diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'groups-Consolidate-the-setgroups-permission-checks.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | groups-Consolidate-the-setgroups-permission-checks.patch | 90 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/groups-Consolidate-the-setgroups-permission-checks.patch b/groups-Consolidate-the-setgroups-permission-checks.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e65ea2641 --- /dev/null +++ b/groups-Consolidate-the-setgroups-permission-checks.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> +Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 17:19:27 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks + +Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their +permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that +they may all share the same permission checking code. + +This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks +and adds a helper to avoid this in the future. + +A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly. + +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> +--- + arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c | 2 +- + include/linux/cred.h | 1 + + kernel/groups.c | 9 ++++++++- + kernel/uid16.c | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c +index ca38139423ae..437e61159279 100644 +--- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c ++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c +@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, u16 __user *, grouplis + struct group_info *group_info; + int retval; + +- if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) ++ if (!may_setgroups()) + return -EPERM; + if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) + return -EINVAL; +diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h +index b2d0820837c4..2fb2ca2127ed 100644 +--- a/include/linux/cred.h ++++ b/include/linux/cred.h +@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern void groups_free(struct group_info *); + extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *); + extern void set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *); + extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t); ++extern bool may_setgroups(void); + + /* access the groups "array" with this macro */ + #define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \ +diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c +index 451698f86cfa..02d8a251c476 100644 +--- a/kernel/groups.c ++++ b/kernel/groups.c +@@ -213,6 +213,13 @@ out: + return i; + } + ++bool may_setgroups(void) ++{ ++ struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); ++ ++ return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID); ++} ++ + /* + * SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely + * without another task interfering. +@@ -223,7 +230,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist) + struct group_info *group_info; + int retval; + +- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID)) ++ if (!may_setgroups()) + return -EPERM; + if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) + return -EINVAL; +diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c +index 602e5bbbceff..d58cc4d8f0d1 100644 +--- a/kernel/uid16.c ++++ b/kernel/uid16.c +@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist) + struct group_info *group_info; + int retval; + +- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID)) ++ if (!may_setgroups()) + return -EPERM; + if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) + return -EINVAL; +-- +2.1.0 + |