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-rw-r--r--xsa270.patch55
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diff --git a/xsa270.patch b/xsa270.patch
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index 000000000..867896f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xsa270.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: xen-netback: fix input validation in xenvif_set_hash_mapping()
+
+Both len and off are frontend specified values, so we need to make
+sure there's no overflow when adding the two for the bounds check. We
+also want to avoid undefined behavior and hence use off to index into
+->hash.mapping[] only after bounds checking. This at the same time
+allows to take care of not applying off twice for the bounds checking
+against vif->num_queues.
+
+It is also insufficient to bounds check copy_op.len, as this is len
+truncated to 16 bits.
+
+This is XSA-270.
+
+Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
+Tested-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
+---
+The bounds checking against vif->num_queues also occurs too early afaict
+(it should be done after the grant copy). I have patches ready as public
+follow-ups for both this and the (at least latent) issue of the mapping
+array crossing a page boundary.
+
+--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
+@@ -332,20 +332,22 @@ u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping_size(struct
+ u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping(struct xenvif *vif, u32 gref, u32 len,
+ u32 off)
+ {
+- u32 *mapping = &vif->hash.mapping[off];
++ u32 *mapping = vif->hash.mapping;
+ struct gnttab_copy copy_op = {
+ .source.u.ref = gref,
+ .source.domid = vif->domid,
+- .dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping),
+ .dest.domid = DOMID_SELF,
+- .dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping),
+- .len = len * sizeof(u32),
++ .len = len * sizeof(*mapping),
+ .flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref
+ };
+
+- if ((off + len > vif->hash.size) || copy_op.len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE)
++ if ((off + len < off) || (off + len > vif->hash.size) ||
++ len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*mapping))
+ return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
++ copy_op.dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping + off);
++ copy_op.dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping + off);
++
+ while (len-- != 0)
+ if (mapping[off++] >= vif->num_queues)
+ return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;