diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130226.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130226.patch | 5916 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 5916 deletions
diff --git a/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130226.patch b/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130226.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2a95ac4ab..000000000 --- a/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130226.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5916 +0,0 @@ -From d8cfe24ede3c3d8ce48d9c8ea791984777d783fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:53:35 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 01/47] KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring - -Load all the files matching the pattern "*.x509" that are to be found in kernel -base source dir and base build dir into the module signing keyring. - -The "extra_certificates" file is then redundant. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/Makefile | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ - kernel/modsign_certificate.S | 3 +-- - 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index eceac38..2c83d21 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -134,17 +134,40 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE - $(call if_changed,timeconst) - - ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) -+############################################################################### - # --# Pull the signing certificate and any extra certificates into the kernel -+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull -+# them into the kernel. - # -+############################################################################### -+X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509) -+X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509 -+X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y)) -+ -+ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),) -+$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***) -+endif -+ -+ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),) -+ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES)) -+$(info X.509 certificate list changed) -+$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list) -+endif -+endif -+ -+kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list - --quiet_cmd_touch = TOUCH $@ -- cmd_touch = touch $@ -+quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@ -+ cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ -+targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list -+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list -+ $(call if_changed,x509certs) - --extra_certificates: -- $(call cmd,touch) -+targets += $(obj)/.x509.list -+$(obj)/.x509.list: -+ @echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@ - --kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates -+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list - - ############################################################################### - # -diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S -index 246b4c6..0a60203 100644 ---- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S -+++ b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S -@@ -14,6 +14,5 @@ - .section ".init.data","aw" - - GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list) -- .incbin "signing_key.x509" -- .incbin "extra_certificates" -+ .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list" - GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end) --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 45078a904bc6488f2e3a69b71213950e0ff04db0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 18:39:54 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 02/47] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring - from module signing - -Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it -can be used by code other than the module-signing code. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/keys/system_keyring.h | 23 ++++++++++ - init/Kconfig | 13 ++++++ - kernel/Makefile | 17 ++++--- - kernel/modsign_certificate.S | 18 -------- - kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 104 ------------------------------------------ - kernel/module-internal.h | 2 - - kernel/module_signing.c | 3 +- - kernel/system_certificates.S | 18 ++++++++ - kernel/system_keyring.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 9 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 include/keys/system_keyring.h - delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_certificate.S - delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c - create mode 100644 kernel/system_certificates.S - create mode 100644 kernel/system_keyring.c - -diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..8dabc39 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h -@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ -+/* System keyring containing trusted public keys. -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H -+#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING -+ -+#include <linux/key.h> -+ -+extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring; -+ -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */ -diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index 0a5e80f..053072f 100644 ---- a/init/Kconfig -+++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -1567,6 +1567,18 @@ config BASE_SMALL - default 0 if BASE_FULL - default 1 if !BASE_FULL - -+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING -+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys" -+ depends on KEYS -+ help -+ Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in -+ the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will -+ by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but -+ userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by -+ keys already in the keyring. -+ -+ Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking. -+ - menuconfig MODULES - bool "Enable loadable module support" - help -@@ -1639,6 +1651,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL - config MODULE_SIG - bool "Module signature verification" - depends on MODULES -+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING - select KEYS - select CRYPTO - select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index 2c83d21..454ce54 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -53,8 +53,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o --obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o - obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o -@@ -133,13 +134,14 @@ targets += timeconst.h - $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE - $(call if_changed,timeconst) - --ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) - ############################################################################### - # --# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull --# them into the kernel. -+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into -+# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during -+# boot. - # - ############################################################################### -+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y) - X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509) - X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509 - X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y)) -@@ -155,10 +157,11 @@ $(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list) - endif - endif - --kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list -+kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list - - quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@ -- cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ -+ cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; echo " - Including cert $(X509)") -+ - targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list - $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list - $(call if_changed,x509certs) -@@ -168,7 +171,9 @@ $(obj)/.x509.list: - @echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@ - - clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list -+endif - -+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) - ############################################################################### - # - # If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been -diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S -deleted file mode 100644 -index 0a60203..0000000 ---- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ --/* SYMBOL_PREFIX defined on commandline from CONFIG_SYMBOL_PREFIX */ --#ifndef SYMBOL_PREFIX --#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) sym --#else --#define PASTE2(x,y) x##y --#define PASTE(x,y) PASTE2(x,y) --#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) PASTE(SYMBOL_PREFIX, sym) --#endif -- --#define GLOBAL(name) \ -- .globl ASM_SYMBOL(name); \ -- ASM_SYMBOL(name): -- -- .section ".init.data","aw" -- --GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list) -- .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list" --GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end) -diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c -deleted file mode 100644 -index 2b6e699..0000000 ---- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@ --/* Public keys for module signature verification -- * -- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -- * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -- * -- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -- */ -- --#include <linux/kernel.h> --#include <linux/sched.h> --#include <linux/cred.h> --#include <linux/err.h> --#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> --#include "module-internal.h" -- --struct key *modsign_keyring; -- --extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[]; --extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[]; -- --/* -- * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice -- * if modsign.pub changes. -- */ --static __initdata const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo"; -- --/* -- * Load the compiled-in keys -- */ --static __init int module_verify_init(void) --{ -- pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n"); -- -- modsign_keyring = keyring_alloc(".module_sign", -- KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), -- current_cred(), -- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), -- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); -- if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring)) -- panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n"); -- -- return 0; --} -- --/* -- * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. -- */ --device_initcall(module_verify_init); -- --/* -- * Load the compiled-in keys -- */ --static __init int load_module_signing_keys(void) --{ -- key_ref_t key; -- const u8 *p, *end; -- size_t plen; -- -- pr_notice("Loading module verification certificates\n"); -- -- end = modsign_certificate_list_end; -- p = modsign_certificate_list; -- while (p < end) { -- /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more -- * than 256 bytes in size. -- */ -- if (end - p < 4) -- goto dodgy_cert; -- if (p[0] != 0x30 && -- p[1] != 0x82) -- goto dodgy_cert; -- plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; -- plen += 4; -- if (plen > end - p) -- goto dodgy_cert; -- -- key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), -- "asymmetric", -- NULL, -- p, -- plen, -- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -- KEY_USR_VIEW, -- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); -- if (IS_ERR(key)) -- pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", -- PTR_ERR(key)); -- else -- pr_notice("MODSIGN: Loaded cert '%s'\n", -- key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); -- p += plen; -- } -- -- return 0; -- --dodgy_cert: -- pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); -- return 0; --} --late_initcall(load_module_signing_keys); -diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h -index 24f9247..915e123 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-internal.h -+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h -@@ -9,6 +9,4 @@ - * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. - */ - --extern struct key *modsign_keyring; -- - extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen); -diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c -index f2970bd..0034e36 100644 ---- a/kernel/module_signing.c -+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c -@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ - #include <crypto/public_key.h> - #include <crypto/hash.h> - #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> -+#include <keys/system_keyring.h> - #include "module-internal.h" - - /* -@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, - - pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); - -- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), -+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1), - &key_type_asymmetric, id); - if (IS_ERR(key)) - pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n", -diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..86240df ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S -@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ -+/* SYMBOL_PREFIX defined on commandline from CONFIG_SYMBOL_PREFIX */ -+#ifndef SYMBOL_PREFIX -+#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) sym -+#else -+#define PASTE2(x,y) x##y -+#define PASTE(x,y) PASTE2(x,y) -+#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) PASTE(SYMBOL_PREFIX, sym) -+#endif -+ -+#define GLOBAL(name) \ -+ .globl ASM_SYMBOL(name); \ -+ ASM_SYMBOL(name): -+ -+ .section ".init.data","aw" -+ -+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list) -+ .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list" -+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list_end) -diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..a3ca76f ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c -@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ -+/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/export.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/sched.h> -+#include <linux/cred.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> -+#include <keys/system_keyring.h> -+#include "module-internal.h" -+ -+struct key *system_trusted_keyring; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring); -+ -+extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list[]; -+extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list_end[]; -+ -+/* -+ * Load the compiled-in keys -+ */ -+static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) -+{ -+ pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n"); -+ -+ system_trusted_keyring = -+ keyring_alloc(".system_keyring", -+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), -+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); -+ if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring)) -+ panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n"); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. -+ */ -+device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init); -+ -+/* -+ * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates. -+ */ -+static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) -+{ -+ key_ref_t key; -+ const u8 *p, *end; -+ size_t plen; -+ -+ pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n"); -+ -+ end = system_certificate_list_end; -+ p = system_certificate_list; -+ while (p < end) { -+ /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more -+ * than 256 bytes in size. -+ */ -+ if (end - p < 4) -+ goto dodgy_cert; -+ if (p[0] != 0x30 && -+ p[1] != 0x82) -+ goto dodgy_cert; -+ plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; -+ plen += 4; -+ if (plen > end - p) -+ goto dodgy_cert; -+ -+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1), -+ "asymmetric", -+ NULL, -+ p, -+ plen, -+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -+ KEY_USR_VIEW, -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", -+ PTR_ERR(key)); -+ else -+ pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", -+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); -+ p += plen; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+ -+dodgy_cert: -+ pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); -+ return 0; -+} -+late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From cde17a931bb2f8631cfd6576f07f77857a383248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 16:25:00 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 03/47] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag - -Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source -or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the -kernel already possessed. - -Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to -keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - include/linux/key-type.h | 1 + - include/linux/key.h | 3 +++ - kernel/system_keyring.c | 4 +++- - security/keys/key.c | 8 ++++++++ - security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++++ - 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h -index 518a53a..f942b2d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/key-type.h -+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h -@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload { - const void *data; /* Raw data */ - size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ - size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ -+ bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */ - }; - - typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, -diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h -index 4dfde11..0b32a09 100644 ---- a/include/linux/key.h -+++ b/include/linux/key.h -@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ struct key { - #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */ - #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ - #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */ -+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */ -+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */ - - /* the description string - * - this is used to match a key against search criteria -@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, - #define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */ - #define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */ - #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */ -+#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED 0x0004 /* Key should be flagged as trusted */ - - extern void key_revoke(struct key *key); - extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key); -diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c -index a3ca76f..dae8778 100644 ---- a/kernel/system_keyring.c -+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c -@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) - if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring)) - panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n"); - -+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags); - return 0; - } - -@@ -82,7 +83,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) - plen, - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW, -- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | -+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED); - if (IS_ERR(key)) - pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", - PTR_ERR(key)); -diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c -index 8fb7c7b..f3de9e4 100644 ---- a/security/keys/key.c -+++ b/security/keys/key.c -@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, - - if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) - key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; -+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED) -+ key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED; - - memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data)); - -@@ -813,6 +815,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - prep.data = payload; - prep.datalen = plen; - prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen; -+ prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED; - if (ktype->preparse) { - ret = ktype->preparse(&prep); - if (ret < 0) { -@@ -826,6 +829,11 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - goto error_free_prep; - } - -+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); -+ if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags)) -+ goto error_free_prep; -+ flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0; -+ - ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); - if (ret < 0) { - key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); -diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c -index 6ece7f2..f18d7ff 100644 ---- a/security/keys/keyring.c -+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c -@@ -1006,6 +1006,10 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) - key_check(keyring); - key_check(key); - -+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) && -+ !