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-rw-r--r--efi-efi_test-lock-down-dev-efi_test-and-require-CAP_.patch87
1 files changed, 87 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/efi-efi_test-lock-down-dev-efi_test-and-require-CAP_.patch b/efi-efi_test-lock-down-dev-efi_test-and-require-CAP_.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61a52c6fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/efi-efi_test-lock-down-dev-efi_test-and-require-CAP_.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
+Subject: [PATCH v2] efi/efi_test: lock down /dev/efi_test and require
+ CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:55:10 +0200
+
+The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
+interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
+using the efivar API.
+
+Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
+locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.
+
+Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
+users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
+chardev file mode bits for this.
+
+The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
+the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
+cause any regression to this tool.
+
+[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo
+
+Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
+---
+
+Changes in v2:
+- Also disable /dev/efi_test access when the kernel is locked down as
+ suggested by Matthew Garrett.
+- Add Acked-by tag from Laszlo Ersek.
+
+ drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c | 8 ++++++++
+ include/linux/security.h | 1 +
+ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
+index 877745c3aaf..7baf48c01e7 100644
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/efi.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -717,6 +718,13 @@ static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+
+ static int efi_test_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+ {
++ int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST);
++
++ if (ret)
++ return ret;
++
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++ return -EACCES;
+ /*
+ * nothing special to do here
+ * We do accept multiple open files at the same time as we
+diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
+index a8d59d612d2..9df7547afc0 100644
+--- a/include/linux/security.h
++++ b/include/linux/security.h
+@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
+ LOCKDOWN_NONE,
+ LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
++ LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST,
+ LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
+ LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION,
+ LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
+diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+index 8a10b43daf7..40b790536de 100644
+--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
++++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
+ [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
+ [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
++ [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
+ [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
+ [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",