From 83203f5209afeeef5a61e61eb107ab8e831db450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Justin M. Forbes" Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 10:58:25 -0500 Subject: Linux v4.12.14 --- KEYS-prevent-KEYCTL_READ-on-negative-key.patch | 88 +++++++++ kernel.spec | 16 +- md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch | 132 -------------- ...-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch | 196 --------------------- sources | 2 +- 5 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 336 deletions(-) create mode 100644 KEYS-prevent-KEYCTL_READ-on-negative-key.patch delete mode 100644 md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch delete mode 100644 net-sctp-Avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch diff --git a/KEYS-prevent-KEYCTL_READ-on-negative-key.patch b/KEYS-prevent-KEYCTL_READ-on-negative-key.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d80176e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/KEYS-prevent-KEYCTL_READ-on-negative-key.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From patchwork Mon Sep 18 18:37:23 2017 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit +Subject: KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key +From: Eric Biggers +X-Patchwork-Id: 9957387 +Message-Id: <20170918183723.114253-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com> +To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +Cc: David Howells , Michael Halcrow , + linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, + linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers , + stable@vger.kernel.org +Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 11:37:23 -0700 + +From: Eric Biggers + +Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions +requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key. If the key is +also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key. But the +key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the +normal payload. Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the +user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82. + +Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be +possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive... + +Reproducer: + keyctl new_session + keyctl request2 user desc '' @s + keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}') + +It causes a crash like the following: + BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92 + IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 + PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0 + Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP + CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337 + Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014 + task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000 + RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0 + RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246 + RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017 + RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340 + RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000 + R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 + R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 + FS: 00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 + CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 + CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0 + Call Trace: + keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0 + SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120 + entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe + RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9 + RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9 + RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b + RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020 + R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800 + R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 + Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48 + RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8 + CR2: 00000000ffffff92 + +Fixes: 61ea0c0ba904 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession") +Cc: [v3.13+] +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +--- + security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c +index ab0b337c84b4..6a82090c7fc1 100644 +--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c ++++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c +@@ -766,6 +766,11 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + ++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { ++ ret = -ENOKEY; ++ goto error2; ++ } ++ + /* see if we can read it directly */ + ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); + if (ret == 0) diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index 93c3ce04e..24ecb9881 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel %if 0%{?released_kernel} # Do we have a -stable update to apply? -%define stable_update 13 +%define stable_update 14 # Set rpm version accordingly %if 0%{?stable_update} %define stablerev %{stable_update} @@ -672,9 +672,6 @@ Patch706: Fix-for-module-sig-verification.patch # rhbz 1485086 Patch710: pci-mark-amd-stoney-gpu-ats-as-broken.patch -# CVE-2017-7558 rhbz 1480266 1484810 -Patch712: net-sctp-Avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch - # CVE-2017-13693 rhbz 1485346 1485356 Patch713: acpi-acpica-fix-acpi-operand-cache-leak-in-dsutils.c.patch @@ -684,9 +681,6 @@ Patch714: V4-acpi-acpica-fix-acpi-parse-and-parseext-cache-leaks.patch # CVE-2017-13695 rhbz 1485349 Patch715: acpi-acpica-fix-acpi-operand-cache-leak-in-nseval.c.patch -# rhbz 1484587 -Patch716: md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch - # CVE-2017-14051 rhbz 1487126 1487127 Patch717: v2-scsi-qla2xxx-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-sysfs-code.patch @@ -702,6 +696,9 @@ Patch720: kvm-nVMX-Don-t-allow-L2-to-access-the-hardware-CR8.patch # CVE-2017-12153 rhbz 1491046 1491057 Patch721: nl80211-check-for-the-required-netlink-attributes-presence.patch +# rhbz 1493435 1493436 +Patch722: KEYS-prevent-KEYCTL_READ-on-negative-key.patch + # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS %endif @@ -2276,6 +2273,11 @@ fi # # %changelog +* Wed Sep 20 2017 Justin M. Forbes - 4.12.14-300 +- Linux v4.12.14 +- Fixes 1493435 1493436 +- Fixes CVE-2017-14497 (rhbz 1492593 1492594) + * Mon Sep 18 2017 Justin M. Forbes - Fixes for QXL (rhbz 1462381) diff --git a/md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch b/md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b3a73354f..000000000 --- a/md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -From: Shaohua Li -Date: 2017-08-25 2:41:16 -Subject: [PATCH] md/raid1/10: reset bio allocated from mempool - -From: Shaohua Li - -Data allocated from mempool doesn't always get initialized, this happens when -the data is reused instead of fresh allocation. In the raid1/10 case, we must -reinitialize the bios. - -Reported-by: Jonathan G. Underwood -Fixes: f0250618361d(md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages) -Fixes: 98d30c5812c3(md: raid1: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages) -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (4.12+) -Cc: Ming Lei -Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li ---- - drivers/md/raid1.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- - drivers/md/raid10.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/md/raid1.c b/drivers/md/raid1.c -index f50958ded9f0..79474f47eeef 100644 ---- a/drivers/md/raid1.c -+++ b/drivers/md/raid1.c -@@ -2564,6 +2564,23 @@ static int init_resync(struct r1conf *conf) - return 0; - } - -+static struct r1bio *raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(struct r1conf *conf) -+{ -+ struct r1bio *r1bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); -+ struct resync_pages *rps; -+ struct bio *bio; -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = conf->poolinfo->raid_disks; i--; ) { -+ bio = r1bio->bios[i]; -+ rps = bio->bi_private; -+ bio_reset(bio); -+ bio->bi_private = rps; -+ } -+ r1bio->master_bio = NULL; -+ return r1bio; -+} -+ - /* - * perform a "sync" on one "block" - * -@@ -2649,7 +2666,7 @@ static sector_t raid1_sync_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, - - bitmap_cond_end_sync(mddev->bitmap, sector_nr, - mddev_is_clustered(mddev) && (sector_nr + 2 * RESYNC_SECTORS > conf->cluster_sync_high)); -- r1_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); -+ r1_bio = raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(conf); - - raise_barrier(conf, sector_nr); - -diff --git a/drivers/md/raid10.c b/drivers/md/raid10.c -index f55d4cc085f6..d51ac02e98ef 100644 ---- a/drivers/md/raid10.c -+++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c -@@ -2798,6 +2798,35 @@ static int init_resync(struct r10conf *conf) - return 0; - } - -+static struct r10bio *raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(struct r10conf *conf) -+{ -+ struct r10bio *r10bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); -+ struct rsync_pages *rp; -+ struct bio *bio; -+ int nalloc; -+ int i; -+ -+ if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &conf->mddev->recovery) || -+ test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &conf->mddev->recovery)) -+ nalloc = conf->copies; /* resync */ -+ else -+ nalloc = 2; /* recovery */ -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) { -+ bio = r10bio->devs[i].bio; -+ rp = bio->bi_private; -+ bio_reset(bio); -+ bio->bi_private = rp; -+ bio = r10bio->devs[i].repl_bio; -+ if (bio) { -+ rp = bio->bi_private; -+ bio_reset(bio); -+ bio->bi_private = rp; -+ } -+ } -+ return r10bio; -+} -+ - /* - * perform a "sync" on one "block" - * -@@ -3027,7 +3056,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, - atomic_inc(&mreplace->nr_pending); - rcu_read_unlock(); - -- r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); -+ r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf); - r10_bio->state = 0; - raise_barrier(conf, rb2 != NULL); - atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0); -@@ -3236,7 +3265,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, - } - if (sync_blocks < max_sync) - max_sync = sync_blocks; -- r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); -+ r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf); - r10_bio->state = 0; - - r10_bio->mddev = mddev; -@@ -4360,7 +4389,7 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, - - read_more: - /* Now schedule reads for blocks from sector_nr to last */ -- r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO); -+ r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf); - r10_bio->state = 0; - raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0); - atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0); --- -2.11.0 - --- -To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-raid" in -the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org -More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html diff --git