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc); - if (ret == 0) { - ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 2e5ee12060b914772094d038b7bd9c2e486d339f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:32 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 04/47] KEYS: Rename public key parameter name arrays - -Rename the arrays of public key parameters (public key algorithm names, hash -algorithm names and ID type names) so that the array name ends in "_name". - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 14 +++++++------- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 8 ++++---- - include/crypto/public_key.h | 6 +++--- - kernel/module_signing.c | 4 ++-- - 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -index cb2e291..b313df1 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ - - MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); - --const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { -+const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { - [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "DSA", - [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "RSA", - }; --EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo); -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name); - --const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { -+const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { - [PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4", - [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5", - [PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = "sha1", -@@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { - [PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = "sha512", - [PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = "sha224", - }; --EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo); -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo_name); - --const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = { -+const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = { - [PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP", - [PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509", - }; --EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type); -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name); - - /* - * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys. -@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, - - if (key) - seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", -- pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name); -+ pkey_id_type_name[key->id_type], key->algo->name); - } - - /* -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index 06007f0..afbbc36 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, - /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how - * big the hash operational data will be. - */ -- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0); -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); - -@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - - pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); - pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); -- pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]); -+ pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]); - pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n", - cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1, - cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour, -@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour, - cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec); - pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", -- pkey_algo[cert->sig_pkey_algo], -- pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo]); -+ pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo], -+ pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]); - - if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) { - pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n", -diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h -index f5b0224..619d570 100644 ---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h -+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h -@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ enum pkey_algo { - PKEY_ALGO__LAST - }; - --extern const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; -+extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; - - enum pkey_hash_algo { - PKEY_HASH_MD4, -@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ enum pkey_hash_algo { - PKEY_HASH__LAST - }; - --extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST]; -+extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST]; - - enum pkey_id_type { - PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ -@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ enum pkey_id_type { - PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST - }; - --extern const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST]; -+extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST]; - - /* - * Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type. -diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c -index 0034e36..0b6b870 100644 ---- a/kernel/module_signing.c -+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c -@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash, - /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how - * big the hash operational data will be. - */ -- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0); -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm); - -@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen) - return -ENOPKG; - - if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || -- !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash]) -+ !pkey_hash_algo_name[ms.hash]) - return -ENOPKG; - - key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len, --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From d823c31e932ecd1e1c24435b447b35bbe9e3ee9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:33 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 05/47] KEYS: Move the algorithm pointer array from x509 to - public_key.c - -Move the public-key algorithm pointer array from x509_public_key.c to -public_key.c as it isn't X.509 specific. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 8 ++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +---------- - include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + - 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -index b313df1..796ce08 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { - }; - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name); - -+const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { -+#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \ -+ defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE) -+ [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm, -+#endif -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo); -+ - const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { - [PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4", - [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5", -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index afbbc36..fe38628 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@ - #include "public_key.h" - #include "x509_parser.h" - --static const --struct public_key_algorithm *x509_public_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { -- [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = NULL, --#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \ -- defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE) -- [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm, --#endif --}; -- - /* - * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key - */ -@@ -174,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - goto error_free_cert; - } - -- cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo]; -+ cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]; - cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; - - /* Check the signature on the key */ -diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h -index 619d570..46bde25 100644 ---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h -+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum pkey_algo { - }; - - extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; -+extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; - - enum pkey_hash_algo { - PKEY_HASH_MD4, --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From cd2153b3e5b694e88fe4a136b9bae70c16b72fd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:33 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 06/47] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key struct - -Store public key algo ID in public_key struct for reference purposes. This -allows it to be removed from the x509_certificate struct and used to find a -default in public_key_verify_signature(). - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 5 +++-- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 - - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 4 ++-- - include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + - 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -index 7fabc4c..a583930 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -@@ -343,8 +343,9 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption) - return -ENOPKG; - -- /* There seems to be an extraneous 0 byte on the front of the data */ -- ctx->cert->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ -+ /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */ - ctx->key = value + 1; - ctx->key_size = vlen - 1; - return 0; -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -index f86dc5f..e583ad0 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ struct x509_certificate { - char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */ - struct tm valid_from; - struct tm valid_to; -- enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; /* Public key algorithm */ - enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */ - enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */ - const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index fe38628..fac574c 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - - pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); - pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); -- pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]); -+ pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]); - pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n", - cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1, - cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour, -@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - goto error_free_cert; - } - -- cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]; -+ cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo]; - cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; - - /* Check the signature on the key */ -diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h -index 46bde25..05778df 100644 ---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h -+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h -@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct public_key { - #define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT 0x02 - #define PKEY_CAN_SIGN 0x04 - #define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY 0x08 -+ enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; - enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; - union { - MPI mpi[5]; --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 120a94c9b259d1d19ab64c82737121dcc23e50ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:34 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 07/47] KEYS: Split public_key_verify_signature() and make - available - -Modify public_key_verify_signature() so that it now takes a public_key struct -rather than a key struct and supply a wrapper that takes a key struct. The -wrapper is then used by the asymmetric key subtype and the modified function is -used by X.509 self-signature checking and can be used by PKCS#7 also. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h | 6 +++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 2 +- - 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -index 796ce08..49ac8d8 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c -@@ -86,21 +86,45 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy); - /* - * Verify a signature using a public key. - */ --static int public_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, -- const struct public_key_signature *sig) -+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk, -+ const struct public_key_signature *sig) - { -- const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data; -+ const struct public_key_algorithm *algo; -+ -+ BUG_ON(!pk); -+ BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[0]); -+ BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[1]); -+ BUG_ON(!sig); -+ BUG_ON(!sig->digest); -+ BUG_ON(!sig->mpi[0]); -+ -+ algo = pk->algo; -+ if (!algo) { -+ if (pk->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST) -+ return -ENOPKG; -+ algo = pkey_algo[pk->pkey_algo]; -+ if (!algo) -+ return -ENOPKG; -+ } - -- if (!pk->algo->verify_signature) -+ if (!algo->verify_signature) - return -ENOTSUPP; - -- if (sig->nr_mpi != pk->algo->n_sig_mpi) { -+ if (sig->nr_mpi != algo->n_sig_mpi) { - pr_debug("Signature has %u MPI not %u\n", -- sig->nr_mpi, pk->algo->n_sig_mpi); -+ sig->nr_mpi, algo->n_sig_mpi); - return -EINVAL; - } - -- return pk->algo->verify_signature(pk, sig); -+ return algo->verify_signature(pk, sig); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature); -+ -+static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key, -+ const struct public_key_signature *sig) -+{ -+ const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data; -+ return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig); - } - - /* -@@ -111,6 +135,6 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = { - .name = "public_key", - .describe = public_key_describe, - .destroy = public_key_destroy, -- .verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature, -+ .verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature_2, - }; - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h -index 5e5e356..5c37a22 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h -@@ -28,3 +28,9 @@ struct public_key_algorithm { - }; - - extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm; -+ -+/* -+ * public_key.c -+ */ -+extern int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk, -+ const struct public_key_signature *sig); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index fac574c..8cb2f70 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, - if (ret < 0) - goto error_mpi; - -- ret = pub->algo->verify_signature(pub, sig); -+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig); - - pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret); - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 2fc59e9f40053886e23c7bbed0841676472d0641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 08/47] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key_signature - struct - -Store public key algorithm ID in public_key_signature struct for reference -purposes. This allows a public_key_signature struct to be embedded in -struct x509_certificate and struct pkcs7_message more easily. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h -index 05778df..b34fda4 100644 ---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h -+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h -@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct public_key_signature { - u8 *digest; - u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ - u8 nr_mpi; /* Occupancy of mpi[] */ -+ enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; - enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; - union { - MPI mpi[2]; --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 8de67c627dbfc895797320c82a3ebf87f5b8d446 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 09/47] X.509: struct x509_certificate needs struct tm - declaring - -struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring by #inclusion of linux/time.h -prior to its definition. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -index e583ad0..2d01182 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ - * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. - */ - -+#include <linux/time.h> - #include <crypto/public_key.h> - - struct x509_certificate { --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 074c5a12ea0152b2a3331174ad02f3ccc8ac9915 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 10/47] X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7 - -PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an -X.509 certificate. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 2 +- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 10 ++++++++-- - 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 -index bf32b3d..aae0cde 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 -@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { - - TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { - version [ 0 ] Version DEFAULT, -- serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, -+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }), - signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }), - issuer Name ({ x509_note_issuer }), - validity Validity, -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -index a583930..08bebf1 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -@@ -209,6 +209,19 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - } - - /* -+ * Note the certificate serial number -+ */ -+int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ ctx->cert->raw_serial = value; -+ ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* - * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name. - */ - int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -@@ -320,6 +333,8 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - const void *value, size_t vlen) - { - struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value; -+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen; - return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen); - } - -@@ -328,6 +343,8 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - const void *value, size_t vlen) - { - struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ ctx->cert->raw_subject = value; -+ ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen; - return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen); - } - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -index 2d01182..a6ce46f 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -@@ -24,9 +24,15 @@ struct x509_certificate { - enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */ - enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */ - const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ -- size_t tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ -+ unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ -+ unsigned sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ - const void *sig; /* Signature data */ -- size_t sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ -+ const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */ -+ unsigned raw_serial_size; -+ unsigned raw_issuer_size; -+ const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ -+ const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ -+ unsigned raw_subject_size; - }; - - /* --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 539f6dc3de1679495b7ce4f252e815d8373ffcef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:36 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 11/47] X.509: Embed public_key_signature struct and create - filler function - -Embed a public_key_signature struct in struct x509_certificate, eliminating -now unnecessary fields, and split x509_check_signature() to create a filler -function for it that attaches a digest of the signed data and an MPI that -represents the signature data. x509_free_certificate() is then modified to -deal with these. - -Whilst we're at it, export both x509_check_signature() and the new -x509_get_sig_params(). - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 30 +++++------ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 14 ++++-- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++-------------- - 3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -index 08bebf1..931f069 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) - kfree(cert->subject); - kfree(cert->fingerprint); - kfree(cert->authority); -+ kfree(cert->sig.digest); -+ mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s); - kfree(cert); - } - } -@@ -152,33 +154,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */ - - case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption: -- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5; -- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - break; - - case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption: -- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1; -- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - break; - - case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: -- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; -- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - break; - - case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption: -- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384; -- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - break; - - case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption: -- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512; -- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - break; - - case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption: -- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224; -- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224; -+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; - break; - } - -@@ -203,8 +205,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - return -EINVAL; - } - -- ctx->cert->sig = value; -- ctx->cert->sig_size = vlen; -+ ctx->cert->raw_sig = value; -+ ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen; - return 0; - } - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -index a6ce46f..6b1d877 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -@@ -21,18 +21,17 @@ struct x509_certificate { - char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */ - struct tm valid_from; - struct tm valid_to; -- enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */ -- enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */ - const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ - unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ -- unsigned sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ -- const void *sig; /* Signature data */ -+ unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ -+ const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */ - const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */ - unsigned raw_serial_size; - unsigned raw_issuer_size; - const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ - const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ - unsigned raw_subject_size; -+ struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ - }; - - /* -@@ -40,3 +39,10 @@ struct x509_certificate { - */ - extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert); - extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ -+/* -+ * x509_public_key.c -+ */ -+extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert); -+extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, -+ struct x509_certificate *cert); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index 8cb2f70..b7c81d8 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -24,72 +24,83 @@ - #include "x509_parser.h" - - /* -- * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key -+ * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves -+ * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature. - */ --static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, -- const struct x509_certificate *cert) -+int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) - { -- struct public_key_signature *sig; - struct crypto_shash *tfm; - struct shash_desc *desc; - size_t digest_size, desc_size; -+ void *digest; - int ret; - - pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); -- -+ -+ if (cert->sig.rsa.s) -+ return 0; -+ -+ cert->sig.