { + struct rmi_device_platform_data *pdata = rmi_get_platform_data(rmi_dev); +- struct rmi_driver_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev); + int irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq); + int ret; + +@@ -235,8 +247,6 @@ static int rmi_irq_init(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev) + return ret; + } + +- data->enabled = true; +- + return 0; + } + +@@ -886,23 +896,27 @@ void rmi_enable_irq(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, bool clear_wake) + if (data->enabled) + goto out; + +- enable_irq(irq); +- data->enabled = true; +- if (clear_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { +- retval = disable_irq_wake(irq); +- if (retval) +- dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, +- "Failed to disable irq for wake: %d\n", +- retval); +- } ++ if (irq) { ++ enable_irq(irq); ++ data->enabled = true; ++ if (clear_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { ++ retval = disable_irq_wake(irq); ++ if (retval) ++ dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, ++ "Failed to disable irq for wake: %d\n", ++ retval); ++ } + +- /* +- * Call rmi_process_interrupt_requests() after enabling irq, +- * otherwise we may lose interrupt on edge-triggered systems. +- */ +- irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq); +- if (irq_flags & IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH) +- rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); ++ /* ++ * Call rmi_process_interrupt_requests() after enabling irq, ++ * otherwise we may lose interrupt on edge-triggered systems. ++ */ ++ irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq); ++ if (irq_flags & IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH) ++ rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); ++ } else { ++ data->enabled = true; ++ } + + out: + mutex_unlock(&data->enabled_mutex); +@@ -922,20 +936,22 @@ void rmi_disable_irq(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, bool enable_wake) + goto out; + + data->enabled = false; +- disable_irq(irq); +- if (enable_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { +- retval = enable_irq_wake(irq); +- if (retval) +- dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, +- "Failed to enable irq for wake: %d\n", +- retval); +- } +- +- /* make sure the fifo is clean */ +- while (!kfifo_is_empty(&data->attn_fifo)) { +- count = kfifo_get(&data->attn_fifo, &attn_data); +- if (count) +- kfree(attn_data.data); ++ if (irq) { ++ disable_irq(irq); ++ if (enable_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { ++ retval = enable_irq_wake(irq); ++ if (retval) ++ dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, ++ "Failed to enable irq for wake: %d\n", ++ retval); ++ } ++ } else { ++ /* make sure the fifo is clean */ ++ while (!kfifo_is_empty(&data->attn_fifo)) { ++ count = kfifo_get(&data->attn_fifo, &attn_data); ++ if (count) ++ kfree(attn_data.data); ++ } + } + + out: +@@ -981,6 +997,8 @@ static int rmi_driver_remove(struct device *dev) + irq_domain_remove(data->irqdomain); + data->irqdomain = NULL; + ++ cancel_work_sync(&data->attn_work); ++ + rmi_f34_remove_sysfs(rmi_dev); + rmi_free_function_list(rmi_dev); + +@@ -1219,9 +1237,15 @@ static int rmi_driver_probe(struct device *dev) + } + } + +- retval = rmi_irq_init(rmi_dev); +- if (retval < 0) +- goto err_destroy_functions; ++ if (pdata->irq) { ++ retval = rmi_irq_init(rmi_dev); ++ if (retval < 0) ++ goto err_destroy_functions; ++ } ++ ++ data->enabled = true; ++ ++ INIT_WORK(&data->attn_work, attn_callback); + + if (data->f01_container->dev.driver) { + /* Driver already bound, so enable ATTN now. */ +diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c +index 8b86406b7162..2dffe129b902 100644 +--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c ++++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c +@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "iommu: " fmt + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -3119,6 +3120,27 @@ u32 iommu_sva_get_pasid(struct iommu_sva *handle) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_sva_get_pasid); + ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 ++static int __init iommu_quirks(void) ++{ ++ const char *vendor, *name; ++ ++ vendor = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_SYS_VENDOR); ++ name = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME); ++ ++ if (vendor && ++ (strncmp(vendor, "GIGABYTE", 8) == 0 && name && ++ (strncmp(name, "R120", 4) == 0 || ++ strncmp(name, "R270", 4) == 0))) { ++ pr_warn("Gigabyte %s detected, force iommu passthrough mode", name); ++ iommu_def_domain_type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++arch_initcall(iommu_quirks); ++#endif ++ + /* + * Changes the default domain of an iommu group that has *only* one device + * +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.c +index cb8cacbbd5b4..246147e03c09 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.c +@@ -291,6 +291,59 @@ static const struct ath11k_hw_params ath11k_hw_params[] = { + .alloc_cacheable_memory = false, + .wakeup_mhi = true, + }, ++ { ++ .name = "wcn6855 hw2.1", ++ .hw_rev = ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW21, ++ .fw = { ++ .dir = "WCN6855/hw2.1", ++ .board_size = 256 * 1024, ++ .cal_offset = 128 * 1024, ++ }, ++ .max_radios = 3, ++ .bdf_addr = 0x4B0C0000, ++ .hw_ops = &wcn6855_ops, ++ .ring_mask = &ath11k_hw_ring_mask_qca6390, ++ .internal_sleep_clock = true, ++ .regs = &wcn6855_regs, ++ .qmi_service_ins_id = ATH11K_QMI_WLFW_SERVICE_INS_ID_V01_QCA6390, ++ .host_ce_config = ath11k_host_ce_config_qca6390, ++ .ce_count = 9, ++ .target_ce_config = ath11k_target_ce_config_wlan_qca6390, ++ .target_ce_count = 9, ++ .svc_to_ce_map = ath11k_target_service_to_ce_map_wlan_qca6390, ++ .svc_to_ce_map_len = 14, ++ .single_pdev_only = true, ++ .rxdma1_enable = false, ++ .num_rxmda_per_pdev = 2, ++ .rx_mac_buf_ring = true, ++ .vdev_start_delay = true, ++ .htt_peer_map_v2 = false, ++ ++ .spectral = { ++ .fft_sz = 0, ++ .fft_pad_sz = 0, ++ .summary_pad_sz = 0, ++ .fft_hdr_len = 0, ++ .max_fft_bins = 0, ++ }, ++ ++ .interface_modes = BIT(NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) | ++ BIT(NL80211_IFTYPE_AP), ++ .supports_monitor = false, ++ .supports_shadow_regs = true, ++ .idle_ps = true, ++ .supports_sta_ps = true, ++ .cold_boot_calib = false, ++ .supports_suspend = true, ++ .hal_desc_sz = sizeof(struct hal_rx_desc_wcn6855), ++ .fix_l1ss = false, ++ .credit_flow = true, ++ .max_tx_ring = DP_TCL_NUM_RING_MAX_QCA6390, ++ .hal_params = &ath11k_hw_hal_params_qca6390, ++ .supports_dynamic_smps_6ghz = false, ++ .alloc_cacheable_memory = false, ++ .wakeup_mhi = true, ++ }, + }; + + int ath11k_core_suspend(struct ath11k_base *ab) +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.h +index 011373b91ae0..3d6519612422 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.h +@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ enum ath11k_hw_rev { + ATH11K_HW_IPQ6018_HW10, + ATH11K_HW_QCN9074_HW10, + ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW20, ++ ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW21, + }; + + enum ath11k_firmware_mode { +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/mhi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/mhi.c +index 49c0b1ad40a0..95f5a1960676 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/mhi.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/mhi.c +@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ int ath11k_mhi_register(struct ath11k_pci *ab_pci) + break; + case ATH11K_HW_QCA6390_HW20: + case ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW20: ++ case ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW21: + ath11k_mhi_config = &ath11k_mhi_config_qca6390; + break; + default: +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c +index 4c348bacf2cb..9fe496d35b38 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c +@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ + #define WINDOW_RANGE_MASK GENMASK(18, 0) + + #define TCSR_SOC_HW_VERSION 0x0224 +-#define TCSR_SOC_HW_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK GENMASK(16, 8) ++#define TCSR_SOC_HW_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK GENMASK(11, 8) + #define TCSR_SOC_HW_VERSION_MINOR_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) + + /* BAR0 + 4k is always accessible, and no +@@ -1297,9 +1297,21 @@ static int ath11k_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, + &soc_hw_version_minor); + switch (soc_hw_version_major) { + case 2: +- ab->hw_rev = ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW20; ++ switch (soc_hw_version_minor) { ++ case 0x00: ++ case 0x01: ++ ab->hw_rev = ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW20; ++ break; ++ case 0x10: ++ case 0x11: ++ ab->hw_rev = ATH11K_HW_WCN6855_HW21; ++ break; ++ default: ++ goto unsupported_wcn6855_soc; ++ } + break; + default: ++unsupported_wcn6855_soc: + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unsupported WCN6855 SOC hardware version: %d %d\n", + soc_hw_version_major, soc_hw_version_minor); + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; +diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +index 1af8a4513708..5a23e077ab86 100644 +--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c ++++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +@@ -244,6 +244,9 @@ static void nvme_delete_ctrl_sync(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) + + static blk_status_t nvme_error_status(u16 status) + { ++ if (unlikely(status & NVME_SC_DNR)) ++ return BLK_STS_TARGET; ++ + switch (status & 0x7ff) { + case NVME_SC_SUCCESS: + return BLK_STS_OK; +@@ -303,6 +306,7 @@ enum nvme_disposition { + COMPLETE, + RETRY, + FAILOVER, ++ FAILUP, + }; + + static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req) +@@ -310,15 +314,16 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req) + if (likely(nvme_req(req)->status == 0)) + return COMPLETE; + +- if (blk_noretry_request(req) || ++ if ((req->cmd_flags & (REQ_FAILFAST_DEV | REQ_FAILFAST_DRIVER)) || + (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_DNR) || + nvme_req(req)->retries >= nvme_max_retries) + return COMPLETE; + +- if (req->cmd_flags & REQ_NVME_MPATH) { ++ if (req->cmd_flags & (REQ_NVME_MPATH | REQ_FAILFAST_TRANSPORT)) { + if (nvme_is_path_error(nvme_req(req)->status) || + blk_queue_dying(req->q)) +- return FAILOVER; ++ return (req->cmd_flags & REQ_NVME_MPATH) ? ++ FAILOVER : FAILUP; + } else { + if (blk_queue_dying(req->q)) + return COMPLETE; +@@ -344,6 +349,14 @@ static inline void nvme_end_req(struct request *req) + blk_mq_end_request(req, status); + } + ++static inline void nvme_failup_req(struct request *req) ++{ ++ nvme_update_ana(req); ++ ++ nvme_req(req)->status = NVME_SC_HOST_PATH_ERROR; ++ nvme_end_req(req); ++} ++ + void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req) + { + trace_nvme_complete_rq(req); +@@ -362,6 +375,9 @@ void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req) + case FAILOVER: + nvme_failover_req(req); + return; ++ case FAILUP: ++ nvme_failup_req(req); ++ return; + } + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_rq); +diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c b/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c +index 13e5d503ed07..daaeb316f624 100644 +--- a/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c ++++ b/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c +@@ -65,14 +65,10 @@ bool nvme_mpath_set_disk_name(struct nvme_ns *ns, char *disk_name, int *flags) + return true; + } + +-void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req) ++void nvme_update_ana(struct request *req) + { + struct nvme_ns *ns = req->q->queuedata; + u16 status = nvme_req(req)->status & 0x7ff; +- unsigned long flags; +- struct bio *bio; +- +- nvme_mpath_clear_current_path(ns); + + /* + * If we got back an ANA error, we know the controller is alive but not +@@ -83,6 +79,16 @@ void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req) + set_bit(NVME_NS_ANA_PENDING, &ns->flags); + queue_work(nvme_wq, &ns->ctrl->ana_work); + } ++} ++ ++void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req) ++{ ++ struct nvme_ns *ns = req->q->queuedata; ++ unsigned long flags; ++ struct bio *bio; ++ ++ nvme_mpath_clear_current_path(ns); ++ nvme_update_ana(req); + + spin_lock_irqsave(&ns->head->requeue_lock, flags); + for (bio = req->bio; bio; bio = bio->bi_next) { +@@ -838,8 +844,7 @@ int nvme_mpath_init_identify(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_id_ctrl *id) + int error = 0; + + /* check if multipath is enabled and we have the capability */ +- if (!multipath || !ctrl->subsys || +- !(ctrl->subsys->cmic & NVME_CTRL_CMIC_ANA)) ++ if (!ctrl->subsys || !(ctrl->subsys->cmic & NVME_CTRL_CMIC_ANA)) + return 0; + + if (!ctrl->max_namespaces || +diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +index 9b095ee01364..bf25ef206cd2 100644 +--- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h ++++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ void nvme_mpath_wait_freeze(struct nvme_subsystem *subsys); + void nvme_mpath_start_freeze(struct nvme_subsystem *subsys); + bool nvme_mpath_set_disk_name(struct nvme_ns *ns, char *disk_name, int *flags); + void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req); ++void nvme_update_ana(struct request *req); + void nvme_kick_requeue_lists(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); + int nvme_mpath_alloc_disk(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,struct nvme_ns_head *head); + void nvme_mpath_add_disk(struct nvme_ns *ns, struct nvme_id_ns *id); +@@ -803,6 +804,9 @@ static inline bool nvme_mpath_set_disk_name(struct nvme_ns *ns, char *disk_name, + static inline void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req) + { + } ++static inline void nvme_update_ana(struct request *req) ++{ ++} + static inline void nvme_kick_requeue_lists(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) + { + } +diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c +index 20a932690738..494cee3aec7b 100644 +--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c ++++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c +@@ -4272,6 +4272,30 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9000, + DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9084, + quirk_bridge_cavm_thrx2_pcie_root); + ++/* ++ * PCI BAR 5 is not setup correctly for the on-board AHCI controller ++ * on Broadcom's Vulcan processor. Added a quirk to fix BAR 5 by ++ * using BAR 4's resources which are populated correctly and NOT ++ * actually used by the AHCI controller. ++ */ ++static void quirk_fix_vulcan_ahci_bars(struct pci_dev *dev) ++{ ++ struct resource *r = &dev->resource[4]; ++ ++ if (!