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-rw-r--r--lockdown-fix-coordination-of-kernel-module-signature-verification.patch75
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/lockdown-fix-coordination-of-kernel-module-signature-verification.patch b/lockdown-fix-coordination-of-kernel-module-signature-verification.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c600f1437..000000000
--- a/lockdown-fix-coordination-of-kernel-module-signature-verification.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From patchwork Fri Apr 13 15:27:52 2018
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
-Subject: lockdown: fix coordination of kernel module signature verification
-From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-X-Patchwork-Id: 10340277
-Message-Id: <1523633272.3272.30.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Cc: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>,
- "Bruno E. O. Meneguele" <bmeneg@redhat.com>,
- linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
- linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
- linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
-Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 11:27:52 -0400
-
-If both IMA-appraisal and sig_enforce are enabled, then both signatures
-are currently required. If the IMA-appraisal signature verification
-fails, it could rely on the appended signature verification; but with the
-lockdown patch set, the appended signature verification assumes that if
-IMA-appraisal is enabled, it has verified the signature. Basically each
-signature verification method would be relying on the other to verify the
-kernel module signature.
-
-This patch addresses the problem of requiring both kernel module signature
-verification methods, when both are enabled, by verifying just the
-appended signature.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Acked-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/module.c | 4 +---
- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++++++-
- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
-index 9c1709a05037..60861eb7bc4d 100644
---- a/kernel/module.c
-+++ b/kernel/module.c
-@@ -2803,9 +2803,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
- if (sig_enforce) {
- pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason);
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
-- }
--
-- if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled())
-+ } else if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled())
- return 0;
- if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason))
- return -EPERM;
-diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
-index 754ece08e1c6..2155b1f316a4 100644
---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
-+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
-@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
- int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
- {
-+ bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
- enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
-
-@@ -490,7 +491,11 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- return 0;
- }
-
-- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
-+ /*
-+ * If both IMA-appraisal and appended signature verification are
-+ * enabled, rely on the appended signature verification.
-+ */
-+ if (sig_enforce && read_id == READING_MODULE)
- return 0;
-
- /* permit signed certs */