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size); -+ if (!cert->sig.rsa.s) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ cert->sig.nr_mpi = 1; -+ - /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how - * big the hash operational data will be. - */ -- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0); -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); - - desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); - digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); - -- /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our -- * context data. -+ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the -+ * digest storage space. - */ - ret = -ENOMEM; -- sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); -- if (!sig) -- goto error_no_sig; -+ digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!digest) -+ goto error; - -- sig->pkey_hash_algo = cert->sig_hash_algo; -- sig->digest = (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size; -- sig->digest_size = digest_size; -+ cert->sig.digest = digest; -+ cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size; - -- desc = (void *)sig + sizeof(*sig); -- desc->tfm = tfm; -- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; -+ desc = digest + digest_size; -+ desc->tfm = tfm; -+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; - - ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; -+ might_sleep(); -+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest); -+error: -+ crypto_free_shash(tfm); -+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_sig_params); - -- ret = -ENOMEM; -- sig->rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->sig, cert->sig_size); -- if (!sig->rsa.s) -- goto error; -+/* -+ * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key -+ */ -+int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, -+ struct x509_certificate *cert) -+{ -+ int ret; - -- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest); -- if (ret < 0) -- goto error_mpi; -+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - -- ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig); -+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; - -+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig); - pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret); -- --error_mpi: -- mpi_free(sig->rsa.s); --error: -- kfree(sig); --error_no_sig: -- crypto_free_shash(tfm); -- -- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); - return ret; - } -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature); - - /* - * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. -@@ -118,8 +129,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour, - cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec); - pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", -- pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo], -- pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]); -+ pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo], -+ pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]); - - if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) { - pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n", --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 760bd4c7f0be3da4191b737a480af92df125431e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:36 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 12/47] X.509: Check the algorithm IDs obtained from parsing an - X.509 certificate - -Check that the algorithm IDs obtained from the ASN.1 parse by OID lookup -corresponds to algorithms that are available to us. - -Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index b7c81d8..eb368d4 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - - pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); - pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); -+ -+ if (cert->pub->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST || -+ cert->sig.pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST || -+ cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || -+ !pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo] || -+ !pkey_algo[cert->sig.pkey_algo] || -+ !pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) { -+ ret = -ENOPKG; -+ goto error_free_cert; -+ } -+ - pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]); - pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n", - cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1, --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 5f7f7268ce26dfdd754f9bcb081c380b5409b072 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:37 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 13/47] X.509: Handle certificates that lack an - authorityKeyIdentifier field - -Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field by assuming -they're self-signed and checking their signatures against themselves. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 9 +++++---- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index eb368d4..0f55e3b 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo], - pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]); - -- if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) { -- pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n", -+ if (!cert->fingerprint) { -+ pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n", - cert->subject); - ret = -EKEYREJECTED; - goto error_free_cert; -@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo]; - cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; - -- /* Check the signature on the key */ -- if (strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) { -+ /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ -+ if (!cert->authority || -+ strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) { - ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free_cert; --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From e2d27f7dd12e2368b03a2007b435c5ae35020218 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:37 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 14/47] X.509: Export certificate parse and free functions - -Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -index 931f069..9cf0e16 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c -@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ - - #define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt - #include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/export.h> - #include <linux/slab.h> - #include <linux/err.h> - #include <linux/oid_registry.h> -@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) - kfree(cert); - } - } -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate); - - /* - * Parse an X.509 certificate -@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ error_no_ctx: - error_no_cert: - return ERR_PTR(ret); - } -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse); - - /* - * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From b6c2806dcc10f6377cafcde2b74d49419266fba8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:38 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 15/47] PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315] - -Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of -RFC 2315. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 + - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 13 ++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 127 +++++++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 326 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 65 +++++++ - include/linux/oid_registry.h | 1 + - 6 files changed, 541 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -index 6d2c2ea..413f3f6 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -@@ -35,4 +35,13 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER - data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a - public key packet found inside the certificate. - -+config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER -+ tristate "PKCS#7 message parser" -+ depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER -+ select ASN1 -+ select OID_REGISTRY -+ help -+ This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for -+ signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature. -+ - endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -index 0727204..59d8cad 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -@@ -25,3 +25,16 @@ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h - - clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h - clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h -+ -+# -+# PKCS#7 message handling -+# -+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o -+pkcs7_message-y := \ -+ pkcs7-asn1.o \ -+ pkcs7_parser.o -+ -+$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h -+$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h -+ -+clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..7bf91ed ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 -@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ -+PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -+ contentType ContentType, -+ content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL -+} -+ -+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }) -+ -+SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { -+ version INTEGER, -+ digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ({ pkcs7_note_digest_algo }), -+ contentInfo ContentInfo, -+ certificates CHOICE { -+ certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates, -+ certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates -+ } OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }), -+ crls CHOICE { -+ crlSet [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists, -+ crlSequence [3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence -+ } OPTIONAL, -+ signerInfos SignerInfos -+} -+ -+ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -+ contentType ContentType, -+ content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL -+} -+ -+Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data }) -+ -+DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE { -+ daSet SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, -+ daSequence SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier -+} -+ -+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { -+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), -+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL -+} -+ -+-- -+-- Certificates and certificate lists -+-- -+ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate -+ -+ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { -+ certificate Certificate, -- X.509 -+ extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate -- PKCS#6 -+} -+ -+ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating -+ -+Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -+ -+CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList -+ -+CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly -+ -+CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList -+ -+Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509 -+ -+-- -+-- Signer information -+-- -+SignerInfos ::= CHOICE { -+ siSet SET OF SignerInfo, -+ siSequence SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo -+} -+ -+SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -+ version INTEGER, -+ issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, -+ digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_note_digest_algo }), -+ authenticatedAttributes CHOICE { -+ aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute -+ ({ pkcs7_note_set_of_authattrs }), -+ aaSequence [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute -+ -- Explicit because easier to compute digest on -+ -- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded -+ -- sequence in aaSequence. -+ } OPTIONAL, -+ digestEncryptionAlgorithm -+ DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_note_pkey_algo }), -+ encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest, -+ unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE { -+ uaSet [1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute, -+ uaSequence [3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute -+ } OPTIONAL -+} -+ -+IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { -+ issuer Name ({ pkcs7_note_issuer }), -+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_note_serial }) -+} -+ -+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER -+ -+SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute -+ -+AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { -+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), -+ values SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_note_authenticated_attr }) -+} -+ -+UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { -+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), -+ values SET OF ANY -+} -+ -+DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { -+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), -+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL -+} -+ -+EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_note_signature }) -+ -+--- -+--- X.500 Name -+--- -+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName -+ -+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion -+ -+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE { -+ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), -+ attributeValue ANY -+} -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..231aff9 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c -@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ -+/* PKCS#7 parser -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/export.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/oid_registry.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pkcs7_parser.h" -+#include "pkcs7-asn1.h" -+ -+struct pkcs7_parse_context { -+ struct pkcs7_message *msg; /* Message being constructed */ -+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate cache */ -+ struct x509_certificate **ppcerts; -+ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */ -+ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */ -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Free a PKCS#7 message -+ */ -+void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -+{ -+ struct x509_certificate *cert; -+ -+ if (pkcs7) { -+ while (pkcs7->certs) { -+ cert = pkcs7->certs; -+ pkcs7->certs = cert->next; -+ x509_free_certificate(cert); -+ } -+ while (pkcs7->crl) { -+ cert = pkcs7->crl; -+ pkcs7->crl = cert->next; -+ x509_free_certificate(cert); -+ } -+ kfree(pkcs7->sig.digest); -+ mpi_free(pkcs7->sig.mpi[0]); -+ kfree(pkcs7); -+ } -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message); -+ -+/* -+ * Parse a PKCS#7 message -+ */ -+struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx; -+ struct pkcs7_message *msg; -+ long ret; -+ -+ ret = -ENOMEM; -+ msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!msg) -+ goto error_no_sig; -+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!ctx) -+ goto error_no_ctx; -+ -+ ctx->msg = msg; -+ ctx->data = (unsigned long)data; -+ ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs; -+ -+ /* Attempt to decode the signature */ -+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error_decode; -+ -+ while (ctx->certs) { -+ struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs; -+ ctx->certs = cert->next; -+ x509_free_certificate(cert); -+ } -+ kfree(ctx); -+ return msg; -+ -+error_decode: -+ kfree(ctx); -+error_no_ctx: -+ pkcs7_free_message(msg); -+error_no_sig: -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message); -+ -+/* -+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how -+ * to interpret it. -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); -+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) { -+ char buffer[50]; -+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); -+ printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n", -+ (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the digest algorithm for the signature. -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ switch (ctx->last_oid) { -+ case OID_md4: -+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD4; -+ break; -+ case OID_md5: -+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5; -+ break; -+ case OID_sha1: -+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1; -+ break; -+ case OID_sha256: -+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; -+ break; -+ default: -+ printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); -+ return -ENOPKG; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the public key algorithm for the signature. -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ switch (ctx->last_oid) { -+ case OID_rsaEncryption: -+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; -+ break; -+ default: -+ printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); -+ return -ENOPKG; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Extract a certificate and store it in the context. -+ */ -+int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ struct x509_certificate *cert; -+ -+ if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) { -+ pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n", -+ tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ /* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start -+ * from the beginning. Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there -+ * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which -+ * stipulates BER). -+ */ -+ value -= hdrlen; -+ vlen += hdrlen; -+ -+ if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80) -+ vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */ -+ -+ cert = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen); -+ if (IS_ERR(cert)) -+ return PTR_ERR(cert); -+ -+ pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", cert->subject); -+ pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", cert->fingerprint); -+ -+ *ctx->ppcerts = cert; -+ ctx->ppcerts = &cert->next; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Save the certificate list -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag); -+ -+ *ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs; -+ ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs; -+ ctx->certs = NULL; -+ ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Extract the data from the signature and store that and its content type OID -+ * in the context. -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ pr_debug("Got data\n"); -+ -+ ctx->msg->data = value; -+ ctx->msg->data_len = vlen; -+ ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen; -+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Parse authenticated attributes -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value); -+ -+ switch (ctx->last_oid) { -+ case OID_messageDigest: -+ if (tag != ASN1_OTS) -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ ctx->msg->msgdigest = value; -+ ctx->msg->msgdigest_len = vlen; -+ return 0; -+ default: -+ return 0; -+ } -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3] -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ -+ /* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */ -+ ctx->msg->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1); -+ ctx->msg->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the issuing certificate serial number -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ ctx->msg->raw_serial = value; -+ ctx->msg->raw_serial_size = vlen; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the issuer's name -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ ctx->msg->raw_issuer = value; -+ ctx->msg->raw_issuer_size = vlen; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the signature data -+ */ -+int pkcs7_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; -+ MPI mpi; -+ -+ BUG_ON(ctx->msg->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA); -+ -+ mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen); -+ if (!mpi) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ ctx->msg->sig.mpi[0] = mpi; -+ ctx->msg->sig.nr_mpi = 1; -+ return 0; -+} -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..5415857 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h -@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ -+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/oid_registry.h> -+#include "x509_parser.h" -+ -+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \ -+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) -+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \ -+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) -+ -+struct pkcs7_message { -+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */ -+ struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */ -+ struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in ->certs) */ -+ -+ /* Content Data (or NULL) */ -+ enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */ -+ size_t data_len; /* Length of Data */ -+ size_t data_hdrlen; /* Length of Data ASN.1 header */ -+ const void *data; /* Content Data (or 0) */ -+ -+ /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */ -+ const void *msgdigest; -+ unsigned msgdigest_len; -+ -+ /* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */ -+ unsigned authattrs_len; -+ const void *authattrs; -+ -+ /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */ -+ const void *raw_serial; -+ unsigned raw_serial_size; -+ unsigned raw_issuer_size; -+ const void *raw_issuer; -+ -+ /* Message signature. -+ * -+ * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or -+ * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3]. If the latter, one of -+ * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within -+ * it. -+ */ -+ struct public_key_signature sig; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * pkcs7_parser.c -+ */ -+extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, -+ size_t datalen); -+extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); -+ -+/* -+ * pkcs7_verify.c -+ */ -+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); -diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h -index 6926db7..edeff85 100644 ---- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h -+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h -@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ enum OID { - OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ - OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */ - OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */ -+ OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */ - - /* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */ - OID_commonName, /* 2.5.4.3 */ --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 0aa7a27b37790e737bbd80f61ccc12184baed13c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:38 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 16/47] PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message - -Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the -public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 3 +- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -index 59d8cad..b6b39e7 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h - obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o - pkcs7_message-y := \ - pkcs7-asn1.o \ -- pkcs7_parser.o -+ pkcs7_parser.o \ -+ pkcs7_verify.o - - $(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h - $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..2f9f26c ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ -+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message. -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/export.