diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'netfilter-x_tables-check-for-size-overflow.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | netfilter-x_tables-check-for-size-overflow.patch | 31 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/netfilter-x_tables-check-for-size-overflow.patch b/netfilter-x_tables-check-for-size-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81e3d36fa --- /dev/null +++ b/netfilter-x_tables-check-for-size-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +Subject: [PATCH nf] netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow +From: Florian Westphal <fw () strlen ! de> +Date: 2016-03-10 0:56:23 + +Ben Hawkes says: + integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can + lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap + corruption. + +Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> +Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> +--- + net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +index c8a0b7d..17a9a9f 100644 +--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c ++++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +@@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size) + struct xt_table_info *info = NULL; + size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size; + ++ if (sz < sizeof(*info)) ++ return NULL; ++ + /* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */ + if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages) + return NULL; +-- +2.4.10 |