a/net-sctp-Avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch b/net-sctp-Avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 84968f03f..000000000 --- a/net-sctp-Avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ -From patchwork Wed Aug 23 11:27:13 2017 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -Subject: [net] sctp: Avoid out-of-bounds reads from address storage -From: Stefano Brivio -X-Patchwork-Id: 9917151 -Message-Id: <7763d91bcf14744e49f09fc4bec0fb22c097774f.1502384055.git.sbrivio@redhat.com> -To: "David S . Miller" , netdev@vger.kernel.org, - linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org -Cc: Xin Long , Vlad Yasevich , - Neil Horman , linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org -Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 13:27:13 +0200 - -inet_diag_msg_sctp{,l}addr_fill() and sctp_get_sctp_info() copy -sizeof(sockaddr_storage) bytes to fill in sockaddr structs used -to export diagnostic information to userspace. - -However, the memory allocated to store sockaddr information is -smaller than that and depends on the address family, so we leak -up to 100 uninitialized bytes to userspace. Just use the size of -the source structs instead, in all the three cases this is what -userspace expects. Zero out the remaining memory. - -Unused bytes (i.e. when IPv4 addresses are used) in source -structs sctp_sockaddr_entry and sctp_transport are already -cleared by sctp_add_bind_addr() and sctp_transport_new(), -respectively. - -Noticed while testing KASAN-enabled kernel with 'ss': - -[ 2326.885243] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] at addr ffff881be8779800 -[ 2326.896800] Read of size 128 by task ss/9527 -[ 2326.901564] CPU: 0 PID: 9527 Comm: ss Not tainted 4.11.0-22.el7a.x86_64 #1 -[ 2326.909236] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 -[ 2326.917585] Call Trace: -[ 2326.920312] dump_stack+0x63/0x8d -[ 2326.924014] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 -[ 2326.928295] kasan_report+0x288/0x540 -[ 2326.932380] ? inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] -[ 2326.938500] ? skb_put+0x8b/0xd0 -[ 2326.942098] ? memset+0x31/0x40 -[ 2326.945599] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 -[ 2326.950362] memcpy+0x23/0x50 -[ 2326.953669] inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] -[ 2326.959596] ? inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill+0x460/0x460 [sctp_diag] -[ 2326.966495] ? __lock_sock+0x102/0x150 -[ 2326.970671] ? sock_def_wakeup+0x60/0x60 -[ 2326.975048] ? remove_wait_queue+0xc0/0xc0 -[ 2326.979619] sctp_diag_dump+0x44a/0x760 [sctp_diag] -[ 2326.985063] ? sctp_ep_dump+0x280/0x280 [sctp_diag] -[ 2326.990504] ? memset+0x31/0x40 -[ 2326.994007] ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40 -[ 2326.997900] __inet_diag_dump+0x57/0xb0 [inet_diag] -[ 2327.003340] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150 -[ 2327.007715] inet_diag_dump+0x4d/0x80 [inet_diag] -[ 2327.012979] netlink_dump+0x1e6/0x490 -[ 2327.017064] __netlink_dump_start+0x28e/0x2c0 -[ 2327.021924] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x189/0x1a0 [inet_diag] -[ 2327.028045] ? inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x1b0/0x1b0 [inet_diag] -[ 2327.034651] ? inet_diag_dump_compat+0x190/0x190 [inet_diag] -[ 2327.040965] ? __netlink_lookup+0x1b9/0x260 -[ 2327.045631] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x1e0 -[ 2327.050199] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x180 -[ 2327.054574] ? sock_diag_bind+0x60/0x60 -[ 2327.058850] sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 -[ 2327.062837] netlink_unicast+0x2e7/0x3b0 -[ 2327.067212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x330/0x330 -[ 2327.071975] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 -[ 2327.076544] netlink_sendmsg+0x5be/0x730 -[ 2327.080918] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0 -[ 2327.085486] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 -[ 2327.090057] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 -[ 2327.095109] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0 -[ 2327.099678] sock_sendmsg+0x74/0x80 -[ 2327.103567] ___sys_sendmsg+0x520/0x530 -[ 2327.107844] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x200 -[ 2327.112510] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x270/0x270 -[ 2327.117660] ? vm_insert_page+0x360/0x360 -[ 2327.122133] ? vm_insert_pfn_prot+0xb4/0x150 -[ 2327.126895] ? vm_insert_pfn+0x32/0x40 -[ 2327.131077] ? vvar_fault+0x71/0xd0 -[ 2327.134968] ? special_mapping_fault+0x69/0x110 -[ 2327.140022] ? __do_fault+0x42/0x120 -[ 2327.144008] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x17a0 -[ 2327.148965] ? __fget_light+0xa7/0xc0 -[ 2327.153049] __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150 -[ 2327.157133] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150 -[ 2327.161409] ? SyS_shutdown+0x140/0x140 -[ 2327.165688] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd0/0xd0 -[ 2327.170646] ? __do_page_fault+0x55d/0x620 -[ 2327.175216] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150 -[ 2327.179591] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 -[ 2327.183384] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230 -[ 2327.187471] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 -[ 2327.192622] RIP: 0033:0x7f41d18fa3b0 -[ 2327.196608] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3b731218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e -[ 