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/asn1.h> -+#include <crypto/hash.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pkcs7_parser.h" -+ -+/* -+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data -+ */ -+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -+{ -+ struct crypto_shash *tfm; -+ struct shash_desc *desc; -+ size_t digest_size, desc_size; -+ void *digest; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(",%u", pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo); -+ -+ if (pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || -+ !pkey_hash_algo_name[pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) -+ return -ENOPKG; -+ -+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how -+ * big the hash operational data will be. -+ */ -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo], -+ 0, 0); -+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) -+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); -+ -+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); -+ pkcs7->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); -+ -+ ret = -ENOMEM; -+ digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!digest) -+ goto error_no_desc; -+ -+ desc = digest + digest_size; -+ desc->tfm = tfm; -+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; -+ -+ /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */ -+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest); -+ -+ /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a -+ * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the -+ * digest we just calculated. -+ */ -+ if (pkcs7->msgdigest) { -+ u8 tag; -+ -+ if (pkcs7->msgdigest_len != pkcs7->sig.digest_size) { -+ pr_debug("Invalid digest size (%u)\n", -+ pkcs7->msgdigest_len); -+ ret = -EBADMSG; -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ if (memcmp(digest, pkcs7->msgdigest, pkcs7->msgdigest_len) != 0) { -+ pr_debug("Message digest doesn't match\n"); -+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED; -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ /* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes -+ * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to -+ * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we -+ * hash it. -+ */ -+ memset(digest, 0, pkcs7->sig.digest_size); -+ -+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET; -+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->authattrs, -+ pkcs7->authattrs_len, digest); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest); -+ } -+ -+ pkcs7->sig.digest = digest; -+ digest = NULL; -+ -+error: -+ kfree(digest); -+error_no_desc: -+ crypto_free_shash(tfm); -+ kleave(" = %d\n", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Verify a PKCS#7 message -+ */ -+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -+{ -+ int ret; -+ -+ /* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message */ -+ ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From e84f2d2018594d3b5c4ecbe45e29ca7eb0b50909 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 17/47] PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and - verify the signature - -Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with -it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that -chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -index 2f9f26c..3f6f0e2 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -@@ -118,6 +118,53 @@ error_no_desc: - } - - /* -+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7 -+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for -+ * matching purposes. These must match the certificate issuer's name (not -+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7]. -+ */ -+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -+{ -+ struct x509_certificate *x509; -+ -+ kenter("%u,%u", pkcs7->raw_serial_size, pkcs7->raw_issuer_size); -+ -+ for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next) { -+ pr_devel("- x509 %u,%u\n", -+ x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_issuer_size); -+ -+ /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will -+ * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the -+ * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's -+ * possible this will need element-by-element comparison. -+ */ -+ if (x509->raw_serial_size != pkcs7->raw_serial_size || -+ memcmp(x509->raw_serial, pkcs7->raw_serial, -+ pkcs7->raw_serial_size) != 0) -+ continue; -+ pr_devel("Found cert serial match\n"); -+ -+ if (x509->raw_issuer_size != pkcs7->raw_issuer_size || -+ memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, pkcs7->raw_issuer, -+ pkcs7->raw_issuer_size) != 0) { -+ pr_warn("X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n"); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != pkcs7->sig.pkey_algo) { -+ pr_warn("X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n"); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ pkcs7->signer = x509; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ pr_warn("Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n", -+ pkcs7->raw_serial_size, pkcs7->raw_serial); -+ return -ENOKEY; -+} -+ -+/* - * Verify a PKCS#7 message - */ - int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -@@ -129,6 +176,20 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - -+ /* Find the key for the message signature */ -+ ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ pr_devel("Found X.509 cert\n"); -+ -+ /* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */ -+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(pkcs7->signer->pub, &pkcs7->sig); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ pr_devel("Verified signature\n"); -+ - return 0; - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From d64d4625334797a96891b93cffb0899f3dd6218d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 18/47] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain - -Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7 -message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify -fails, we reject the whole lot. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 + - 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -index 3f6f0e2..b3774bd 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c -@@ -165,6 +165,70 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) - } - - /* -+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can. -+ */ -+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -+{ -+ struct x509_certificate *x509 = pkcs7->signer, *p; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ for (;;) { -+ pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint); -+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ if (x509->issuer) -+ pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); -+ if (x509->authority) -+ pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority); -+ -+ if (!x509->authority || -+ (x509->subject && -+ strcmp(x509->subject, x509->authority) == 0)) { -+ /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then -+ * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root -+ * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own -+ * authority. -+ */ -+ pr_debug("- no auth?\n"); -+ if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size || -+ memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer, -+ x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0) -+ return 0; -+ -+ ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ x509->signer = x509; -+ pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) -+ if (!p->signer && -+ p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size && -+ strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 && -+ memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer, -+ x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0) -+ goto found_issuer; -+ pr_debug("- top\n"); -+ return 0; -+ -+ found_issuer: -+ pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject); -+ ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ x509->signer = p; -+ x509 = p; -+ might_sleep(); -+ } -+} -+ -+/* - * Verify a PKCS#7 message - */ - int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) -@@ -190,6 +254,7 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) - - pr_devel("Verified signature\n"); - -- return 0; -+ /* Verify the internal certificate chain */ -+ return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7); - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -index 6b1d877..5e35fba 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ - - struct x509_certificate { - struct x509_certificate *next; -+ const struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */ - struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */ - char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ - char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 051964867e90089bcd643cce929e1a6494abe20b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:42 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 19/47] PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and - known, trusted keys - -Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7 -message and a set of keys that we already know and trust. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 + - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 7 ++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -index b6b39e7..d63cb43 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o - pkcs7_message-y := \ - pkcs7-asn1.o \ - pkcs7_parser.o \ -+ pkcs7_trust.o \ - pkcs7_verify.o - - $(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h -index 5415857..ffa72dc 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h -@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, - extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); - - /* -+ * pkcs7_trust.c -+ */ -+extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -+ struct key *trust_keyring, -+ bool *_trusted); -+ -+/* - * pkcs7_verify.c - */ - extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..cc226f5 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c -@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ -+/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message. -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/export.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/asn1.h> -+#include <linux/key.h> -+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pkcs7_parser.h" -+ -+/* -+ * Request an asymmetric key. -+ */ -+static struct key *pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key( -+ struct key *keyring, -+ const char *signer, size_t signer_len, -+ const char *authority, size_t auth_len) -+{ -+ key_ref_t key; -+ char *id; -+ -+ kenter(",%zu,,%zu", signer_len, auth_len); -+ -+ /* Construct an identifier. */ -+ id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!id) -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -+ -+ memcpy(id, signer, signer_len); -+ id[signer_len + 0] = ':'; -+ id[signer_len + 1] = ' '; -+ memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len); -+ id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0; -+ -+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); -+ -+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), -+ &key_type_asymmetric, id); -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n", -+ id, PTR_ERR(key)); -+ kfree(id); -+ -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) { -+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { -+ /* Hide some search errors */ -+ case -EACCES: -+ case -ENOTDIR: -+ case -EAGAIN: -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); -+ default: -+ return ERR_CAST(key); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); -+ return key_ref_to_ptr(key); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects -+ * keys we already know and trust. -+ */ -+int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -+ struct key *trust_keyring, -+ bool *_trusted) -+{ -+ struct public_key_signature *sig = &pkcs7->sig; -+ struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL; -+ struct key *key; -+ bool trusted; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ for (x509 = pkcs7->signer; x509; x509 = x509->next) { -+ /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted -+ * keys. -+ */ -+ key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key( -+ trust_keyring, -+ x509->subject, strlen(x509->subject), -+ x509->fingerprint, strlen(x509->fingerprint)); -+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) -+ /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message -+ * is apparently the same as one we already trust. -+ * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate -+ * the signature on the descendent. -+ */ -+ goto matched; -+ if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we -+ * don't know them, then we can't accept them. -+ */ -+ if (x509->next == x509) { -+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [unknown self-signed]"); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } -+ -+ might_sleep(); -+ last = x509; -+ sig = &last->sig; -+ } -+ -+ /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the -+ * trusted keys. -+ */ -+ if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) { -+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [no backref]"); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } -+ -+ key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key( -+ trust_keyring, -+ last->issuer, strlen(last->issuer), -+ last->authority, strlen(last->authority)); -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -EKEYREJECTED; -+ -+matched: -+ ret = verify_signature(key, sig); -+ trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags); -+ key_put(key); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ if (ret == -ENOMEM) -+ return ret; -+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } -+ -+ *_trusted = trusted; -+ kleave(" = 0"); -+ return 0; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 7cbe9a52ec426f2d1e2bdaefda34a16987114a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 20/47] Provide PE binary definitions - -Provide some PE binary structural and constant definitions as taken from the -pesign package sources. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - include/linux/pe.h | 448 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 448 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 include/linux/pe.h - -diff --git a/include/linux/pe.h b/include/linux/pe.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..9234aef ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/linux/pe.h -@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. -+ * All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by -+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License. -+ * -+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -+ * GNU General Public License for more details. -+ * -+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License -+ * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. -+ * -+ * Author(s): Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> -+ */ -+#ifndef __LINUX_PE_H -+#define __LINUX_PE_H -+ -+#include <linux/types.h> -+ -+#define MZ_MAGIC 0x5a4d /* "MZ" */ -+ -+struct mz_hdr { -+ uint16_t magic; /* MZ_MAGIC */ -+ uint16_t lbsize; /* size of last used block */ -+ uint16_t blocks; /* pages in file, 0x3 */ -+ uint16_t relocs; /* relocations */ -+ uint16_t hdrsize; /* header size in "paragraphs" */ -+ uint16_t min_extra_pps; /* .bss */ -+ uint16_t max_extra_pps; /* runtime limit for the arena size */ -+ uint16_t ss; /* relative stack segment */ -+ uint16_t sp; /* initial %sp register */ -+ uint16_t checksum; /* word checksum */ -+ uint16_t ip; /* initial %ip register */ -+ uint16_t cs; /* initial %cs relative to load segment */ -+ uint16_t reloc_table_offset; /* offset of the first relocation */ -+ uint16_t overlay_num; /* overlay number. set to 0. */ -+ uint16_t reserved0[4]; /* reserved */ -+ uint16_t oem_id; /* oem identifier */ -+ uint16_t oem_info; /* oem specific */ -+ uint16_t reserved1[10]; /* reserved */ -+ uint32_t peaddr; /* address of pe header */ -+ char message[64]; /* message to print */ -+}; -+ -+struct mz_reloc { -+ uint16_t offset; -+ uint16_t segment; -+}; -+ -+#define PE_MAGIC 0x00004550 /* "PE\0\0" */ -+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32 0x010b -+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32_ROM 0x0107 -+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS 0x020b -+ -+/* machine type */ -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN 0x0000 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AM33 0x01d3 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64 0x8664 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM 0x01c0 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARMV7 0x01c4 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_EBC 0x0ebc -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 0x014c -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 0x0200 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_M32R 0x9041 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPS16 0x0266 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU 0x0366 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU16 0x0466 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPC 0x01f0 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPCFP 0x01f1 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_R4000 0x0166 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3 0x01a2 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3DSP 0x01a3 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3E 0x01a4 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH4 0x01a6 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH5 0x01a8 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_THUMB 0x01c2 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_WCEMIPSV2 0x0169 -+ -+/* flags */ -+#define IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED 0x0001 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE 0x0002 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED 0x0004 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED 0x0008 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_AGGRESSIVE_WS_TRIM 0x0010 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE 0x0020 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_16BIT_MACHINE 0x0040 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO 0x0080 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE 0x0100 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED 0x0200 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0400 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0800 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM 0x1000 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_DLL 0x2000 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY 0x4000 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI 0x8000 -+ -+struct pe_hdr { -+ uint32_t magic; /* PE magic */ -+ uint16_t machine; /* machine type */ -+ uint16_t sections; /* number of sections */ -+ uint32_t timestamp; /* time_t */ -+ uint32_t symbol_table; /* symbol table offset */ -+ uint32_t symbols; /* number of symbols */ -+ uint16_t opt_hdr_size; /* size of optional header */ -+ uint16_t flags; /* flags */ -+}; -+ -+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_ROM_MAGIC 0x107 -+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_MAGIC 0x10b -+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_PLUS_MAGIC 0x20b -+ -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN 0 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE 1 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI 2 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI 3 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI 7 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI 9 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION 10 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER 11 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER 12 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_ROM_IMAGE 13 -+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX 14 -+ -+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE 0x0040 -+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY 0x0080 -+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT 0x0100 -+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_ISOLATION 0x0200 -+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH 0x0400 -+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_BIND 0x0800 -+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_WDM_DRIVER 0x2000 -+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE 0x8000 -+ -+/* the fact that pe32 isn't padded where pe32+ is 64-bit means union won't -+ * work right. vomit. */ -+struct pe32_opt_hdr { -+ /* "standard" header */ -+ uint16_t magic; /* file type */ -+ uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */ -+ uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */ -+ uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */ -+ uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */ -+ uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */ -+ uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */ -+ uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */ -+ uint32_t data_base; /* relative data addr in ram */ -+ /* "windows" header */ -+ uint32_t image_base; /* preferred load address */ -+ uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */ -+ uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */ -+ uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */ -+ uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */ -+ uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */ -+ uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */ -+ uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */ -+ uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */ -+ uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */ -+ uint32_t image_size; /* image size */ -+ uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to -+ file_align */ -+ uint32_t csum; /* checksum */ -+ uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */ -+ uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */ -+ uint32_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */ -+ uint32_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */ -+ uint32_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */ -+ uint32_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */ -+ uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */ -+ uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */ -+}; -+ -+struct pe32plus_opt_hdr { -+ uint16_t magic; /* file type */ -+ uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */ -+ uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */ -+ uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */ -+ uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */ -+ uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */ -+ uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */ -+ uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */ -+ /* "windows" header */ -+ uint64_t image_base; /* preferred load address */ -+ uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */ -+ uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */ -+ uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */ -+ uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */ -+ uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */ -+ uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */ -+ uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */ -+ uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */ -+ uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */ -+ uint32_t image_size; /* image size */ -+ uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to -+ file_align */ -+ uint32_t csum; /* checksum */ -+ uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */ -+ uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */ -+ uint64_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */ -+ uint64_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */ -+ uint64_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */ -+ uint64_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */ -+ uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */ -+ uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */ -+}; -+ -+struct data_dirent { -+ uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative to load address */ -+ uint32_t size; -+}; -+ -+struct data_directory { -+ struct data_dirent exports; /* .edata */ -+ struct data_dirent imports; /* .idata */ -+ struct data_dirent resources; /* .rsrc */ -+ struct data_dirent exceptions; /* .pdata */ -+ struct data_dirent certs; /* certs */ -+ struct data_dirent base_relocations; /* .reloc */ -+ struct data_dirent debug; /* .debug */ -+ struct data_dirent arch; /* reservered */ -+ struct data_dirent global_ptr; /* global pointer reg. Size=0 */ -+ struct data_dirent tls; /* .tls */ -+ struct data_dirent load_config; /* load configuration structure */ -+ struct data_dirent bound_imports; /* no idea */ -+ struct data_dirent import_addrs; /* import address table */ -+ struct data_dirent delay_imports; /* delay-load import table */ -+ struct data_dirent clr_runtime_hdr; /* .cor (object only) */ -+ struct data_dirent reserved; -+}; -+ -+struct section_header { -+ char name[8]; /* name or "/12\0" string tbl offset */ -+ uint32_t virtual_size; /* size of loaded section in ram */ -+ uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative virtual address */ -+ uint32_t raw_data_size; /* size of the section */ -+ uint32_t data_addr; /* file pointer to first page of sec */ -+ uint32_t relocs; /* file pointer to relocation entries */ -+ uint32_t line_numbers; /* line numbers! */ -+ uint16_t num_relocs; /* number of relocations */ -+ uint16_t num_lin_numbers; /* srsly. */ -+ uint32_t flags; -+}; -+ -+/* they actually defined 0x00000000 as well, but I think we'll skip that one. */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_0 0x00000001 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_1 0x00000002 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_2 0x00000004 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NO_PAD 0x00000008 /* don't pad - obsolete */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_3 0x00000010 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE 0x00000020 /* .text */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000040 /* .data */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000080 /* .bss */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER 0x00000100 /* reserved */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO 0x00000200 /* .drectve comments */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_4 0x00000400 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE 0x00000800 /* .o only - scn to be rm'd*/ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT 0x00001000 /* .o only - COMDAT data */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_5 0x00002000 /* spec omits this */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_6 0x00004000 /* spec omits this */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_GPREL 0x00008000 /* global pointer referenced data */ -+/* spec lists 0x20000 twice, I suspect they meant 0x10000 for one of them */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE 0x00010000 /* reserved for "future" use */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_16BIT 0x00020000 /* reserved for "future" use */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_LOCKED 0x00040000 /* reserved for "future" use */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_PRELOAD 0x00080000 /* reserved for "future" use */ -+/* and here they just stuck a 1-byte integer in the middle of a bitfield */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES 0x00100000 /* it does what it says on the box */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES 0x00200000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES 0x00300000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES 0x00400000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES 0x00500000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES 0x00600000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES 0x00700000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES 0x00800000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES 0x00900000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES 0x00a00000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES 0x00b00000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES 0x00c00000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES 0x00d00000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES 0x00e00000 -+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_NRELOC_OVFL 0x01000000 /* extended relocations */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE 0x02000000 /* scn can be discarded */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_CACHED 0x04000000 /* cannot be cached */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED 0x08000000 /* not pageable */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED 0x10000000 /* can be shared */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE 0x20000000 /* can be executed as code */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ 0x40000000 /* readable */ -+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE 0x80000000 /* writeable */ -+ -+enum x64_coff_reloc_type { -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ABSOLUTE = 0, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR64, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32N, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_1, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_2, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_3, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_4, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_5, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL7, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_TOKEN, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SREL32, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_PAIR, -+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SSPAN32, -+}; -+ -+enum arm_coff_reloc_type { -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ABSOLUTE, -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32, -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32N, -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH2, -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH1, -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECREL, -+}; -+ -+enum sh_coff_reloc_type { -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_ABSOLUTE, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT16, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_WORD, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_LONG, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_WORD, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_LONG, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_WORD, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_LONG, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL12_WORD, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_STARTOF_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SIZEOF_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECREL, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32_NB, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_GPREL4_LONG, -+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_TOKEN, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_PCRELPT, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFLO, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFHALF, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELLO, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELHALF, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_PAIR, -+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_NOMODE, -+}; -+ -+enum ppc_coff_reloc_type { -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ABSOLUTE, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR64, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR24, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR16, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR14, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL24, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL14, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32N, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL16, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFHI, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFLO, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_PAIR, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECRELLO, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_GPREL, -+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_TOKEN, -+}; -+ -+enum x86_coff_reloc_type { -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_ABSOLUTE, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR16, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_REL16, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32NB, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SEG12, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_TOKEN, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL7, -+ IMAGE_REL_I386_REL32, -+}; -+ -+enum ia64_coff_reloc_type { -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_ABSOLUTE, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM14, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM22, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM64, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR64, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21B, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21M, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21F, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL22, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_LTOFF22, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECTION, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL22, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL64I, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL32, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32NB, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL14, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL22, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL32, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_UREL32, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60X, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60B, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60F, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60I, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60M, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMMGPREL6, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_TOKEN, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL32, -+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_ADDEND, -+}; -+ -+struct coff_reloc { -+ uint32_t virtual_address; -+ uint32_t symbol_table_index; -+ union { -+ enum x64_coff_reloc_type x64_type; -+ enum arm_coff_reloc_type arm_type; -+ enum sh_coff_reloc_type sh_type; -+ enum ppc_coff_reloc_type ppc_type; -+ enum x86_coff_reloc_type x86_type; -+ enum ia64_coff_reloc_type ia64_type; -+ uint16_t data; -+ }; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Definitions for the contents of the certs data block -+ */ -+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA 0x0002 -+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_OKCS115 0x0EF0 -+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID 0x0EF1 -+ -+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_1_0 0x0100 -+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0 0x0200 -+ -+struct win_certificate { -+ uint32_t length; -+ uint16_t revision; -+ uint16_t cert_type; -+}; -+ -+#endif /* __LINUX_PE_H */ --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 63bfd5e0dbf914df3e39011ea0bc0e3fa056420b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 21/47] pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature - contained therein - -Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later -patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 10 +- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 8 ++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h | 31 ++++++ - 4 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -index 413f3f6..2e7315c 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER - select ASN1 - select OID_REGISTRY - help -- This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key -+ This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key - data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a - public key packet found inside the certificate. - -@@ -44,4 +44,12 @@ config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER - This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for - signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature. - -+config PE_FILE_PARSER -+ tristate "PE binary-wrapped key parser" -+ depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER -+ depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER -+ help -+ This option provides support for parsing signed PE binaries that -+ contain an X.509 certificate in an internal section. -+ - endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -index d63cb43..2675146 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -@@ -40,3 +40,11 @@ $(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h - $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h - - clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h -+ -+# -+# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling -+# -+obj-$(CONFIG_PE_FILE_PARSER) += pefile_key_parser.o -+ -+pefile_key_parser-y := \ -+ pefile_parser.o -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..fb80cf0 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ -+/* Parse a signed PE binary that wraps a key. -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/pe.h> -+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> -+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> -+#include <crypto/hash.h> -+#include "asymmetric_keys.h" -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pefile_parser.h" -+ -+/* -+ * Parse a PE binary. -+ */ -+static int pefile_parse_binary(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, -+ struct pefile_context *ctx) -+{ -+ const struct mz_hdr *mz = prep->data; -+ const struct pe_hdr *pe; -+ const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32; -+ const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64; -+ const struct data_directory *ddir; -+ const struct data_dirent *dde; -+ const struct section_header *secs, *sec; -+ unsigned loop; -+ size_t cursor, datalen = prep->datalen; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+#define chkaddr(base, x, s) \ -+ do { \ -+ if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \ -+ return -ELIBBAD; \ -+ } while(0) -+ -+ chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz)); -+ if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ cursor = sizeof(*mz); -+ -+ chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe)); -+ pe = prep->data + mz->peaddr; -+ if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe); -+ -+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic)); -+ pe32 = prep->data + cursor; -+ pe64 = prep->data + cursor; -+ -+ switch (pe32->magic) { -+ case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32: -+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32)); -+ ctx->image_checksum_offset = -+ (unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)prep->data; -+ ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size; -+ cursor += sizeof(*pe32); -+ ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs; -+ break; -+ -+ case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS: -+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64)); -+ ctx->image_checksum_offset = -+ (unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)prep->data; -+ ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size; -+ cursor += sizeof(*pe64); -+ ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs; -+ break; -+ -+ default: -+ pr_devel("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ } -+ -+ pr_devel("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset); -+ pr_devel("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size); -+ -+ if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ -+ if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde) || -+ ctx->n_data_dirents < sizeof(*ddir) / sizeof(*dde)) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ -+ ddir = prep->data + cursor; -+ cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents; -+ -+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset = -+ (unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)prep->data; -+ ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size; -+ -+ if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) { -+ pr_devel("Unsigned PE binary\n"); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } -+ -+ chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, ddir->certs.size); -+ ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address; -+ ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size; -+ pr_devel("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n", -+ ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset, -+ ctx->sig_len, prep->data + ctx->sig_offset); -+ -+ /* Parse the section table, checking the parameters and looking for the -+ * section containing the list of keys. -+ */ -+ ctx->n_sections = pe->sections; -+ if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec)) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ ctx->secs = secs = prep->data + cursor; -+ cursor += sizeof(*sec) * ctx->n_sections; -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) { -+ sec = &secs[loop]; -+ chkaddr(cursor, sec->data_addr, sec->raw_data_size); -+ if (memcmp(sec->name, ".keylist", 8) == 0) { -+ ctx->keylist_offset = sec->data_addr; -+ ctx->keylist_len = sec->raw_data_size; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (ctx->keylist_offset == 0) { -+ pr_devel("No .keylist section in PE binary\n"); -+ return -ENOENT; -+ } -+ -+ pr_devel("keylist = %x @%x [%*ph]\n", -+ ctx->keylist_len, ctx->keylist_offset, -+ ctx->keylist_len, prep->data + ctx->keylist_offset); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Parse a PE binary. -+ */ -+static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -+{ -+ struct pefile_context ctx; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); -+ ret = pefile_parse_binary(prep, &ctx); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ return -ENOANO; // Not yet complete -+} -+ -+static struct asymmetric_key_parser pefile_key_parser = { -+ .owner = THIS_MODULE, -+ .name = "pefile", -+ .parse = pefile_key_preparse, -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Module stuff -+ */ -+static int __init pefile_key_init(void) -+{ -+ return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&pefile_key_parser); -+} -+ -+static void __exit pefile_key_exit(void) -+{ -+ unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&pefile_key_parser); -+} -+ -+module_init(pefile_key_init); -+module_exit(pefile_key_exit); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..82bcaf6 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h -@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ -+/* PE Binary parser bits -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+#include "pkcs7_parser.h" -+ -+struct pefile_context { -+ unsigned header_size; -+ unsigned image_checksum_offset; -+ unsigned cert_dirent_offset; -+ unsigned n_data_dirents; -+ unsigned n_sections; -+ unsigned certs_size; -+ unsigned sig_offset; -+ unsigned sig_len; -+ unsigned keylist_offset; -+ unsigned keylist_len; -+ const struct section_header *secs; -+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; -+ -+ /* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */ -+ const void *digest; /* Digest */ -+ unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */ -+ enum pkey_hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */ -+}; --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 82101ad57553b695c00e1b1c686d61ae4be27ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 22/47] pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block - -The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7 -signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got -something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -index fb80cf0..f2d4df0 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include <linux/slab.h> - #include <linux/err.h> - #include <linux/pe.h> -+#include <linux/asn1.h> - #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> - #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> - #include <crypto/hash.h> -@@ -145,6 +146,61 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, - } - - /* -+ * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the -+ * remnant looks something like PKCS#7. -+ */ -+static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, -+ struct pefile_context *ctx) -+{ -+ struct win_certificate wrapper; -+ const u8 *pkcs7; -+ -+ if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) { -+ pr_devel("Signature wrapper too short\n"); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ } -+ -+ memcpy(&wrapper, prep->data + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper)); -+ pr_devel("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n", -+ wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type); -+ if (wrapper.length != ctx->sig_len) { -+ pr_devel("Signature wrapper len wrong\n"); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ } -+ if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) { -+ pr_devel("Signature is not revision 2.0\n"); -+ return -ENOTSUPP; -+ } -+ if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) { -+ pr_devel("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n"); -+ return -ENOTSUPP; -+ } -+ -+ ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper); -+ ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper); -+ if (ctx->sig_len == 0) { -+ pr_devel("Signature data missing\n"); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } -+ -+ /* What's left should a PKCS#7 cert */ -+ pkcs7 = prep->data + ctx->sig_offset; -+ if (pkcs7[0] == (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) { -+ if (pkcs7[1] == 0x82 && -+ pkcs7[2] == (((ctx->sig_len - 4) >> 8) & 0xff) && -+ pkcs7[3] == ((ctx->sig_len - 4) & 0xff)) -+ return 0; -+ if (pkcs7[1] == 0x80) -+ return 0; -+ if (pkcs7[1] > 0x82) -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+ } -+ -+ pr_devel("Signature data not PKCS#7\n"); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+} -+ -+/* - * Parse a PE binary. - */ - static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -@@ -159,6 +215,10 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - -+ ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(prep, &ctx); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ - return -ENOANO; // Not yet complete - } - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 1e9df8e0c3ac669a43ca856f15e377f3ac671ae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 23/47] pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the - certificate blob - -Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -index f2d4df0..056500f 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, - */ - static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { -+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; - struct pefile_context ctx; - int ret; - -@@ -219,7 +220,22 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - -- return -ENOANO; // Not yet complete -+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(prep->data + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len); -+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) -+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); -+ ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7; -+ -+ if (!ctx.pkcs7->data || !ctx.pkcs7->data_len) { -+ pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n"); -+ ret = -EBADMSG; -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete -+ -+error: -+ pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7); -+ return ret; - } - - static struct asymmetric_key_parser pefile_key_parser = { --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 99df31e182eafe3473eec9805d08847411527c79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:41 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 24/47] pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" - data blob - -The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing" -data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed -content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically -SHA256). - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 9 ++- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 | 28 +++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 6 ++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h | 5 ++ - include/linux/oid_registry.h | 6 +- - 6 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -index 2675146..ddc64bb 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -@@ -47,4 +47,11 @@ clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h - obj-$(CONFIG_PE_FILE_PARSER) += pefile_key_parser.o - - pefile_key_parser-y := \ -- pefile_parser.o -+ pefile_parser.o \ -+ mscode_parser.o \ -+ mscode-asn1.o -+ -+$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h -+$(obj)/mscode-asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.c $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h -+ -+clean-files += mscode-asn1.c mscode-asn1.h -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..6d09ba4 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 -@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ -+--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser -+--- -+--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+--- -+--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+--- -+ -+MSCode ::= SEQUENCE { -+ type SEQUENCE { -+ contentType ContentType, -+ parameters ANY -+ }, -+ content SEQUENCE { -+ digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, -+ digest OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest }) -+ } -+} -+ -+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type }) -+ -+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { -+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }), -+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL -+} -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..0bd68e0 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c -@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ -+/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/oid_registry.h> -+#include "pefile_parser.h" -+#include "mscode-asn1.h" -+ -+/* -+ * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob -+ */ -+int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx) -+{ -+ pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", -+ ctx->pkcs7->data_len + ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen, -+ (unsigned)(ctx->pkcs7->data_len + ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen), -+ ctx->pkcs7->data - ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen); -+ -+ return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx, -+ ctx->pkcs7->data - ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen, -+ ctx->pkcs7->data_len + ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Check the content type OID -+ */ -+int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ enum OID oid; -+ -+ oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); -+ if (oid == OID__NR) { -+ char buffer[50]; -+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); -+ printk("MSCODE: Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ if (oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) { -+ printk("MSCODE: Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the digest algorithm OID -+ */ -+int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pefile_context *ctx = context; -+ char buffer[50]; -+ enum OID oid; -+ -+ oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); -+ switch (oid) { -+ case OID_md4: -+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD4; -+ break; -+ case OID_md5: -+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5; -+ break; -+ case OID_sha1: -+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1; -+ break; -+ case OID_sha256: -+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; -+ break; -+ -+ case OID__NR: -+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); -+ printk("MSCODE: Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ -+ default: -+ printk("MSCODE: Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid); -+ return -ENOPKG; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate -+ */ -+int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen, -+ unsigned char tag, -+ const void *value, size_t vlen) -+{ -+ struct pefile_context *ctx = context; -+ ctx->digest = value; -+ ctx->digest_len = vlen; -+ return 0; -+} -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -index 056500f..f1c8cc1 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -231,6 +231,12 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - goto error; - } - -+ ret = mscode_parse(&ctx); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ pr_devel("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n", ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest); -+ - ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete - - error: -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h -index 82bcaf6..c3462b7 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h -@@ -29,3 +29,8 @@ struct pefile_context { - unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */ - enum pkey_hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */ - }; -+ -+/* -+ * mscode_parser.c -+ */ -+extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx); -diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h -index edeff85..332dcf5 100644 ---- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h -+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h -@@ -52,8 +52,12 @@ enum OID { - OID_md4, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.4 */ - OID_md5, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.5 */ - -- OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ -+ /* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */ -+ OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */ -+ OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */ - OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */ -+ -+ OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ - OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */ - OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */ - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From dcebe53a75f108c10ac0c429d2b63f3f1f02c109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:41 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 25/47] pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 - data - -Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table -before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the -PKCS#7 signed content. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 198 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -index f1c8cc1..dfdb85e 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -201,6 +201,193 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, - } - - /* -+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation. -+ */ -+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b) -+{ -+ const struct section_header *shdra = a; -+ const struct section_header *shdrb = b; -+ int rc; -+ -+ if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr) -+ return 1; -+ if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr) -+ return -1; -+ -+ if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address) -+ return 1; -+ if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address) -+ return -1; -+ -+ rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name); -+ if (rc != 0) -+ return rc; -+ -+ if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size) -+ return 1; -+ if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size) -+ return -1; -+ -+ if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size) -+ return 1; -+ if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size) -+ return -1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image -+ * checksum and the certificate data block. -+ */ -+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, -+ struct pefile_context *ctx, -+ struct shash_desc *desc) -+{ -+ unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes; -+ int ret; -+ -+ /* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image -+ * checksum and the data dirent for the signature. -+ */ -+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, prep->data, ctx->image_checksum_offset); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t); -+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, prep->data + tmp, -+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent); -+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, prep->data + tmp, -+ ctx->header_size - tmp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!canon) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ /* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an -+ * insertion sort. -+ */ -+ canon[0] = 0; -+ for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) { -+ for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) { -+ if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]], -+ &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) { -+ memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i], -+ (loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0])); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ canon[i] = loop; -+ } -+ -+ hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size; -+ for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) { -+ i = canon[loop]; -+ if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0) -+ continue; -+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, -+ prep->data + ctx->secs[i].data_addr, -+ ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ kfree(canon); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size; -+ } -+ kfree(canon); -+ -+ if (prep->datalen > hashed_bytes) { -+ tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size; -+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, -+ prep->data + hashed_bytes, -+ prep->datalen - tmp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the -+ * certificate data block. -+ */ -+static int pefile_digest_pe(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, -+ struct pefile_context *ctx) -+{ -+ struct crypto_shash *tfm; -+ struct shash_desc *desc; -+ size_t digest_size, desc_size; -+ void *digest; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo); -+ -+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how -+ * big the hash operational data will be. -+ */ -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0); -+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) -+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); -+ -+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); -+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); -+ -+ if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) { -+ pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n", -+ digest_size, ctx->digest_len); -+ ret = -EBADMSG; -+ goto error_no_desc; -+ } -+ pr_devel("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size); -+ -+ ret = -ENOMEM; -+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!desc) -+ goto error_no_desc; -+ -+ desc->tfm = tfm; -+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; -+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(prep, ctx, desc); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ digest = (void *)desc + desc_size; -+ ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ pr_devel("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest); -+ -+ /* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the -+ * PKCS#7 certificate. -+ */ -+ if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) { -+ pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n"); -+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } else { -+ pr_debug("The digests match!\n"); -+ } -+ -+error: -+ kfree(desc); -+error_no_desc: -+ crypto_free_shash(tfm); -+ kleave(" = %d", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* - * Parse a PE binary. - */ - static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -@@ -237,6 +424,17 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - - pr_devel("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n", ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest); - -+ /* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate -+ * contents. -+ */ -+ ret = pefile_digest_pe(prep, &ctx); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ - ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete - - error: --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 3aa52815d5d27045e66b9a3970ff2af8b707bfa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:58:35 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 26/47] PEFILE: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain - -Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 1 + - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 5 +++++ - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -index 2e7315c..2777916 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ config PE_FILE_PARSER - tristate "PE binary-wrapped key parser" - depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER - depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER -+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING - help - This option provides support for parsing signed PE binaries that - contain an X.509 certificate in an internal section. -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -index dfdb85e..edad948 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ - #include <linux/asn1.h> - #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> - #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> -+#include <keys/system_keyring.h> - #include <crypto/hash.h> - #include "asymmetric_keys.h" - #include "public_key.h" -@@ -435,6 +436,10 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - if (ret < 0) - goto error; - -+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &prep->trusted); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ - ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete - - error: --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 125d3794df049a715905529e05b6400db1309ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:42 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 27/47] PEFILE: Load the contained key if we consider the - container to be validly signed - -Load the key contained in the PE binary if the signature on the container can -be verified by following the chain of X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message -to a key that we already trust. Typically, the trusted key will be acquired -from a source outside of the kernel, such as the UEFI database. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 11 ++++++++++- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 3 +++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 ++- - 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -index edad948..c3efe39 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c -@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; - struct pefile_context ctx; -+ const void *saved_data; -+ size_t saved_datalen; - int ret; - - kenter(""); -@@ -440,7 +442,14 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - if (ret < 0) - goto error; - -- ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete -+ /* We can now try to load the key */ -+ saved_data = prep->data; -+ saved_datalen = prep->datalen; -+ prep->data += ctx.keylist_offset; -+ prep->datalen = ctx.keylist_len; -+ ret = x509_key_preparse(prep); -+ prep->data = saved_data; -+ prep->datalen = saved_datalen; - - error: - pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -index 5e35fba..65452c4 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h -@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ - #include <linux/time.h> - #include <crypto/public_key.h> - -+struct key_preparsed_payload; -+ - struct x509_certificate { - struct x509_certificate *next; - const struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */ -@@ -47,3 +49,4 @@ extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen - extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert); - extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, - struct x509_certificate *cert); -+extern int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -index 0f55e3b..c3e5a6d 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c -@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature); - /* - * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. - */ --static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -+int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct x509_certificate *cert; - struct tm now; -@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ error_free_cert: - x509_free_certificate(cert); - return ret; - } -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_key_preparse); - - static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From f8089a0ae1983d8a079510126d7f21bd01d3a971 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> -Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 19:23:49 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH 28/47] MODSIGN: Fix including certificate twice when the - signing_key.x509 already exists - -This issue was found in devel-pekey branch on linux-modsign.git tree. The -x509_certificate_list includes certificate twice when the signing_key.x509 -already exists. -We can reproduce this issue by making kernel twice, the build log of -second time looks like this: - -... - CHK kernel/config_data.h - CERTS kernel/x509_certificate_list - - Including cert /ramdisk/working/joey/linux-modsign/signing_key.x509 - - Including cert signing_key.x509 -... - -Actually the build path was the same with the srctree path when building -kernel. It causes the size of bzImage increased by packaging certificates -twice. - -Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> -Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> -Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> -Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> -Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> -Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/Makefile | 5 ++++- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index 454ce54..9824a86 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -142,7 +142,10 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE - # - ############################################################################### - ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y) --X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509) -+X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) -+ifneq ($(shell pwd), $(srctree)) -+X509_CERTIFICATES-y += $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509) -+endif - X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509 - X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y)) - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 26909a21e7274b6d9e04374e2a11e4fbc07713f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 29/47] Secure boot: Add new capability - -Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not -be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code. -The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability -and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial -capability set if required. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h -index ba478fa..7109e65 100644 ---- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h -+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h -@@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data { - - #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36 - --#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND -+/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */ -+ -+#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37 -+ -+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL - - #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From ea9b455fe0e2c2f133ab26e24cc3c1e83fd2a0e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 30/47] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability - -Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux -policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate -capability class. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h -index 14d04e6..ed99a2d 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h -+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h -@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { - { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, - { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, - { "capability2", -- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", -- NULL } }, -+ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", -+ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } }, - { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, - { "tun_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } }, --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From f945b0d4c7653109a2cca48de11faa8c44e4c503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 31/47] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will - switch on Secure Boot mode - -This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset -in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from. This works on -any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++++++ - kernel/cred.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt -index 1da9465..6152011 100644 ---- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt -+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt -@@ -2710,6 +2710,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. - Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be - enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads. - -+ secureboot_enable= -+ [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This -+ locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the -+ CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things -+ like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can -+ be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes. -+ - security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot. - If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first - security module asking for security registration will be -diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c -index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644 ---- a/kernel/cred.c -+++ b/kernel/cred.c -@@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void) - 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - } - -+void __init secureboot_enable() -+{ -+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); -+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); -+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); -+} -+ -+/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ -+static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str) -+{ -+ int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); -+ if (sb_enable) -+ secureboot_enable(); -+ return 1; -+} -+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt); -+ - /** - * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service - * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From eb90b28185e0a14b4d585713078229f1416fbf0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 32/47] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when - enabled in firmware - -The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled -and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself -down. We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the -EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ - arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- - arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 7 +++++++ - include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ - include/linux/efi.h | 1 + - 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt -index 199f453..ff651d3 100644 ---- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt -+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt -@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning - 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) - 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer - (below) -+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled -+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns - 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders - 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures - 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table -diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -index f8fa411..96bd86b 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -@@ -849,6 +849,36 @@ fail: - return status; - } - -+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table) -+{ -+ u8 sb, setup; -+ unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); -+ efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; -+ efi_status_t status; -+ -+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, -+ L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb); -+ -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (sb == 0) -+ return 0; -+ -+ -+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, -+ L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, -+ &setup); -+ -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (setup == 1) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - /* - * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we - * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create -@@ -1143,6 +1173,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table, - if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE) - goto fail; - -+ boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table); -+ - setup_graphics(boot_params); - - setup_efi_pci(boot_params); -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h -index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h -@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct boot_params { - __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ - __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ - __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ -- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */ -+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ -+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */ - /* - * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S. - * -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -index 9c857f0..72c67cf 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -@@ -1107,6 +1107,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) - - io_delay_init(); - -+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) { -+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI -+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility); -+#endif -+ secureboot_enable(); -+ } -+ - /* - * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration. - */ -diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h -index 04421e8..9e69542 100644 ---- a/include/linux/cred.h -+++ b/include/linux/cred.h -@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *); - extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *); - extern void __init cred_init(void); - -+extern void secureboot_enable(void); -+ - /* - * check for validity of credentials - */ -diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h -index 9bf2f1f..1bf382b 100644 ---- a/include/linux/efi.h -+++ b/include/linux/efi.h -@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); - #define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES 3 /* Can we use runtime services? */ - #define EFI_MEMMAP 4 /* Can we use EFI memory map? */ - #define EFI_64BIT 5 /* Is the firmware 64-bit? */ -+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 6 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_EFI - # ifdef CONFIG_X86 --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 32e9fbbf1bc41283c3af2ed24044edff8fcf1c69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 33/47] Add EFI signature data types - -Add the data types that are used for containing hashes, keys and certificates -for cryptographic verification. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h -index 1bf382b..8902faf 100644 ---- a/include/linux/efi.h -+++ b/include/linux/efi.h -@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules, - #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \ - EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b ) - -+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \ -+ EFI_GUID( 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 ) -+ -+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \ -+ EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 ) -+ - typedef struct { - efi_guid_t guid; - u64 table; -@@ -523,6 +529,20 @@ typedef struct { - - #define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR (~0UL) - -+typedef struct { -+ efi_guid_t signature_owner; -+ u8 signature_data[]; -+} efi_signature_data_t; -+ -+typedef struct { -+ efi_guid_t signature_type; -+ u32 signature_list_size; -+ u32 signature_header_size; -+ u32 signature_size; -+ u8 signature_header[]; -+ /* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */ -+} efi_signature_list_t; -+ - /* - * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure: - */ --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From a040224f153348fa8df70f6c2cefd107d5ea004f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 34/47] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader. - -X.509 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type -keys. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 8 +++ - crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 + - crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - include/linux/efi.h | 4 ++ - 4 files changed, 122 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c - -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -index 2777916..429bbb7 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig -@@ -53,4 +53,12 @@ config PE_FILE_PARSER - This option provides support for parsing signed PE binaries that - contain an X.509 certificate in an internal section. - -+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER -+ bool "EFI signature list parser" -+ depends on EFI -+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER -+ help -+ This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for -+ X.509 certificates and turning them into keys. -+ - endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -index ddc64bb..360b308 100644 ---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile -@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o - obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o - - # - # X.509 Certificate handling -diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..424896a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c -@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ -+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/printk.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/efi.h> -+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> -+ -+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; -+ -+/** -+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates -+ * @data: The data blob to parse -+ * @size: The size of the data blob -+ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to -+ */ -+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring) -+{ -+ unsigned offs = 0; -+ size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize; -+ -+ pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size); -+ -+ while (size > 0) { -+ efi_signature_list_t list; -+ const efi_signature_data_t *elem; -+ key_ref_t key; -+ -+ if (size < sizeof(list)) -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ -+ memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list)); -+ pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n", -+ offs, -+ list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size, -+ list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size); -+ -+ lsize = list.signature_list_size; -+ hsize = list.signature_header_size; -+ esize = list.signature_size; -+ elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize; -+ -+ if (lsize > size) { -+ pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n", -+ __func__, offs); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ if (lsize < sizeof(list) || -+ lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize || -+ esize < sizeof(*elem) || -+ elsize < esize || -+ elsize % esize != 0) { -+ pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) { -+ data += lsize; -+ size -= lsize; -+ offs += lsize; -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ data += sizeof(list) + hsize; -+ size -= sizeof(list) + hsize; -+ offs += sizeof(list) + hsize; -+ -+ for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) { -+ elem = data; -+ -+ pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs); -+ -+ key = key_create_or_update( -+ make_key_ref(keyring, 1), -+ "asymmetric", -+ NULL, -+ &elem->signature_data, -+ esize - sizeof(*elem), -+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -+ KEY_USR_VIEW, -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | -+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED); -+ -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", -+ PTR_ERR(key)); -+ else -+ pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s' linked to '%s'\n", -+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, -+ keyring->description); -+ -+ data += esize; -+ size -= esize; -+ offs += esize; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h -index 8902faf..ff3c599 100644 ---- a/include/linux/efi.h -+++ b/include/linux/efi.h -@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime); - extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void); - extern struct efi_memory_map memmap; - -+struct key; -+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, -+ struct key *keyring); -+ - /** - * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range - * @start: starting kvirt address --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From e096ebf28fdc1a96055a1e2a8b3a194c64560e77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 35/47] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring - -This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that -are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules -and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load. This is -useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 ++++ - init/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ - kernel/module_signing.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - kernel/system_keyring.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h -index 8dabc39..e466de1 100644 ---- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h -+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h -@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ - - extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring; - -+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -+extern struct key *system_blacklist_keyring; -+#endif -+ - #endif - - #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */ -diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index 053072f..e82c950 100644 ---- a/init/Kconfig -+++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -1579,6 +1579,15 @@ config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING - - Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking. - -+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys" -+ depends on KEYS -+ help -+ Provide a system keyring to which blacklisted keys can be added. Keys -+ in the keyring are considered entirely untrusted. Keys in this keyring -+ are used by the module signature checking to reject loading of modules -+ signed with a blacklisted key. -+ - menuconfig MODULES - bool "Enable loadable module support" - help -diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c -index 0b6b870..0a29b40 100644 ---- a/kernel/module_signing.c -+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c -@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, - - pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); - -+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_blacklist_keyring, 1), -+ &key_type_asymmetric, id); -+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) { -+ /* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist. reject */ -+ pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id); -+ key_ref_put(key); -+ kfree(id); -+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); -+ } -+#endif -+ - key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1), - &key_type_asymmetric, id); - if (IS_ERR(key)) -diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c -index dae8778..2913c70 100644 ---- a/kernel/system_keyring.c -+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c -@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ - - struct key *system_trusted_keyring; - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring); -+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -+struct key *system_blacklist_keyring; -+#endif - - extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list[]; - extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list_end[]; -@@ -41,6 +44,20 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) - panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n"); - - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags); -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -+ system_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".system_blacklist_keyring", -+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), -+ current_cred(), -+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); -+ if (IS_ERR(system_blacklist_keyring)) -+ panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n"); -+ -+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_blacklist_keyring->flags); -+#endif -+ - return 0; - } - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 8ae4ff8d17e43538f4b5aca9758c461dbd4e26f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 36/47] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot - -Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable. -This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring. This -allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction -with signed modules. By importing the public certificate into the 'db' -variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to -load. The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored -in the 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well. - -In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed -certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into -the newly introduced system blacklist keyring and forbid any module -signed with those from loading. