diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | genkey | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel.spec | 76 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | mod-extra-sign.sh | 28 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | modsign-20120816.patch | 10434 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch | 9153 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | secure-boot-20120924.patch (renamed from secure-boot-20120809.patch) | 486 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | x509.genkey | 16 |
7 files changed, 9498 insertions, 10705 deletions
diff --git a/genkey b/genkey deleted file mode 100644 index fdb7d1f64..000000000 --- a/genkey +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -%pubring modsign.pub -%secring modsign.sec -%no-protection: yes -%transient-key: yes -Key-Type: RSA -Key-Length: 2048 -Name-Real: Fedora Project -Name-Comment: Kernel Module GPG key -%commit - diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index 8212eaaf6..10fb41cbc 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel # For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and # gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3" # -%global baserelease 3 +%global baserelease 4 %global fedora_build %{baserelease} # base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching @@ -551,19 +551,20 @@ BuildRequires: rpm-build >= 4.9.0-1, elfutils >= elfutils-0.153-1 %endif %if %{signmodules} -BuildRequires: gnupg +BuildRequires: openssl BuildRequires: pesign >= 0.10-4 %endif Source0: ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/linux-%{kversion}.tar.xz %if %{signmodules} -Source11: genkey +Source11: x509.genkey %endif Source15: merge.pl Source16: mod-extra.list Source17: mod-extra.sh +Source18: mod-extra-sign.sh Source19: Makefile.release Source20: Makefile.config @@ -680,10 +681,10 @@ Patch700: linux-2.6-e1000-ich9-montevina.patch Patch800: linux-2.6-crash-driver.patch # crypto/ -Patch900: modsign-20120816.patch +Patch900: modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch # secure boot -Patch1000: secure-boot-20120809.patch +Patch1000: secure-boot-20120924.patch # Improve PCI support on UEFI Patch1100: handle-efi-roms.patch @@ -1393,10 +1394,10 @@ ApplyPatch linux-2.6-crash-driver.patch ApplyPatch linux-2.6-e1000-ich9-montevina.patch # crypto/ -ApplyPatch modsign-20120816.patch +ApplyPatch modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch # secure boot -ApplyPatch secure-boot-20120809.patch +ApplyPatch secure-boot-20120924.patch # Improved PCI support for UEFI ApplyPatch handle-efi-roms.patch @@ -1623,13 +1624,6 @@ BuildKernel() { # we'll get it from the linux-firmware package and we don't want conflicts make -s ARCH=$Arch INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT modules_install KERNELRELEASE=$KernelVer mod-fw= -%if %{signmodules} - if [ -z "$(readelf -n $(find fs/ -name \*.ko | head -n 1) | grep module.sig)" ]; then - echo "ERROR: modules are NOT signed" >&2; - exit 1; - fi -%endif - %ifarch %{vdso_arches} make -s ARCH=$Arch INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT vdso_install KERNELRELEASE=$KernelVer if [ ! -s ldconfig-kernel.conf ]; then @@ -1753,6 +1747,12 @@ BuildKernel() { # Call the modules-extra script to move things around %{SOURCE17} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/lib/modules/$KernelVer %{SOURCE16} +%if %{signmodules} + # Save off the .tmp_versions/ directory. We'll use it in the + # __debug_install_post macro below to sign the right things + cp -r .tmp_versions .tmp_versions.sign${Flavour:+.${Flavour}} +%endif + # remove files that will be auto generated by depmod at rpm -i time for i in alias alias.bin builtin.bin ccwmap dep dep.bin ieee1394map inputmap isapnpmap ofmap pcimap seriomap symbols symbols.bin usbmap devname softdep do @@ -1875,9 +1875,56 @@ find Documentation -type d | xargs chmod u+w # This macro is used by %%install, so we must redefine it before that. %define debug_package %{nil} +# In the modsign case, we do 3 things. 1) We check the "flavour" and hard +# code the value in the following invocations. This is somewhat sub-optimal +# but we're doing this inside of an RPM macro and it isn't as easy as it +# could be because of that. 2) We restore the .tmp_versions/ directory from +# the one we saved off in BuildKernel above. This is to make sure we're +# signing the modules we actually built/installed in that flavour. 3) We +# grab the arch and invoke 'make modules_sign' and the mod-extra-sign.sh +# commands to actually sign the modules. +# +# We have to do all of those things _after_ find-debuginfo runs, otherwise +# that will strip the signature off of the modules. + %if %{with_debuginfo} %define __debug_install_post \ /usr/lib/rpm/find-debuginfo.sh %{debuginfo_args} %{_builddir}/%{?buildsubdir}\ + if [ "%{signmodules}" == "1" ]; \ + then \ + if [ "%{with_pae}" != "0" ]; \ + then \ + Arch=`head -1 configs/kernel-%{version}-%{_target_cpu}-PAE.config | cut -b 3-` \ + rm -rf .tmp_versions \ + mv .tmp_versions.sign.PAE .tmp_versions \ + make -s ARCH=$Arch V=1 INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT modules_sign KERNELRELEASE=%{KVERREL}.PAE \ + %{SOURCE18} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/lib/modules/%{KVERREL}.PAE/extra/ \ + fi \ + if [ "%{with_debug}" != "0" ]; \ + then \ + Arch=`head -1 configs/kernel-%{version}-%{_target_cpu}-debug.config | cut -b 3-` \ + rm -rf .tmp_versions \ + mv .tmp_versions.sign.debug .tmp_versions \ + make -s ARCH=$Arch V=1 INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT modules_sign KERNELRELEASE=%{KVERREL}.debug \ + %{SOURCE18} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/lib/modules/%{KVERREL}.debug/extra/ \ + fi \ + if [ "%{with_pae_debug}" != "0" ]; \ + then \ + Arch=`head -1 configs/kernel-%{version}-%{_target_cpu}-PAEdebug.config | cut -b 3-` \ + rm -rf .tmp_versions \ + mv .tmp_versions.sign.PAEdebug .tmp_versions \ + make -s ARCH=$Arch V=1 INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT modules_sign KERNELRELEASE=%{KVERREL}.PAEdebug \ + %{SOURCE18} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/lib/modules/%{KVERREL}.PAEdebug/extra/ \ + fi \ + if [ "%{with_up}" != "0" ]; \ + then \ + Arch=`head -1 configs/kernel-%{version}-%{_target_cpu}.config | cut -b 3-` \ + rm -rf .tmp_versions \ + mv .tmp_versions.sign .tmp_versions \ + make -s ARCH=$Arch V=1 INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT modules_sign KERNELRELEASE=%{KVERREL} \ + %{SOURCE18} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/lib/modules/%{KVERREL}/extra/ \ + fi \ + fi \ %{nil} %ifnarch noarch @@ -2263,6 +2310,7 @@ fi * Tue Sep 25 2012 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> - Move the modules-extra processing to a script - Prep mod-extra.sh for signed modules +- Switch to using modsign-post-KS upstream with x509 certs * Tue Sep 25 2012 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> - 3.6.0-0.rc7.git1.2 - Update team driver from net-next from Jiri Pirko diff --git a/mod-extra-sign.sh b/mod-extra-sign.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..a4b2c8cf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/mod-extra-sign.sh @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +#! /bin/bash + +# We need to sign modules we've moved from <path>/kernel/ to <path>/extra/ +# during mod-extra processing by hand. The 'modules_sign' Kbuild target can +# "handle" out-of-tree modules, but it does that by not signing them. Plus, +# the modules we've moved aren't actually out-of-tree. We've just shifted +# them to a different location behind Kbuild's back because we are mean. + +# This essentially duplicates the 'modules_sign' Kbuild target and runs the +# same commands for those modules. + +moddir=$1 + +modules=`find $moddir -name *.ko` + +MODSECKEY="./signing_key.priv" +MODPUBKEY="./signing_key.x509" + +for mod in $modules +do + dir=`dirname $mod` + file=`basename $mod` + + sh ./scripts/sign-file ${MODSECKEY} ${MODPUBKEY} ${dir}/${file} \ + ${dir}/${file}.signed + mv ${dir}/${file}.signed ${dir}/${file} + rm -f ${dir}/${file}.{sig,dig} +done diff --git a/modsign-20120816.patch b/modsign-20120816.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3c679558d..000000000 --- a/modsign-20120816.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10434 +0,0 @@ -From bcb9a5e7e8108872ec9fd7083209cbf3a47ef952 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:14 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 01/32] KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key - instantiate or update - -Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the -instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the -provision of two new key type operations: - - int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - -If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in -the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and -instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first -was called. - -preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: - - struct key_preparsed_payload { - char *description; - void *type_data[2]; - void *payload; - const void *data; - size_t datalen; - size_t quotalen; - }; - -Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, -the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default -quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. - -The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in -the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() -ops. - -The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a -string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" -description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() -function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description -to tell the upcall about the key to be created. - -This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own -name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. - -The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: - - int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - -and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/security/keys.txt | 50 +++++++++++++- - fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 6 +- - fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 8 +-- - include/keys/user-type.h | 6 +- - include/linux/key-type.h | 35 +++++++++- - net/ceph/crypto.c | 9 +-- - net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 6 +- - net/rxrpc/ar-key.c | 40 ++++++------ - security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 16 +++-- - security/keys/key.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- - security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 ++++-- - security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +- - security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 8 +-- - security/keys/trusted.c | 16 +++-- - security/keys/user_defined.c | 14 ++-- - 15 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt -index aa0dbd7..7d9ca92 100644 ---- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt -+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt -@@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ The main syscalls are: - to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the process - does not have permission to write to the keyring. - -+ If the key type supports it, if the description is NULL or an empty -+ string, the key type will try and generate a description from the content -+ of the payload. -+ - The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by - the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty - payload. -@@ -1114,12 +1118,53 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: - it should return 0. - - -- (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ (*) int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -+ -+ This optional method permits the key type to attempt to parse payload -+ before a key is created (add key) or the key semaphore is taken (update or -+ instantiate key). The structure pointed to by prep looks like: -+ -+ struct key_preparsed_payload { -+ char *description; -+ void *type_data[2]; -+ void *payload; -+ const void *data; -+ size_t datalen; -+ size_t quotalen; -+ }; -+ -+ Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with -+ the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default -+ quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared. -+ -+ If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be -+ attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the -+ key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "". -+ -+ The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These -+ are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. -+ -+ The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code -+ otherwise. -+ -+ -+ (*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -+ -+ This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided, -+ otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the -+ description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload -+ struct as filled in by the preparse() method. -+ -+ -+ (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - - This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction. - The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to this - function. - -+ The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload -+ blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. -+ - If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in - keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called. - -@@ -1135,6 +1180,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: - If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be provided. - It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data provided. - -+ The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload -+ blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. -+ - key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change - before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the type - is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered, so all -diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c -index e622863..086f381 100644 ---- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c -+++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c -@@ -31,18 +31,18 @@ - - /* create a new cifs key */ - static int --cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - char *payload; - int ret; - - ret = -ENOMEM; -- payload = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); -+ payload = kmalloc(prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!payload) - goto error; - - /* attach the data */ -- memcpy(payload, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); - key->payload.data = payload; - ret = 0; - -diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c -index 05f4dc2..f3c60e2 100644 ---- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c -+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c -@@ -167,17 +167,17 @@ static struct shrinker cifs_shrinker = { - }; - - static int --cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - char *payload; - -- payload = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); -+ payload = kmalloc(prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!payload) - return -ENOMEM; - -- memcpy(payload, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); - key->payload.data = payload; -- key->datalen = datalen; -+ key->datalen = prep->datalen; - return 0; - } - -diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h -index bc9ec1d..5e452c8 100644 ---- a/include/keys/user-type.h -+++ b/include/keys/user-type.h -@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ struct user_key_payload { - extern struct key_type key_type_user; - extern struct key_type key_type_logon; - --extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); --extern int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); -+struct key_preparsed_payload; -+ -+extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -+extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - extern int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *criterion); - extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); - extern void user_destroy(struct key *key); -diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h -index f0c651c..518a53a 100644 ---- a/include/linux/key-type.h -+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h -@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct key_construction { - struct key *authkey;/* authorisation for key being constructed */ - }; - -+/* -+ * Pre-parsed payload, used by key add, update and instantiate. -+ * -+ * This struct will be cleared and data and datalen will be set with the data -+ * and length parameters from the caller and quotalen will be set from -+ * def_datalen from the key type. Then if the preparse() op is provided by the -+ * key type, that will be called. Then the struct will be passed to the -+ * instantiate() or the update() op. -+ * -+ * If the preparse() op is given, the free_preparse() op will be called to -+ * clear the contents. -+ */ -+struct key_preparsed_payload { -+ char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */ -+ void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */ -+ void *payload; /* Proposed payload */ -+ const void *data; /* Raw data */ -+ size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ -+ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ -+}; -+ - typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, - const char *op, void *aux); - -@@ -45,18 +66,28 @@ struct key_type { - /* vet a description */ - int (*vet_description)(const char *description); - -+ /* Preparse the data blob from userspace that is to be the payload, -+ * generating a proposed description and payload that will be handed to -+ * the instantiate() and update() ops. -+ */ -+ int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -+ -+ /* Free a preparse data structure. -+ */ -+ void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -+ - /* instantiate a key of this type - * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to determine if the - * user's quota will hold the payload - */ -- int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - - /* update a key of this type (optional) - * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to recalculate the - * quota consumption - * - the key must be locked against read when modifying - */ -- int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - - /* match a key against a description */ - int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc); -diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c -index 9da7fdd..af14cb4 100644 ---- a/net/ceph/crypto.c -+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c -@@ -423,14 +423,15 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, - } - } - --int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - int ret; - void *p; - - ret = -EINVAL; -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - goto err; - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); -@@ -443,8 +444,8 @@ int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - goto err; - - /* TODO ceph_crypto_key_decode should really take const input */ -- p = (void *)data; -- ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)data+datalen); -+ p = (void *)prep->data; -+ ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)prep->data+datalen); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_ckey; - -diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c -index d9507dd..859ab8b 100644 ---- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c -+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c -@@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache; - * "ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar" - */ - static int --dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *_data, size_t datalen) -+dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct user_key_payload *upayload; - unsigned long derrno; - int ret; -- size_t result_len = 0; -- const char *data = _data, *end, *opt; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0; -+ const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt; - - kenter("%%%d,%s,'%*.*s',%zu", - key->serial, key->description, -diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c -index 8b1f9f4..106c5a6 100644 ---- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c -+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c -@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ - #include "ar-internal.h" - - static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *); --static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); --static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, const void *, size_t); -+static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); -+static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); - static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); - static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); - static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); -@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ error: - * - * if no data is provided, then a no-security key is made - */ --static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - const struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 *v1; - struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pp; -@@ -686,26 +686,26 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - u32 kver; - int ret; - -- _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), datalen); -+ _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); - - /* handle a no-security key */ -- if (!data && datalen == 0) -+ if (!prep->data && prep->datalen == 0) - return 0; - - /* determine if the XDR payload format is being used */ -- if (datalen > 7 * 4) { -- ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, data, datalen); -+ if (prep->datalen > 7 * 4) { -+ ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, prep->data, prep->datalen); - if (ret != -EPROTO) - return ret; - } - - /* get the key interface version number */ - ret = -EINVAL; -- if (datalen <= 4 || !data) -+ if (prep->datalen <= 4 || !prep->data) - goto error; -- memcpy(&kver, data, sizeof(kver)); -- data += sizeof(kver); -- datalen -= sizeof(kver); -+ memcpy(&kver, prep->data, sizeof(kver)); -+ prep->data += sizeof(kver); -+ prep->datalen -= sizeof(kver); - - _debug("KEY I/F VERSION: %u", kver); - -@@ -715,11 +715,11 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - - /* deal with a version 1 key */ - ret = -EINVAL; -- if (datalen < sizeof(*v1)) -+ if (prep->datalen < sizeof(*v1)) - goto error; - -- v1 = data; -- if (datalen != sizeof(*v1) + v1->ticket_length) -+ v1 = prep->data; -+ if (prep->datalen != sizeof(*v1) + v1->ticket_length) - goto error; - - _debug("SCIX: %u", v1->security_index); -@@ -784,17 +784,17 @@ error: - * instantiate a server secret key - * data should be a pointer to the 8-byte secret key - */ --static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, const void *data, -- size_t datalen) -+static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct crypto_blkcipher *ci; - -- _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), datalen); -+ _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); - -- if (datalen != 8) -+ if (prep->datalen != 8) - return -EINVAL; - -- memcpy(&key->type_data, data, 8); -+ memcpy(&key->type_data, prep->data, 8); - - ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - if (IS_ERR(ci)) { -@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, const void *data, - return PTR_ERR(ci); - } - -- if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, data, 8) < 0) -+ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0) - BUG(); - - key->payload.data = ci; -diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c -index 2d1bb8a..9e1e005 100644 ---- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c -+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c -@@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, - * - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. - */ --static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, -- size_t datalen) -+static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; - char *datablob = NULL; -@@ -782,16 +782,17 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, - char *master_desc = NULL; - char *decrypted_datalen = NULL; - char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - int ret; - -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; - datablob[datalen] = 0; -- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc, - &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv); - if (ret < 0) -@@ -834,16 +835,17 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) - * - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. - */ --static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; - struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; - char *buf; - char *new_master_desc = NULL; - const char *format = NULL; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - int ret = 0; - -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); -@@ -851,7 +853,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - return -ENOMEM; - - buf[datalen] = 0; -- memcpy(buf, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen); - ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; -diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c -index 50d96d4..732a53e 100644 ---- a/security/keys/key.c -+++ b/security/keys/key.c -@@ -412,8 +412,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); - * key_construction_mutex. - */ - static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, -- const void *data, -- size_t datalen, -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, - struct key *keyring, - struct key *authkey, - unsigned long *_prealloc) -@@ -431,7 +430,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, - /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { - /* instantiate the key */ -- ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen); -+ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); - - if (ret == 0) { - /* mark the key as being instantiated */ -@@ -482,22 +481,37 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, - struct key *keyring, - struct key *authkey) - { -+ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; - unsigned long prealloc; - int ret; - -+ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); -+ prep.data = data; -+ prep.datalen = datalen; -+ prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; -+ if (key->type->preparse) { -+ ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ } -+ - if (keyring) { - ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, - &prealloc); - if (ret < 0) -- return ret; -+ goto error_free_preparse; - } - -- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey, -+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, - &prealloc); - - if (keyring) - __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); - -+error_free_preparse: -+ if (key->type->preparse) -+ key->type->free_preparse(&prep); -+error: - return ret; - } - -@@ -706,7 +720,7 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype) - * if we get an error. - */ - static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, -- const void *payload, size_t plen) -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - int ret; -@@ -722,7 +736,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, - - down_write(&key->sem); - -- ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); -+ ret = key->type->update(key, prep); - if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); -@@ -774,6 +788,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - unsigned long flags) - { - unsigned long prealloc; -+ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - struct key_type *ktype; - struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; -@@ -789,8 +804,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - } - - key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); -- if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate) -- goto error_2; -+ if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate || -+ (!description && !ktype->preparse)) -+ goto error_put_type; - - keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); - -@@ -798,18 +814,33 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - - key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); - if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) -- goto error_2; -+ goto error_put_type; -+ -+ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); -+ prep.data = payload; -+ prep.datalen = plen; -+ prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen; -+ if (ktype->preparse) { -+ ret = ktype->preparse(&prep); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error_put_type; -+ if (!description) -+ description = prep.description; -+ ret = -EINVAL; -+ if (!description) -+ goto error_free_prep; -+ } - - ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); - if (ret < 0) -- goto error_2; -+ goto error_free_prep; - - /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have - * to modify the keyring */ - ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE); - if (ret < 0) { - key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); -- goto error_3; -+ goto error_link_end; - } - - /* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing -@@ -840,25 +871,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - perm, flags); - if (IS_ERR(key)) { - key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); -- goto error_3; -+ goto error_link_end; - } - - /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ -- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL, -- &prealloc); -+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc); - if (ret < 0) { - key_put(key); - key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); -- goto error_3; -+ goto error_link_end; - } - - key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); - -- error_3: -+error_link_end: - __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); -- error_2: -+error_free_prep: -+ if (ktype->preparse) -+ ktype->free_preparse(&prep); -+error_put_type: - key_type_put(ktype); -- error: -+error: - return key_ref; - - found_matching_key: -@@ -866,10 +899,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, - * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned - */ - __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); -- key_type_put(ktype); - -- key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen); -- goto error; -+ key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); -+ goto error_free_prep; - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); - -@@ -888,6 +920,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); - */ - int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) - { -+ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; - struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - int ret; - -@@ -900,18 +933,31 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) - - /* attempt to update it if supported */ - ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; -- if (key->type->update) { -- down_write(&key->sem); -- -- ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); -- if (ret == 0) -- /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ -- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); -+ if (!key->type->update) -+ goto error; - -- up_write(&key->sem); -+ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); -+ prep.data = payload; -+ prep.datalen = plen; -+ prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; -+ if (key->type->preparse) { -+ ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; - } - -- error: -+ down_write(&key->sem); -+ -+ ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); -+ if (ret == 0) -+ /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ -+ clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); -+ -+ up_write(&key->sem); -+ -+ if (key->type->preparse) -+ key->type->free_preparse(&prep); -+error: - return ret; - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); -diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c -index 3364fbf..505d40b 100644 ---- a/security/keys/keyctl.c -+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c -@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type, - * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a - * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring. - * -+ * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to -+ * generate one from the payload. -+ * - * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it. - * - * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error -@@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, - if (ret < 0) - goto error; - -- description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); -- if (IS_ERR(description)) { -- ret = PTR_ERR(description); -- goto error; -+ description = NULL; -+ if (_description) { -+ description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); -+ if (IS_ERR(description)) { -+ ret = PTR_ERR(description); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ if (!