2327.205055] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3b731380 RCX: 00007f41d18fa3b0 -[ 2327.213017] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc3b731340 RDI: 0000000000000003 -[ 2327.220978] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000040 -[ 2327.228939] R10: 00007ffc3b730f30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 -[ 2327.236901] R13: 00007ffc3b731340 R14: 00007ffc3b7313d0 R15: 0000000000000084 -[ 2327.244865] Object at ffff881be87797e0, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64 -[ 2327.251953] Allocated: -[ 2327.254581] PID = 9484 -[ 2327.257215] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 -[ 2327.261485] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 -[ 2327.265179] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 -[ 2327.269165] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe6/0x1d0 -[ 2327.274138] sctp_add_bind_addr+0x58/0x180 [sctp] -[ 2327.279400] sctp_do_bind+0x208/0x310 [sctp] -[ 2327.284176] sctp_bind+0x61/0xa0 [sctp] -[ 2327.288455] inet_bind+0x5f/0x3a0 -[ 2327.292151] SYSC_bind+0x1a4/0x1e0 -[ 2327.295944] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10 -[ 2327.299349] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230 -[ 2327.303433] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a -[ 2327.308194] Freed: -[ 2327.310434] PID = 4131 -[ 2327.313065] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 -[ 2327.317344] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 -[ 2327.321040] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 -[ 2327.325220] kfree+0x96/0x1a0 -[ 2327.328530] dynamic_kobj_release+0x15/0x40 -[ 2327.333195] kobject_release+0x99/0x1e0 -[ 2327.337472] kobject_put+0x38/0x70 -[ 2327.341266] free_notes_attrs+0x66/0x80 -[ 2327.345545] mod_sysfs_teardown+0x1a5/0x270 -[ 2327.350211] free_module+0x20/0x2a0 -[ 2327.354099] SyS_delete_module+0x2cb/0x2f0 -[ 2327.358667] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230 -[ 2327.362750] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a -[ 2327.367510] Memory state around the buggy address: -[ 2327.372855] ffff881be8779700: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc -[ 2327.380914] ffff881be8779780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 -[ 2327.388972] >ffff881be8779800: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb -[ 2327.397031] ^ -[ 2327.401792] ffff881be8779880: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc -[ 2327.409850] ffff881be8779900: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 -[ 2327.417907] ================================================================== - -This fixes CVE-2017-7558. - -References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1480266 -Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file") -Cc: # 4.7+ -Cc: Xin Long -Cc: Vlad Yasevich -Cc: Neil Horman -Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio -Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner -Reviewed-by: Xin Long ---- - net/sctp/sctp_diag.c | 7 +++++-- - net/sctp/socket.c | 3 +-- - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c -index 9a647214a91e..e99518e79b52 100644 ---- a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c -+++ b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c -@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpladdrs_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, - - info = nla_data(attr); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, address_list, list) { -- memcpy(info, &laddr->a, addrlen); -+ memcpy(info, &laddr->a, sizeof(laddr->a)); -+ memset(info + sizeof(laddr->a), 0, addrlen - sizeof(laddr->a)); - info += addrlen; - } - -@@ -93,7 +94,9 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpaddrs_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, - info = nla_data(attr); - list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list, - transports) { -- memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, addrlen); -+ memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(from->ipaddr)); -+ memset(info + sizeof(from->ipaddr), 0, -+ addrlen - sizeof(from->ipaddr)); - info += addrlen; - } - -diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c -index 1db478e34520..8d760863bc41 100644 ---- a/net/sctp/socket.c -+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c -@@ -4538,8 +4538,7 @@ int sctp_get_sctp_info(struct sock *sk, struct sctp_association *asoc, - info->sctpi_ictrlchunks = asoc->stats.ictrlchunks; - - prim = asoc->peer.primary_path; -- memcpy(&info->sctpi_p_address, &prim->ipaddr, -- sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); -+ memcpy(&info->sctpi_p_address, &prim->ipaddr, sizeof(prim->ipaddr)); - info->sctpi_p_state = prim->state; - info->sctpi_p_cwnd = prim->cwnd; - info->sctpi_p_srtt = prim->srtt; diff --git a/sources b/sources index 03a00b9e0..fc1667589 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ SHA512 (perf-man-4.12.tar.gz) = 4d3bbda1f520dba0007c351af46f45085fe4842074eb2e01aee736fd369df595f8f72ed6c1192715f1120bf3353279777f9dca1178fe93bffe5be2de700d409c SHA512 (linux-4.12.tar.xz) = 8e81b41b253e63233e92948941f44c6482acb52aa3a3fd172f03a38a86f2c35b2ad4fd407acd1bc3964673eba344fe104d3a03e3ff4bf9cd1f22bd44263bd728 -SHA512 (patch-4.12.13.xz) = c7991705a0f76a09c22777159c93c0c4c0c60c5663432da41ebefdd93ed220abec5584a02c39f12ef46148b9cb23aa50723b3159ba3467effffcf3cf1bf4f6cd +SHA512 (patch-4.12.14.xz) = 8bef19b2a87147b4ac7c5852d6cac0281c7df7deb84460c6462c981b9213d288061c19535bd9a4da03db73f8a9fd2fb76bf9c6d42b0b6ad1f30c97d5ee0964d1 -- cgit