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++ - init/Kconfig | 9 +++++ - kernel/Makefile | 3 ++ - kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 109 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c - -diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h -index ff3c599..8400949 100644 ---- a/include/linux/efi.h -+++ b/include/linux/efi.h -@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules, - #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \ - EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 ) - -+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \ -+ EFI_GUID( 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f ) -+ -+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \ -+ EFI_GUID( 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 ) -+ - typedef struct { - efi_guid_t guid; - u64 table; -diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index e82c950..e15c960 100644 ---- a/init/Kconfig -+++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -1697,6 +1697,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_ALL - comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file" - depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL - -+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI -+ bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI" -+ depends on MODULE_SIG && SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING && EFI -+ select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER -+ help -+ This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules -+ signed with those to be loaded. It will also disallow loading -+ of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable. -+ - choice - prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" - depends on MODULE_SIG -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index 9824a86..ac803d0 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o - obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o - obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o -@@ -115,6 +116,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o - - $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h - -+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -+ - # config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped. - # Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config* - targets += config_data.gz -diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..df831ff ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c -@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/sched.h> -+#include <linux/cred.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/efi.h> -+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> -+#include <keys/system_keyring.h> -+#include "module-internal.h" -+ -+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size) -+{ -+ efi_status_t status; -+ unsigned long lsize = 4; -+ unsigned long tmpdb[4]; -+ void *db = NULL; -+ -+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb); -+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { -+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!db) { -+ pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { -+ kfree(db); -+ db = NULL; -+ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status); -+ } -+out: -+ *size = lsize; -+ return db; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases -+ * */ -+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) -+{ -+ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; -+ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; -+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL; -+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0; -+ int rc = 0; -+ -+ /* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */ -+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't -+ * an error if we can't get them. -+ */ -+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); -+ if (!db) { -+ pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n"); -+ } else { -+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, system_trusted_keyring); -+ if (rc) -+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc); -+ kfree(db); -+ } -+ -+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize); -+ if (!mok) { -+ pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n"); -+ } else { -+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, system_trusted_keyring); -+ if (rc) -+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc); -+ kfree(mok); -+ } -+ -+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize); -+ if (!dbx) { -+ pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n"); -+ } else { -+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize, -+ system_blacklist_keyring); -+ if (rc) -+ pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc); -+ kfree(dbx); -+ } -+ -+ return rc; -+} -+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From a7aa88c97e85e0a9fdd95b1a0ba3605b36f4313a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 37/47] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments - -Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from -userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause -arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can -potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ - drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++- - drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +- - 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c -index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644 ---- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c -+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c -@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj, - loff_t init_off = off; - u8 *data = (u8*) buf; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (off > dev->cfg_size) - return 0; - if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { -@@ -928,6 +931,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, - resource_size_t start, end; - int i; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) - if (res == &pdev->resource[i]) - break; -@@ -1035,6 +1041,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, - struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, - loff_t off, size_t count) - { -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); - } - -diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c -index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644 ---- a/drivers/pci/proc.c -+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c -@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof - int size = dp->size; - int cnt; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (pos >= size) - return 0; - if (nbytes >= size) -@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, - #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ - int ret = 0; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - switch (cmd) { - case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: - ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); -@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) - struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; - int i, ret; - -- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) - return -EPERM; - - /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */ -diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c -index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644 ---- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c -+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c -@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, - u32 dword; - int err = 0; - -- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) - return -EPERM; - - dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 3ab26acbd1042405f65bf72f44c857511d953b83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 38/47] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot - environments - -IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration -registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register -space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock -it down by default. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++-- - drivers/char/mem.c | 3 +++ - 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c -index 4ddaf66..f505995 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c -@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on) - - if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) - return -EINVAL; -- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) -+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))) - return -EPERM; - - /* -@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level) - return -EINVAL; - /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ - if (level > old) { -- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) - return -EPERM; - } - regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12); -diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c -index 6f6e92a..9362b9b 100644 ---- a/drivers/char/mem.c -+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c -@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - unsigned long i = *ppos; - const char __user *tmp = buf; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count)) - return -EFAULT; - while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) { --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From c05363da5dfcc35d9717c2cd6cc47690f92e9cdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 39/47] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method - -It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context -under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary -access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c -index 12b62f2..edf0710 100644 ---- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c -+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c -@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, - struct acpi_table_header table; - acpi_status status; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (!(*ppos)) { - /* parse the table header to get the table length */ - if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 47f48642c2e767b8f1219a6692a90262e2dfaee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 40/47] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface - -We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a -given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to -be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the -kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++ - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c -index f80ae4d..059195f 100644 ---- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c -+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c -@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data) - int err; - u32 retval = -1; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval); - - if (err < 0) -@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) - int err; - u32 retval = -1; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param, - &retval); - -@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) - union acpi_object *obj; - acpi_status status; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID, - 1, asus->debug.method_id, - &input, &output); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From a18dec77f42e30d986a29f51d2f0933d2c30b9c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 41/47] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups - -Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel -to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c -index 9362b9b..3c55828 100644 ---- a/drivers/char/mem.c -+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c -@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - unsigned long copied; - void *ptr; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count)) - return -EFAULT; - -@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ - int err = 0; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { - unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count, - (unsigned long)high_memory - p); --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From b03691364e9bee51a92a32887bdb783a8210364c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 42/47] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure - boot environment - -This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This -could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model. -This is setup through the setup_arch function, which is called before the -security_init function sets up the security_ops, so we cannot use a -capable call here. We ignore the setting if we are booted in Secure Boot -mode. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c -index 586e7e9..8950454 100644 ---- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c -+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c -@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp); - acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) - { - #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC -- if (acpi_rsdp) -+ if (acpi_rsdp && !efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) - return acpi_rsdp; - #endif - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From febf4b93d82db4e575014ff518f500ae988ef2aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 43/47] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment - -kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel -to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to -support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable -loading entirely in that situation. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/kexec.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c -index 2436ffc..a78e71a 100644 ---- a/kernel/kexec.c -+++ b/kernel/kexec.c -@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, - int result; - - /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ -- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) - return -EPERM; - - /* --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 99a767e78759ad32c78e79690f6aabd72caf5969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 44/47] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot - environment - -If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to -protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed -with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for -this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make -this visible within the kernel and force it to be true. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++ - kernel/module.c | 4 ++-- - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c -index c3f4e3e..c5554e0 100644 ---- a/kernel/cred.c -+++ b/kernel/cred.c -@@ -565,11 +565,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void) - 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - } - -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+extern bool sig_enforce; -+#endif -+ - void __init secureboot_enable() - { - pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); - cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); - cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+ /* Enable module signature enforcing */ -+ sig_enforce = true; -+#endif - } - - /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ -diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c -index 921bed4..2ee8a7c 100644 ---- a/kernel/module.c -+++ b/kernel/module.c -@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG - #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE --static bool sig_enforce = true; -+bool sig_enforce = true; - #else --static bool sig_enforce = false; -+bool sig_enforce = false; - - static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val, - const struct kernel_param *kp) --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 9a3364262073f8ae3f00a4bad626823811fedffa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 45/47] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment - -There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning -from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model, -so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in -a Secure Boot environment. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/power/hibernate.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- - kernel/power/main.c | 7 ++++++- - kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++ - 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c -index b26f5f1..7f63cb4 100644 ---- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c -+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> - #include <linux/ctype.h> - #include <linux/genhd.h> -+#include <linux/efi.h> - - #include "power.h" - -@@ -632,6 +633,10 @@ int hibernate(void) - { - int error; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { -+ return -EPERM; -+ } -+ - lock_system_sleep(); - /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */ - if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { -@@ -723,7 +728,7 @@ static int software_resume(void) - /* - * If the user said "noresume".. bail out early. - */ -- if (noresume) -+ if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) - return 0; - - /* -@@ -889,6 +894,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, - int i; - char *start = buf; - -+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) { -+ buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled"); -+ return buf-start; -+ } -+ - for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) { - if (!hibernation_modes[i]) - continue; -@@ -923,6 +933,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, - char *p; - int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - p = memchr(buf, '\n', n); - len = p ? p - buf : n; - -diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c -index d77663b..78f8ed5 100644 ---- a/kernel/power/main.c -+++ b/kernel/power/main.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include <linux/workqueue.h> - #include <linux/debugfs.h> - #include <linux/seq_file.h> -+#include <linux/efi.h> - - #include "power.h" - -@@ -301,7 +302,11 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, - } - #endif - #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION -- s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); -+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) { -+ s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); -+ } else { -+ s += sprintf(s, "\n"); -+ } - #else - if (s != buf) - /* convert the last space to a newline */ -diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c -index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644 ---- a/kernel/power/user.c -+++ b/kernel/power/user.c -@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) - struct snapshot_data *data; - int error; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - lock_system_sleep(); - - if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From 74bfbcb7c06c502b536d0d0e2eab3f4423452e11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 46/47] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode - -A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of -images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called -MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the -user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable -secure boot mode if that variable is set. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -index 96bd86b..6e1331c 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -@@ -851,8 +851,9 @@ fail: - - static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table) - { -- u8 sb, setup; -+ u8 sb, setup, moksbstate; - unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); -+ u32 attr; - efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; - efi_status_t status; - -@@ -876,6 +877,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table) - if (setup == 1) - return 0; - -+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable -+ * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that. -+ */ -+ var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; -+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, -+ L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize, -+ &moksbstate); -+ -+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return 1; -+ -+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) { -+ if (moksbstate == 1) -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - return 1; - } - --- -1.8.1.2 - - -From f472a81527c0f2efbb8f2ad9c799b3fd13a79806 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 47/47] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot - -Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is -set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. - -Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> ---- - arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c -index 4929502..adaab3d 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c -@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - int err = 0; - ssize_t bytes = 0; - -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) -+ return -EPERM; -+ - if (count % 8) - return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */ - -@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg) - err = -EBADF; - break; - } -+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { -+ err = -EPERM; -+ break; -+ } - if (copy_from_user(®s, uregs, sizeof regs)) { - err = -EFAULT; - break; --- -1.8.1.2 - |