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-rw-r--r--KEYS-Fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch108
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 108 deletions
diff --git a/KEYS-Fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch b/KEYS-Fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index df0d9376b..000000000
--- a/KEYS-Fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From f144220f72062ed5359e0211f130670c915a12dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 10:36:31 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
-
-There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
-happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
-semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
-
-This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
-its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
-and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
-
-Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
-semaphore instead of before.
-
-This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
-(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <keyutils.h>
- #include <pthread.h>
- void *thr0(void *arg)
- {
- key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
- keyctl_revoke(key);
- return 0;
- }
- void *thr1(void *arg)
- {
- key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
- char buffer[16];
- keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
- return 0;
- }
- int main()
- {
- key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
- pthread_t th[5];
- pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
- pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
- pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
- pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
- pthread_join(th[0], 0);
- pthread_join(th[1], 0);
- pthread_join(th[2], 0);
- pthread_join(th[3], 0);
- return 0;
- }
-
-Build as:
-
- cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
-
-Run as:
-
- while keyctl-race; do :; done
-
-as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
-summarised as:
-
- BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
- IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
- ...
- Call Trace:
- [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
- [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
- [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
-
-Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 +++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
-index fb111eafcb89..1c3872aeed14 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
-@@ -751,16 +751,16 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
-
- /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
- can_read_key:
-- ret = key_validate(key);
-- if (ret == 0) {
-- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-- if (key->type->read) {
-- /* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
-- * might sleep) */
-- down_read(&key->sem);
-+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-+ if (key->type->read) {
-+ /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
-+ * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
-+ */
-+ down_read(&key->sem);
-+ ret = key_validate(key);
-+ if (ret == 0)
- ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
-- up_read(&key->sem);
-- }
-+ up_read(&key->sem);
- }
-
- error2:
---
-2.5.0
-