diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel.spec | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sources | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch | 140 |
4 files changed, 5 insertions, 225 deletions
diff --git a/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch b/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5eec95c62..000000000 --- a/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -From 05fd13592b60c3e9873f56705f80ff934e98b046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 10:53:31 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring() - -This fixes CVE-2016-0728. - -If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already -set as its session, we leak a keyring reference. - -This can be tested with the following program: - - #include <stddef.h> - #include <stdio.h> - #include <sys/types.h> - #include <keyutils.h> - - int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) - { - int i = 0; - key_serial_t serial; - - serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, - "leaked-keyring"); - if (serial < 0) { - perror("keyctl"); - return -1; - } - - if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial, - KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) { - perror("keyctl"); - return -1; - } - - for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { - serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, - "leaked-keyring"); - if (serial < 0) { - perror("keyctl"); - return -1; - } - } - - return 0; - } - -If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in -/proc/keys: - -3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty - -with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run, -then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or -has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed. - -Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -RH-bugzilla: 1298036 ---- - security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c -index 43b4cddbf2b3..7877e5cd4e23 100644 ---- a/security/keys/process_keys.c -+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c -@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) - ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); - goto error2; - } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) { -+ key_put(keyring); - ret = 0; - goto error2; - } --- -2.5.0 - diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index 7ff9d8c78..835146287 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel %if 0%{?released_kernel} # Do we have a -stable update to apply? -%define stable_update 0 +%define stable_update 1 # Set rpm version accordingly %if 0%{?stable_update} %define stablerev %{stable_update} @@ -606,12 +606,6 @@ Patch604: drm-i915-shut-up-gen8-SDE-irq-dmesg-noise-again.patch #rhbz 1296677 Patch641: HID-multitouch-fix-input-mode-switching-on-some-Elan.patch -#CVE-2016-0728 rhbz 1296623 1297475 -Patch634: KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch - -#CVE-2013-4312 rhbz 1297813 1300216 -Patch636: unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch - #CVE-2016-0723 rhbz 1296253 1300224 Patch637: tty-Fix-unsafe-ldisc-reference-via-ioctl-TIOCGETD.patch @@ -2077,6 +2071,9 @@ fi # # %changelog +* Mon Feb 01 2016 Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> +- Linux v4.4.1 + * Fri Jan 29 2016 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> - Backport HID sony patch to fix some gamepads (rhbz 1255235) @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ 9a78fa2eb6c68ca5a40ed5af08142599 linux-4.4.tar.xz dcbc8fe378a676d5d0dd208cf524e144 perf-man-4.4.tar.gz +d9e951895c8c249f0bf52d85f3e63bce patch-4.4.1.xz diff --git a/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch b/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c263abf2b..000000000 --- a/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,140 +0,0 @@ -From 0cd038d23b86853d68993c94f3c713e4375fd61f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu> -Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets - -It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than -the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them -to keep the process' fd count low. - -This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs -in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having -more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit. - -Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com -Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> -Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) -Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> -Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> -Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> -Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> ---- - include/linux/sched.h | 1 + - net/unix/af_unix.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- - net/unix/garbage.c | 13 ++++++++----- - 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h -index b7b9501b41af..f477e87ca46f 100644 ---- a/include/linux/sched.h -+++ b/include/linux/sched.h -@@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ struct user_struct { - unsigned long mq_bytes; /* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */ - #endif - unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */ -+ unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */ -diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c -index 128b0982c96b..9085de63bb81 100644 ---- a/net/unix/af_unix.c -+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c -@@ -1498,6 +1498,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) - sock_wfree(skb); - } - -+/* -+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage -+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go -+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing -+ * it across threads. Tough. -+ */ -+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p) -+{ -+ struct user_struct *user = current_user(); -+ -+ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE))) -+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); -+ return false; -+} -+ - #define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4 - - static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) -@@ -1506,6 +1521,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) - unsigned char max_level = 0; - int unix_sock_count = 0; - -+ if (too_many_unix_fds(current)) -+ return -ETOOMANYREFS; -+ - for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]); - -@@ -1527,10 +1545,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) - if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp) - return -ENOMEM; - -- if (unix_sock_count) { -- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) -- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]); -- } -+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) -+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]); - return max_level; - } - -diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c -index a73a226f2d33..8fcdc2283af5 100644 ---- a/net/unix/garbage.c -+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c -@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp) - { - struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); - -+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); -+ - if (s) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); - -- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); -- - if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) { - BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link)); - list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list); -@@ -132,25 +132,28 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp) - BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); - } - unix_tot_inflight++; -- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); - } -+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++; -+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); - } - - void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp) - { - struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); - -+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); -+ - if (s) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); - -- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); - BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); - - if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight)) - list_del_init(&u->link); - unix_tot_inflight--; -- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); - } -+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--; -+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); - } - - static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *), --- -2.5.0 - |