*description) { -+ kfree(description); -+ description = NULL; -+ } - } - - /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ -diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c -index 81e7852..f04d8cf 100644 ---- a/security/keys/keyring.c -+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c -@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) - * operations. - */ - static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, -- const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); - static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); - static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); - static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); -@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) - * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data. - */ - static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, -- const void *data, size_t datalen) -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - int ret; - - ret = -EINVAL; -- if (datalen == 0) { -+ if (prep->datalen == 0) { - /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ - keyring_publish_name(keyring); - ret = 0; -diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c -index 60d4e3f..85730d5 100644 ---- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c -+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c -@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ - #include <asm/uaccess.h> - #include "internal.h" - --static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); -+static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *); - static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); - static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); - static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); -@@ -42,10 +43,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = { - * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key. - */ - static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, -- const void *data, -- size_t datalen) -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { -- key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data; -+ key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; - return 0; - } - -diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c -index 2d5d041..42036c7 100644 ---- a/security/keys/trusted.c -+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c -@@ -927,22 +927,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) - * - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. - */ --static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, -- size_t datalen) -+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, -+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; - struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; - int ret = 0; - int key_cmd; - -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; -- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - - options = trusted_options_alloc(); -@@ -1011,17 +1012,18 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) - /* - * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values - */ --static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; - struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; - struct trusted_key_options *new_o; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; - int ret = 0; - - if (!p->migratable) - return -EPERM; -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); -@@ -1038,7 +1040,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - goto out; - } - -- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); - if (ret != Opt_update) { -diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c -index c7660a2..55dc889 100644 ---- a/security/keys/user_defined.c -+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c -@@ -58,13 +58,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon); - /* - * instantiate a user defined key - */ --int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct user_key_payload *upayload; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - int ret; - - ret = -EINVAL; -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - goto error; - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); -@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - - /* attach the data */ - upayload->datalen = datalen; -- memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); - ret = 0; - -@@ -92,13 +93,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); - * update a user defined key - * - the key's semaphore is write-locked - */ --int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) -+int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - { - struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap; -+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - int ret; - - ret = -EINVAL; -- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) -+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - goto error; - - /* construct a replacement payload */ -@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) - goto error; - - upayload->datalen = datalen; -- memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); -+ memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); - - /* check the quota and attach the new data */ - zap = upayload; --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 2f5f2d483565648dbe050fda8767edd5d65b1d98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 02/32] MPILIB: Provide count_leading/trailing_zeros() based - on arch functions - -Provide count_leading/trailing_zeros() macros based on extant arch bit scanning -functions rather than reimplementing from scratch in MPILIB. - -Whilst we're at it, turn count_foo_zeros(n, x) into n = count_foo_zeros(x). - -Also move the definition to asm-generic as other people may be interested in -using it. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> -Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> -Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.com> ---- - include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h | 57 +++++++++++++ - lib/mpi/longlong.h | 138 +------------------------------ - lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c | 2 +- - lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c | 4 +- - 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h - -diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h b/include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..97520d2 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h -@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ -+/* Count leading and trailing zeros functions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_COUNT_ZEROS_H_ -+#define _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_COUNT_ZEROS_H_ -+ -+#include <asm/bitops.h> -+ -+/** -+ * count_leading_zeros - Count the number of zeros from the MSB back -+ * @x: The value -+ * -+ * Count the number of leading zeros from the MSB going towards the LSB in @x. -+ * -+ * If the MSB of @x is set, the result is 0. -+ * If only the LSB of @x is set, then the result is BITS_PER_LONG-1. -+ * If @x is 0 then the result is COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0. -+ */ -+static inline int count_leading_zeros(unsigned long x) -+{ -+ if (sizeof(x) == 4) -+ return BITS_PER_LONG - fls(x); -+ else -+ return BITS_PER_LONG - fls64(x); -+} -+ -+#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 BITS_PER_LONG -+ -+/** -+ * count_trailing_zeros - Count the number of zeros from the LSB forwards -+ * @x: The value -+ * -+ * Count the number of trailing zeros from the LSB going towards the MSB in @x. -+ * -+ * If the LSB of @x is set, the result is 0. -+ * If only the MSB of @x is set, then the result is BITS_PER_LONG-1. -+ * If @x is 0 then the result is COUNT_TRAILING_ZEROS_0. -+ */ -+static inline int count_trailing_zeros(unsigned long x) -+{ -+#define COUNT_TRAILING_ZEROS_0 (-1) -+ -+ if (sizeof(x) == 4) -+ return ffs(x); -+ else -+ return (x != 0) ? __ffs(x) : COUNT_TRAILING_ZEROS_0; -+} -+ -+#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_COUNT_ZEROS_H_ */ -diff --git a/lib/mpi/longlong.h b/lib/mpi/longlong.h -index 29f9862..678ce4f 100644 ---- a/lib/mpi/longlong.h -+++ b/lib/mpi/longlong.h -@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ - * the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, - * MA 02111-1307, USA. */ - -+#include <asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h> -+ - /* You have to define the following before including this file: - * - * UWtype -- An unsigned type, default type for operations (typically a "word") -@@ -146,12 +148,6 @@ do { \ - : "1" ((USItype)(n1)), \ - "r" ((USItype)(n0)), \ - "r" ((USItype)(d))) -- --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ -- __asm__ ("clz %0,%1" \ -- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(x))) --#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 32 - #endif /* __a29k__ */ - - #if defined(__alpha) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 64 -@@ -298,11 +294,6 @@ extern UDItype __udiv_qrnnd(); - : "1" ((USItype)(nh)), \ - "0" ((USItype)(nl)), \ - "g" ((USItype)(d))) --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ -- __asm__ ("bsch/1 %1,%0" \ -- : "=g" (count) \ -- : "g" ((USItype)(x)), \ -- "0" ((USItype)0)) - #endif - - /*************************************** -@@ -354,27 +345,6 @@ do { USItype __r; \ - } while (0) - extern USItype __udiv_qrnnd(); - #endif /* LONGLONG_STANDALONE */ --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- USItype __tmp; \ -- __asm__ ( \ -- "ldi 1,%0\n" \ -- "extru,= %1,15,16,%%r0 ; Bits 31..16 zero?\n" \ -- "extru,tr %1,15,16,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ -- "ldo 16(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ -- "extru,= %1,23,8,%%r0 ; Bits 15..8 zero?\n" \ -- "extru,tr %1,23,8,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ -- "ldo 8(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ -- "extru,= %1,27,4,%%r0 ; Bits 7..4 zero?\n" \ -- "extru,tr %1,27,4,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ -- "ldo 4(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ -- "extru,= %1,29,2,%%r0 ; Bits 3..2 zero?\n" \ -- "extru,tr %1,29,2,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ -- "ldo 2(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ -- "extru %1,30,1,%1 ; Extract bit 1.\n" \ -- "sub %0,%1,%0 ; Subtract it. " \ -- : "=r" (count), "=r" (__tmp) : "1" (x)); \ --} while (0) - #endif /* hppa */ - - /*************************************** -@@ -457,15 +427,6 @@ do { \ - : "0" ((USItype)(n0)), \ - "1" ((USItype)(n1)), \ - "rm" ((USItype)(d))) --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- USItype __cbtmp; \ -- __asm__ ("bsrl %1,%0" \ -- : "=r" (__cbtmp) : "rm" ((USItype)(x))); \ -- (count) = __cbtmp ^ 31; \ --} while (0) --#define count_trailing_zeros(count, x) \ -- __asm__ ("bsfl %1,%0" : "=r" (count) : "rm" ((USItype)(x))) - #ifndef UMUL_TIME - #define UMUL_TIME 40 - #endif -@@ -536,15 +497,6 @@ do { \ - "dI" ((USItype)(d))); \ - (r) = __rq.__i.__l; (q) = __rq.__i.__h; \ - } while (0) --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- USItype __cbtmp; \ -- __asm__ ("scanbit %1,%0" \ -- : "=r" (__cbtmp) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(x))); \ -- (count) = __cbtmp ^ 31; \ --} while (0) --#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 (-32) /* sic */ - #if defined(__i960mx) /* what is the proper symbol to test??? */ - #define rshift_rhlc(r, h, l, c) \ - do { \ -@@ -603,11 +555,6 @@ do { \ - : "0" ((USItype)(n0)), \ - "1" ((USItype)(n1)), \ - "dmi" ((USItype)(d))) --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ -- __asm__ ("bfffo %1{%b2:%b2},%0" \ -- : "=d" ((USItype)(count)) \ -- : "od" ((USItype)(x)), "n" (0)) --#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 32 - #else /* not mc68020 */ - #define umul_ppmm(xh, xl, a, b) \ - do { USItype __umul_tmp1, __umul_tmp2; \ -@@ -664,15 +611,6 @@ do { USItype __umul_tmp1, __umul_tmp2; \ - "rJ" ((USItype)(bh)), \ - "rJ" ((USItype)(al)), \ - "rJ" ((USItype)(bl))) --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- USItype __cbtmp; \ -- __asm__ ("ff1 %0,%1" \ -- : "=r" (__cbtmp) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(x))); \ -- (count) = __cbtmp ^ 31; \ --} while (0) --#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 63 /* sic */ - #if defined(__m88110__) - #define umul_ppmm(wh, wl, u, v) \ - do { \ -@@ -779,12 +717,6 @@ do { \ - : "0" (__xx.__ll), \ - "g" ((USItype)(d))); \ - (r) = __xx.__i.__l; (q) = __xx.__i.__h; }) --#define count_trailing_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- __asm__("ffsd %2,%0" \ -- : "=r"((USItype) (count)) \ -- : "0"((USItype) 0), "r"((USItype) (x))); \ -- } while (0) - #endif /* __ns32000__ */ - - /*************************************** -@@ -855,11 +787,6 @@ do { \ - "rI" ((USItype)(al)), \ - "r" ((USItype)(bl))); \ - } while (0) --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ -- __asm__ ("{cntlz|cntlzw} %0,%1" \ -- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(x))) --#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 32 - #if defined(_ARCH_PPC) - #define umul_ppmm(ph, pl, m0, m1) \ - do { \ -@@ -1001,19 +928,6 @@ do { \ - } while (0) - #define UMUL_TIME 20 - #define UDIV_TIME 200 --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- if ((x) >= 0x10000) \ -- __asm__ ("clz %0,%1" \ -- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(x) >> 16)); \ -- else { \ -- __asm__ ("clz %0,%1" \ -- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(x))); \ -- (count) += 16; \ -- } \ --} while (0) - #endif /* RT/ROMP */ - - /*************************************** -@@ -1142,13 +1056,6 @@ do { \ - "rI" ((USItype)(d)) \ - : "%g1" __AND_CLOBBER_CC) - #define UDIV_TIME 37 --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ -- __asm__ ("scan %1,0,%0" \ -- : "=r" ((USItype)(x)) \ -- : "r" ((USItype)(count))) --/* Early sparclites return 63 for an argument of 0, but they warn that future -- implementations might change this. Therefore, leave COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 -- undefined. */ - #endif /* __sparclite__ */ - #endif /* __sparc_v8__ */ - /* Default to sparc v7 versions of umul_ppmm and udiv_qrnnd. */ -@@ -1454,47 +1361,6 @@ do { \ - #define udiv_qrnnd __udiv_qrnnd_c - #endif - --#undef count_leading_zeros --#if !defined(count_leading_zeros) -- extern --#ifdef __STDC__ -- const --#endif -- unsigned char __clz_tab[]; --#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- UWtype __xr = (x); \ -- UWtype __a; \ -- \ -- if (W_TYPE_SIZE <= 32) { \ -- __a = __xr < ((UWtype) 1 << 2*__BITS4) \ -- ? (__xr < ((UWtype) 1 << __BITS4) ? 0 : __BITS4) \ -- : (__xr < ((UWtype) 1 << 3*__BITS4) ? 2*__BITS4 : 3*__BITS4); \ -- } \ -- else { \ -- for (__a = W_TYPE_SIZE - 8; __a > 0; __a -= 8) \ -- if (((__xr >> __a) & 0xff) != 0) \ -- break; \ -- } \ -- \ -- (count) = W_TYPE_SIZE - (__clz_tab[__xr >> __a] + __a); \ --} while (0) -- /* This version gives a well-defined value for zero. */ --#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 W_TYPE_SIZE --#endif -- --#if !defined(count_trailing_zeros) --/* Define count_trailing_zeros using count_leading_zeros. The latter might be -- defined in asm, but if it is not, the C version above is good enough. */ --#define count_trailing_zeros(count, x) \ --do { \ -- UWtype __ctz_x = (x); \ -- UWtype __ctz_c; \ -- count_leading_zeros(__ctz_c, __ctz_x & -__ctz_x); \ -- (count) = W_TYPE_SIZE - 1 - __ctz_c; \ --} while (0) --#endif -- - #ifndef UDIV_NEEDS_NORMALIZATION - #define UDIV_NEEDS_NORMALIZATION 0 - #endif -diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c -index 5687248..503537e 100644 ---- a/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c -+++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c -@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ unsigned mpi_get_nbits(MPI a) - if (a->nlimbs) { - mpi_limb_t alimb = a->d[a->nlimbs - 1]; - if (alimb) -- count_leading_zeros(n, alimb); -+ n = count_leading_zeros(alimb); - else - n = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB; - n = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - n + (a->nlimbs - 1) * BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB; -diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c -index 67f3e79..5464c87 100644 ---- a/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c -+++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c -@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod) - mp = mp_marker = mpi_alloc_limb_space(msize); - if (!mp) - goto enomem; -- count_leading_zeros(mod_shift_cnt, mod->d[msize - 1]); -+ mod_shift_cnt = count_leading_zeros(mod->d[msize - 1]); - if (mod_shift_cnt) - mpihelp_lshift(mp, mod->d, msize, mod_shift_cnt); - else -@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod) - - i = esize - 1; - e = ep[i]; -- count_leading_zeros(c, e); -+ c = count_leading_zeros(e); - e = (e << c) << 1; /* shift the exp bits to the left, lose msb */ - c = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1 - c; - --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 15b76403afcc626b91e5fcee8b6a950a51f284ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 03/32] KEYS: Create a key type that can be used for general - cryptographic operations - -Create a key type that can be used for general cryptographic operations, such -as encryption, decryption, signature generation and signature verification. - -The key type is "crypto" and can provide access to a variety of cryptographic -algorithms. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++ - include/keys/crypto-subtype.h | 57 +++++++ - include/keys/crypto-type.h | 25 +++ - security/keys/Kconfig | 2 + - security/keys/Makefile | 1 + - security/keys/crypto/Kconfig | 7 + - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 7 + - security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h | 28 ++++ - security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c | 272 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 9 files changed, 580 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt - create mode 100644 include/keys/crypto-subtype.h - create mode 100644 include/keys/crypto-type.h - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/Kconfig - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/Makefile - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c - -diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..97dee80 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ -+ ====================== -+ CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY TYPE -+ ====================== -+ -+Contents: -+ -+ - Overview. -+ - Key identification. -+ - Accessing crypto keys. -+ - Implementing crypto parsers. -+ - Implementing crypto subtypes. -+ -+ -+======== -+OVERVIEW -+======== -+ -+The "crypto" key type is designed to be a container for cryptographic keys, -+without imposing any particular restrictions on the form of the cryptography or -+the key. -+ -+The crypto key is given a subtype that defines what sort of data is associated -+with the key and provides operations to describe and destroy it. However, no -+requirement is made that the key data actually be loaded into the key. -+ -+The crypto key also has a number of data parsers registered with it. The data -+parsers are responsible for extracing information the blobs of data passed to -+the instantiator function. The first data parser that recognises the blob gets -+to set the subtype of the key and define the operations that can be done on -+that key. -+ -+Completely in-kernel key retention and operation subtypes and parsers can be -+defined, but it would also be possible to provide access to cryptographic -+hardware (such as a TPM) that might be used to both retain the relevant key and -+perform operations using that key. In such a case, the crypto key would then -+merely be an interface to the TPM driver. -+ -+ -+================== -+KEY IDENTIFICATION -+================== -+ -+Because the identity of a key is not necessarily known and may not be easily -+calculated when a crypto key is allocated, it may not be a simple matter to set -+a key description to something that's useful for determining whether this is -+the key you're looking for. Furthermore, it may be necessary to perform a -+partial match upon the key identity. -+ -+To help with this, when a key is loaded, the parser calculates the key -+fingerprint and stores a copy in the key structure. -+ -+The crypto key type's key matching function then performs more checks than just -+the straightforward comparison of the description with the criterion string: -+ -+ (1) If the criterion string is of the form "id:<hexdigits>" then the match -+ function will examine a key's fingerprint to see if the hex digits given -+ after the "id:" match the tail. For instance: -+ -+ keyctl search @s crypto id:5acc2142 -+ -+ will match a key with fingerprint: -+ -+ 1A00 2040 7601 7889 DE11 882C 3823 04AD 5ACC 2142 -+ -+ (2) If the criterion string is of the form "<subtype>:<hexdigits>" then the -+ match will match the ID as in (1), but with the added restriction that -+ only keys of the specified subtype (e.g. dsa or rsa) will be matched. For -+ instance: -+ -+ keyctl search @s crypto dsa:5acc2142 -+ -+Looking in /proc/keys, the last 8 hex digits of the key fingerprint are -+displayed, along with the subtype: -+ -+ 1a39e171 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: DSA 5acc2142 [] -+ -+ -+===================== -+ACCESSING CRYPTO KEYS -+===================== -+ -+To access crypto keys from within the kernel, the following inclusion is -+required: -+ -+ #include <keys/crypto-type.h> -+ -+This gives access to the key type: -+ -+ struct key_type key_type_crypto; -+ -+ -+=========================== -+IMPLEMENTING CRYPTO PARSERS -+=========================== -+ -+The crypto key type keeps a list of registered data parsers. An example of -+such a parser is one that parses OpenPGP packet formatted data [RFC 4880]. -+ -+During key instantiation each parser in the list is tried until one doesn't -+return -EBADMSG. -+ -+The parser definition structure looks like the following: -+ -+ struct crypto_key_parser { -+ struct module *owner; -+ const char *name; -+ -+ int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ }; -+ -+The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of -+the parser. -+ -+There are a number of operations defined by the parser. They are all optional, -+but it is expected that at least one will be defined. -+ -+ (1) instantiate(). -+ -+ The arguments are the same as for the instantiate function in the key -+ type. 'key' is the crypto key being instantiated; data and datalen are -+ the instantiation data, presumably containing cryptographic key data, and -+ the length of that data. -+ -+ If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned. If it -+ is recognised, but the key cannot for some reason be set up, some other -+ negative error code should be returned. -+ -+ If the key can be successfully set up, then key->payload should be set to -+ point to the retained data, key->type_data.p[0] should be set to point to -+ the subtype chosen and key->type_data.p[1] should be set to point to a -+ copy of the key's identity string and 0 should be returned. -+ -+ The key's identity string may be partially matched upon. For a public-key -+ algorithm such as RSA and DSA this will likely be a printable hex version -+ of the key's fingerprint. -+ -+Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers: -+ -+ int register_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *parser); -+ void unregister_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *subtype); -+ -+Parsers may not have the same name. The names are only used for displaying in -+debugging messages. -+ -+ -+============================ -+IMPLEMENTING CRYPTO SUBTYPES -+============================ -+ -+The parser selects the appropriate subtype directly and sets it on the key; the -+crypto key then retains a reference on the subtype module (which means the -+parser can be removed thereafter). -+ -+The subtype definition structure looks like the following: -+ -+ struct crypto_key_subtype { -+ struct module *owner; -+ const char *name; -+ -+ void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m); -+ void (*destroy)(void *payload); -+ }; -+ -+The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of -+the subtype. -+ -+There are a number of operations defined by the subtype: -+ -+ (1) describe(). -+ -+ Mandatory. This allows the subtype to display something in /proc/keys -+ against the key. For instance the name of the public key algorithm type -+ could be displayed. The key type will display the tail of the key -+ identity string after this. -+ -+ (2) destroy(). -+ -+ Mandatory. This should free the memory associated with the key. The -+ crypto key will look after freeing the fingerprint and releasing the -+ reference on the subtype module. -diff --git a/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h b/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..1f546e6 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h -@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ -+/* Cryptographic key subtype -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * See Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _KEYS_CRYPTO_SUBTYPE_H -+#define _KEYS_CRYPTO_SUBTYPE_H -+ -+#include <linux/seq_file.h> -+#include <keys/crypto-type.h> -+ -+extern struct key_type key_type_crypto; -+ -+/* -+ * Keys of this type declare a subtype that indicates the handlers and -+ * capabilities. -+ */ -+struct crypto_key_subtype { -+ struct module *owner; -+ const char *name; -+ unsigned short name_len; /* length of name */ -+ -+ void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m); -+ -+ void (*destroy)(void *payload); -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Data parser. Called during instantiation and signature verification -+ * initiation. -+ */ -+struct crypto_key_parser { -+ struct list_head link; -+ struct module *owner; -+ const char *name; -+ -+ /* Attempt to parse a key from the data blob passed to add_key() or -+ * keyctl_instantiate(). Should also generate a proposed description -+ * that the caller can optionally use for the key. -+ * -+ * Return EBADMSG if not recognised. -+ */ -+ int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -+}; -+ -+extern int register_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *); -+extern void unregister_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *); -+ -+#endif /* _KEYS_CRYPTO_SUBTYPE_H */ -diff --git a/include/keys/crypto-type.h b/include/keys/crypto-type.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..47c00c7 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/keys/crypto-type.h -@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ -+/* Cryptographic key type interface -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * See Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _KEYS_CRYPTO_TYPE_H -+#define _KEYS_CRYPTO_TYPE_H -+ -+#include <linux/key-type.h> -+ -+extern struct key_type key_type_crypto; -+ -+/* -+ * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. -+ */ -+ -+#endif /* _KEYS_CRYPTO_TYPE_H */ -diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig -index a90d6d3..992fe52 100644 ---- a/security/keys/Kconfig -+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig -@@ -69,3 +69,5 @@ config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - the resulting table. - - If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. -+ -+source security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile -index 504aaa0..67dae73 100644 ---- a/security/keys/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/Makefile -@@ -24,3 +24,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o - # - obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o - obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ -+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE) += crypto/ -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..3d15710 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ -+config CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE -+ tristate "Cryptographic key type" -+ depends on KEYS -+ help -+ This option provides support for a type of key that holds the keys -+ required for cryptographic operations such as encryption, decryption, -+ signature generation and signature verification. -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..36db1d5 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ -+# -+# Makefile for cryptographic keys -+# -+ -+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE) += crypto_keys.o -+ -+crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..eb11788 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h -@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ -+/* Internal crypto type stuff -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+static inline -+struct crypto_key_subtype *crypto_key_subtype(const struct key *key) -+{ -+ return key->type_data.p[0]; -+} -+ -+static inline const char *crypto_key_id(const struct key *key) -+{ -+ return key->type_data.p[1]; -+} -+ -+ -+/* -+ * crypto_type.c -+ */ -+extern struct list_head crypto_key_parsers; -+extern struct rw_semaphore crypto_key_parsers_sem; -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..e8f83a6 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c -@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ -+/* Cryptographic key type -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * See Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+ */ -+#include <keys/crypto-subtype.h> -+#include <linux/seq_file.h> -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include "crypto_keys.h" -+ -+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -+ -+LIST_HEAD(crypto_key_parsers); -+DECLARE_RWSEM(crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+/* -+ * Match crypto_keys on (part of) their name -+ * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow: -+ * -+ * "<desc>" - request a key by description -+ * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID -+ * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype -+ */ -+static int crypto_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) -+{ -+ const struct crypto_key_subtype *subtype = crypto_key_subtype(key); -+ const char *spec = description; -+ const char *id, *kid; -+ ptrdiff_t speclen; -+ size_t idlen, kidlen; -+ -+ if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec) -+ return 0; -+ -+ /* See if the full key description matches as is */ -+ if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) -+ return 1; -+ -+ /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a -+ * specifier, a colon and then an identifier. -+ */ -+ id = strchr(spec, ':'); -+ if (!id) -+ return 0; -+ -+ speclen = id - spec; -+ id++; -+ -+ /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */ -+ kid = crypto_key_id(key); -+ if (!kid) -+ return 0; -+ -+ idlen = strlen(id); -+ kidlen = strlen(kid); -+ if (idlen > kidlen) -+ return 0; -+ -+ kid += kidlen - idlen; -+ if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (speclen == 2 && -+ memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0) -+ return 1; -+ -+ if (speclen == subtype->name_len && -+ memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0) -+ return 1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Describe the crypto key -+ */ -+static void crypto_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) -+{ -+ const struct crypto_key_subtype *subtype = crypto_key_subtype(key); -+ const char *kid = crypto_key_id(key); -+ size_t n; -+ -+ seq_puts(m, key->description); -+ -+ if (subtype) { -+ seq_puts(m, ": "); -+ subtype->describe(key, m); -+ -+ if (kid) { -+ seq_putc(m, ' '); -+ n = strlen(kid); -+ if (n <= 8) -+ seq_puts(m, kid); -+ else -+ seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8); -+ } -+ -+ seq_puts(m, " ["); -+ /* put something here to indicate the key's capabilities */ -+ seq_putc(m, ']'); -+ } -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Preparse a crypto payload to get format the contents appropriately for the -+ * internal payload to cut down on the number of scans of the data performed. -+ * -+ * We also generate a proposed description from the contents of the key that -+ * can be used to name the key if the user doesn't want to provide one. -+ */ -+static int crypto_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -+{ -+ struct crypto_key_parser *parser; -+ int ret; -+ -+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); -+ -+ if (prep->datalen == 0) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ down_read(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+ ret = -EBADMSG; -+ list_for_each_entry(parser, &crypto_key_parsers, link) { -+ pr_debug("Trying parser '%s'\n", parser->name); -+ -+ ret = parser->preparse(prep); -+ if (ret != -EBADMSG) { -+ pr_debug("Parser recognised the format (ret %d)\n", -+ ret); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ up_read(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Clean up the preparse data -+ */ -+static void crypto_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -+{ -+ struct crypto_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0]; -+ -+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); -+ -+ if (subtype) { -+ subtype->destroy(prep->payload); -+ module_put(subtype->owner); -+ } -+ kfree(prep->type_data[1]); -+ kfree(prep->description); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Instantiate a crypto_key defined key -+ */ -+static int crypto_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -+{ -+ int ret; -+ -+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); -+ -+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen); -+ if (ret == 0) { -+ key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0]; -+ key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1]; -+ key->payload.data = prep->payload; -+ prep->type_data[0] = NULL; -+ prep->type_data[1] = NULL; -+ prep->payload = NULL; -+ } -+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a crypto key -+ */ -+static void crypto_key_destroy(struct key *key) -+{ -+ struct crypto_key_subtype *subtype = crypto_key_subtype(key); -+ if (subtype) { -+ subtype->destroy(key->payload.data); -+ module_put(subtype->owner); -+ key->type_data.p[0] = NULL; -+ } -+ kfree(key->type_data.p[1]); -+ key->type_data.p[1] = NULL; -+} -+ -+struct key_type key_type_crypto = { -+ .name = "crypto", -+ .preparse = crypto_key_preparse, -+ .free_preparse = crypto_key_free_preparse, -+ .instantiate = crypto_key_instantiate, -+ .match = crypto_key_match, -+ .destroy = crypto_key_destroy, -+ .describe = crypto_key_describe, -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_crypto); -+ -+/** -+ * register_crypto_key_parser - Register a crypto key blob parser -+ * @parser: The parser to register -+ */ -+int register_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *parser) -+{ -+ struct crypto_key_parser *cursor; -+ int ret; -+ -+ down_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+ list_for_each_entry(cursor, &crypto_key_parsers, link) { -+ if (strcmp(cursor->name, parser->name) == 0) { -+ pr_err("Crypto key parser '%s' already registered\n", -+ parser->name); -+ ret = -EEXIST; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ list_add_tail(&parser->link, &crypto_key_parsers); -+ -+ pr_notice("Crypto key parser '%s' registered\n", parser->name); -+ ret = 0; -+ -+out: -+ up_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ return ret; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_crypto_key_parser); -+ -+/** -+ * unregister_crypto_key_parser - Unregister a crypto key blob parser -+ * @parser: The parser to unregister -+ */ -+void unregister_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *parser) -+{ -+ down_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ list_del(&parser->link); -+ up_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+ pr_notice("Crypto key parser '%s' unregistered\n", parser->name); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_crypto_key_parser); -+ -+/* -+ * Module stuff -+ */ -+static int __init crypto_key_init(void) -+{ -+ return register_key_type(&key_type_crypto); -+} -+ -+static void __exit crypto_key_cleanup(void) -+{ -+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_crypto); -+} -+ -+module_init(crypto_key_init); -+module_exit(crypto_key_cleanup); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From a4e8ef15db9c013c4d3141424120c5ba74376483 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 04/32] KEYS: Add signature verification facility - -Add a facility whereby a key subtype may be asked to verify a signature against -the data it is purported to have signed. - -This adds four routines: - - (1) struct crypto_key_verify_context * - verify_sig_begin(struct key *keyring, const void *sig, size_t siglen); - - This sets up a verification context for the given signature using - information in that signature to select a key from the specified keyring - and to request a hash algorithm from the crypto layer. - - (2) int verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx, - const void *data, size_t datalen); - - Incrementally supply data to be signed. May be called multiple times. - - (3) int verify_sig_end(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx, - const void *sig, size_t siglen); - - Complete the verification process and return the result. -EKEYREJECTED - will indicate that the verification failed and 0 will indicate success. - Other errors are also possible. - - (4) void verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx); - - Cancel the verification process. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++ - include/keys/crypto-subtype.h | 36 +++++++- - include/keys/crypto-type.h | 9 ++ - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- - security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h | 1 - - security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c | 2 +- - security/keys/crypto/crypto_verify.c | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 7 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/crypto_verify.c - -diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -index 97dee80..0a886ec 100644 ---- a/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+++ b/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Contents: - - Overview. - - Key identification. - - Accessing crypto keys. -+ - Signature verification. - - Implementing crypto parsers. - - Implementing crypto subtypes. - -@@ -89,6 +90,65 @@ This gives access to the key type: - struct key_type key_type_crypto; - - -+SIGNATURE VERIFICATION -+---------------------- -+ -+The four operations that can perform cryptographic signature verification, -+using one of a set of keys to provide the public key: -+ -+ (1) Begin verification procedure. -+ -+ struct crypto_key_verify_context * -+ verify_sig_begin(struct key *keyring, const void *sig, size_t siglen); -+ -+ This function sets up a verification context from the information in the -+ signature and looks for a suitable key in the keyring. The signature blob -+ must be presented again at the end of the procedure. The keys will be -+ checked against parameters in the signature, and if the matching one is -+ not found then -ENOKEY will be returned. -+ -+ The hashing algorithm, if such a thing applies, will be determined from -+ information in the signature and the appropriate crypto module will be -+ used. -ENOPKG will be returned if the hash algorithm is unavailable. -+ -+ The return value is an opaque pointer to be passed to the other functions, -+ or a negative error code. -+ -+ (2) Indicate data to be verified. -+ -+ int verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ -+ This function is used to shovel data to the verification procedure so that -+ it can load it into the hash, pass it to hardware or whatever is -+ appropriate for the algorithm being employed. -+ -+ The data is not canonicalised for the document type specified in the -+ signature. The caller must do that. -+ -+ It will return 0 if successful and a negative error code if not. -+ -+ (3) Complete the verification process. -+ -+ int verify_sig_end(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *sig, size_t siglen); -+ -+ This function performs the actual signature verification step and cleans -+ up the resources allocated at the beginning. The signature must be -+ presented again as some of the data therein may need to be added to the -+ internal hash. -+ -+ It will return -EKEYREJECTED if the signature didn't match, 0 if -+ successful and may return other errors as appropriate. -+ -+ (4) Cancel the verification process. -+ -+ void verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx); -+ -+ This function cleans up the resources allocated at the beginning. This is -+ not necessary if verify_sig_end() was called. -+ -+ - =========================== - IMPLEMENTING CRYPTO PARSERS - =========================== -@@ -107,6 +167,8 @@ The parser definition structure looks like the following: - - int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, - const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ struct crypto_key_verify_context *(*verify_sig_begin)( -+ struct key *keyring, const u8 *sig, size_t siglen); - }; - - The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of -@@ -135,6 +197,44 @@ but it is expected that at least one will be defined. - algorithm such as RSA and DSA this will likely be a printable hex version - of the key's fingerprint. - -+ (2) verify_sig_begin(). -+ -+ This is similar in concept to the instantiate() function, except that it -+ is given a signature blob to parse rather than a key data blob. -+ -+ If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned. If it -+ is recognised, but the signature verification process cannot for some -+ reason be set up, some other negative error code should be returned. -+ -ENOKEY should be used to indicate that no matching key is available and -+ -ENOPKG should be returned if the hash algorithm or the verification -+ algorithm are unavailable. -+ -+ If successful, the parser should allocate a verification context and embed -+ the following struct in it: -+ -+ struct crypto_key_verify_context { -+ struct key *key; -+ int (*add_data)(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ int (*end)(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx, -+ const u8 *sig, size_t siglen); -+ void (*cancel)(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx); -+ }; -+ -+ and return a pointer to this to the caller, who will then pass it to the -+ verification operation wrappers described in the "Signature Verification" -+ section. The three operation pointers here correspond exactly to those -+ wrappers and are all mandatory. container_of() should be used to retrieve -+ the actual context. -+ -+ Note that the crypto key type retains a reference on the parser module for -+ the lifetime of this context, though the operation pointers need not point -+ into this module. -+ -+ The parser should also record a pointer to the key selected and take a -+ reference on that key with key_get(). -+ -+ - Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers: - - int register_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *parser); -diff --git a/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h b/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h -index 1f546e6..61a5338 100644 ---- a/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h -+++ b/include/keys/crypto-subtype.h -@@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ struct crypto_key_subtype { - }; - - /* -- * Data parser. Called during instantiation and signature verification -- * initiation. -+ * Key data parser. Called during key instantiation. - */ - struct crypto_key_parser { - struct list_head link; -@@ -54,4 +53,37 @@ struct crypto_key_parser { - extern int register_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *); - extern void unregister_crypto_key_parser(struct crypto_key_parser *); - -+/* -+ * Context base for signature verification methods. Allocated by the subtype -+ * and presumably embedded in something appropriate. -+ */ -+struct crypto_sig_verify_context { -+ struct key *key; -+ struct crypto_sig_parser *parser; -+ int (*add_data)(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen); -+ int (*end)(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const u8 *sig, size_t siglen); -+ void (*cancel)(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx); -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Signature data parser. Called during signature verification initiation. -+ */ -+struct crypto_sig_parser { -+ struct list_head link; -+ struct module *owner; -+ const char *name; -+ -+ /* Attempt to recognise a signature blob and find a matching key. -+ * -+ * Return EBADMSG if not recognised. -+ */ -+ struct crypto_sig_verify_context *(*verify_sig_begin)( -+ struct key *keyring, const u8 *sig, size_t siglen); -+}; -+ -+extern int register_crypto_sig_parser(struct crypto_sig_parser *); -+extern void unregister_crypto_sig_parser(struct crypto_sig_parser *); -+ - #endif /* _KEYS_CRYPTO_SUBTYPE_H */ -diff --git a/include/keys/crypto-type.h b/include/keys/crypto-type.h -index 47c00c7..0fb362a 100644 ---- a/include/keys/crypto-type.h -+++ b/include/keys/crypto-type.h -@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ - - extern struct key_type key_type_crypto; - -+struct crypto_sig_verify_context; -+extern struct crypto_sig_verify_context *verify_sig_begin( -+ struct key *key, const void *sig, size_t siglen); -+extern int verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen); -+extern int verify_sig_end(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *sig, size_t siglen); -+extern void verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx); -+ - /* - * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. - */ -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index 36db1d5..67001bc 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@ - - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE) += crypto_keys.o - --crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o -+crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h -index eb11788..ab9b381 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_keys.h -@@ -24,5 +24,4 @@ static inline const char *crypto_key_id(const struct key *key) - /* - * crypto_type.c - */ --extern struct list_head crypto_key_parsers; - extern struct rw_semaphore crypto_key_parsers_sem; -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c -index e8f83a6..821db37 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_type.c -@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ - - MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); - --LIST_HEAD(crypto_key_parsers); -+static LIST_HEAD(crypto_key_parsers); - DECLARE_RWSEM(crypto_key_parsers_sem); - - /* -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_verify.c b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_verify.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..d64f1c7 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_verify.c -@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ -+/* Signature verification with a crypto key -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * See Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+ */ -+ -+#include <keys/crypto-subtype.h> -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include "crypto_keys.h" -+ -+static LIST_HEAD(crypto_sig_parsers); -+ -+/** -+ * verify_sig_begin - Initiate the use of a crypto key to verify a signature -+ * @keyring: The public keys to verify against -+ * @sig: The signature data -+ * @siglen: The signature length -+ * -+ * Returns a context or an error. -+ */ -+struct crypto_sig_verify_context *verify_sig_begin( -+ struct key *keyring, const void *sig, size_t siglen) -+{ -+ struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ret; -+ struct crypto_sig_parser *parser; -+ -+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); -+ -+ if (siglen == 0 || !sig) -+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); -+ -+ down_read(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+ ret = ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); -+ list_for_each_entry(parser, &crypto_sig_parsers, link) { -+ if (parser->verify_sig_begin) { -+ if (!try_module_get(parser->owner)) -+ continue; -+ -+ pr_debug("Trying parser '%s'\n", parser->name); -+ -+ ret = parser->verify_sig_begin(keyring, sig, siglen); -+ if (IS_ERR(ret)) -+ module_put(parser->owner); -+ else -+ ret->parser = parser; -+ if (ret != ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG)) { -+ pr_debug("Parser recognised the format" -+ " (ret %ld)\n", -+ PTR_ERR(ret)); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+ up_read(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %p\n", __func__, ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_sig_begin); -+ -+/** -+ * verify_sig_add_data - Incrementally provide data to be verified -+ * @ctx: The context from verify_sig_begin() -+ * @data: Data -+ * @datalen: The amount of @data -+ * -+ * This may be called multiple times. -+ */ -+int verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen) -+{ -+ return ctx->add_data(ctx, data, datalen); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_sig_add_data); -+ -+/** -+ * verify_sig_end - Finalise signature verification and return result -+ * @ctx: The context from verify_sig_begin() -+ * @sig: The signature data -+ * @siglen: The signature length -+ */ -+int verify_sig_end(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *sig, size_t siglen) -+{ -+ struct crypto_sig_parser *parser = ctx->parser; -+ int ret; -+ -+ ret = ctx->end(ctx, sig, siglen); -+ module_put(parser->owner); -+ return ret; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_sig_end); -+ -+/** -+ * verify_sig_end - Cancel signature verification -+ * @ctx: The context from verify_sig_begin() -+ */ -+void verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx) -+{ -+ struct crypto_sig_parser *parser = ctx->parser; -+ -+ ctx->cancel(ctx); -+ module_put(parser->owner); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_sig_cancel); -+ -+/** -+ * register_crypto_sig_parser - Register a crypto sig blob parser -+ * @parser: The parser to register -+ */ -+int register_crypto_sig_parser(struct crypto_sig_parser *parser) -+{ -+ struct crypto_sig_parser *cursor; -+ int ret; -+ -+ down_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+ list_for_each_entry(cursor, &crypto_sig_parsers, link) { -+ if (strcmp(cursor->name, parser->name) == 0) { -+ pr_err("Crypto signature parser '%s' already registered\n", -+ parser->name); -+ ret = -EEXIST; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ list_add_tail(&parser->link, &crypto_sig_parsers); -+ -+ pr_notice("Crypto signature parser '%s' registered\n", parser->name); -+ ret = 0; -+ -+out: -+ up_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ return ret; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_crypto_sig_parser); -+ -+/** -+ * unregister_crypto_sig_parser - Unregister a crypto sig blob parser -+ * @parser: The parser to unregister -+ */ -+void unregister_crypto_sig_parser(struct crypto_sig_parser *parser) -+{ -+ down_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ list_del(&parser->link); -+ up_write(&crypto_key_parsers_sem); -+ -+ pr_notice("Crypto signature parser '%s' unregistered\n", parser->name); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_crypto_sig_parser); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From d8cb66a6f69869c8c2992f67915a7c238066f2fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 05/32] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key - subtype - -Add a subtype for supporting asymmetric public-key encryption algorithms such -as DSA (FIPS-186) and RSA (PKCS#1 / RFC1337). - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/Kconfig | 10 ++++ - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 3 +- - security/keys/crypto/public_key.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ - security/keys/crypto/public_key.h | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/public_key.c - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/public_key.h - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -index 3d15710..5f2b8ac 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -@@ -5,3 +5,13 @@ config CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE - This option provides support for a type of key that holds the keys - required for cryptographic operations such as encryption, decryption, - signature generation and signature verification. -+ -+config CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE -+ tristate "Asymmetric public-key crypto algorithm subtype" -+ depends on CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE -+ select MPILIB -+ help -+ This option provides support for asymmetric public key type handling. -+ If signature generation and/or verification are to be used, -+ appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available. -+ ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index 67001bc..6384306 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ - # - - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE) += crypto_keys.o -- - crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o -+ -+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/public_key.c b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..ebb31ec ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.c -@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ -+/* Asymmetric public key crypto subtype -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/export.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+ -+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -+ -+const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { -+ [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "DSA", -+ [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "RSA", -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo); -+ -+const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { -+ [PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4", -+ [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5", -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = "sha1", -+ [PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = "rmd160", -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = "sha256", -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = "sha384", -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = "sha512", -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = "sha224", -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo); -+ -+const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = { -+ [PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP", -+ [PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509", -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type); -+ -+/* -+ * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys. -+ */ -+static void public_key_describe(const struct key *crypto_key, -+ struct seq_file *m) -+{ -+ struct public_key *key = crypto_key->payload.data; -+ -+ if (key) -+ seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", -+ pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Destroy a public key algorithm key -+ */ -+void public_key_destroy(void *payload) -+{ -+ struct public_key *key = payload; -+ int i; -+ -+ if (key) { -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi); i++) -+ mpi_free(key->mpi[i]); -+ kfree(key); -+ } -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy); -+ -+/* -+ * Public key algorithm crypto key subtype -+ */ -+struct crypto_key_subtype public_key_crypto_key_subtype = { -+ .owner = THIS_MODULE, -+ .name = "public_key", -+ .describe = public_key_describe, -+ .destroy = public_key_destroy, -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_crypto_key_subtype); -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..228090d ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h -@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ -+/* Asymmetric public-key algorithm definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H -+#define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H -+ -+#include <linux/mpi.h> -+#include <crypto/hash.h> -+#include <keys/crypto-subtype.h> -+ -+struct public_key; -+struct public_key_signature; -+ -+enum pkey_algo { -+ PKEY_ALGO_DSA, -+ PKEY_ALGO_RSA, -+ PKEY_ALGO__LAST -+}; -+ -+extern const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; -+ -+enum pkey_hash_algo { -+ PKEY_HASH_MD4, -+ PKEY_HASH_MD5, -+ PKEY_HASH_SHA1, -+ PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160, -+ PKEY_HASH_SHA256, -+ PKEY_HASH_SHA384, -+ PKEY_HASH_SHA512, -+ PKEY_HASH_SHA224, -+ PKEY_HASH__LAST -+}; -+ -+extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST]; -+ -+enum pkey_id_type { -+ PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ -+ PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ -+ PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST -+}; -+ -+extern const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST]; -+ -+/* -+ * Public key type definition -+ */ -+struct public_key_algorithm { -+ const char *name; -+ u8 n_pub_mpi; /* Number of MPIs in public key */ -+ u8 n_sec_mpi; /* Number of MPIs in secret key */ -+ u8 n_sig_mpi; /* Number of MPIs in a signature */ -+ int (*verify)(const struct public_key *key, -+ const struct public_key_signature *sig); -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Asymmetric public key data -+ */ -+struct public_key { -+ const struct public_key_algorithm *algo; -+ u8 capabilities; -+#define PKEY_CAN_ENCRYPT 0x01 -+#define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT 0x02 -+#define PKEY_CAN_ENCDEC (PKEY_CAN_ENCRYPT | PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT) -+#define PKEY_CAN_SIGN 0x04 -+#define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY 0x08 -+#define PKEY_CAN_SIGVER (PKEY_CAN_SIGN | PKEY_CAN_VERIFY) -+ enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; -+ union { -+ MPI mpi[5]; -+ struct { -+ MPI p; /* DSA prime */ -+ MPI q; /* DSA group order */ -+ MPI g; /* DSA group generator */ -+ MPI y; /* DSA public-key value = g^x mod p */ -+ MPI x; /* DSA secret exponent (if present) */ -+ } dsa; -+ struct { -+ MPI n; /* RSA public modulus */ -+ MPI e; /* RSA public encryption exponent */ -+ MPI d; /* RSA secret encryption exponent (if present) */ -+ MPI p; /* RSA secret prime (if present) */ -+ MPI q; /* RSA secret prime (if present) */ -+ } rsa; -+ }; -+ -+ u8 key_id[8]; /* ID of this key pair */ -+ u8 key_id_size; /* Number of bytes in key_id */ -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Asymmetric public key algorithm signature data -+ */ -+struct public_key_signature { -+ struct crypto_sig_verify_context base; -+ u8 *digest; -+ enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; -+ u8 signed_hash_msw[2]; -+ u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ -+ union { -+ MPI mpi[2]; -+ struct { -+ MPI s; /* m^d mod n */ -+ } rsa; -+ struct { -+ MPI r; -+ MPI s; -+ } dsa; -+ }; -+ struct shash_desc hash; /* This must go last! */ -+}; -+ -+extern struct crypto_key_subtype public_key_crypto_key_subtype; -+ -+#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */ --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 76b6843d2be046bd5ab8fbae8a1cc5b5d2d48a80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 06/32] MPILIB: Reinstate mpi_cmp[_ui]() and export for RSA - signature verification - -Reinstate and export mpi_cmp() and mpi_cmp_ui() from the MPI library for use by -RSA signature verification as per RFC3447 section 5.2.2 step 1. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - lib/mpi/Makefile | 1 + - lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c - -diff --git a/lib/mpi/Makefile b/lib/mpi/Makefile -index 45ca90a..019a68c 100644 ---- a/lib/mpi/Makefile -+++ b/lib/mpi/Makefile -@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ mpi-y = \ - generic_mpih-add1.o \ - mpicoder.o \ - mpi-bit.o \ -+ mpi-cmp.o \ - mpih-cmp.o \ - mpih-div.o \ - mpih-mul.o \ -diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..1871e7b ---- /dev/null -+++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c -@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ -+/* mpi-cmp.c - MPI functions -+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. -+ * -+ * This file is part of GnuPG. -+ * -+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by -+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or -+ * (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -+ * GNU General Public License for more details. -+ * -+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License -+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software -+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA -+ */ -+ -+#include "mpi-internal.h" -+ -+int mpi_cmp_ui(MPI u, unsigned long v) -+{ -+ mpi_limb_t limb = v; -+ -+ mpi_normalize(u); -+ if (!u->nlimbs && !limb) -+ return 0; -+ if (u->sign) -+ return -1; -+ if (u->nlimbs > 1) -+ return 1; -+ -+ if (u->d[0] == limb) -+ return 0; -+ else if (u->d[0] > limb) -+ return 1; -+ else -+ return -1; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_cmp_ui); -+ -+int mpi_cmp(MPI u, MPI v) -+{ -+ mpi_size_t usize, vsize; -+ int cmp; -+ -+ mpi_normalize(u); -+ mpi_normalize(v); -+ usize = u->nlimbs; -+ vsize = v->nlimbs; -+ if (!u->sign && v->sign) -+ return 1; -+ if (u->sign && !v->sign) -+ return -1; -+ if (usize != vsize && !u->sign && !v->sign) -+ return usize - vsize; -+ if (usize != vsize && u->sign && v->sign) -+ return vsize + usize; -+ if (!usize) -+ return 0; -+ cmp = mpihelp_cmp(u->d, v->d, usize); -+ if (!cmp) -+ return 0; -+ if ((cmp < 0 ? 1 : 0) == (u->sign ? 1 : 0)) -+ return 1; -+ return -1; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_cmp); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 48c4be1c886e51edbbbebdb65421a7ca120a8d21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 07/32] KEYS: RSA: Implement signature verification algorithm - [PKCS#1 / RFC3447] - -Implement RSA public key cryptography [PKCS#1 / RFC3447]. At this time, only -the signature verification algorithm is supported. This uses the asymmetric -public key subtype to hold its key data. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/Kconfig | 7 + - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 1 + - security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c | 267 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - security/keys/crypto/public_key.h | 2 + - 4 files changed, 277 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -index 5f2b8ac..4e3777e 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -@@ -15,3 +15,10 @@ config CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE - If signature generation and/or verification are to be used, - appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available. - ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. -+ -+config CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA -+ tristate "RSA public-key algorithm" -+ depends on CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE -+ select MPILIB_EXTRA -+ help -+ This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447). -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index 6384306..b6b1a5a 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE) += crypto_keys.o - crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA) += crypto_rsa.