(r->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) || (r->start == 0)) ++ return; ++ ++ /* Set BAR5 resource to BAR4 */ ++ dev->resource[5] = *r; ++ ++ /* Update BAR5 in pci config space */ ++ pci_write_config_dword(dev, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_5, r->start); ++ ++ /* Clear BAR4's resource */ ++ memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); ++} ++DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9027, quirk_fix_vulcan_ahci_bars); ++ + /* + * Intersil/Techwell TW686[4589]-based video capture cards have an empty (zero) + * class code. Fix it. +diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +index ac6c5ccfe1cb..ec784479eece 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +@@ -5669,6 +5669,13 @@ static void hub_event(struct work_struct *work) + (u16) hub->change_bits[0], + (u16) hub->event_bits[0]); + ++ /* Don't disconnect USB-SATA on TrimSlice */ ++ if (strcmp(dev_name(hdev->bus->controller), "tegra-ehci.0") == 0) { ++ if ((hdev->state == 7) && (hub->change_bits[0] == 0) && ++ (hub->event_bits[0] == 0x2)) ++ hub->event_bits[0] = 0; ++ } ++ + /* Lock the device, then check to see if we were + * disconnected while waiting for the lock to succeed. */ + usb_lock_device(hdev); +diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h +index ef8dbc0a1522..836a5dfc6156 100644 +--- a/include/linux/efi.h ++++ b/include/linux/efi.h +@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ + #define EFI_ABORTED (21 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) + #define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION (26 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) + ++#define EFI_IS_ERROR(x) ((x) & (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) ++ + typedef unsigned long efi_status_t; + typedef u8 efi_bool_t; + typedef u16 efi_char16_t; /* UNICODE character */ +@@ -783,6 +785,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); + #define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */ + #define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE 11 /* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */ + #define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS 12 /* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */ ++#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 13 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */ ++ ++enum efi_secureboot_mode { ++ efi_secureboot_mode_unset, ++ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown, ++ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, ++ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, ++}; + + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI + /* +@@ -794,6 +804,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature) + } + extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused); + ++extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode); ++ + bool __pure __efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void); + + static inline bool __pure efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void) +@@ -814,6 +826,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature) + static inline void + efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused) {} + ++static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {} ++ + static inline bool efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void) + { + return false; +@@ -826,6 +840,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_supported(unsigned int mask) + #endif + + extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status); ++extern const char *efi_status_to_str(efi_status_t status); + + /* + * Variable Attributes +@@ -1078,13 +1093,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(void) { return true; } + extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call); + extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void); + +-enum efi_secureboot_mode { +- efi_secureboot_mode_unset, +- efi_secureboot_mode_unknown, +- efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, +- efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, +-}; +- + static inline + enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var) + { +diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +index f0c7b352340a..bea09711d8d7 100644 +--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h ++++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_prog_free_security, struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) + #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + + LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what) ++LSM_HOOK(int, 0, lock_kernel_down, const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) ++ + + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS + LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) +diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +index d45b6f6e27fd..70622b506461 100644 +--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h ++++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +@@ -1548,6 +1548,12 @@ + * + * @what: kernel feature being accessed + * ++ * @lock_kernel_down ++ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode. ++ * ++ * @where: Where the lock-down is originating from (e.g. command line option) ++ * @level: The lock-down level (can only increase) ++ * + * Security hooks for perf events + * + * @perf_event_open: +diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h +index f45b8be3e3c4..7ccdec68b789 100644 +--- a/include/linux/random.h ++++ b/include/linux/random.h +@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ + + #include + ++struct random_extrng { ++ ssize_t (*extrng_read)(void __user *buf, size_t buflen); ++ struct module *owner; ++}; ++ + struct random_ready_callback { + struct list_head list; + void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); +@@ -44,6 +49,8 @@ extern bool