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-rw-r--r--fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch64
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch b/fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3bce47f5e..000000000
--- a/fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Thu Nov 18 21:03:11 2010
-From: Josef Bacik <josef@redhat.com>
-To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com,
- linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
- selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, bfields@fieldses.org
-Subject: [PATCH] fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias V2
-Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 20:52:55 -0500
-Message-Id: <1290131575-2489-1-git-send-email-josef@redhat.com>
-X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
-
-While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was
-getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me
-figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following
-denial
-
-type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772
-comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
-tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file
-
-Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create
-one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the
-security_d_instantiate.
-
-Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
-security_d_instantiate() by the parent's i_mutex, but obviously this isn't an
-option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in
-and finds our new dentry before we get to run security_d_instantiate(), we go
-ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok
-as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so calling
-security_d_instantiate() against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With
-this patch I'm no longer getting errant -EACCESS values.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@redhat.com>
----
-V1->V2:
--added second security_d_instantiate() call
-
- fs/dcache.c | 3 +++
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
-index 5699d4c..85388fc 100644
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1577,9 +1577,13 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
- spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
- spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-+ security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
-+
- return tmp;
-
- out_iput:
-+ if (res && !IS_ERR(res))
-+ security_d_instantiate(res, inode);
- iput(inode);
- return res;
- }
-
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