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..6e95e60 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c -@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ -+/* RSA asymmetric public-key algorithm [RFC3447] -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+ -+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -+ -+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \ -+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) -+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \ -+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) -+ -+/* -+ * Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2]. -+ */ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08, -+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */ -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10 -+}; -+ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, -+ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 -+}; -+ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, -+ 0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 -+}; -+ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, -+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C -+}; -+ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, -+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20 -+}; -+ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, -+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30 -+}; -+ -+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, -+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, -+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40 -+}; -+ -+static const struct { -+ const u8 *data; -+ size_t size; -+} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { -+#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) } -+ [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = _(MD5), -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = _(SHA1), -+ [PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160), -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = _(SHA256), -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = _(SHA384), -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = _(SHA512), -+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = _(SHA224), -+#undef _ -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2] -+ */ -+static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m) -+{ -+ MPI m; -+ int ret; -+ -+ /* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */ -+ if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ m = mpi_alloc(0); -+ if (!m) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ /* (2) m = s^e mod n */ -+ ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ mpi_free(m); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ -+ *_m = m; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1] -+ */ -+static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X) -+{ -+ unsigned X_size, x_size; -+ int X_sign; -+ u8 *X; -+ -+ /* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin -+ * with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero -+ * bits not being reported by MPI. -+ */ -+ x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x); -+ pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8); -+ if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15) -+ return -ERANGE; -+ -+ X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign); -+ if (!X) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ if (X_sign < 0) { -+ kfree(X); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ if (X_size != xLen - 1) { -+ kfree(X); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ *_X = X; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Perform the RSA signature verification. -+ * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata -+ * @EM: The computed signature value -+ * @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00) -+ * @hash_size: The size of H -+ * @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template -+ * @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[] -+ */ -+static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size, -+ const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size) -+{ -+ unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i; -+ -+ kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size); -+ -+ if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size) -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ -+ /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */ -+ if (EM[1] != 0x01) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size); -+ PS_end = T_offset - 1; -+ if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) { -+ if (EM[i] != 0xff) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) { -+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]"); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } -+ -+ kleave(" = 0"); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2]. -+ */ -+static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, -+ const struct public_key_signature *sig) -+{ -+ size_t tsize; -+ int ret; -+ -+ /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */ -+ const u8 *H = sig->digest; -+ u8 *EM = NULL; -+ MPI m = NULL; -+ size_t k; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data) -+ return -ENOTSUPP; -+ -+ /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */ -+ k = (mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n) + 7) / 8; -+ -+ tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s) + 7) / 8; -+ pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize); -+ if (tsize != k) { -+ ret = -EBADMSG; -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */ -+ ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message -+ * (EM) of length k octets. -+ * -+ * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a -+ * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()! -+ */ -+ ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size, -+ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data, -+ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size); -+ -+error: -+ kfree(EM); -+ mpi_free(m); -+ kleave(" = %d", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = { -+ .name = "RSA", -+ .n_pub_mpi = 2, -+ .n_sec_mpi = 3, -+ .n_sig_mpi = 1, -+ .verify = RSA_verify_signature, -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm); -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h -index 228090d..947817b 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h -@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct public_key_algorithm { - const struct public_key_signature *sig); - }; - -+extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm; -+ - /* - * Asymmetric public key data - */ --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 311305a6e970236bd30d8942552a26e6f93730ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:19 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 08/32] KEYS: RSA: Fix signature verification for shorter - signatures - -gpg can produce a signature file where length of signature is less than the -modulus size because the amount of space an MPI takes up is kept as low as -possible by discarding leading zeros. This regularly happens for several -modules during the build. - -Fix it by relaxing check in RSA verification code. - -Thanks to Tomas Mraz and Miloslav Trmac for help. - -Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c | 14 +++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c -index 6e95e60..796ed1d 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c -@@ -222,15 +222,23 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, - return -ENOTSUPP; - - /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */ -- k = (mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n) + 7) / 8; -+ k = mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n); -+ tsize = mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s); - -- tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s) + 7) / 8; -+ /* According to RFC 4880 sec 3.2, length of MPI is computed starting -+ * from most significant bit. So the RFC 3447 sec 8.2.2 size check -+ * must be relaxed to conform with shorter signatures - so we fail here -+ * only if signature length is longer than modulus size. -+ */ - pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize); -- if (tsize != k) { -+ if (k < tsize) { - ret = -EBADMSG; - goto error; - } - -+ /* Round up and convert to octets */ -+ k = (k + 7) / 8; -+ - /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */ - ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m); - if (ret < 0) --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From a9b954d2c225dc99ecc319ea760576f525f0a623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:14:19 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 09/32] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) - -Provide some useful PGP definitions from RFC 4880. These describe details of -public key crypto as used by crypto keys for things like signature -verification. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/pgp.h | 206 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 206 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h - -diff --git a/include/linux/pgp.h b/include/linux/pgp.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..1359f64 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/linux/pgp.h -@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ -+/* PGP definitions (RFC 4880) -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _LINUX_PGP_H -+#define _LINUX_PGP_H -+ -+#include <linux/types.h> -+ -+struct pgp_key_ID { -+ u8 id[8]; -+}; -+ -+struct pgp_time { -+ u8 time[4]; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * PGP public-key algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.1] -+ */ -+enum pgp_pubkey_algo { -+ PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_OR_SIG = 1, -+ PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_ONLY = 2, -+ PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_SIG_ONLY = 3, -+ PGP_PUBKEY_ELGAMAL = 16, -+ PGP_PUBKEY_DSA = 17, -+ PGP_PUBKEY__LAST -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * PGP symmetric-key algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.2] -+ */ -+enum pgp_symkey_algo { -+ PGP_SYMKEY_PLAINTEXT = 0, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_IDEA = 1, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_3DES = 2, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_CAST5 = 3, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_BLOWFISH = 4, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_AES_128KEY = 7, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_AES_192KEY = 8, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_AES_256KEY = 9, -+ PGP_SYMKEY_TWOFISH_256KEY = 10, -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * PGP compression algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.3] -+ */ -+enum pgp_compr_algo { -+ PGP_COMPR_UNCOMPRESSED = 0, -+ PGP_COMPR_ZIP = 1, -+ PGP_COMPR_ZLIB = 2, -+ PGP_COMPR_BZIP2 = 3, -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * PGP hash algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.4] -+ */ -+enum pgp_hash_algo { -+ PGP_HASH_MD5 = 1, -+ PGP_HASH_SHA1 = 2, -+ PGP_HASH_RIPE_MD_160 = 3, -+ PGP_HASH_SHA256 = 8, -+ PGP_HASH_SHA384 = 9, -+ PGP_HASH_SHA512 = 10, -+ PGP_HASH_SHA224 = 11, -+ PGP_HASH__LAST -+}; -+ -+extern const char *const pgp_hash_algorithms[PGP_HASH__LAST]; -+ -+/* -+ * PGP packet type tags [RFC4880: 4.3]. -+ */ -+enum pgp_packet_tag { -+ PGP_PKT_RESERVED = 0, -+ PGP_PKT_PUBKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY = 1, -+ PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE = 2, -+ PGP_PKT_SYMKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY = 3, -+ PGP_PKT_ONEPASS_SIGNATURE = 4, -+ PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY = 5, -+ PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY = 6, -+ PGP_PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY = 7, -+ PGP_PKT_COMPRESSED_DATA = 8, -+ PGP_PKT_SYM_ENC_DATA = 9, -+ PGP_PKT_MARKER = 10, -+ PGP_PKT_LITERAL_DATA = 11, -+ PGP_PKT_TRUST = 12, -+ PGP_PKT_USER_ID = 13, -+ PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY = 14, -+ PGP_PKT_USER_ATTRIBUTE = 17, -+ PGP_PKT_SYM_ENC_AND_INTEG_DATA = 18, -+ PGP_PKT_MODIFY_DETECT_CODE = 19, -+ PGP_PKT_PRIVATE_0 = 60, -+ PGP_PKT_PRIVATE_3 = 63, -+ PGP_PKT__HIGHEST = 63 -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Signature (tag 2) packet [RFC4880: 5.2]. -+ */ -+enum pgp_signature_version { -+ PGP_SIG_VERSION_3 = 3, -+ PGP_SIG_VERSION_4 = 4, -+}; -+ -+enum pgp_signature_type { -+ PGP_SIG_BINARY_DOCUMENT_SIG = 0x00, -+ PGP_SIG_CANONICAL_TEXT_DOCUMENT_SIG = 0x01, -+ PGP_SIG_STANDALONE_SIG = 0x02, -+ PGP_SIG_GENERAL_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x10, -+ PGP_SIG_PERSONAL_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x11, -+ PGP_SIG_CASUAL_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x12, -+ PGP_SIG_POSTITIVE_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x13, -+ PGP_SIG_SUBKEY_BINDING_SIG = 0x18, -+ PGP_SIG_PRIMARY_KEY_BINDING_SIG = 0x19, -+ PGP_SIG_DIRECTLY_ON_KEY = 0x1F, -+ PGP_SIG_KEY_REVOCATION_SIG = 0x20, -+ PGP_SIG_SUBKEY_REVOCATION_SIG = 0x28, -+ PGP_SIG_CERT_REVOCATION_SIG = 0x30, -+ PGP_SIG_TIMESTAMP_SIG = 0x40, -+ PGP_SIG_THIRD_PARTY_CONFIRM_SIG = 0x50, -+}; -+ -+struct pgp_signature_v3_packet { -+ enum pgp_signature_version version : 8; /* == PGP_SIG_VERSION_3 */ -+ u8 length_of_hashed; /* == 5 */ -+ struct { -+ enum pgp_signature_type signature_type : 8; -+ struct pgp_time creation_time; -+ } hashed; -+ struct pgp_key_ID issuer; -+ enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; -+ enum pgp_hash_algo hash_algo : 8; -+} __packed; -+ -+struct pgp_signature_v4_packet { -+ enum pgp_signature_version version : 8; /* == PGP_SIG_VERSION_4 */ -+ enum pgp_signature_type signature_type : 8; -+ enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; -+ enum pgp_hash_algo hash_algo : 8; -+} __packed; -+ -+/* -+ * V4 signature subpacket types [RFC4880: 5.2.3.1]. -+ */ -+enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type { -+ PGP_SIG_CREATION_TIME = 2, -+ PGP_SIG_EXPIRATION_TIME = 3, -+ PGP_SIG_EXPORTABLE_CERT = 4, -+ PGP_SIG_TRUST_SIG = 5, -+ PGP_SIG_REGEXP = 6, -+ PGP_SIG_REVOCABLE = 7, -+ PGP_SIG_KEY_EXPIRATION_TIME = 9, -+ PGP_SIG_PREF_SYM_ALGO = 11, -+ PGP_SIG_REVOCATION_KEY = 12, -+ PGP_SIG_ISSUER = 16, -+ PGP_SIG_NOTATION_DATA = 20, -+ PGP_SIG_PREF_HASH_ALGO = 21, -+ PGP_SIG_PREF_COMPR_ALGO = 22, -+ PGP_SIG_KEY_SERVER_PREFS = 23, -+ PGP_SIG_PREF_KEY_SERVER = 24, -+ PGP_SIG_PRIMARY_USER_ID = 25, -+ PGP_SIG_POLICY_URI = 26, -+ PGP_SIG_KEY_FLAGS = 27, -+ PGP_SIG_SIGNERS_USER_ID = 28, -+ PGP_SIG_REASON_FOR_REVOCATION = 29, -+ PGP_SIG_FEATURES = 30, -+ PGP_SIG_TARGET = 31, -+ PGP_SIG_EMBEDDED_SIG = 32, -+ PGP_SIG__LAST -+}; -+ -+#define PGP_SIG_SUBPKT_TYPE_CRITICAL_MASK 0x80 -+ -+/* -+ * Key (tag 5, 6, 7 and 14) packet -+ */ -+enum pgp_key_version { -+ PGP_KEY_VERSION_2 = 2, -+ PGP_KEY_VERSION_3 = 3, -+ PGP_KEY_VERSION_4 = 4, -+}; -+ -+struct pgp_key_v3_packet { -+ enum pgp_key_version version : 8; -+ struct pgp_time creation_time; -+ u8 expiry[2]; /* 0 or time in days till expiry */ -+ enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; -+ u8 key_material[0]; -+} __packed; -+ -+struct pgp_key_v4_packet { -+ enum pgp_key_version version : 8; -+ struct pgp_time creation_time; -+ enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; -+ u8 key_material[0]; -+} __packed; -+ -+#endif /* _LINUX_PGP_H */ --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 1937e5a7e8ae1abdb7f1dc72f7b128e33c31d644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:13 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 10/32] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser - -Provide a simple parser that extracts the packets from a PGP packet blob and -passes the desirous ones to the given processor function: - - struct pgp_parse_context { - u64 types_of_interest; - int (*process_packet)(struct pgp_parse_context *context, - enum pgp_packet_tag type, - u8 headerlen, - const u8 *data, - size_t datalen); - }; - - int pgp_parse_packets(const u8 *data, size_t datalen, - struct pgp_parse_context *ctx); - -This is configured on with CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/pgplib.h | 47 +++++++ - security/keys/crypto/Kconfig | 6 + - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 1 + - security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 322 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c - -diff --git a/include/linux/pgplib.h b/include/linux/pgplib.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..a045b3a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/linux/pgplib.h -@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ -+/* PGP library definitions (RFC 4880) -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _LINUX_PGPLIB_H -+#define _LINUX_PGPLIB_H -+ -+#if defined(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) || defined(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY_MODULE) -+ -+#include <linux/pgp.h> -+ -+/* -+ * PGP library packet parser -+ */ -+struct pgp_parse_context { -+ u64 types_of_interest; -+ int (*process_packet)(struct pgp_parse_context *context, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type, -+ u8 headerlen, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen); -+}; -+ -+extern int pgp_parse_packets(const u8 *data, size_t datalen, -+ struct pgp_parse_context *ctx); -+ -+struct pgp_parse_pubkey { -+ enum pgp_key_version version : 8; -+ enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; -+ time_t creation_time; -+ time_t expires_at; -+}; -+ -+extern int pgp_parse_public_key(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, -+ struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pk); -+ -+ -+#endif /* CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY */ -+ -+#endif /* _LINUX_PGPLIB_H */ -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -index 4e3777e..88ce0e2 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -@@ -22,3 +22,9 @@ config CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA - select MPILIB_EXTRA - help - This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447). -+ -+config PGP_LIBRARY -+ tristate "PGP parsing library" -+ help -+ This option enables a library that provides a number of simple -+ utility functions for parsing PGP (RFC 4880) packet-based messages. -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index b6b1a5a..5fbe54e 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA) += crypto_rsa.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..39d2878 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c -@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ -+/* PGP packet parser (RFC 4880) -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PGP: "fmt -+#include <linux/pgplib.h> -+#include <linux/errno.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/module.h> -+ -+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -+ -+const char *const pgp_hash_algorithms[PGP_HASH__LAST] = { -+ [PGP_HASH_MD5] = "md5", -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA1] = "sha1", -+ [PGP_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = "rmd160", -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA256] = "sha256", -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA384] = "sha384", -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA512] = "sha512", -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA224] = "sha224", -+}; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgp_hash_algorithms); -+ -+/** -+ * pgp_parse_packet_header - Parse a PGP packet header -+ * @_data: Start of the PGP packet (updated to PGP packet data) -+ * @_datalen: Amount of data remaining in buffer (decreased) -+ * @_type: Where the packet type will be returned -+ * @_headerlen: Where the header length will be returned -+ * -+ * Parse a set of PGP packet header [RFC 4880: 4.2]. -+ * -+ * Returns packet data size on success; non-zero on error. If successful, -+ * *_data and *_datalen will have been updated and *_headerlen will be set to -+ * hold the length of the packet header. -+ */ -+static ssize_t pgp_parse_packet_header(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag *_type, -+ u8 *_headerlen) -+{ -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type; -+ const u8 *data = *_data; -+ size_t size, datalen = *_datalen; -+ -+ pr_devel("-->pgp_parse_packet_header(,%zu,,)\n", datalen); -+ -+ if (datalen < 2) -+ goto short_packet; -+ -+ pr_devel("pkthdr %02x, %02x\n", data[0], data[1]); -+ -+ type = *data++; -+ datalen--; -+ if (!(type & 0x80)) { -+ pr_debug("Packet type does not have MSB set\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ type &= ~0x80; -+ -+ if (type & 0x40) { -+ /* New packet length format */ -+ type &= ~0x40; -+ pr_devel("new format: t=%u\n", type); -+ switch (data[0]) { -+ case 0x00 ... 0xbf: -+ /* One-byte length */ -+ size = data[0]; -+ data++; -+ datalen--; -+ *_headerlen = 2; -+ break; -+ case 0xc0 ... 0xdf: -+ /* Two-byte length */ -+ if (datalen < 2) -+ goto short_packet; -+ size = (data[0] - 192) * 256; -+ size += data[1] + 192; -+ data += 2; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ *_headerlen = 3; -+ break; -+ case 0xff: -+ /* Five-byte length */ -+ if (datalen < 5) -+ goto short_packet; -+ size = data[1] << 24; -+ size |= data[2] << 16; -+ size |= data[3] << 8; -+ size |= data[4]; -+ data += 5; -+ datalen -= 5; -+ *_headerlen = 6; -+ break; -+ default: -+ pr_debug("Partial body length packet not supported\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ } else { -+ /* Old packet length format */ -+ u8 length_type = type & 0x03; -+ type >>= 2; -+ pr_devel("old format: t=%u lt=%u\n", type, length_type); -+ -+ switch (length_type) { -+ case 0: -+ /* One-byte length */ -+ size = data[0]; -+ data++; -+ datalen--; -+ *_headerlen = 2; -+ break; -+ case 1: -+ /* Two-byte length */ -+ if (datalen < 2) -+ goto short_packet; -+ size = data[0] << 8; -+ size |= data[1]; -+ data += 2; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ *_headerlen = 3; -+ break; -+ case 2: -+ /* Four-byte length */ -+ if (datalen < 4) -+ goto short_packet; -+ size = data[0] << 24; -+ size |= data[1] << 16; -+ size |= data[2] << 8; -+ size |= data[3]; -+ data += 4; -+ datalen -= 4; -+ *_headerlen = 5; -+ break; -+ default: -+ pr_debug("Indefinite length packet not supported\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pr_devel("datalen=%zu size=%zu", datalen, size); -+ if (datalen < size) -+ goto short_packet; -+ if ((int)size < 0) -+ goto too_big; -+ -+ *_data = data; -+ *_datalen = datalen; -+ *_type = type; -+ pr_devel("Found packet type=%u size=%zd\n", type, size); -+ return size; -+ -+short_packet: -+ pr_debug("Attempt to parse short packet\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+too_big: -+ pr_debug("Signature subpacket size >2G\n"); -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+} -+ -+/** -+ * pgp_parse_packets - Parse a set of PGP packets -+ * @_data: Data to be parsed (updated) -+ * @_datalen: Amount of data (updated) -+ * @ctx: Parsing context -+ * -+ * Parse a set of PGP packets [RFC 4880: 4]. -+ */ -+int pgp_parse_packets(const u8 *data, size_t datalen, -+ struct pgp_parse_context *ctx) -+{ -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type; -+ ssize_t pktlen; -+ u8 headerlen; -+ int ret; -+ -+ while (datalen > 2) { -+ pktlen = pgp_parse_packet_header(&data, &datalen, &type, -+ &headerlen); -+ if (pktlen < 0) -+ return pktlen; -+ -+ if ((ctx->types_of_interest >> type) & 1) { -+ ret = ctx->process_packet(ctx, type, headerlen, -+ data, pktlen); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ } -+ data += pktlen; -+ datalen -= pktlen; -+ } -+ -+ if (datalen != 0) { -+ pr_debug("Excess octets in packet stream\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgp_parse_packets); -+ -+/** -+ * pgp_parse_public_key - Parse the common part of a PGP pubkey packet -+ * @_data: Content of packet (updated) -+ * @_datalen: Length of packet remaining (updated) -+ * @pk: Public key data -+ * -+ * Parse the common data struct for a PGP pubkey packet [RFC 4880: 5.5.2]. -+ */ -+int pgp_parse_public_key(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, -+ struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pk) -+{ -+ const u8 *data = *_data; -+ size_t datalen = *_datalen; -+ __be32 tmp; -+ -+ if (datalen < 12) { -+ pr_debug("Public key packet too short\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ pk->version = *data++; -+ switch (pk->version) { -+ case PGP_KEY_VERSION_2: -+ case PGP_KEY_VERSION_3: -+ case PGP_KEY_VERSION_4: -+ break; -+ default: -+ pr_debug("Public key packet with unhandled version %d\n", -+ pk->version); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ tmp = *data++ << 24; -+ tmp |= *data++ << 16; -+ tmp |= *data++ << 8; -+ tmp |= *data++; -+ pk->creation_time = tmp; -+ if (pk->version == PGP_KEY_VERSION_4) { -+ pk->expires_at = 0; /* Have to get it from the selfsignature */ -+ } else { -+ unsigned short ndays; -+ ndays = *data++ << 8; -+ ndays |= *data++; -+ if (ndays) -+ pk->expires_at = pk->creation_time + ndays * 86400UL; -+ else -+ pk->expires_at = 0; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ } -+ -+ pk->pubkey_algo = *data++; -+ datalen -= 6; -+ -+ pr_devel("%x,%x,%lx,%lx", -+ pk->version, pk->pubkey_algo, pk->creation_time, -+ pk->expires_at); -+ -+ *_data = data; -+ *_datalen = datalen; -+ return 0; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgp_parse_public_key); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 3379efc21d2ecc93de135e3265baabbe1f326d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 11/32] PGPLIB: Signature parser - -Provide some PGP signature parsing helpers: - - (1) A function to parse V4 signature subpackets and pass the desired ones to - a processor function: - - int pgp_parse_sig_subpkts(const u8 *data, size_t datalen, - struct pgp_parse_sig_context *ctx); - - (2) A function to parse out basic signature parameters from any PGP signature - such that the algorithms and public key can be selected: - - int pgp_parse_sig_params(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, - struct pgp_sig_parameters *p); - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/pgplib.h | 25 ++++ - security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 305 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/include/linux/pgplib.h b/include/linux/pgplib.h -index a045b3a..34594a9 100644 ---- a/include/linux/pgplib.h -+++ b/include/linux/pgplib.h -@@ -41,6 +41,31 @@ struct pgp_parse_pubkey { - extern int pgp_parse_public_key(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, - struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pk); - -+struct pgp_parse_sig_context { -+ unsigned long types_of_interest[128 / BITS_PER_LONG]; -+ int (*process_packet)(struct pgp_parse_sig_context *context, -+ enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type type, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen); -+}; -+ -+extern int pgp_parse_sig_packets(const u8 *data, size_t datalen, -+ struct pgp_parse_sig_context *ctx); -+ -+struct pgp_sig_parameters { -+ enum pgp_signature_version version : 8; -+ enum pgp_signature_type signature_type : 8; -+ enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; -+ enum pgp_hash_algo hash_algo : 8; -+ union { -+ struct pgp_key_ID issuer; -+ __be32 issuer32[2]; -+ }; -+}; -+ -+extern int pgp_parse_sig_params(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, -+ struct pgp_sig_parameters *p); -+ - - #endif /* CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY */ - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c -index 39d2878..50b7fa0 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_library.c -@@ -266,3 +266,283 @@ int pgp_parse_public_key(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, - return 0; - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgp_parse_public_key); -+ -+/** -+ * pgp_parse_sig_subpkt_header - Parse a PGP V4 signature subpacket header -+ * @_data: Start of the subpacket (updated to subpacket data) -+ * @_datalen: Amount of data remaining in buffer (decreased) -+ * @_type: Where the subpacket type will be returned -+ * -+ * Parse a PGP V4 signature subpacket header [RFC 4880: 5.2.3.1]. -+ * -+ * Returns packet data size on success; non-zero on error. If successful, -+ * *_data and *_datalen will have been updated and *_headerlen will be set to -+ * hold the length of the packet header. -+ */ -+static ssize_t pgp_parse_sig_subpkt_header(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, -+ enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type *_type) -+{ -+ enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type type; -+ const u8 *data = *_data; -+ size_t size, datalen = *_datalen; -+ -+ pr_devel("-->pgp_parse_sig_subpkt_header(,%zu,,)", datalen); -+ -+ if (datalen < 2) -+ goto short_subpacket; -+ -+ pr_devel("subpkt hdr %02x, %02x\n", data[0], data[1]); -+ -+ switch (data[0]) { -+ case 0x00 ... 0xbf: -+ /* One-byte length */ -+ size = data[0]; -+ data++; -+ datalen--; -+ break; -+ case 0xc0 ... 0xfe: -+ /* Two-byte length */ -+ if (datalen < 3) -+ goto short_subpacket; -+ size = (data[0] - 192) * 256; -+ size += data[1] + 192; -+ data += 2; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ break; -+ case 0xff: -+ if (datalen < 6) -+ goto short_subpacket; -+ size = data[1] << 24; -+ size |= data[2] << 16; -+ size |= data[3] << 8; -+ size |= data[4]; -+ data += 5; -+ datalen -= 5; -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ /* The type octet is included in the size */ -+ pr_devel("datalen=%zu size=%zu", datalen, size); -+ if (datalen < size) -+ goto short_subpacket; -+ if (size == 0) -+ goto very_short_subpacket; -+ if ((int)size < 0) -+ goto too_big; -+ -+ type = *data++ & ~PGP_SIG_SUBPKT_TYPE_CRITICAL_MASK; -+ datalen--; -+ size--; -+ -+ *_data = data; -+ *_datalen = datalen; -+ *_type = type; -+ pr_devel("Found subpkt type=%u size=%zd\n", type, size); -+ return size; -+ -+very_short_subpacket: -+ pr_debug("Signature subpacket size can't be zero\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+short_subpacket: -+ pr_debug("Attempt to parse short signature subpacket\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+too_big: -+ pr_debug("Signature subpacket size >2G\n"); -+ return -EMSGSIZE; -+} -+ -+/** -+ * pgp_parse_sig_subpkts - Parse a set of PGP V4 signatute subpackets -+ * @_data: Data to be parsed (updated) -+ * @_datalen: Amount of data (updated) -+ * @ctx: Parsing context -+ * -+ * Parse a set of PGP signature subpackets [RFC 4880: 5.2.3]. -+ */ -+static int pgp_parse_sig_subpkts(const u8 *data, size_t datalen, -+ struct pgp_parse_sig_context *ctx) -+{ -+ enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type type; -+ ssize_t pktlen; -+ int ret; -+ -+ pr_devel("-->pgp_parse_sig_subpkts(,%zu,,)", datalen); -+ -+ while (datalen > 2) { -+ pktlen = pgp_parse_sig_subpkt_header(&data, &datalen, &type); -+ if (pktlen < 0) -+ return pktlen; -+ if (test_bit(type, ctx->types_of_interest)) { -+ ret = ctx->process_packet(ctx, type, data, pktlen); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ } -+ data += pktlen; -+ datalen -= pktlen; -+ } -+ -+ if (datalen != 0) { -+ pr_debug("Excess octets in signature subpacket stream\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+struct pgp_parse_sig_params_ctx { -+ struct pgp_parse_sig_context base; -+ struct pgp_sig_parameters *params; -+ bool got_the_issuer; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Process a V4 signature subpacket. -+ */ -+static int pgp_process_sig_params_subpkt(struct pgp_parse_sig_context *context, -+ enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type type, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct pgp_parse_sig_params_ctx *ctx = -+ container_of(context, struct pgp_parse_sig_params_ctx, base); -+ -+ if (ctx->got_the_issuer) { -+ pr_debug("V4 signature packet has multiple issuers\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ if (datalen != 8) { -+ pr_debug("V4 signature issuer subpkt not 8 long (%zu)\n", -+ datalen); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ memcpy(&ctx->params->issuer, data, 8); -+ ctx->got_the_issuer = true; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/** -+ * pgp_parse_sig_params - Parse basic parameters from a PGP signature packet -+ * @_data: Content of packet (updated) -+ * @_datalen: Length of packet remaining (updated) -+ * @p: The basic parameters -+ * -+ * Parse the basic parameters from a PGP signature packet [RFC 4880: 5.2] that -+ * are needed to start off a signature verification operation. The only ones -+ * actually necessary are the signature type (which affects how the data is -+ * transformed) and the hash algorithm. -+ * -+ * We also extract the public key algorithm and the issuer's key ID as we'll -+ * need those to determine if we actually have the public key available. If -+ * not, then we can't verify the signature anyway. -+ * -+ * Returns 0 if successful or a negative error code. *_data and *_datalen are -+ * updated to point to the 16-bit subset of the hash value and the set of MPIs. -+ */ -+int pgp_parse_sig_params(const u8 **_data, size_t *_datalen, -+ struct pgp_sig_parameters *p) -+{ -+ const u8 *data = *_data; -+ size_t datalen = *_datalen; -+ int ret; -+ -+ pr_devel("-->pgp_parse_sig_params(,%zu,,)", datalen); -+ -+ if (datalen < 1) -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ p->version = *data; -+ -+ if (p->version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_3) { -+ const struct pgp_signature_v3_packet *v3 = (const void *)data; -+ -+ if (datalen < sizeof(*v3)) { -+ pr_debug("Short V3 signature packet\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ datalen -= sizeof(*v3); -+ data += sizeof(*v3); -+ -+ /* V3 has everything we need in the header */ -+ p->signature_type = v3->hashed.signature_type; -+ p->issuer = v3->issuer; -+ p->pubkey_algo = v3->pubkey_algo; -+ p->hash_algo = v3->hash_algo; -+ -+ } else if (p->version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_4) { -+ const struct pgp_signature_v4_packet *v4 = (const void *)data; -+ struct pgp_parse_sig_params_ctx ctx = { -+ .base.process_packet = pgp_process_sig_params_subpkt, -+ .params = p, -+ .got_the_issuer = false, -+ }; -+ size_t subdatalen; -+ -+ if (datalen < sizeof(*v4) + 2 + 2 + 2) { -+ pr_debug("Short V4 signature packet\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ datalen -= sizeof(*v4); -+ data += sizeof(*v4); -+ -+ /* V4 has most things in the header... */ -+ p->signature_type = v4->signature_type; -+ p->pubkey_algo = v4->pubkey_algo; -+ p->hash_algo = v4->hash_algo; -+ -+ /* ... but we have to get the key ID from the subpackets, of -+ * which there are two sets. */ -+ __set_bit(PGP_SIG_ISSUER, ctx.base.types_of_interest); -+ -+ subdatalen = *data++ << 8; -+ subdatalen |= *data++; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ if (subdatalen) { -+ /* Hashed subpackets */ -+ pr_devel("hashed data: %zu (after %zu)\n", -+ subdatalen, sizeof(*v4)); -+ if (subdatalen > datalen + 2 + 2) { -+ pr_debug("Short V4 signature packet [hdata]\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ ret = pgp_parse_sig_subpkts(data, subdatalen, -+ &ctx.base); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ data += subdatalen; -+ datalen -= subdatalen; -+ } -+ -+ subdatalen = *data++ << 8; -+ subdatalen |= *data++; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ if (subdatalen) { -+ /* Unhashed subpackets */ -+ pr_devel("unhashed data: %zu\n", subdatalen); -+ if (subdatalen > datalen + 2) { -+ pr_debug("Short V4 signature packet [udata]\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ ret = pgp_parse_sig_subpkts(data, subdatalen, -+ &ctx.base); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ data += subdatalen; -+ datalen -= subdatalen; -+ } -+ -+ if (!ctx.got_the_issuer) { -+ pr_debug("V4 signature packet lacks issuer\n"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ } else { -+ pr_debug("Signature packet with unhandled version %d\n", -+ p->version); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ *_data = data; -+ *_datalen = datalen; -+ return 0; -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pgp_parse_sig_params); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 39b6dd66338812a1e1806489d3fed50620011b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 12/32] KEYS: PGP data parser - -Implement a PGP data parser for the crypto key type to use when instantiating a -key. - -This parser attempts to parse the instantiation data as a PGP packet sequence -(RFC 4880) and if it parses okay, attempts to extract a public-key algorithm -key or subkey from it. - -If it finds such a key, it will set up a public_key subtype payload with -appropriate handler routines (DSA or RSA) and attach it to the key. - -Thanks to Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> for pointing out -some errors. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/Kconfig | 12 ++ - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 4 + - security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h | 23 +++ - security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c | 344 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 383 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -index 88ce0e2..1c2ae55 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -@@ -28,3 +28,15 @@ config PGP_LIBRARY - help - This option enables a library that provides a number of simple - utility functions for parsing PGP (RFC 4880) packet-based messages. -+ -+config CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER -+ tristate "PGP key blob parser" -+ depends on CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE -+ select CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE -+ select PGP_LIBRARY -+ select MD5 # V3 fingerprint generation -+ select SHA1 # V4 fingerprint generation -+ help -+ This option provides support for parsing PGP (RFC 4880) format blobs -+ for key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key -+ from a public key packet found inside the blob. -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index 5fbe54e..35733fc 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -8,3 +8,7 @@ crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA) += crypto_rsa.o - obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o -+ -+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o -+pgp_key_parser-y := \ -+ pgp_public_key.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..1cda231 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h -@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ -+/* PGP crypto data parser internal definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/pgp.h> -+ -+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \ -+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) -+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \ -+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) -+ -+/* -+ * pgp_key_parser.c -+ */ -+extern const -+struct public_key_algorithm *pgp_public_key_algorithms[PGP_PUBKEY__LAST]; -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..c260e02 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c -@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ -+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from PGP format data [RFC 4880] -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PGP: "fmt -+#include <keys/crypto-subtype.h> -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/mpi.h> -+#include <linux/pgplib.h> -+#include <crypto/hash.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pgp_parser.h" -+ -+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -+ -+const -+struct public_key_algorithm *pgp_public_key_algorithms[PGP_PUBKEY__LAST] = { -+#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA) || \ -+ defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE) -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_OR_SIG] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_ONLY] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_SIG_ONLY] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm, -+#endif -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_ELGAMAL] = NULL, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_DSA] = NULL, -+}; -+ -+static const u8 pgp_public_key_capabilities[PGP_PUBKEY__LAST] = { -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_OR_SIG] = PKEY_CAN_ENCDEC | PKEY_CAN_SIGVER, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_ONLY] = PKEY_CAN_ENCDEC, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_SIG_ONLY] = PKEY_CAN_SIGVER, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_ELGAMAL] = 0, -+ [PGP_PUBKEY_DSA] = 0, -+}; -+ -+static inline void digest_putc(struct shash_desc *digest, uint8_t ch) -+{ -+ crypto_shash_update(digest, &ch, 1); -+} -+ -+struct pgp_key_data_parse_context { -+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp; -+ struct crypto_key_subtype *subtype; -+ char *fingerprint; -+ void *payload; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Calculate the public key ID (RFC4880 12.2) -+ */ -+static int pgp_calc_pkey_keyid(struct shash_desc *digest, -+ struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pgp, -+ struct public_key *key) -+{ -+ unsigned nb[ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi)]; -+ unsigned nn[ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi)]; -+ unsigned n; -+ u8 *pp[ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi)]; -+ u32 a32; -+ int npkey = key->algo->n_pub_mpi; -+ int i, ret = -ENOMEM; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pp); i++) -+ pp[i] = NULL; -+ -+ n = (pgp->version < PGP_KEY_VERSION_4) ? 8 : 6; -+ for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++) { -+ nb[i] = mpi_get_nbits(key->mpi[i]); -+ pp[i] = mpi_get_buffer(key->mpi[i], nn + i, NULL); -+ if (!pp[i]) -+ goto error; -+ n += 2 + nn[i]; -+ } -+ -+ digest_putc(digest, 0x99); /* ctb */ -+ digest_putc(digest, n >> 8); /* 16-bit header length */ -+ digest_putc(digest, n); -+ digest_putc(digest, pgp->version); -+ -+ a32 = pgp->creation_time; -+ digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 24); -+ digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 16); -+ digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 8); -+ digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 0); -+ -+ if (pgp->version < PGP_KEY_VERSION_4) { -+ u16 a16; -+ -+ if (pgp->expires_at) -+ a16 = (pgp->expires_at - pgp->creation_time) / 86400UL; -+ else -+ a16 = 0; -+ digest_putc(digest, a16 >> 8); -+ digest_putc(digest, a16 >> 0); -+ } -+ -+ digest_putc(digest, pgp->pubkey_algo); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++) { -+ digest_putc(digest, nb[i] >> 8); -+ digest_putc(digest, nb[i]); -+ crypto_shash_update(digest, pp[i], nn[i]); -+ } -+ ret = 0; -+ -+error: -+ for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++) -+ kfree(pp[i]); -+ kleave(" = %d", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Calculate the public key ID fingerprint -+ */ -+static int pgp_generate_fingerprint(struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx, -+ struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pgp, -+ struct public_key *key) -+{ -+ struct crypto_shash *tfm; -+ struct shash_desc *digest; -+ char *fingerprint; -+ u8 *raw_fingerprint; -+ int digest_size, offset; -+ int ret, i; -+ -+ ret = -ENOMEM; -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pgp->version < PGP_KEY_VERSION_4 ? -+ "md5" : "sha1", 0, 0); -+ if (!tfm) -+ goto cleanup; -+ -+ digest = kmalloc(sizeof(*digest) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), -+ GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!digest) -+ goto cleanup_tfm; -+ -+ digest->tfm = tfm; -+ digest->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; -+ ret = crypto_shash_init(digest); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto cleanup_hash; -+ -+ ret = pgp_calc_pkey_keyid(digest, pgp, key); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto cleanup_hash; -+ -+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); -+ -+ raw_fingerprint = kmalloc(digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!raw_fingerprint) -+ goto cleanup_hash; -+ -+ ret = crypto_shash_final(digest, raw_fingerprint); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; -+ -+ fingerprint = kmalloc(digest_size * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!fingerprint) -+ goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; -+ -+ offset = digest_size - 8; -+ pr_debug("offset %u/%u\n", offset, digest_size); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < digest_size; i++) -+ sprintf(fingerprint + i * 2, "%02x", raw_fingerprint[i]); -+ pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", fingerprint); -+ -+ memcpy(&key->key_id, raw_fingerprint + offset, 8); -+ key->key_id_size = 8; -+ key->id_type = PKEY_ID_PGP; -+ -+ ctx->fingerprint = fingerprint; -+ ret = 0; -+cleanup_raw_fingerprint: -+ kfree(raw_fingerprint); -+cleanup_hash: -+ kfree(digest); -+cleanup_tfm: -+ crypto_free_shash(tfm); -+cleanup: -+ kleave(" = %d", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Extract a public key or public subkey from the PGP stream. -+ */ -+static int pgp_process_public_key(struct pgp_parse_context *context, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type, -+ u8 headerlen, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen) -+{ -+ const struct public_key_algorithm *algo; -+ struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx = -+ container_of(context, struct pgp_key_data_parse_context, pgp); -+ struct pgp_parse_pubkey pgp; -+ struct public_key *key; -+ int i, ret; -+ -+ kenter(",%u,%u,,%zu", type, headerlen, datalen); -+ -+ if (ctx->subtype) { -+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [already]"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!key) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ ret = pgp_parse_public_key(&data, &datalen, &pgp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto cleanup; -+ -+ if (pgp.pubkey_algo >= PGP_PUBKEY__LAST || -+ !pgp_public_key_algorithms[pgp.pubkey_algo]) { -+ pr_debug("Unsupported public key algorithm %u\n", -+ pgp.pubkey_algo); -+ ret = -ENOPKG; -+ goto cleanup; -+ } -+ -+ algo = key->algo = pgp_public_key_algorithms[pgp.pubkey_algo]; -+ -+ /* It's a public key, so that only gives us encrypt and verify -+ * capabilities. -+ */ -+ key->capabilities = pgp_public_key_capabilities[pgp.pubkey_algo] & -+ (PKEY_CAN_ENCRYPT | PKEY_CAN_VERIFY); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < algo->n_pub_mpi; i++) { -+ unsigned int remaining = datalen; -+ if (remaining == 0) { -+ pr_debug("short %zu mpi %d\n", datalen, i); -+ goto cleanup_badmsg; -+ } -+ key->mpi[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(data, &remaining); -+ if (!key->mpi[i]) -+ goto cleanup_nomem; -+ data += remaining; -+ datalen -= remaining; -+ } -+ -+ if (datalen != 0) { -+ pr_debug("excess %zu\n", datalen); -+ goto cleanup_badmsg; -+ } -+ -+ ret = pgp_generate_fingerprint(ctx, &pgp, key); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto cleanup; -+ -+ /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ -+ __module_get(public_key_crypto_key_subtype.owner); -+ ctx->subtype = &public_key_crypto_key_subtype; -+ ctx->payload = key; -+ kleave(" = 0 [use]"); -+ return 0; -+ -+cleanup_nomem: -+ ret = -ENOMEM; -+ goto cleanup; -+cleanup_badmsg: -+ ret = -EBADMSG; -+cleanup: -+ pr_devel("cleanup"); -+ if (key) { -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi); i++) -+ mpi_free(key->mpi[i]); -+ kfree(key); -+ } -+ kleave(" = %d", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Attempt to parse the instantiation data blob for a key as a PGP packet -+ * message holding a key. -+ */ -+static int pgp_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -+{ -+ struct pgp_key_data_parse_context ctx; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = -+ (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) | (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY); -+ ctx.pgp.process_packet = pgp_process_public_key; -+ ctx.subtype = NULL; -+ ctx.fingerprint = NULL; -+ ctx.payload = NULL; -+ -+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(prep->data, prep->datalen, &ctx.pgp); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ if (ctx.payload) -+ ctx.subtype->destroy(ctx.payload); -+ if (ctx.subtype) -+ module_put(ctx.subtype->owner); -+ kfree(ctx.fingerprint); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ -+ prep->type_data[0] = ctx.subtype; -+ prep->type_data[1] = ctx.fingerprint; -+ prep->payload = ctx.payload; -+ prep->quotalen = prep->datalen; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static struct crypto_key_parser pgp_key_parser = { -+ .owner = THIS_MODULE, -+ .name = "pgp", -+ .preparse = pgp_key_preparse, -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Module stuff -+ */ -+static int __init pgp_key_init(void) -+{ -+ return register_crypto_key_parser(&pgp_key_parser); -+} -+ -+static void __exit pgp_key_exit(void) -+{ -+ unregister_crypto_key_parser(&pgp_key_parser); -+} -+ -+module_init(pgp_key_init); -+module_exit(pgp_key_exit); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 1095ff02a49868cf8f3706dd2c83474bcf2081f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 13/32] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification - -Provide handlers for PGP-based public-key algorithm signature verification. -This does most of the work involved in signature verification as most of it is -public-key algorithm agnostic. The public-key verification algorithm itself -is just the last little bit and is supplied the complete hash data to process. - -This requires glue logic putting on top to make use of it - something the next -patch provides. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 3 +- - security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h | 6 + - security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c | 325 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 333 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index 35733fc..0c8b8a1 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -11,4 +11,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o - pgp_key_parser-y := \ -- pgp_public_key.o -+ pgp_public_key.o \ -+ pgp_sig_verify.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h -index 1cda231..6f5b3af 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_parser.h -@@ -21,3 +21,9 @@ - */ - extern const - struct public_key_algorithm *pgp_public_key_algorithms[PGP_PUBKEY__LAST]; -+ -+/* -+ * pgp_pubkey_sig.c -+ */ -+extern struct crypto_sig_verify_context *pgp_pkey_verify_sig_begin( -+ struct key *crypto_key, const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen); -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..f9bb949 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_verify.c -@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ -+/* PGP public key signature verification [RFC 4880] -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PGPSIG: "fmt -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/pgplib.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pgp_parser.h" -+ -+static const struct { -+ enum pkey_hash_algo algo : 8; -+} pgp_pubkey_hash[PGP_HASH__LAST] = { -+ [PGP_HASH_MD5].algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5, -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA1].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1, -+ [PGP_HASH_RIPE_MD_160].algo = PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160, -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA256].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256, -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA384].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384, -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA512].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512, -+ [PGP_HASH_SHA224].algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224, -+}; -+ -+static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen); -+static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_end(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const u8 *sig, size_t siglen); -+static void pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx); -+ -+struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context { -+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp; -+ struct pgp_sig_parameters params; -+}; -+ -+static int pgp_pkey_parse_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type, -+ u8 headerlen, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context *ctx = -+ container_of(context, struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context, pgp); -+ -+ return pgp_parse_sig_params(&data, &datalen, &ctx->params); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Begin the process of verifying a DSA signature. -+ * -+ * This involves allocating the hash into which first the data and then the -+ * metadata will be put, and parsing the signature to check that it matches the -+ * key. -+ */ -+struct crypto_sig_verify_context *pgp_pkey_verify_sig_begin( -+ struct key *crypto_key, const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen) -+{ -+ struct pgp_pkey_sig_parse_context p; -+ struct public_key_signature *sig; -+ struct crypto_shash *tfm; -+ const struct public_key *key = crypto_key->payload.data; -+ size_t digest_size, desc_size; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(crypto_key), siglen); -+ -+ if (!key) { -+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no public key]"); -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); -+ } -+ -+ p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE); -+ p.pgp.process_packet = pgp_pkey_parse_signature; -+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(sigdata, siglen, &p.pgp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+ -+ if (p.params.pubkey_algo >= PGP_PUBKEY__LAST || -+ !pgp_public_key_algorithms[p.params.pubkey_algo]) { -+ pr_debug("Unsupported public key algorithm %u\n", -+ p.params.pubkey_algo); -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG); -+ } -+ -+ if (pgp_public_key_algorithms[p.params.pubkey_algo] != key->algo) { -+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [wrong pk algo]"); -+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); -+ } -+ -+ if (!(key->capabilities & PKEY_CAN_VERIFY)) { -+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [key can't verify]"); -+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); -+ } -+ -+ if (p.params.hash_algo >= PGP_HASH__LAST || -+ !pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo]) { -+ pr_debug("Unsupported hash algorithm %u\n", -+ p.params.hash_algo); -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG); -+ } -+ -+ pr_debug("Signature generated with %s hash\n", -+ pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo]); -+ -+ if (memcmp(&p.params.issuer, key->key_id, 8) != 0) { -+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [wrong key ID]"); -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); -+ } -+ -+ if (p.params.signature_type != PGP_SIG_BINARY_DOCUMENT_SIG && -+ p.params.signature_type != PGP_SIG_STANDALONE_SIG) { -+ /* We don't want to canonicalise */ -+ kleave(" = -EOPNOTSUPP [canon]"); -+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); -+ } -+ -+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how -+ * big the hash operational data will be. -+ */ -+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo], 0, 0); -+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) -+ return PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT ? -+ ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm); -+ -+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm); -+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); -+ -+ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our -+ * context data. -+ */ -+ sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!sig) { -+ crypto_free_shash(tfm); -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -+ } -+ -+ sig->base.key = crypto_key; -+ sig->base.add_data = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_add_data; -+ sig->base.end = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_end; -+ sig->base.cancel = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel; -+ sig->pkey_hash_algo = pgp_pubkey_hash[p.params.hash_algo].algo; -+ sig->digest = (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size; -+ sig->digest_size = digest_size; -+ sig->hash.tfm = tfm; -+ sig->hash.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; -+ -+ ret = crypto_shash_init(&sig->hash); -+ if (ret < 0) { -+ crypto_free_shash(sig->hash.tfm); -+ kfree(sig); -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+ } -+ -+ key_get(sig->base.key); -+ kleave(" = %p", sig); -+ return &sig->base; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Load data into the hash -+ */ -+static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const void *data, size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct public_key_signature *sig = -+ container_of(ctx, struct public_key_signature, base); -+ -+ return crypto_shash_update(&sig->hash, data, datalen); -+} -+ -+struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context { -+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp; -+ const struct public_key *key; -+ struct public_key_signature *sig; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Extract required metadata from the signature packet and add what we need to -+ * to the hash. -+ */ -+static int pgp_pkey_digest_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type, -+ u8 headerlen, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context *ctx = -+ container_of(context, struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context, pgp); -+ enum pgp_signature_version version; -+ int i; -+ -+ kenter(",%u,%u,,%zu", type, headerlen, datalen); -+ -+ version = *data; -+ if (version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_3) { -+ /* We just include an excerpt of the metadata from a V3 -+ * signature. -+ */ -+ crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, data + 1, 5); -+ data += sizeof(struct pgp_signature_v3_packet); -+ datalen -= sizeof(struct pgp_signature_v3_packet); -+ } else if (version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_4) { -+ /* We add the whole metadata header and some of the hashed data -+ * for a V4 signature, plus a trailer. -+ */ -+ size_t hashedsz, unhashedsz; -+ u8 trailer[6]; -+ -+ hashedsz = 4 + 2 + (data[4] << 8) + data[5]; -+ crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, data, hashedsz); -+ -+ trailer[0] = version; -+ trailer[1] = 0xffU; -+ trailer[2] = hashedsz >> 24; -+ trailer[3] = hashedsz >> 16; -+ trailer[4] = hashedsz >> 8; -+ trailer[5] = hashedsz; -+ -+ crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, trailer, 6); -+ data += hashedsz; -+ datalen -= hashedsz; -+ -+ unhashedsz = 2 + (data[0] << 8) + data[1]; -+ data += unhashedsz; -+ datalen -= unhashedsz; -+ } -+ -+ if (datalen <= 2) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG"); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ /* There's a quick check on the hash available. */ -+ ctx->sig->signed_hash_msw[0] = *data++; -+ ctx->sig->signed_hash_msw[1] = *data++; -+ datalen -= 2; -+ -+ /* And then the cryptographic data, which we'll need for the -+ * algorithm. -+ */ -+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->key->algo->n_sig_mpi; i++) { -+ unsigned int remaining = datalen; -+ if (remaining == 0) { -+ pr_debug("short %zu mpi %d\n", datalen, i); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ ctx->sig->mpi[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(data, &remaining); -+ if (!ctx->sig->mpi[i]) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ data += remaining; -+ datalen -= remaining; -+ } -+ -+ if (datalen != 0) { -+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [trailer %zu]", datalen); -+ return -EBADMSG; -+ } -+ -+ kleave(" = 0"); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * The data is now all loaded into the hash; load the metadata, finalise the -+ * hash and perform the verification step. -+ */ -+static int pgp_pkey_verify_sig_end(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx, -+ const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen) -+{ -+ struct public_key_signature *sig = -+ container_of(ctx, struct public_key_signature, base); -+ const struct public_key *key = sig->base.key->payload.data; -+ struct pgp_pkey_sig_digest_context p; -+ int ret; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ /* Firstly we add metadata, starting with some of the data from the -+ * signature packet */ -+ p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE); -+ p.pgp.process_packet = pgp_pkey_digest_signature; -+ p.key = key; -+ p.sig = sig; -+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(sigdata, siglen, &p.pgp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error_free_ctx; -+ -+ crypto_shash_final(&sig->hash, sig->digest); -+ -+ ret = key->algo->verify(key, sig); -+ -+error_free_ctx: -+ pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel(ctx); -+ kleave(" = %d", ret); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Cancel an in-progress data loading -+ */ -+static void pgp_pkey_verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx) -+{ -+ struct public_key_signature *sig = -+ container_of(ctx, struct public_key_signature, base); -+ int i; -+ -+ kenter(""); -+ -+ /* !!! Do we need to tell the crypto layer to cancel too? */ -+ crypto_free_shash(sig->hash.tfm); -+ key_put(sig->base.key); -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->mpi); i++) -+ mpi_free(sig->mpi[i]); -+ kfree(sig); -+ -+ kleave(""); -+} --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 69d9f31b888090b5705b7148760143a6b706a116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 14/32] KEYS: PGP format signature parser - -Implement a signature parser that will attempt to parse a signature blob as a -PGP packet format message. If it can, it will find an appropriate crypto key -and set the public-key algorithm according to the data in the signature. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 1 + - security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_parser.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 137 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_parser.c - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index 0c8b8a1..a9a34c6 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -12,4 +12,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o - pgp_key_parser-y := \ - pgp_public_key.o \ -+ pgp_sig_parser.o \ - pgp_sig_verify.o -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_parser.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_parser.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..683eb53 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_sig_parser.c -@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ -+/* Handling for PGP public key signature data [RFC 4880] -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PGPSIG: "fmt -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/pgplib.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include "public_key.h" -+#include "pgp_parser.h" -+ -+struct PGP_sig_parse_context { -+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp; -+ struct pgp_sig_parameters params; -+ bool found_sig; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Look inside signature sections for a key ID -+ */ -+static int pgp_process_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type, -+ u8 headerlen, -+ const u8 *data, -+ size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct PGP_sig_parse_context *ctx = -+ container_of(context, struct PGP_sig_parse_context, pgp); -+ -+ ctx->found_sig = true; -+ return pgp_parse_sig_params(&data, &datalen, &ctx->params); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Attempt to find a key to use for PGP signature verification, starting off by -+ * looking in the supplied keyring. -+ * -+ * The function may also look for other key sources such as a TPM. If an -+ * alternative key is found it can be added to the keyring for future -+ * reference. -+ */ -+static struct key *find_key_for_pgp_sig(struct key *keyring, -+ const u8 *sig, size_t siglen) -+{ -+ struct PGP_sig_parse_context p; -+ key_ref_t key; -+ char criterion[3 + 8 * 2 + 1]; -+ int ret; -+ -+ if (!keyring) -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); -+ -+ /* Need to find the key ID */ -+ p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE); -+ p.pgp.process_packet = pgp_process_signature; -+ p.found_sig = false; -+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(sig, siglen, &p.pgp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ERR_PTR(ret); -+ -+ if (!p.found_sig) -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG); -+ -+ sprintf(criterion, "id:%08x%08x", -+ be32_to_cpu(p.params.issuer32[0]), -+ be32_to_cpu(p.params.issuer32[1])); -+ -+ pr_debug("Look up: %s\n", criterion); -+ -+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), -+ &key_type_crypto, criterion); -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) { -+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { -+ /* Hide some search errors */ -+ case -EACCES: -+ case -ENOTDIR: -+ case -EAGAIN: -+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); -+ default: -+ return ERR_CAST(key); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ pr_debug("Found key %x\n", key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); -+ return key_ref_to_ptr(key); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Attempt to parse a signature as a PGP packet format blob and find a -+ * matching key. -+ */ -+static struct crypto_sig_verify_context *pgp_verify_sig_begin( -+ struct key *keyring, const u8 *sig, size_t siglen) -+{ -+ struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx; -+ struct key *key; -+ -+ key = find_key_for_pgp_sig(keyring, sig, siglen); -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ return ERR_CAST(key); -+ -+ /* We only handle in-kernel public key signatures for the moment */ -+ ctx = pgp_pkey_verify_sig_begin(key, sig, siglen); -+ key_put(key); -+ return ctx; -+} -+ -+static struct crypto_sig_parser pgp_sig_parser = { -+ .owner = THIS_MODULE, -+ .name = "pgp", -+ .verify_sig_begin = pgp_verify_sig_begin, -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Module stuff -+ */ -+static int __init pgp_sig_init(void) -+{ -+ return register_crypto_sig_parser(&pgp_sig_parser); -+} -+ -+static void __exit pgp_sig_exit(void) -+{ -+ unregister_crypto_sig_parser(&pgp_sig_parser); -+} -+ -+module_init(pgp_sig_init); -+module_exit(pgp_sig_exit); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From fe109b5adbb22b3503cb1f72f5585543218ba990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:17 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 15/32] KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration - -Provide a facility to autogenerate the name of PGP keys from the contents of -the payload. If add_key() is given a blank description, a description is -constructed from the last user ID packet in the payload data plus the last 8 -hex digits of the key ID. For instance: - - keyctl padd crypto "" @s </tmp/key.pub - -might create a key with a constructed description that can be seen in -/proc/keys: - -2f674b96 I--Q--- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 crypto Sample kernel key 31f0ae93: PGP.RSA 31f0ae93 [] - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ - 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c -index c260e02..2347ecd 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_public_key.c -@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ struct pgp_key_data_parse_context { - struct crypto_key_subtype *subtype; - char *fingerprint; - void *payload; -+ const char *user_id; -+ size_t user_id_len; -+ size_t fingerprint_len; - }; - - /* -@@ -166,6 +169,7 @@ static int pgp_generate_fingerprint(struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx, - if (ret < 0) - goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; - -+ ctx->fingerprint_len = digest_size * 2; - fingerprint = kmalloc(digest_size * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!fingerprint) - goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; -@@ -212,6 +216,13 @@ static int pgp_process_public_key(struct pgp_parse_context *context, - - kenter(",%u,%u,,%zu", type, headerlen, datalen); - -+ if (type == PGP_PKT_USER_ID) { -+ ctx->user_id = data; -+ ctx->user_id_len = datalen; -+ kleave(" = 0 [user ID]"); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - if (ctx->subtype) { - kleave(" = -ENOKEY [already]"); - return -EBADMSG; -@@ -297,21 +308,44 @@ static int pgp_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - - kenter(""); - -+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); - ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = -- (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) | (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY); -+ (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) | (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) | -+ (1 << PGP_PKT_USER_ID); - ctx.pgp.process_packet = pgp_process_public_key; -- ctx.subtype = NULL; -- ctx.fingerprint = NULL; -- ctx.payload = NULL; - - ret = pgp_parse_packets(prep->data, prep->datalen, &ctx.pgp); -- if (ret < 0) { -- if (ctx.payload) -- ctx.subtype->destroy(ctx.payload); -- if (ctx.subtype) -- module_put(ctx.subtype->owner); -- kfree(ctx.fingerprint); -- return ret; -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto error; -+ -+ if (ctx.user_id && ctx.user_id_len > 0) { -+ /* Propose a description for the key (user ID without the comment) */ -+ size_t ulen = ctx.user_id_len, flen = ctx.fingerprint_len; -+ const char *p; -+ -+ p = memchr(ctx.user_id, '(', ulen); -+ if (p) { -+ /* Remove the comment */ -+ do { -+ p--; -+ } while (*p == ' ' && p > ctx.user_id); -+ if (*p != ' ') -+ p++; -+ ulen = p - ctx.user_id; -+ } -+ -+ if (ulen > 255 - 9) -+ ulen = 255 - 9; -+ prep->description = kmalloc(ulen + 1 + 8 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); -+ ret = -ENOMEM; -+ if (!prep->description) -+ goto error; -+ memcpy(prep->description, ctx.user_id, ulen); -+ prep->description[ulen] = ' '; -+ memcpy(prep->description + ulen + 1, -+ ctx.fingerprint + flen - 8, 8); -+ prep->description[ulen + 9] = 0; -+ pr_debug("desc '%s'\n", prep->description); - } - - prep->type_data[0] = ctx.subtype; -@@ -319,6 +353,14 @@ static int pgp_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) - prep->payload = ctx.payload; - prep->quotalen = prep->datalen; - return 0; -+ -+error: -+ if (ctx.payload) -+ ctx.subtype->destroy(ctx.payload); -+ if (ctx.subtype) -+ module_put(ctx.subtype->owner); -+ kfree(ctx.fingerprint); -+ return ret; - } - - static struct crypto_key_parser pgp_key_parser = { --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 77b00423d002eb013293177310644c8284b6ea2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 16/32] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP - keyring blob - -Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob for use in initialising -the module signing key keyring: - - int load_PGP_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, - struct key *keyring, const char *descprefix); - -The keys are labelled with descprefix plus a number to uniquify them. The keys -will actually be identified by the ID calculated from the PGP data rather than -by the description, so this shouldn't be a problem. - -The keys are attached to the keyring supplied. - -Looking as root in /proc/keys after the module signing keyring has been loaded: - -24460d1c I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: dsa 5acc2142 [] -3ca85723 I----- 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4 - -Thanks to Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> for some pointing -out some errors. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt | 20 ++++++ - include/keys/crypto-type.h | 3 + - security/keys/crypto/Kconfig | 9 +++ - security/keys/crypto/Makefile | 1 + - security/keys/crypto/pgp_preload.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 5 files changed, 148 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/pgp_preload.c - -diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -index 0a886ec..be5067e 100644 ---- a/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+++ b/Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Contents: - - Signature verification. - - Implementing crypto parsers. - - Implementing crypto subtypes. -+ - Initial PGP key preloading. - - - ======== -@@ -279,3 +280,22 @@ There are a number of operations defined by the subtype: - Mandatory. This should free the memory associated with the key. The - crypto key will look after freeing the fingerprint and releasing the - reference on the subtype module. -+ -+ -+======================= -+INITIAL PGP KEY LOADING -+======================= -+ -+A function is provided to perform an initial load of a set of public keys bound -+into a PGP packet format blob: -+ -+ int preload_pgp_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, -+ struct key *keyring); -+ -+This takes the blob of data defined by pgpdata and pgpdatalen, extracts keys -+from them and adds them to the specified keyring. The keys are labelled with a -+description generated from the fingerprint and last user ID of each key. The -+description is required to prevent all but the last key being discarded when -+the keys are linked into the keyring. -+ -+This function is only available during initial kernel set up. -diff --git a/include/keys/crypto-type.h b/include/keys/crypto-type.h -index 0fb362a..ed9b203 100644 ---- a/include/keys/crypto-type.h -+++ b/include/keys/crypto-type.h -@@ -31,4 +31,7 @@ extern void verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_sig_verify_context *ctx); - * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. - */ - -+extern __init int preload_pgp_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, -+ struct key *keyring); -+ - #endif /* _KEYS_CRYPTO_TYPE_H */ -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -index 1c2ae55..8af0155 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig -@@ -40,3 +40,12 @@ config CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER - This option provides support for parsing PGP (RFC 4880) format blobs - for key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key - from a public key packet found inside the blob. -+ -+config PGP_PRELOAD -+ bool "PGP public key preloading facility" -+ select PGP_LIBRARY -+ select CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER -+ help -+ This option provides a facility for the kernel to preload PGP-wrapped -+ bundles of keys during boot. It is used by module signing to load -+ the module signing keys for example. -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -index a9a34c6..c873674 100644 ---- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile -@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA) += crypto_rsa.o - obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_PRELOAD) += pgp_preload.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PGP_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o - pgp_key_parser-y := \ -diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/pgp_preload.c b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_preload.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..ca4cfe6 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/keys/crypto/pgp_preload.c -@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ -+/* Cryptographic key request handling -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * See Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/key.h> -+#include <linux/pgplib.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <keys/crypto-type.h> -+#include "crypto_keys.h" -+ -+struct preload_pgp_keys_context { -+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp; -+ key_ref_t keyring; -+ const u8 *key_start; -+ const u8 *key_end; -+ bool found_key; -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Create a key. -+ */ -+static int __init create_pgp_key(struct preload_pgp_keys_context *ctx) -+{ -+ key_ref_t key; -+ -+ key = key_create_or_update(ctx->keyring, "crypto", NULL, -+ ctx->key_start, -+ ctx->key_end - ctx->key_start, -+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW, -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ return PTR_ERR(key); -+ -+ pr_notice("Loaded %s key: %s\n", -+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, -+ crypto_key_id(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); -+ -+ key_ref_put(key); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Extract a public key or subkey from the PGP stream. -+ */ -+static int __init found_pgp_key(struct pgp_parse_context *context, -+ enum pgp_packet_tag type, u8 headerlen, -+ const u8 *data, size_t datalen) -+{ -+ struct preload_pgp_keys_context *ctx = -+ container_of(context, struct preload_pgp_keys_context, pgp); -+ int ret; -+ -+ if (ctx->found_key) { -+ ctx->key_end = data - headerlen; -+ ret = create_pgp_key(ctx); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ } -+ -+ ctx->key_start = data - headerlen; -+ ctx->found_key = true; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/** -+ * preload_pgp_keys - Load keys from a PGP keyring blob -+ * @pgpdata: The PGP keyring blob containing the keys. -+ * @pgpdatalen: The size of the @pgpdata blob. -+ * @keyring: The keyring to add the new keys to. -+ * -+ * Preload a pack of keys from a PGP keyring blob. -+ * -+ * The keys have their descriptions generated from the user ID and fingerprint -+ * in the PGP stream. Since keys can be matched on their key IDs independently -+ * of the key description, the description is mostly irrelevant apart from the -+ * fact that keys of the same description displace one another from a keyring. -+ * -+ * The caller should override the current creds if they want the keys to be -+ * owned by someone other than the current process's owner. Keys will not be -+ * accounted towards the owner's quota. -+ * -+ * This function may only be called whilst the kernel is booting. -+ */ -+int __init preload_pgp_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, -+ struct key *keyring) -+{ -+ struct preload_pgp_keys_context ctx; -+ int ret; -+ -+ ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = -+ (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) | (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY); -+ ctx.pgp.process_packet = found_pgp_key; -+ ctx.keyring = make_key_ref(keyring, 1); -+ ctx.found_key = false; -+ -+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(pgpdata, pgpdatalen, &ctx.pgp); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ return ret; -+ -+ if (ctx.found_key) { -+ ctx.key_end = pgpdata + pgpdatalen; -+ return create_pgp_key(&ctx); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From d569964b0037289f291f5ac48df54a6b90b3435a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:33:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 17/32] Make most arch asm/module.h files use - asm-generic/module.h - -Use the mapping of Elf_[SPE]hdr, Elf_Addr, Elf_Sym, Elf_Dyn, Elf_Rel/Rela, -ELF_R_TYPE() and ELF_R_SYM() to either the 32-bit version or the 64-bit version -into asm-generic/module.h for all arches bar MIPS. - -Also, use the generic definition mod_arch_specific where possible. - -To this end, I've defined three new config bools: - - (*) HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC - - Arches define this if they don't want to use the empty generic - mod_arch_specific struct. - - (*) MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - Arches define this if their modules can contain RELA records. This causes - the Elf_Rela mapping to be emitted and allows apply_relocate_add() to be - defined by the arch rather than have the core emit an error message. - - (*) MODULES_USE_ELF_REL - - Arches define this if their modules can contain REL records. This causes - the Elf_Rel mapping to be emitted and allows apply_relocate() to be - defined by the arch rather than have the core emit an error message. - -Note that it is possible to allow both REL and RELA records: m68k and mips are -two arches that do this. - -With this, some arch asm/module.h files can be deleted entirely and replaced -with a generic-y marker in the arch Kbuild file. - -Additionally, I have removed the bits from m32r and score that handle the -unsupported type of relocation record as that's now handled centrally. - -Thanks to Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com> for some MIPS fixes. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> ---- - arch/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ - arch/alpha/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/alpha/include/asm/module.h | 10 ++-------- - arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/arm/include/asm/module.h | 8 ++------ - arch/avr32/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/avr32/include/asm/module.h | 6 ++---- - arch/blackfin/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/blackfin/include/asm/module.h | 4 +--- - arch/c6x/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/c6x/include/asm/module.h | 12 +----------- - arch/cris/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/cris/include/asm/Kbuild | 2 ++ - arch/cris/include/asm/module.h | 9 --------- - arch/frv/include/asm/module.h | 8 +------- - arch/h8300/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/h8300/include/asm/Kbuild | 2 ++ - arch/h8300/include/asm/module.h | 11 ----------- - arch/hexagon/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/ia64/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/ia64/include/asm/module.h | 6 ++---- - arch/m32r/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/m32r/include/asm/Kbuild | 2 ++ - arch/m32r/include/asm/module.h | 10 ---------- - arch/m32r/kernel/module.c | 15 -------------- - arch/m68k/Kconfig | 3 +++ - arch/m68k/include/asm/module.h | 6 ++---- - arch/microblaze/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/mips/Kconfig | 3 +++ - arch/mips/include/asm/module.h | 10 ++++++++-- - arch/mips/kernel/module.c | 2 ++ - arch/mn10300/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/mn10300/include/asm/module.h | 7 +------ - arch/openrisc/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/parisc/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/parisc/include/asm/module.h | 16 +++------------ - arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/powerpc/include/asm/module.h | 7 +------ - arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/s390/include/asm/module.h | 18 +++-------------- - arch/score/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/score/include/asm/module.h | 6 +----- - arch/score/kernel/module.c | 10 ---------- - arch/sh/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/sh/include/asm/module.h | 14 +++---------- - arch/sparc/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/sparc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + - arch/sparc/include/asm/module.h | 24 ----------------------- - arch/tile/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/unicore32/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/x86/um/Kconfig | 2 ++ - arch/xtensa/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/xtensa/include/asm/module.h | 9 +-------- - include/asm-generic/module.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- - include/linux/moduleloader.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- - kernel/module.c | 20 ------------------- - 57 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 223 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/cris/include/asm/module.h - delete mode 100644 arch/h8300/include/asm/module.h - delete mode 100644 arch/m32r/include/asm/module.h - delete mode 100644 arch/sparc/include/asm/module.h - -diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig -index 72f2fa1..3450115 100644 ---- a/arch/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/Kconfig -@@ -281,4 +281,23 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER - - See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details. - -+config HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ bool -+ help -+ The arch uses struct mod_arch_specific to store data. Many arches -+ just need a simple module loader without arch specific data - those -+ should not enable this. -+ -+config MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA -+ bool -+ help -+ Modules only use ELF RELA relocations. Modules with ELF REL -+ relocations will give an error. -+ -+config MODULES_USE_ELF_REL -+ bool -+ help -+ Modules only use ELF REL relocations. Modules with ELF RELA -+ relocations will give an error. -+ - source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" -diff --git a/arch/alpha/Kconfig b/arch/alpha/Kconfig -index 9944ded..7e3710c 100644 ---- a/arch/alpha/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/alpha/Kconfig -@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ config ALPHA - select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - help - The Alpha is a 64-bit general-purpose processor designed and - marketed by the Digital Equipment Corporation of blessed memory, -diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/module.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/module.h -index 7b63743..9cd13b5 100644 ---- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,19 +1,13 @@ - #ifndef _ALPHA_MODULE_H - #define _ALPHA_MODULE_H - -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - struct mod_arch_specific - { - unsigned int gotsecindex; - }; - --#define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym --#define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr --#define Elf_Phdr Elf64_Phdr --#define Elf_Dyn Elf64_Dyn --#define Elf_Rel Elf64_Rel --#define Elf_Rela Elf64_Rela -- - #define ARCH_SHF_SMALL SHF_ALPHA_GPREL - - #ifdef MODULE -diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig -index e91c7cd..c75c217 100644 ---- a/arch/arm/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig -@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ config ARM - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER - select DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS if (CPU_V6 || CPU_V6K || CPU_V7) && !CPU_BIG_ENDIAN -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC if ARM_UNWIND -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL - help - The ARM series is a line of low-power-consumption RISC chip designs - licensed by ARM Ltd and targeted at embedded applications and -diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/module.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/module.h -index 6c6809f..0d3a28d 100644 ---- a/arch/arm/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_ARM_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_ARM_MODULE_H - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - struct unwind_table; - -@@ -16,13 +14,11 @@ enum { - ARM_SEC_DEVEXIT, - ARM_SEC_MAX, - }; --#endif - - struct mod_arch_specific { --#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_UNWIND - struct unwind_table *unwind[ARM_SEC_MAX]; --#endif - }; -+#endif - - /* - * Add the ARM architecture version to the version magic string -diff --git a/arch/avr32/Kconfig b/arch/avr32/Kconfig -index 5ade51c..06e73bf 100644 ---- a/arch/avr32/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/avr32/Kconfig -@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ config AVR32 - select ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION - select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - help - AVR32 is a high-performance 32-bit RISC microprocessor core, - designed for cost-sensitive embedded applications, with particular -diff --git a/arch/avr32/include/asm/module.h b/arch/avr32/include/asm/module.h -index 4514445..3f083d3 100644 ---- a/arch/avr32/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/avr32/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ - #ifndef __ASM_AVR32_MODULE_H - #define __ASM_AVR32_MODULE_H - -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - struct mod_arch_syminfo { - unsigned long got_offset; - int got_initialized; -@@ -17,10 +19,6 @@ struct mod_arch_specific { - struct mod_arch_syminfo *syminfo; - }; - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -- - #define MODULE_PROC_FAMILY "AVR32v1" - - #define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY -diff --git a/arch/blackfin/Kconfig b/arch/blackfin/Kconfig -index f348619..a48d8be 100644 ---- a/arch/blackfin/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/blackfin/Kconfig -@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ config BLACKFIN - select HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG if NMI_WATCHDOG - select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD - select ARCH_USES_GETTIMEOFFSET if !GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config GENERIC_CSUM - def_bool y -diff --git a/arch/blackfin/include/asm/module.h b/arch/blackfin/include/asm/module.h -index ed5689b..231a149 100644 ---- a/arch/blackfin/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/blackfin/include/asm/module.h -@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_BFIN_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_BFIN_MODULE_H - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - struct mod_arch_specific { - Elf_Shdr *text_l1; -diff --git a/arch/c6x/Kconfig b/arch/c6x/Kconfig -index 052f81a..8f3a304 100644 ---- a/arch/c6x/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/c6x/Kconfig -@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ config C6X - select OF - select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config MMU - def_bool n -diff --git a/arch/c6x/include/asm/module.h b/arch/c6x/include/asm/module.h -index a453f97..5c7269c 100644 ---- a/arch/c6x/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/c6x/include/asm/module.h -@@ -13,17 +13,7 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_C6X_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_C6X_MODULE_H - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr --#define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr --#define Elf_Word Elf32_Word -- --/* -- * This file contains the C6x architecture specific module code. -- */ --struct mod_arch_specific { --}; -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - struct loaded_sections { - unsigned int new_vaddr; -diff --git a/arch/cris/Kconfig b/arch/cris/Kconfig -index e922154..7bb8cf9 100644 ---- a/arch/cris/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/cris/Kconfig -@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config CRIS - select GENERIC_IOMAP - select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD if ETRAX_ARCH_V32 - select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config HZ - int -diff --git a/arch/cris/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/cris/include/asm/Kbuild -index 04d02a5..28b690d 100644 ---- a/arch/cris/include/asm/Kbuild -+++ b/arch/cris/include/asm/Kbuild -@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ header-y += ethernet.h - header-y += etraxgpio.h - header-y += rs485.h - header-y += sync_serial.h -+ -+generic-y += module.h -diff --git a/arch/cris/include/asm/module.h b/arch/cris/include/asm/module.h -deleted file mode 100644 -index 7ee7231..0000000 ---- a/arch/cris/include/asm/module.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ --#ifndef _ASM_CRIS_MODULE_H --#define _ASM_CRIS_MODULE_H --/* cris is simple */ --struct mod_arch_specific { }; -- --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr --#endif /* _ASM_CRIS_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/arch/frv/include/asm/module.h b/arch/frv/include/asm/module.h -index 3d5c636..a8848f0 100644 ---- a/arch/frv/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/frv/include/asm/module.h -@@ -11,13 +11,7 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_MODULE_H - --struct mod_arch_specific --{ --}; -- --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - /* - * Include the architecture version. -diff --git a/arch/h8300/Kconfig b/arch/h8300/Kconfig -index 5e8a0d9..c149d3b29 100644 ---- a/arch/h8300/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/h8300/Kconfig -@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config H8300 - select ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION - select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW - select GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config SYMBOL_PREFIX - string -diff --git a/arch/h8300/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/h8300/include/asm/Kbuild -index c68e168..871382d 100644 ---- a/arch/h8300/include/asm/Kbuild -+++ b/arch/h8300/include/asm/Kbuild -@@ -1 +1,3 @@ - include include/asm-generic/Kbuild.asm -+ -+generic-y += module.h -diff --git a/arch/h8300/include/asm/module.h b/arch/h8300/include/asm/module.h -deleted file mode 100644 -index 8e46724..0000000 ---- a/arch/h8300/include/asm/module.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ --#ifndef _ASM_H8300_MODULE_H --#define _ASM_H8300_MODULE_H --/* -- * This file contains the H8/300 architecture specific module code. -- */ --struct mod_arch_specific { }; --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -- --#endif /* _ASM_H8/300_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/arch/hexagon/Kconfig b/arch/hexagon/Kconfig -index b2fdfb7..0744f7d 100644 ---- a/arch/hexagon/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/hexagon/Kconfig -@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config HEXAGON - select KTIME_SCALAR - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - ---help--- - Qualcomm Hexagon is a processor architecture designed for high - performance and low power across a wide variety of applications. -diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig -index 310cf57..6881464 100644 ---- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig -@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ config IA64 - select ARCH_THREAD_INFO_ALLOCATOR - select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA - select GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - default y - help - The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to -diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/module.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/module.h -index 908eaef..dfba22a 100644 ---- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_IA64_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_IA64_MODULE_H - -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - /* - * IA-64-specific support for kernel module loader. - * -@@ -29,10 +31,6 @@ struct mod_arch_specific { - unsigned int next_got_entry; /* index of next available got entry */ - }; - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr -- - #define MODULE_PROC_FAMILY "ia64" - #define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY \ - "gcc-" __stringify(__GNUC__) "." __stringify(__GNUC_MINOR__) -diff --git a/arch/m32r/Kconfig b/arch/m32r/Kconfig -index 49498bb..fc61533 100644 ---- a/arch/m32r/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/m32r/Kconfig -@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ config M32R - select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW - select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 - select ARCH_USES_GETTIMEOFFSET -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config SBUS - bool -diff --git a/arch/m32r/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/m32r/include/asm/Kbuild -index c68e168..871382d 100644 ---- a/arch/m32r/include/asm/Kbuild -+++ b/arch/m32r/include/asm/Kbuild -@@ -1 +1,3 @@ - include include/asm-generic/Kbuild.asm -+ -+generic-y += module.h -diff --git a/arch/m32r/include/asm/module.h b/arch/m32r/include/asm/module.h -deleted file mode 100644 -index eb73ee0..0000000 ---- a/arch/m32r/include/asm/module.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ --#ifndef _ASM_M32R_MODULE_H --#define _ASM_M32R_MODULE_H -- --struct mod_arch_specific { }; -- --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -- --#endif /* _ASM_M32R_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/arch/m32r/kernel/module.c b/arch/m32r/kernel/module.c -index 3071fe8..38233b6 100644 ---- a/arch/m32r/kernel/module.c -+++ b/arch/m32r/kernel/module.c -@@ -201,18 +201,3 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs, - } - return 0; - } -- --int apply_relocate(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs, -- const char *strtab, -- unsigned int symindex, -- unsigned int relsec, -- struct module *me) --{ --#if 0 -- printk(KERN_ERR "module %s: REL RELOCATION unsupported\n", -- me->name); -- return -ENOEXEC; --#endif -- return 0; -- --} -diff --git a/arch/m68k/Kconfig b/arch/m68k/Kconfig -index 4a46990..714a850 100644 ---- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig -@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ config M68K - select FPU if MMU - select ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION - select ARCH_USES_GETTIMEOFFSET if MMU && !COLDFIRE -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config RWSEM_GENERIC_SPINLOCK - bool -diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/module.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/module.h -index edffe66..8b58fce 100644 ---- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_M68K_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_M68K_MODULE_H - -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - enum m68k_fixup_type { - m68k_fixup_memoffset, - m68k_fixup_vnode_shift, -@@ -36,8 +38,4 @@ struct module; - extern void module_fixup(struct module *mod, struct m68k_fixup_info *start, - struct m68k_fixup_info *end); - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -- - #endif /* _ASM_M68K_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/arch/microblaze/Kconfig b/arch/microblaze/Kconfig -index ab9afca..b4f409f 100644 ---- a/arch/microblaze/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/microblaze/Kconfig -@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ config MICROBLAZE - select GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES - select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config SWAP - def_bool n -diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig -index 331d574..5ff52db 100644 ---- a/arch/mips/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig -@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ config MIPS - select BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS - select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if 64BIT - - menu "Machine selection" - -diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/module.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/module.h -index 7531ecd..c93b62b 100644 ---- a/arch/mips/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/module.h -@@ -34,11 +34,14 @@ typedef struct { - } Elf64_Mips_Rela; - - #ifdef CONFIG_32BIT -- - #define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr - #define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym - #define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr - #define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr -+#define Elf_Rel Elf32_Rel -+#define Elf_Rela Elf32_Rela -+#define ELF_R_TYPE(X) ELF32_R_TYPE(X) -+#define ELF_R_SYM(X) ELF32_R_SYM(X) - - #define Elf_Mips_Rel Elf32_Rel - #define Elf_Mips_Rela Elf32_Rela -@@ -49,11 +52,14 @@ typedef struct { - #endif - - #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT -- - #define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr - #define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym - #define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr - #define Elf_Addr Elf64_Addr -+#define Elf_Rel Elf64_Rel -+#define Elf_Rela Elf64_Rela -+#define ELF_R_TYPE(X) ELF64_R_TYPE(X) -+#define ELF_R_SYM(X) ELF64_R_SYM(X) - - #define Elf_Mips_Rel Elf64_Mips_Rel - #define Elf_Mips_Rela Elf64_Mips_Rela -diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/module.c b/arch/mips/kernel/module.c -index 4f8c3cb..9f102cf 100644 ---- a/arch/mips/kernel/module.c -+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/module.c -@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, - return 0; - } - -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, - unsigned int symindex, unsigned int relsec, - struct module *me) -@@ -363,6 +364,7 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, - - return 0; - } -+#endif - - /* Given an address, look for it in the module exception tables. */ - const struct exception_table_entry *search_module_dbetables(unsigned long addr) -diff --git a/arch/mn10300/Kconfig b/arch/mn10300/Kconfig -index 5cfb086..aa03f2e 100644 ---- a/arch/mn10300/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/mn10300/Kconfig -@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config MN10300 - select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB - select HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG if MN10300_WD_TIMER - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config AM33_2 - def_bool n -diff --git a/arch/mn10300/include/asm/module.h b/arch/mn10300/include/asm/module.h -index 5d7057d..6571103 100644 ---- a/arch/mn10300/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/mn10300/include/asm/module.h -@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_MODULE_H - --struct mod_arch_specific { --}; -- --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - /* - * Include the MN10300 architecture version. -diff --git a/arch/openrisc/Kconfig b/arch/openrisc/Kconfig -index 49765b5..05f2ba4 100644 ---- a/arch/openrisc/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/openrisc/Kconfig -@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ config OPENRISC - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config MMU - def_bool y -diff --git a/arch/parisc/Kconfig b/arch/parisc/Kconfig -index 3ff21b5..166d991 100644 ---- a/arch/parisc/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/parisc/Kconfig -@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ config PARISC - select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG - select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - help - The PA-RISC microprocessor is designed by Hewlett-Packard and used -diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/module.