rng_is_initialized(void); + extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); + extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy); + extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes); ++void random_register_extrng(const struct random_extrng *rng); ++void random_unregister_extrng(void); + + #ifndef MODULE + extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; +diff --git a/include/linux/rmi.h b/include/linux/rmi.h +index ab7eea01ab42..fff7c5f737fc 100644 +--- a/include/linux/rmi.h ++++ b/include/linux/rmi.h +@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ struct rmi_driver_data { + + struct rmi4_attn_data attn_data; + DECLARE_KFIFO(attn_fifo, struct rmi4_attn_data, 16); ++ struct work_struct attn_work; + }; + + int rmi_register_transport_device(struct rmi_transport_dev *xport); +diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h +index bbf44a466832..026a06b98a96 100644 +--- a/include/linux/security.h ++++ b/include/linux/security.h +@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); + int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); + int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); + int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what); ++int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level); + #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + + static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) +@@ -1355,6 +1356,10 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) + { + return 0; + } ++static inline int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + + #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) +diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h +index d24b0a34c8f0..871489df63c6 100644 +--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h ++++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h +@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct nf_conn { + unsigned long status; + + u16 cpu; ++ u16 local_origin:1; + possible_net_t ct_net; + + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) +diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c +index 8723ae70ea1f..fb2d773498c2 100644 +--- a/kernel/module_signing.c ++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c +@@ -38,8 +38,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) + modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); + info->len = modlen; + +- return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, ++ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); ++ if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) { ++ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, ++ VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, ++ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, ++ NULL, NULL); ++ } ++ return ret; + } +diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +index 7f7997460764..c42478d48f7d 100644 +--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +@@ -1749,6 +1749,9 @@ resolve_normal_ct(struct nf_conn *tmpl, + return 0; + if (IS_ERR(h)) + return PTR_ERR(h); ++ ++ ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); ++ ct->local_origin = state->hook == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT; + } + ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); + +diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +index 4d50d51db796..29d26bc977dc 100644 +--- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +@@ -494,6 +494,38 @@ static void nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + goto another_round; + } + ++static bool tuple_force_port_remap(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) ++{ ++ u16 sp, dp; ++ ++ switch (tuple->dst.protonum) { ++ case IPPROTO_TCP: ++ sp = ntohs(tuple->src.u.tcp.port); ++ dp = ntohs(tuple->dst.u.tcp.port); ++ break; ++ case IPPROTO_UDP: ++ case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: ++ sp = ntohs(tuple->src.u.udp.port); ++ dp = ntohs(tuple->dst.u.udp.port); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ /* IANA: System port range: 1-1023, ++ * user port range: 1024-49151, ++ * private port range: 49152-65535. ++ * ++ * Linux default ephemeral port range is 32768-60999. ++ * ++ * Enforce port remapping if sport is significantly lower ++ * than dport to prevent NAT port shadowing, i.e. ++ * accidental match of 'new' inbound connection vs. ++ * existing outbound one. ++ */ ++ return sp < 16384 && dp >= 32768; ++} ++ + /* Manipulate the tuple into the range given. For NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, + * we change the source to map into the range. For NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING + * and NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, we change the destination to map into the +@@ -507,11 +539,17 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + struct nf_conn *ct, + enum nf_nat_manip_type maniptype) + { ++ bool random_port = range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL; + const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone; + struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct); + + zone = nf_ct_zone(ct); + ++ if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC && ++ !random_port && ++ !ct->local_origin) ++ random_port = tuple_force_port_remap(orig_tuple); ++ + /* 1) If this srcip/proto/src-proto-part is currently mapped, + * and that same mapping gives a unique tuple within the given + * range, use that. +@@ -520,8 +558,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + * So far, we don't do local source mappings, so multiple + * manips not an issue. + */ +- if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC && +- !