diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'CVE-2018-14633.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | CVE-2018-14633.patch | 242 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 242 deletions
diff --git a/CVE-2018-14633.patch b/CVE-2018-14633.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 731903bdb..000000000 --- a/CVE-2018-14633.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,242 +0,0 @@ -From 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> -Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 04:09:26 +0000 -Subject: scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation - -This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance: - -1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow - -2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which - is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is: - chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); - -The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size -(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can -happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated -remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes -attacker-controlled and one null). As switching to hex2bin requires -specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null, -it solves both issues. - -This addresses CVE-2018-14633. - -Beyond this: - -- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log - this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication. - -- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks. - -================================================================== -BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] -Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021 - -CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2 -Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014 -Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod] -Call Trace: - dump_stack+0x71/0xac - print_address_description+0x65/0x22e - ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] - kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd - chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] - chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe - ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0 - ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850 - ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 - ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 - ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 - ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0 - ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11 - ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110 - ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100 - ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 - ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 - ? 0xffffffffc1660000 - ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 - ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 - ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 - ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 - ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod] - chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90 - ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50 - ? memcmp+0x45/0x70 - iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0 - ? memset+0x1f/0x40 - ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0 - iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] - ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod] - process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 - worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 - ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40 - kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 - ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30 - ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 - -The buggy address belongs to the page: -page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 -flags: 0x17fffc000000000() -raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff -raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 -page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected - -Memory state around the buggy address: - ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 - ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ->ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 - ^ - ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 - ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 -================================================================== - -Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> -Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> ---- - drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 30 ++++++++++++++---------------- - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c -index 9518ffd8b8ba..6c3b4c022894 100644 ---- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c -+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c -@@ -26,18 +26,6 @@ - #include "iscsi_target_nego.h" - #include "iscsi_target_auth.h" - --static int chap_string_to_hex(unsigned char *dst, unsigned char *src, int len) --{ -- int j = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 2), rc; -- -- rc = hex2bin(dst, src, j); -- if (rc < 0) -- pr_debug("CHAP string contains non hex digit symbols\n"); -- -- dst[j] = '\0'; -- return j; --} -- - static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len) - { - int i; -@@ -248,9 +236,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( - pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n"); - goto out; - } -+ if (strlen(chap_r) != MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 2) { -+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (hex2bin(client_digest, chap_r, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) < 0) { -+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n"); -+ goto out; -+ } - - pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_R=%s\n", chap_r); -- chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); - - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { -@@ -349,9 +344,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( - pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n"); - goto out; - } -- pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge); -- challenge_len = chap_string_to_hex(challenge_binhex, challenge, -- strlen(challenge)); -+ challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2); - if (!challenge_len) { - pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n"); - goto out; -@@ -360,6 +353,11 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( - pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n"); - goto out; - } -+ if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) { -+ pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge); - /* - * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the - * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by --- -cgit 1.2-0.3.lf.el7 - -From 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> -Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 04:09:27 +0000 -Subject: scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation - -Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> -Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> ---- - drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 15 +++------------ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c -index 6c3b4c022894..4e680d753941 100644 ---- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c -+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c -@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ - #include "iscsi_target_nego.h" - #include "iscsi_target_auth.h" - --static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len) --{ -- int i; -- -- for (i = 0; i < src_len; i++) { -- sprintf(&dst[i*2], "%02x", (int) src[i] & 0xff); -- } --} -- - static int chap_gen_challenge( - struct iscsi_conn *conn, - int caller, -@@ -50,7 +41,7 @@ static int chap_gen_challenge( - ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); - if (unlikely(ret)) - return ret; -- chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge, -+ bin2hex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge, - CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); - /* - * Set CHAP_C, and copy the generated challenge into c_str. -@@ -289,7 +280,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( - goto out; - } - -- chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); -+ bin2hex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - pr_debug("[server] MD5 Server Digest: %s\n", response); - - if (memcmp(server_digest, client_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0) { -@@ -411,7 +402,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( - /* - * Convert response from binary hex to ascii hext. - */ -- chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); -+ bin2hex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - *nr_out_len += sprintf(nr_out_ptr + *nr_out_len, "CHAP_R=0x%s", - response); - *nr_out_len += 1; --- -cgit 1.2-0.3.lf.el7 - |