(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) { ++ if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC && !random_port) { + /* try the original tuple first */ + if (in_range(orig_tuple, range)) { + if (!nf_nat_used_tuple(orig_tuple, ct)) { +@@ -545,7 +582,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, + */ + + /* Only bother mapping if it's not already in range and unique */ +- if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) { ++ if (!random_port) { + if (range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) { + if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_OFFSET) && + l4proto_in_range(tuple, maniptype, +diff --git a/scripts/tags.sh b/scripts/tags.sh +index b24bfaec6290..0418ba1d33f3 100755 +--- a/scripts/tags.sh ++++ b/scripts/tags.sh +@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ fi + ignore="$(echo "$RCS_FIND_IGNORE" | sed 's|\\||g' )" + # tags and cscope files should also ignore MODVERSION *.mod.c files + ignore="$ignore ( -name *.mod.c ) -prune -o" ++# RHEL tags and cscope should also ignore redhat/rpm ++ignore="$ignore ( -path redhat/rpm ) -prune -o" + + # Use make KBUILD_ABS_SRCTREE=1 {tags|cscope} + # to force full paths for a non-O= build +diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +index f290f78c3f30..d3e7ae04f5be 100644 +--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c ++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, + return NULL; + + if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { +- pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status); ++ pr_err("Couldn't get size: %s (0x%lx)\n", ++ efi_status_to_str(*status), *status); + return NULL; + } + +@@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); + if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + kfree(db); +- pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status); ++ pr_err("Error reading db var: %s (0x%lx)\n", ++ efi_status_to_str(*status), *status); + return NULL; + } + +diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig +index e84ddf484010..d0501353a4b9 100644 +--- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig ++++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig +@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY + subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will + unconditionally be called before any other LSMs. + ++config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT ++ bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode" ++ default n ++ depends on EFI && SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY ++ help ++ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware ++ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Secure boot mode may ++ be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if ++ not indicated by the boot parameters. ++ ++ Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being triggered if ++ EFI Secure Boot is set. ++ + choice + prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode" + default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE +diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +index 87cbdc64d272..18555cf18da7 100644 +--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c ++++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) + + static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down), ++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(lock_kernel_down, lock_kernel_down), + }; + + static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void) +diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c +index 64abdfb20bc2..ed920477e11d 100644 +--- a/security/security.c ++++ b/security/security.c +@@ -2611,6 +2611,12 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); + ++int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) ++{ ++ return call_int_hook(lock_kernel_down, 0, where, level); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lock_kernel_down); ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS + int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) + { +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh +index d88867d2fed7..349a319a9e51 100755 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh +@@ -880,8 +880,9 @@ EOF + return $ksft_skip + fi + +- # test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is redirected to ns2. +- test_port_shadow "default" "CLIENT" ++ # test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is not redirected ++ # due to automatic port translation. ++ test_port_shadow "default" "ROUTER" + + # test packet filter based mitigation: prevent forwarding of + # packets claiming to come from the service port. -- cgit