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/module.h -index 1f41234..bab37e9 100644 ---- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,21 +1,11 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_PARISC_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_PARISC_MODULE_H -+ -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - /* - * This file contains the parisc architecture specific module code. - */ --#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT --#define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr --#define Elf_Addr Elf64_Addr --#define Elf_Rela Elf64_Rela --#else --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr --#define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr --#define Elf_Rela Elf32_Rela --#endif - - struct unwind_table; - -diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig -index 352f416..74f8478 100644 ---- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig -@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ config PPC - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config EARLY_PRINTK - bool -diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/module.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/module.h -index 0192a4e..c1df590 100644 ---- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/module.h -@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ - - #include <linux/list.h> - #include <asm/bug.h> -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - - #ifndef __powerpc64__ -@@ -60,16 +61,10 @@ struct mod_arch_specific { - */ - - #ifdef __powerpc64__ --# define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr --# define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym --# define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr - # ifdef MODULE - asm(".section .stubs,\"ax\",@nobits; .align 3; .previous"); - # endif - #else --# define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --# define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --# define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr - # ifdef MODULE - asm(".section .plt,\"ax\",@nobits; .align 3; .previous"); - asm(".section .init.plt,\"ax\",@nobits; .align 3; .previous"); -diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig -index 107610e..c76a052 100644 ---- a/arch/s390/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig -@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ config S390 - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS - select KTIME_SCALAR if 32BIT - select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER - def_bool y -diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/module.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/module.h -index f0b6b26..df1f861 100644 ---- a/arch/s390/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_S390_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_S390_MODULE_H -+ -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - /* - * This file contains the s390 architecture specific module code. - */ -@@ -28,19 +31,4 @@ struct mod_arch_specific - struct mod_arch_syminfo *syminfo; - }; - --#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT --#define ElfW(x) Elf64_ ## x --#define ELFW(x) ELF64_ ## x --#else --#define ElfW(x) Elf32_ ## x --#define ELFW(x) ELF32_ ## x --#endif -- --#define Elf_Addr ElfW(Addr) --#define Elf_Rela ElfW(Rela) --#define Elf_Shdr ElfW(Shdr) --#define Elf_Sym ElfW(Sym) --#define Elf_Ehdr ElfW(Ehdr) --#define ELF_R_SYM ELFW(R_SYM) --#define ELF_R_TYPE ELFW(R_TYPE) - #endif /* _ASM_S390_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/arch/score/Kconfig b/arch/score/Kconfig -index ba0f412..e2c8db4 100644 ---- a/arch/score/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/score/Kconfig -@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ config SCORE - select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK - select GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL - - choice - prompt "System type" -diff --git a/arch/score/include/asm/module.h b/arch/score/include/asm/module.h -index f0b5dc0..abf395b 100644 ---- a/arch/score/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/score/include/asm/module.h -@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ - - #include <linux/list.h> - #include <asm/uaccess.h> -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - struct mod_arch_specific { - /* Data Bus Error exception tables */ -@@ -13,11 +14,6 @@ struct mod_arch_specific { - - typedef uint8_t Elf64_Byte; /* Type for a 8-bit quantity. */ - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr --#define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr -- - /* Given an address, look for it in the exception tables. */ - #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - const struct exception_table_entry *search_module_dbetables(unsigned long addr); -diff --git a/arch/score/kernel/module.c b/arch/score/kernel/module.c -index 469e3b6..1378d99 100644 ---- a/arch/score/kernel/module.c -+++ b/arch/score/kernel/module.c -@@ -125,16 +125,6 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, - return 0; - } - --int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, -- unsigned int symindex, unsigned int relsec, -- struct module *me) --{ -- /* Non-standard return value... most other arch's return -ENOEXEC -- * for an unsupported relocation variant -- */ -- return 0; --} -- - /* Given an address, look for it in the module exception tables. */ - const struct exception_table_entry *search_module_dbetables(unsigned long addr) - { -diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig -index 36f5141..656329a 100644 ---- a/arch/sh/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig -@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ config SUPERH - select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE if SH_SH03 || SH_DREAMCAST - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER -+ select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC if DWARF_UNWINDER -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - help - The SuperH is a RISC processor targeted for use in embedded systems - and consumer electronics; it was also used in the Sega Dreamcast -diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/module.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/module.h -index b7927de..81300d8b 100644 ---- a/arch/sh/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/module.h -@@ -1,21 +1,13 @@ - #ifndef _ASM_SH_MODULE_H - #define _ASM_SH_MODULE_H - --struct mod_arch_specific { -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_DWARF_UNWINDER -+struct mod_arch_specific { - struct list_head fde_list; - struct list_head cie_list; --#endif - }; -- --#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT --#define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr --#else --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr - #endif - - #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN -diff --git a/arch/sparc/Kconfig b/arch/sparc/Kconfig -index 67f1f6f..a244e70 100644 ---- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig -@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ config SPARC - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config SPARC32 - def_bool !64BIT -diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/Kbuild b/arch/sparc/include/asm/Kbuild -index 67f83e0..fbe1cb5 100644 ---- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/Kbuild -+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/Kbuild -@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ generic-y += div64.h - generic-y += local64.h - generic-y += irq_regs.h - generic-y += local.h -+generic-y += module.h - generic-y += word-at-a-time.h -diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/module.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/module.h -deleted file mode 100644 -index ff8e02d..0000000 ---- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/module.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ --#ifndef __SPARC_MODULE_H --#define __SPARC_MODULE_H --struct mod_arch_specific { }; -- --/* -- * Use some preprocessor magic to define the correct symbol -- * for sparc32 and sparc64. -- * Elf_Addr becomes Elf32_Addr for sparc32 and Elf64_Addr for sparc64 -- */ --#define ___ELF(a, b, c) a##b##c --#define __ELF(a, b, c) ___ELF(a, b, c) --#define _Elf(t) __ELF(Elf, CONFIG_BITS, t) --#define _ELF(t) __ELF(ELF, CONFIG_BITS, t) -- --#define Elf_Shdr _Elf(_Shdr) --#define Elf_Sym _Elf(_Sym) --#define Elf_Ehdr _Elf(_Ehdr) --#define Elf_Rela _Elf(_Rela) --#define Elf_Addr _Elf(_Addr) -- --#define ELF_R_SYM _ELF(_R_SYM) --#define ELF_R_TYPE _ELF(_R_TYPE) -- --#endif /* __SPARC_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/arch/tile/Kconfig b/arch/tile/Kconfig -index 932e443..1603f30 100644 ---- a/arch/tile/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/tile/Kconfig -@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ config TILE - select SYS_HYPERVISOR - select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG - select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - # FIXME: investigate whether we need/want these options. - # select HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT -diff --git a/arch/unicore32/Kconfig b/arch/unicore32/Kconfig -index b0a4743..5ef0814 100644 ---- a/arch/unicore32/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/unicore32/Kconfig -@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ config UNICORE32 - select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW - select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS - select GENERIC_IOMAP -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL - help - UniCore-32 is 32-bit Instruction Set Architecture, - including a series of low-power-consumption RISC chip -diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig -index 8ec3a1a..01726cb 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ config X86 - select KTIME_SCALAR if X86_32 - select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER - select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL if X86_32 -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if X86_64 - - config INSTRUCTION_DECODER - def_bool (KPROBES || PERF_EVENTS || UPROBES) -diff --git a/arch/x86/um/Kconfig b/arch/x86/um/Kconfig -index 9926e11..a4b0c10 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/um/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/um/Kconfig -@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ config 64BIT - config X86_32 - def_bool !64BIT - select HAVE_AOUT -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL - - config X86_64 - def_bool 64BIT -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - - config RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM - def_bool X86_XADD && 64BIT -diff --git a/arch/xtensa/Kconfig b/arch/xtensa/Kconfig -index 8ed64cf..4816e44 100644 ---- a/arch/xtensa/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/xtensa/Kconfig -@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config XTENSA - select HAVE_GENERIC_HARDIRQS - select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW - select GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES -+ select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - help - Xtensa processors are 32-bit RISC machines designed by Tensilica - primarily for embedded systems. These processors are both -diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/module.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/module.h -index d9b34be..488b40c 100644 ---- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/module.h -+++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/module.h -@@ -13,15 +13,8 @@ - #ifndef _XTENSA_MODULE_H - #define _XTENSA_MODULE_H - --struct mod_arch_specific --{ -- /* No special elements, yet. */ --}; -- - #define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC "xtensa-" __stringify(XCHAL_CORE_ID) " " - --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#include <asm-generic/module.h> - - #endif /* _XTENSA_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/include/asm-generic/module.h b/include/asm-generic/module.h -index ed5b44d..14dc41d 100644 ---- a/include/asm-generic/module.h -+++ b/include/asm-generic/module.h -@@ -5,18 +5,44 @@ - * Many architectures just need a simple module - * loader without arch specific data. - */ -+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC - struct mod_arch_specific - { - }; -+#endif - - #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT --#define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr --#else --#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr --#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym --#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#define Elf_Shdr Elf64_Shdr -+#define Elf_Phdr Elf64_Phdr -+#define Elf_Sym Elf64_Sym -+#define Elf_Dyn Elf64_Dyn -+#define Elf_Ehdr Elf64_Ehdr -+#define Elf_Addr Elf64_Addr -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_REL -+#define Elf_Rel Elf64_Rel -+#endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA -+#define Elf_Rela Elf64_Rela -+#endif -+#define ELF_R_TYPE(X) ELF64_R_TYPE(X) -+#define ELF_R_SYM(X) ELF64_R_SYM(X) -+ -+#else /* CONFIG_64BIT */ -+ -+#define Elf_Shdr Elf32_Shdr -+#define Elf_Phdr Elf32_Phdr -+#define Elf_Sym Elf32_Sym -+#define Elf_Dyn Elf32_Dyn -+#define Elf_Ehdr Elf32_Ehdr -+#define Elf_Addr Elf32_Addr -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_REL -+#define Elf_Rel Elf32_Rel -+#endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA -+#define Elf_Rela Elf32_Rela -+#endif -+#define ELF_R_TYPE(X) ELF32_R_TYPE(X) -+#define ELF_R_SYM(X) ELF32_R_SYM(X) - #endif - - #endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_MODULE_H */ -diff --git a/include/linux/moduleloader.h b/include/linux/moduleloader.h -index b2be02e..560ca53 100644 ---- a/include/linux/moduleloader.h -+++ b/include/linux/moduleloader.h -@@ -28,21 +28,49 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size); - /* Free memory returned from module_alloc. */ - void module_free(struct module *mod, void *module_region); - --/* Apply the given relocation to the (simplified) ELF. Return -error -- or 0. */ -+/* -+ * Apply the given relocation to the (simplified) ELF. Return -error -+ * or 0. -+ */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_REL - int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, - const char *strtab, - unsigned int symindex, - unsigned int relsec, - struct module *mod); -+#else -+static inline int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, -+ const char *strtab, -+ unsigned int symindex, -+ unsigned int relsec, -+ struct module *me) -+{ -+ printk(KERN_ERR "module %s: REL relocation unsupported\n", me->name); -+ return -ENOEXEC; -+} -+#endif - --/* Apply the given add relocation to the (simplified) ELF. Return -- -error or 0 */ -+/* -+ * Apply the given add relocation to the (simplified) ELF. Return -+ * -error or 0 -+ */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA - int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, - const char *strtab, - unsigned int symindex, - unsigned int relsec, - struct module *mod); -+#else -+static inline int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, -+ const char *strtab, -+ unsigned int symindex, -+ unsigned int relsec, -+ struct module *me) -+{ -+ printk(KERN_ERR "module %s: REL relocation unsupported\n", me->name); -+ return -ENOEXEC; -+} -+#endif - - /* Any final processing of module before access. Return -error or 0. */ - int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, -diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c -index 4edbd9c..087aeed 100644 ---- a/kernel/module.c -+++ b/kernel/module.c -@@ -1949,26 +1949,6 @@ static int simplify_symbols(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) - return ret; - } - --int __weak apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, -- const char *strtab, -- unsigned int symindex, -- unsigned int relsec, -- struct module *me) --{ -- pr_err("module %s: REL relocation unsupported\n", me->name); -- return -ENOEXEC; --} -- --int __weak apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, -- const char *strtab, -- unsigned int symindex, -- unsigned int relsec, -- struct module *me) --{ -- pr_err("module %s: RELA relocation unsupported\n", me->name); -- return -ENOEXEC; --} -- - static int apply_relocations(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) - { - unsigned int i; --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From c6cfa3260f1e2961e69a2e3240695954aed24976 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:43 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 18/32] MIPS: Fix module.c build for 32 bit - -Fixes build failure introduced by "Make most arch asm/module.h files use -asm-generic/module.h" by moving all the RELA processing code to a -separate file to be used only for RELA processing on 64-bit kernels. - - CC arch/mips/kernel/module.o -arch/mips/kernel/module.c:250:14: error: 'reloc_handlers_rela' defined but not -used [-Werror=unused-variable] -cc1: all warnings being treated as errors - -make[6]: *** [arch/mips/kernel/module.o] Error 1 - -Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - arch/mips/kernel/Makefile | 1 + - arch/mips/kernel/module-rela.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - arch/mips/kernel/module.c | 124 +---------------------------------- - arch/mips/kernel/module.h | 12 ++++ - 4 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 arch/mips/kernel/module-rela.c - create mode 100644 arch/mips/kernel/module.h - -diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/module-rela.c b/arch/mips/kernel/module-rela.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..4e784a8 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/module-rela.c -@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ -+/* -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by -+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or -+ * (at your option) any later version. -+ * -+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -+ * GNU General Public License for more details. -+ * -+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License -+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software -+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Rusty Russell. -+ * Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Ralf Baechle (ralf@linux-mips.org) -+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Thiemo Seufer -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/elf.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/errno.h> -+#include <linux/moduleloader.h> -+#include "module.h" -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_32_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ *location = v; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_26_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ if (v % 4) { -+ pr_err("module %s: dangerous R_MIPS_26 RELArelocation\n", -+ me->name); -+ return -ENOEXEC; -+ } -+ -+ if ((v & 0xf0000000) != (((unsigned long)location + 4) & 0xf0000000)) { -+ printk(KERN_ERR -+ "module %s: relocation overflow\n", -+ me->name); -+ return -ENOEXEC; -+ } -+ -+ *location = (*location & ~0x03ffffff) | ((v >> 2) & 0x03ffffff); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_hi16_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | -+ ((((long long) v + 0x8000LL) >> 16) & 0xffff); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_lo16_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | (v & 0xffff); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_64_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ *(Elf_Addr *)location = v; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_higher_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, -+ Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | -+ ((((long long) v + 0x80008000LL) >> 32) & 0xffff); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int apply_r_mips_highest_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, -+ Elf_Addr v) -+{ -+ *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | -+ ((((long long) v + 0x800080008000LL) >> 48) & 0xffff); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int (*reloc_handlers_rela[]) (struct module *me, u32 *location, -+ Elf_Addr v) = { -+ [R_MIPS_NONE] = apply_r_mips_none, -+ [R_MIPS_32] = apply_r_mips_32_rela, -+ [R_MIPS_26] = apply_r_mips_26_rela, -+ [R_MIPS_HI16] = apply_r_mips_hi16_rela, -+ [R_MIPS_LO16] = apply_r_mips_lo16_rela, -+ [R_MIPS_64] = apply_r_mips_64_rela, -+ [R_MIPS_HIGHER] = apply_r_mips_higher_rela, -+ [R_MIPS_HIGHEST] = apply_r_mips_highest_rela -+}; -+ -+int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, -+ unsigned int symindex, unsigned int relsec, -+ struct module *me) -+{ -+ Elf_Mips_Rela *rel = (void *) sechdrs[relsec].sh_addr; -+ Elf_Sym *sym; -+ u32 *location; -+ unsigned int i; -+ Elf_Addr v; -+ int res; -+ -+ pr_debug("Applying relocate section %u to %u\n", relsec, -+ sechdrs[relsec].sh_info); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < sechdrs[relsec].sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) { -+ /* This is where to make the change */ -+ location = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr -+ + rel[i].r_offset; -+ /* This is the symbol it is referring to */ -+ sym = (Elf_Sym *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr -+ + ELF_MIPS_R_SYM(rel[i]); -+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(sym->st_value)) { -+ /* Ignore unresolved weak symbol */ -+ if (ELF_ST_BIND(sym->st_info) == STB_WEAK) -+ continue; -+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Unknown symbol %s\n", -+ me->name, strtab + sym->st_name); -+ return -ENOENT; -+ } -+ -+ v = sym->st_value + rel[i].r_addend; -+ -+ res = reloc_handlers_rela[ELF_MIPS_R_TYPE(rel[i])](me, location, v); -+ if (res) -+ return res; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/module.h b/arch/mips/kernel/module.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..675d091 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/module.h -@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ -+/* Internal definitions for MIPS module code -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * module.c -+ */ -+extern int apply_r_mips_none(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v); -diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/Makefile b/arch/mips/kernel/Makefile -index fdaf65e..cd1e6c2 100644 ---- a/arch/mips/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/Makefile -@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYNC_R4K) += sync-r4k.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += mips_ksyms.o module.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA) += module-rela.o - - obj-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER) += mcount.o ftrace.o - -diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/module.c b/arch/mips/kernel/module.c -index 9f102cf..e7dc80b 100644 ---- a/arch/mips/kernel/module.c -+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/module.c -@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ - #include <linux/kernel.h> - #include <linux/spinlock.h> - #include <linux/jump_label.h> -+#include "module.h" - - #include <asm/pgtable.h> /* MODULE_START */ - -@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size) - } - #endif - --static int apply_r_mips_none(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) -+int apply_r_mips_none(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) - { - return 0; - } -@@ -63,13 +64,6 @@ static int apply_r_mips_32_rel(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) - return 0; - } - --static int apply_r_mips_32_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) --{ -- *location = v; -- -- return 0; --} -- - static int apply_r_mips_26_rel(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) - { - if (v % 4) { -@@ -91,26 +85,6 @@ static int apply_r_mips_26_rel(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) - return 0; - } - --static int apply_r_mips_26_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) --{ -- if (v % 4) { -- pr_err("module %s: dangerous R_MIPS_26 RELArelocation\n", -- me->name); -- return -ENOEXEC; -- } -- -- if ((v & 0xf0000000) != (((unsigned long)location + 4) & 0xf0000000)) { -- printk(KERN_ERR -- "module %s: relocation overflow\n", -- me->name); -- return -ENOEXEC; -- } -- -- *location = (*location & ~0x03ffffff) | ((v >> 2) & 0x03ffffff); -- -- return 0; --} -- - static int apply_r_mips_hi16_rel(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) - { - struct mips_hi16 *n; -@@ -132,14 +106,6 @@ static int apply_r_mips_hi16_rel(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) - return 0; - } - --static int apply_r_mips_hi16_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) --{ -- *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | -- ((((long long) v + 0x8000LL) >> 16) & 0xffff); -- -- return 0; --} -- - static void free_relocation_chain(struct mips_hi16 *l) - { - struct mips_hi16 *next; -@@ -217,38 +183,6 @@ out_danger: - return -ENOEXEC; - } - --static int apply_r_mips_lo16_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) --{ -- *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | (v & 0xffff); -- -- return 0; --} -- --static int apply_r_mips_64_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v) --{ -- *(Elf_Addr *)location = v; -- -- return 0; --} -- --static int apply_r_mips_higher_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, -- Elf_Addr v) --{ -- *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | -- ((((long long) v + 0x80008000LL) >> 32) & 0xffff); -- -- return 0; --} -- --static int apply_r_mips_highest_rela(struct module *me, u32 *location, -- Elf_Addr v) --{ -- *location = (*location & 0xffff0000) | -- ((((long long) v + 0x800080008000LL) >> 48) & 0xffff); -- -- return 0; --} -- - static int (*reloc_handlers_rel[]) (struct module *me, u32 *location, - Elf_Addr v) = { - [R_MIPS_NONE] = apply_r_mips_none, -@@ -258,18 +192,6 @@ static int (*reloc_handlers_rel[]) (struct module *me, u32 *location, - [R_MIPS_LO16] = apply_r_mips_lo16_rel - }; - --static int (*reloc_handlers_rela[]) (struct module *me, u32 *location, -- Elf_Addr v) = { -- [R_MIPS_NONE] = apply_r_mips_none, -- [R_MIPS_32] = apply_r_mips_32_rela, -- [R_MIPS_26] = apply_r_mips_26_rela, -- [R_MIPS_HI16] = apply_r_mips_hi16_rela, -- [R_MIPS_LO16] = apply_r_mips_lo16_rela, -- [R_MIPS_64] = apply_r_mips_64_rela, -- [R_MIPS_HIGHER] = apply_r_mips_higher_rela, -- [R_MIPS_HIGHEST] = apply_r_mips_highest_rela --}; -- - int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, - unsigned int symindex, unsigned int relsec, - struct module *me) -@@ -324,48 +246,6 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, - return 0; - } - --#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA --int apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab, -- unsigned int symindex, unsigned int relsec, -- struct module *me) --{ -- Elf_Mips_Rela *rel = (void *) sechdrs[relsec].sh_addr; -- Elf_Sym *sym; -- u32 *location; -- unsigned int i; -- Elf_Addr v; -- int res; -- -- pr_debug("Applying relocate section %u to %u\n", relsec, -- sechdrs[relsec].sh_info); -- -- for (i = 0; i < sechdrs[relsec].sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) { -- /* This is where to make the change */ -- location = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr -- + rel[i].r_offset; -- /* This is the symbol it is referring to */ -- sym = (Elf_Sym *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr -- + ELF_MIPS_R_SYM(rel[i]); -- if (IS_ERR_VALUE(sym->st_value)) { -- /* Ignore unresolved weak symbol */ -- if (ELF_ST_BIND(sym->st_info) == STB_WEAK) -- continue; -- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Unknown symbol %s\n", -- me->name, strtab + sym->st_name); -- return -ENOENT; -- } -- -- v = sym->st_value + rel[i].r_addend; -- -- res = reloc_handlers_rela[ELF_MIPS_R_TYPE(rel[i])](me, location, v); -- if (res) -- return res; -- } -- -- return 0; --} --#endif -- - /* Given an address, look for it in the module exception tables. */ - const struct exception_table_entry *search_module_dbetables(unsigned long addr) - { --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 661f0147e9414fb2237f56d88d1f92d8a42345c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 19/32] Provide macros for forming the name of an ELF note and - its section - -Provide macros for stringifying the name of an ELF note and its section -appropriately so that the macro can be used in both C and assembly. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/elfnote.h | 4 ++++ - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/include/linux/elfnote.h b/include/linux/elfnote.h -index 278e3ef..949d494 100644 ---- a/include/linux/elfnote.h -+++ b/include/linux/elfnote.h -@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ - ELFNOTE_END - - #else /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ -+#include <linux/stringify.h> - #include <linux/elf.h> - /* - * Use an anonymous structure which matches the shape of -@@ -93,6 +94,9 @@ - - #define ELFNOTE32(name, type, desc) ELFNOTE(32, name, type, desc) - #define ELFNOTE64(name, type, desc) ELFNOTE(64, name, type, desc) -+ -+#define ELFNOTE_NAME(name) __stringify(name) -+#define ELFNOTE_SECTION(name) ".note."ELFNOTE_NAME(name) - #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ - - #endif /* _LINUX_ELFNOTE_H */ --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 544f02e192a8a38153d7dedc61bc107545666c0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 20/32] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for - extra files - -Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files to hide and clean up the -extra files produced by module signing stuff once it is added. Also add a -clean up rule for the module content extractor program used to extract the data -to be signed. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - .gitignore | 12 ++++++++++++ - Makefile | 1 + - scripts/mod/.gitignore | 1 + - 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore -index 57af07c..7948eeb 100644 ---- a/.gitignore -+++ b/.gitignore -@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ - *.o.* - *.a - *.s -+*.ko.unsigned -+*.ko.digest -+*.ko.digest.sig - *.ko - *.so - *.so.dbg -@@ -84,3 +87,12 @@ GTAGS - *.orig - *~ - \#*# -+ -+# -+# GPG leavings from module signing -+# -+genkey -+modsign.pub -+modsign.sec -+random_seed -+trustdb.gpg -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index ddf5be9..70a6b5b 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -1239,6 +1239,7 @@ clean: $(clean-dirs) - $(call cmd,rmfiles) - @find $(if $(KBUILD_EXTMOD), $(KBUILD_EXTMOD), .) $(RCS_FIND_IGNORE) \ - \( -name '*.[oas]' -o -name '*.ko' -o -name '.*.cmd' \ -+ -o -name '*.ko.*' \ - -o -name '.*.d' -o -name '.*.tmp' -o -name '*.mod.c' \ - -o -name '*.symtypes' -o -name 'modules.order' \ - -o -name modules.builtin -o -name '.tmp_*.o.*' \ -diff --git a/scripts/mod/.gitignore b/scripts/mod/.gitignore -index e9b7abe..223dfd6 100644 ---- a/scripts/mod/.gitignore -+++ b/scripts/mod/.gitignore -@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ - elfconfig.h - mk_elfconfig - modpost -+mod-extract - --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 6e21809168e7b45a830ec354ec9fc1582fcffe4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 21/32] MODSIGN: Provide Documentation and Kconfig options - -Provide documentation and kernel configuration options for module signing. - -The documentation can be found in: - - Documentation/module-signing.txt - -The following configuration options are added: - - (1) CONFIG_MODULE_SIG - - Enable module signing. This will both cause the build process to sign - modules and the kernel to check modules when they're loaded. - - (2) CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 - - Select the cryptographic hash used to digest the data prior to signing. - Additionally, the crypto module selected will be built into the kernel as - it won't be possible to load it as a module without incurring a circular - dependency when the kernel tries to check its signature. - - (3) CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - - Require that any module loaded must be signed with a key compiled into - the kernel. All other modules are rejected with EKEYREJECTED. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/module-signing.txt | 194 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - include/linux/modsign.h | 27 ++++++ - init/Kconfig | 54 +++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 275 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 Documentation/module-signing.txt - create mode 100644 include/linux/modsign.h - -diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..d75d473 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt -@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ -+ ============================== -+ KERNEL MODULE SIGNING FACILITY -+ ============================== -+ -+The module signing facility applies cryptographic signature checking to modules -+on module load, checking the signature against a ring of public keys compiled -+into the kernel. GPG is used to do the cryptographic work and determines the -+format of the signature and key data. The facility uses GPG's MPI library to -+handle the huge numbers involved. -+ -+This facility is enabled through CONFIG_MODULE_SIG. Turning on signature -+checking will also force the module's ELF metadata to be verified before the -+signature is checked. -+ -+The signature checker in the kernel is capable of handling multiple keys of -+either DSA or RSA type, and can support any of MD5, RIPE-MD-160, SHA-1, -+SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hashes - PROVIDED(!) the requisite -+algorithms are compiled into the kernel. -+ -+(!) NOTE: Modules may only be verified initially with algorithms compiled into -+the kernel. Further algorithm modules may be loaded and used - but these must -+first pass a verification step using already loaded/compiled-in algorithms. -+ -+ -+===================== -+SUPPLYING PUBLIC KEYS -+===================== -+ -+A set of public keys must be supplied at kernel image build time. This is done -+by taking a GPG public key file and placing it in the base of the kernel -+directory in a file called modsign.pub. -+ -+For example, a throwaway key could be generated automatically by something like -+the following: -+ -+ cat >genkey <<EOF -+ %pubring modsign.pub -+ %secring modsign.sec -+ Key-Type: RSA -+ Key-Length: 4096 -+ Name-Real: A. N. Other -+ Name-Comment: Kernel Module GPG key -+ %commit -+ EOF -+ gpg --homedir . --batch --gen-key genkey -+ -+The above generates fresh keys using /dev/random. If there's insufficient data -+in /dev/random, more can be provided using the rngd program if there's a -+hardware random number generator available. -+ -+Note that no GPG password is used in the above scriptlet. -+ -+The modsign.pub file is compiled into the kernel directly by the assembler by -+means of an ".incbin" directive in kernel/modsign-pubkey.c. -+ -+Once the kernel is running, the keys are visible to root as kernel crypto keys -+in /proc/keys in a keyring called .module_sign: -+ -+335ab517 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 2/4 -+38d7d169 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: rsa 57532ca5 [] -+195fa736 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.1: dsa 5acc2142 [] -+ -+This keyring can be listed with the keyctl program. See: -+ -+ Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt -+ -+for more information of crypto keys. -+ -+ -+============================ -+SELECTING THE HASH ALGORITHM -+============================ -+ -+The hash algorithm to be used is selected by a multiple choice configuration -+item that enables one of the following variables: -+ -+ CONFIG_SIG_SHA1 -+ CONFIG_SIG_SHA224 -+ CONFIG_SIG_SHA256 -+ CONFIG_SIG_SHA384 -+ CONFIG_SIG_SHA512 -+ -+These cause an appropriate "--digest-algo=" parameter to be passed to gpg when -+signing a module and force the appropriate hash algorithm to be compiled -+directly into the kernel rather than being built as a module. -+ -+ -+============== -+MODULE SIGNING -+============== -+ -+Modules will then be signed automatically. The kernel make command line can -+include the following options: -+ -+ (*) MODSECKEY=<secret-key-ring-path> -+ -+ This indicates the whereabouts of the GPG keyring that is the source of -+ the secret key to be used. The default is "./modsign.sec". -+ -+ (*) MODPUBKEY=<public-key-ring-path> -+ -+ This indicates the whereabouts of the GPG keyring that is the source of -+ the public key to be used. The default is "./modsign.pub". -+ -+ (*) MODKEYNAME=<key-name> -+ -+ The name of the key pair to be used from the aforementioned keyrings. -+ This defaults to being unset, thus leaving the choice of default key to -+ gpg. -+ -+ (*) KEYFLAGS="gpg-options" -+ -+ Override the complete gpg command line, including the preceding three -+ options. The default options supplied to gpg are: -+ -+ --no-default-keyring -+ --secret-keyring $(MODSECKEY) -+ --keyring $(MODPUBKEY) -+ --no-default-keyring -+ --homedir . -+ --no-options -+ --no-auto-check-trustdb -+ --no-permission-warning -+ --digest-algo=<hash-algorithm> -+ -+ with: -+ -+ --default-key $(MODKEYNAME) -+ -+ being added if requested. -+ -+The resulting module.ko file will be the signed module. -+ -+ -+======================== -+STRIPPING SIGNED MODULES -+======================== -+ -+Signed modules may be safely stripped with any of the following: -+ -+ strip -x -+ strip -g -+ eu-strip -+ -+as the signature only covers those parts of the module the kernel actually uses -+and any ELF metadata required to deal with them. Any necessary ELF metadata -+that is affected by stripping is canonicalised by the sig generator and the sig -+checker to hide strip effects. -+ -+This permits the debuginfo to be detached from the module and placed in another -+spot so that gdb can find it when referring to that module without the need for -+multiple signed versions of the module. Such is done by rpmbuild when -+producing RPMs. -+ -+It also permits the module to be stripped as far as possible for when modules -+are being reduced prior to being included in an initial ramdisk composition. -+ -+Note that "strip" and "strip -s" may not be used on a module, signed or -+otherwise, as they remove the symbol table and render the relocation tables -+unusable. -+ -+ -+====================== -+LOADING SIGNED MODULES -+====================== -+ -+Modules are loaded with insmod, exactly as for unsigned modules. The signature -+is inserted into the module object file during the build process as an ELF note -+called "module.sig" in an ELF section called ".note.module.sig". The signature -+checker will detect it and apply signature checking. -+ -+ -+========================================= -+NON-VALID SIGNATURES AND UNSIGNED MODULES -+========================================= -+ -+If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled or "enforcemodulesig=1" is supplied on -+the kernel command line, the kernel will _only_ load validly signed modules -+for which it has a public key. Otherwise, it will also load modules that are -+unsigned. Any module for which the kernel has a key, but which proves to have -+a signature mismatch will not be permitted to load (returning EKEYREJECTED). -+ -+This table indicates the behaviours of the various situations: -+ -+ MODULE STATE PERMISSIVE MODE ENFORCING MODE -+ ======================================= =============== =============== -+ Unsigned Ok EKEYREJECTED -+ Signed, no public key ENOKEY ENOKEY -+ Validly signed, public key Ok Ok -+ Invalidly signed, public key EKEYREJECTED EKEYREJECTED -+ Validly signed, expired key EKEYEXPIRED EKEYEXPIRED -+ Signed, hash algorithm unavailable ENOPKG ENOPKG -+ Corrupt signature EBADMSG EBADMSG -+ Corrupt ELF ELIBBAD ELIBBAD -diff --git a/include/linux/modsign.h b/include/linux/modsign.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..c5ac87a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/include/linux/modsign.h -@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ -+/* Module signing definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef _LINUX_MODSIGN_H -+#define _LINUX_MODSIGN_H -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+ -+#include <linux/elfnote.h> -+ -+/* -+ * The parameters of the ELF note used to carry the signature -+ */ -+#define MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME module.sig -+#define MODSIGN_NOTE_TYPE 100 -+ -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* _LINUX_MODSIGN_H */ -diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index af6c7f8..e23ed83 100644 ---- a/init/Kconfig -+++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -1585,6 +1585,60 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL - the version). With this option, such a "srcversion" field - will be created for all modules. If unsure, say N. - -+config MODULE_SIG -+ bool "Module signature verification" -+ depends on MODULES -+ select KEYS -+ select CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE -+ select CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_DSA -+ select CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA -+ select PGP_PARSER -+ select PGP_PRELOAD -+ help -+ Check modules for valid signatures upon load. For more information -+ see: -+ -+ Documentation/module-signing.txt -+ -+choice -+ prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" -+ depends on MODULE_SIG -+ help -+ This determines which sort of hashing algorithm will be used during -+ signature generation. This algorithm _must_ be built into the kernel -+ directly so that signature verification can take place. It is not -+ possible to load a signed module containing the algorithm to check -+ the signature on that module. -+ -+config MODULE_SIG_SHA1 -+ bool "Sign modules with SHA-1" -+ select CRYPTO_SHA1 -+ -+config MODULE_SIG_SHA224 -+ bool "Sign modules with SHA-224" -+ select CRYPTO_SHA224 -+ -+config MODULE_SIG_SHA256 -+ bool "Sign modules with SHA-256" -+ select CRYPTO_SHA256 -+ -+config MODULE_SIG_SHA384 -+ bool "Sign modules with SHA-384" -+ select CRYPTO_SHA384 -+ -+config MODULE_SIG_SHA512 -+ bool "Sign modules with SHA-512" -+ select CRYPTO_SHA512 -+ -+endchoice -+ -+config MODULE_SIG_FORCE -+ bool "Required modules to be validly signed (EXPERIMENTAL)" -+ depends on MODULE_SIG -+ help -+ Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a -+ key. -+ - endif # MODULES - - config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 7733934d34b7f03574b4578edfad4a60d6fe3d56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 22/32] MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process - -If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, then this patch will cause the module to get a -signature installed. The following steps will occur: - - (1) The module will be linked to foo.ko.unsigned instead of foo.ko - - (2) The module's signable content will be extracted to foo.ko.digest by the - mod-extract program. - - (3) The signature will be generated on foo.ko.digest by gpg and placed in - foo.ko.digest.sig - - (4) The signature will be encapsulated into an ELF note and placed into a file - called foo.ko.note.o using the output from modsign-note.sh piped into the - assembler. - - (5) The unsigned module from (1) and the signature ELF note from (4) will be - linked together to produce foo.ko - -Step (3) requires private and public keys to be available. By default these -are expected to be found in PGP keyring files called modsign.sec (the secret -key) and modsign.pub (the public key) in the build root. - -If the secret key is not found then signing will be skipped and the unsigned -module from (1) will just be copied to foo.ko. - -If signing occurs, lines like the following will be seen: - - LD [M] fs/foo/foo.ko.unsigned - SIGN [M] fs/foo/foo.ko - -will appear in the build log. If it is skipped, the following will be seen: - - LD [M] fs/foo/foo.ko.unsigned - NO SIGN [M] fs/foo/foo.ko - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - scripts/Makefile.modpost | 87 ++++- - scripts/mod/Makefile | 2 +- - scripts/mod/mod-extract.c | 913 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - scripts/mod/modsign-note.sh | 16 + - 4 files changed, 1016 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 scripts/mod/mod-extract.c - create mode 100644 scripts/mod/modsign-note.sh - -diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modpost b/scripts/Makefile.modpost -index 08dce14..17465d8 100644 ---- a/scripts/Makefile.modpost -+++ b/scripts/Makefile.modpost -@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ - # 3) create one <module>.mod.c file pr. module - # 4) create one Module.symvers file with CRC for all exported symbols - # 5) compile all <module>.mod.c files --# 6) final link of the module to a <module.ko> file -+# 6) final link of the module to a <module.ko> (or <module.unsigned>) file -+# 7) signs the modules to a <module.ko> file - - # Step 3 is used to place certain information in the module's ELF - # section, including information such as: -@@ -32,6 +33,8 @@ - # Step 4 is solely used to allow module versioning in external modules, - # where the CRC of each module is retrieved from the Module.symvers file. - -+# Step 7 is dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG being enabled. -+ - # KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN can be set to avoid error out in case of undefined - # symbols in the final module linking stage - # KBUILD_MODPOST_NOFINAL can be set to skip the final link of modules. -@@ -116,6 +119,7 @@ $(modules:.ko=.mod.o): %.mod.o: %.mod.c FORCE - targets += $(modules:.ko=.mod.o) - - # Step 6), final link of the modules -+ifneq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) - quiet_cmd_ld_ko_o = LD [M] $@ - cmd_ld_ko_o = $(LD) -r $(LDFLAGS) \ - $(KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE) $(LDFLAGS_MODULE) \ -@@ -125,7 +129,88 @@ $(modules): %.ko :%.o %.mod.o FORCE - $(call if_changed,ld_ko_o) - - targets += $(modules) -+else -+quiet_cmd_ld_ko_unsigned_o = LD [M] $@ -+ cmd_ld_ko_unsigned_o = \ -+ $(LD) -r $(LDFLAGS) \ -+ $(KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE) $(LDFLAGS_MODULE) \ -+ -o $@ $(filter-out FORCE,$^) \ -+ $(if $(AFTER_LINK),; $(AFTER_LINK)) -+ -+$(modules:.ko=.ko.unsigned): %.ko.unsigned :%.o %.mod.o FORCE -+ $(call if_changed,ld_ko_unsigned_o) -+ -+targets += $(modules:.ko=.ko.unsigned) -+ -+# Step 7), sign the modules -+MODSECKEY = ./modsign.sec -+MODPUBKEY = ./modsign.pub -+KEYFLAGS = --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring $(MODSECKEY) --keyring $(MODPUBKEY) --no-default-keyring --homedir . --no-options --no-auto-check-trustdb --no-permission-warning -+ -+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1 -+KEYFLAGS += --digest-algo=SHA1 -+else -+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224 -+KEYFLAGS += --digest-algo=SHA224 -+else -+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256 -+KEYFLAGS += --digest-algo=SHA256 -+else -+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384 -+KEYFLAGS += --digest-algo=SHA384 -+else -+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 -+KEYFLAGS += --digest-algo=SHA512 -+else -+endif -+endif -+endif -+endif -+endif -+ -+ifdef MODKEYNAME -+KEYFLAGS += --default-key $(MODKEYNAME) -+endif - -+ifeq ($(wildcard $(MODSECKEY))+$(wildcard $(MODPUBKEY)),$(MODSECKEY)+$(MODPUBKEY)) -+ifeq ($(KBUILD_SRC),) -+ # no O= is being used -+ SCRIPTS_DIR := scripts -+else -+ SCRIPTS_DIR := $(KBUILD_SRC)/scripts -+endif -+SIGN_MODULES := 1 -+else -+SIGN_MODULES := 0 -+endif -+ -+# only sign if it's an in-tree module -+ifneq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),) -+SIGN_MODULES := 0 -+endif -+ -+ifeq ($(SIGN_MODULES),1) -+KEYRING_DEP := modsign.sec modsign.pub -+quiet_cmd_sign_ko_ko_unsigned = SIGN [M] $@ -+ cmd_sign_ko_ko_unsigned = \ -+ scripts/mod/mod-extract $< $@.digest && \ -+ rm -f $@.digest.sig && \ -+ gpg --batch --no-greeting $(KEYFLAGS) -b $@.digest && \ -+ sh $(SCRIPTS_DIR)/mod/modsign-note.sh $@.digest.sig | \ -+ $(CC) -x assembler-with-cpp $(c_flags) $(CFLAGS_MODULE) -c -o $@.note.o - && \ -+ $(LD) -r $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $@.note.o -+else -+KEYRING_DEP := -+quiet_cmd_sign_ko_ko_unsigned = NO SIGN [M] $@ -+ cmd_sign_ko_ko_unsigned = \ -+ cp $< $@ -+endif -+ -+$(modules): %.ko :%.ko.unsigned $(KEYRING_DEP) FORCE -+ $(call if_changed,sign_ko_ko_unsigned) -+ -+targets += $(modules) -+endif - - # Add FORCE to the prequisites of a target to force it to be always rebuilt. - # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -diff --git a/scripts/mod/Makefile b/scripts/mod/Makefile -index ff954f8..4654e3b 100644 ---- a/scripts/mod/Makefile -+++ b/scripts/mod/Makefile -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --hostprogs-y := modpost mk_elfconfig -+hostprogs-y := modpost mk_elfconfig mod-extract - always := $(hostprogs-y) empty.o - - modpost-objs := modpost.o file2alias.o sumversion.o -diff --git a/scripts/mod/mod-extract.c b/scripts/mod/mod-extract.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..0c0e3e3 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/scripts/mod/mod-extract.c -@@ -0,0 +1,913 @@ -+/* mod-extract.c: module extractor for signing -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#include <stdio.h> -+#include <stdlib.h> -+#include <stdint.h> -+#include <stdarg.h> -+#include <string.h> -+#include <unistd.h> -+#include <fcntl.h> -+#include <sys/mman.h> -+#include <sys/stat.h> -+#include <elf.h> -+#include <asm/byteorder.h> -+ -+static void extract_elf64(void *buffer, size_t size, Elf64_Ehdr *hdr); -+static void extract_elf32(void *buffer, size_t size, Elf32_Ehdr *hdr); -+ -+struct byteorder { -+ uint16_t (*get16)(const uint16_t *); -+ uint32_t (*get32)(const uint32_t *); -+ uint64_t (*get64)(const uint64_t *); -+ void (*set16)(uint16_t *, uint16_t); -+ void (*set32)(uint32_t *, uint32_t); -+ void (*set64)(uint64_t *, uint64_t); -+}; -+ -+static uint16_t get16_le(const uint16_t *p) { return __le16_to_cpu(*p); } -+static uint32_t get32_le(const uint32_t *p) { return __le32_to_cpu(*p); } -+static uint64_t get64_le(const uint64_t *p) { return __le64_to_cpu(*p); } -+static uint16_t get16_be(const uint16_t *p) { return __be16_to_cpu(*p); } -+static uint32_t get32_be(const uint32_t *p) { return __be32_to_cpu(*p); } -+static uint64_t get64_be(const uint64_t *p) { return __be64_to_cpu(*p); } -+ -+static void set16_le(uint16_t *p, uint16_t n) { *p = __cpu_to_le16(n); } -+static void set32_le(uint32_t *p, uint32_t n) { *p = __cpu_to_le32(n); } -+static void set64_le(uint64_t *p, uint64_t n) { *p = __cpu_to_le64(n); } -+static void set16_be(uint16_t *p, uint16_t n) { *p = __cpu_to_be16(n); } -+static void set32_be(uint32_t *p, uint32_t n) { *p = __cpu_to_be32(n); } -+static void set64_be(uint64_t *p, uint64_t n) { *p = __cpu_to_be64(n); } -+ -+static const struct byteorder byteorder_le = { -+ get16_le, get32_le, get64_le, -+ set16_le, set32_le, set64_le -+}; -+static const struct byteorder byteorder_be = { -+ get16_be, get32_be, get64_be, -+ set16_be, set32_be, set64_be -+}; -+static const struct byteorder *order; -+ -+static inline uint16_t get16(const uint16_t *p) { return order->get16(p); } -+static inline uint32_t get32(const uint32_t *p) { return order->get32(p); } -+static inline uint64_t get64(const uint64_t *p) { return order->get64(p); } -+static inline void set16(uint16_t *p, uint16_t n) { order->set16(p, n); } -+static inline void set32(uint32_t *p, uint32_t n) { order->set32(p, n); } -+static inline void set64(uint64_t *p, uint64_t n) { order->set64(p, n); } -+ -+static FILE *outfd; -+static uint8_t csum, xcsum; -+ -+static void write_out(const void *data, size_t size) -+{ -+ const uint8_t *p = data; -+ size_t loop; -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < size; loop++) { -+ csum += p[loop]; -+ xcsum += p[loop]; -+ } -+ -+ if (fwrite(data, 1, size, outfd) != size) { -+ perror("write"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+} -+ -+#define write_out_val(VAL) write_out(&(VAL), sizeof(VAL)) -+ -+static int is_verbose; -+ -+static __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))) -+void verbose(const char *fmt, ...) -+{ -+ va_list va; -+ -+ if (is_verbose) { -+ va_start(va, fmt); -+ vprintf(fmt, va); -+ va_end(va); -+ } -+} -+ -+static __attribute__((noreturn)) -+void usage(void) -+{ -+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: mod-extract [-v] <modulefile> <extractfile>\n"); -+ exit(2); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * -+ */ -+int main(int argc, char **argv) -+{ -+ struct stat st; -+ Elf32_Ehdr *hdr32; -+ Elf64_Ehdr *hdr64; -+ size_t len; -+ void *buffer; -+ int fd, be, b64; -+ -+ while (argc > 1 && strcmp("-v", argv[1]) == 0) { -+ argv++; -+ argc--; -+ is_verbose++; -+ } -+ -+ if (argc != 3) -+ usage(); -+ -+ /* map the module into memory */ -+ fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); -+ if (fd < 0) { -+ perror("open input"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { -+ perror("fstat"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ len = st.st_size; -+ -+ buffer = mmap(NULL, len, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); -+ if (buffer == MAP_FAILED) { -+ perror("mmap"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ if (close(fd) < 0) { -+ perror("close input"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ /* check it's an ELF object */ -+ hdr32 = buffer; -+ hdr64 = buffer; -+ -+ if (hdr32->e_ident[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0 || -+ hdr32->e_ident[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 || -+ hdr32->e_ident[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || -+ hdr32->e_ident[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3 -+ ) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Module does not appear to be ELF\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ /* determine endianness and word size */ -+ b64 = (hdr32->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64); -+ be = (hdr32->e_ident[EI_DATA] == ELFDATA2MSB); -+ order = be ? &byteorder_be : &byteorder_le; -+ -+ verbose("Module is %s-bit %s-endian\n", -+ b64 ? "64" : "32", -+ be ? "big" : "little"); -+ -+ /* open the output file */ -+ outfd = fopen(argv[2], "w"); -+ if (!outfd) { -+ perror("open output"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ /* perform the extraction */ -+ if (b64) -+ extract_elf64(buffer, len, hdr64); -+ else -+ extract_elf32(buffer, len, hdr32); -+ -+ /* done */ -+ if (fclose(outfd) == EOF) { -+ perror("close output"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * extract a RELA table -+ * - need to canonicalise the entries in case section addition/removal has -+ * rearranged the symbol table and the section table -+ */ -+static void extract_elf64_rela(const void *buffer, int secix, int targetix, -+ const Elf64_Rela *relatab, size_t nrels, -+ const Elf64_Sym *symbols, size_t nsyms, -+ const Elf64_Shdr *sections, size_t nsects, int *canonmap, -+ const char *strings, size_t nstrings, -+ const char *sh_name) -+{ -+ struct { -+ uint64_t r_offset; -+ uint64_t r_addend; -+ uint64_t st_value; -+ uint64_t st_size; -+ uint32_t r_type; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+ -+ } __attribute__((packed)) relocation; -+ -+ const Elf64_Sym *symbol; -+ size_t loop; -+ -+ /* contribute the relevant bits from a join of { RELA, SYMBOL, SECTION } */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < nrels; loop++) { -+ Elf64_Section st_shndx; -+ Elf64_Xword r_info; -+ -+ /* decode the relocation */ -+ r_info = get64(&relatab[loop].r_info); -+ relocation.r_offset = relatab[loop].r_offset; -+ relocation.r_addend = relatab[loop].r_addend; -+ set32(&relocation.r_type, ELF64_R_TYPE(r_info)); -+ -+ if (ELF64_R_SYM(r_info) >= nsyms) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid symbol ID %zx in relocation %zu\n", -+ (size_t)ELF64_R_SYM(r_info), loop); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ /* decode the symbol referenced by the relocation */ -+ symbol = &symbols[ELF64_R_SYM(r_info)]; -+ relocation.st_info = symbol->st_info; -+ relocation.st_other = symbol->st_other; -+ relocation.st_value = symbol->st_value; -+ relocation.st_size = symbol->st_size; -+ relocation.st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ st_shndx = get16(&symbol->st_shndx); -+ -+ /* canonicalise the section used by the symbol */ -+ if (st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && st_shndx < nsects) -+ set16(&relocation.st_shndx, canonmap[st_shndx]); -+ -+ write_out_val(relocation); -+ -+ /* undefined symbols must be named if referenced */ -+ if (st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) { -+ const char *name = strings + get32(&symbol->st_name); -+ write_out(name, strlen(name) + 1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s [canon]\n", csum, secix, sh_name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * extract a REL table -+ * - need to canonicalise the entries in case section addition/removal has -+ * rearranged the symbol table and the section table -+ */ -+static void extract_elf64_rel(const void *buffer, int secix, int targetix, -+ const Elf64_Rel *relatab, size_t nrels, -+ const Elf64_Sym *symbols, size_t nsyms, -+ const Elf64_Shdr *sections, size_t nsects, int *canonmap, -+ const char *strings, size_t nstrings, -+ const char *sh_name) -+{ -+ struct { -+ uint64_t r_offset; -+ uint64_t st_value; -+ uint64_t st_size; -+ uint32_t r_type; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+ -+ } __attribute__((packed)) relocation; -+ -+ const Elf64_Sym *symbol; -+ size_t loop; -+ -+ /* contribute the relevant bits from a join of { RELA, SYMBOL, SECTION } */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < nrels; loop++) { -+ Elf64_Section st_shndx; -+ Elf64_Xword r_info; -+ -+ /* decode the relocation */ -+ r_info = get64(&relatab[loop].r_info); -+ relocation.r_offset = relatab[loop].r_offset; -+ set32(&relocation.r_type, ELF64_R_TYPE(r_info)); -+ -+ if (ELF64_R_SYM(r_info) >= nsyms) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid symbol ID %zx in relocation %zu\n", -+ (size_t)ELF64_R_SYM(r_info), loop); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ /* decode the symbol referenced by the relocation */ -+ symbol = &symbols[ELF64_R_SYM(r_info)]; -+ relocation.st_info = symbol->st_info; -+ relocation.st_other = symbol->st_other; -+ relocation.st_value = symbol->st_value; -+ relocation.st_size = symbol->st_size; -+ relocation.st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ st_shndx = get16(&symbol->st_shndx); -+ -+ /* canonicalise the section used by the symbol */ -+ if (st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && st_shndx < nsects) -+ set16(&relocation.st_shndx, canonmap[st_shndx]); -+ -+ write_out_val(relocation); -+ -+ /* undefined symbols must be named if referenced */ -+ if (st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) { -+ const char *name = strings + get32(&symbol->st_name); -+ write_out(name, strlen(name) + 1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s [canon]\n", csum, secix, sh_name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * extract the data from a 64-bit module -+ */ -+static void extract_elf64(void *buffer, size_t len, Elf64_Ehdr *hdr) -+{ -+ const Elf64_Sym *symbols; -+ Elf64_Shdr *sections; -+ const char *secstrings, *strings; -+ size_t nsyms, nstrings; -+ int loop, shnum, *canonlist, *canonmap, canon, changed, tmp; -+ -+ sections = buffer + get64(&hdr->e_shoff); -+ secstrings = buffer + get64(§ions[get16(&hdr->e_shstrndx)].sh_offset); -+ shnum = get16(&hdr->e_shnum); -+ -+ /* find the symbol table and the string table and produce a list of -+ * index numbers of sections that contribute to the kernel's module -+ * image -+ */ -+ canonlist = calloc(sizeof(int), shnum * 2); -+ if (!canonlist) { -+ perror("calloc"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ canonmap = canonlist + shnum; -+ canon = 0; -+ -+ symbols = NULL; -+ strings = NULL; -+ nstrings = 0; -+ nsyms = 0; -+ -+ for (loop = 1; loop < shnum; loop++) { -+ const char *sh_name = secstrings + get32(§ions[loop].sh_name); -+ Elf64_Word sh_type = get32(§ions[loop].sh_type); -+ Elf64_Xword sh_size = get64(§ions[loop].sh_size); -+ Elf64_Xword sh_flags = get64(§ions[loop].sh_flags); -+ Elf64_Word sh_info = get32(§ions[loop].sh_info); -+ Elf64_Off sh_offset = get64(§ions[loop].sh_offset); -+ void *data = buffer + sh_offset; -+ -+ /* quick sanity check */ -+ if (sh_type != SHT_NOBITS && len < sh_offset + sh_size) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Section goes beyond EOF\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ /* we only need to canonicalise allocatable sections */ -+ if (sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) -+ canonlist[canon++] = loop; -+ else if ((sh_type == SHT_REL || sh_type == SHT_RELA) && -+ get64(§ions[sh_info].sh_flags) & SHF_ALLOC) -+ canonlist[canon++] = loop; -+ -+ /* keep track of certain special sections */ -+ switch (sh_type) { -+ case SHT_SYMTAB: -+ if (strcmp(sh_name, ".symtab") == 0) { -+ symbols = data; -+ nsyms = sh_size / sizeof(Elf64_Sym); -+ } -+ break; -+ -+ case SHT_STRTAB: -+ if (strcmp(sh_name, ".strtab") == 0) { -+ strings = data; -+ nstrings = sh_size; -+ } -+ break; -+ -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (!symbols) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't locate symbol table\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ if (!strings) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't locate strings table\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ /* canonicalise the index numbers of the contributing section */ -+ do { -+ changed = 0; -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon - 1; loop++) { -+ const char *x = secstrings + get32(§ions[canonlist[loop + 0]].sh_name); -+ const char *y = secstrings + get32(§ions[canonlist[loop + 1]].sh_name); -+ if (strcmp(x, y) > 0) { -+ tmp = canonlist[loop + 0]; -+ canonlist[loop + 0] = canonlist[loop + 1]; -+ canonlist[loop + 1] = tmp; -+ changed = 1; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ } while (changed); -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) -+ canonmap[canonlist[loop]] = loop + 1; -+ -+ if (is_verbose > 1) { -+ printf("\nSection canonicalisation map:\n"); -+ for (loop = 1; loop < shnum; loop++) { -+ const char *x = secstrings + get32(§ions[loop].sh_name); -+ printf("%4d %s\n", canonmap[loop], x); -+ } -+ -+ printf("\nAllocated section list in canonical order:\n"); -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) { -+ const char *x = secstrings + get32(§ions[canonlist[loop]].sh_name); -+ printf("%4d %s\n", canonlist[loop], x); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* iterate through the section table looking for sections we want to -+ * contribute to the signature */ -+ verbose("\n"); -+ verbose("CAN FILE POS CS SECT NAME\n"); -+ verbose("=== ======== == ==== ==============================\n"); -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) { -+ int sect = canonlist[loop]; -+ const char *sh_name = secstrings + get32(§ions[sect].sh_name); -+ Elf64_Word sh_type = get32(§ions[sect].sh_type); -+ Elf64_Xword sh_size = get64(§ions[sect].sh_size); -+ Elf64_Xword sh_flags = get64(§ions[sect].sh_flags); -+ Elf64_Word sh_info = get32(§ions[sect].sh_info); -+ Elf64_Off sh_offset = get64(§ions[sect].sh_offset); -+ void *data = buffer + sh_offset; -+ -+ csum = 0; -+ -+ /* include canonicalised relocation sections */ -+ if (sh_type == SHT_REL || sh_type == SHT_RELA) { -+ Elf32_Word canon_sh_info; -+ -+ if (sh_info <= 0 && sh_info >= hdr->e_shnum) { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "Invalid ELF - REL/RELA sh_info does" -+ " not refer to a valid section\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%3u %08lx ", loop, ftell(outfd)); -+ -+ set32(&canon_sh_info, canonmap[sh_info]); -+ -+ /* write out selected portions of the section header */ -+ write_out(sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_type); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_flags); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_size); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_addralign); -+ write_out_val(canon_sh_info); -+ -+ if (sh_type == SHT_RELA) -+ extract_elf64_rela(buffer, sect, sh_info, -+ data, sh_size / sizeof(Elf64_Rela), -+ symbols, nsyms, -+ sections, shnum, canonmap, -+ strings, nstrings, -+ sh_name); -+ else -+ extract_elf64_rel(buffer, sect, sh_info, -+ data, sh_size / sizeof(Elf64_Rel), -+ symbols, nsyms, -+ sections, shnum, canonmap, -+ strings, nstrings, -+ sh_name); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ /* include the headers of BSS sections */ -+ if (sh_type == SHT_NOBITS && sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) { -+ verbose("%3u %08lx ", loop, ftell(outfd)); -+ -+ /* write out selected portions of the section header */ -+ write_out(sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_type); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_flags); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_size); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_addralign); -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s\n", csum, sect, sh_name); -+ } -+ -+ /* include allocatable loadable sections */ -+ if (sh_type != SHT_NOBITS && sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) -+ goto include_section; -+ -+ /* not this section */ -+ continue; -+ -+ include_section: -+ verbose("%3u %08lx ", loop, ftell(outfd)); -+ -+ /* write out selected portions of the section header */ -+ write_out(sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_type); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_flags); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_size); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_addralign); -+ -+ /* write out the section data */ -+ write_out(data, sh_size); -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s\n", csum, sect, sh_name); -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%08lx (%lu bytes csum 0x%02x)\n", -+ ftell(outfd), ftell(outfd), xcsum); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * extract a RELA table -+ * - need to canonicalise the entries in case section addition/removal has -+ * rearranged the symbol table and the section table -+ */ -+static void extract_elf32_rela(const void *buffer, int secix, int targetix, -+ const Elf32_Rela *relatab, size_t nrels, -+ const Elf32_Sym *symbols, size_t nsyms, -+ const Elf32_Shdr *sections, size_t nsects, -+ int *canonmap, -+ const char *strings, size_t nstrings, -+ const char *sh_name) -+{ -+ struct { -+ uint32_t r_offset; -+ uint32_t r_addend; -+ uint32_t st_value; -+ uint32_t st_size; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t r_type; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+ -+ } __attribute__((packed)) relocation; -+ -+ const Elf32_Sym *symbol; -+ size_t loop; -+ -+ /* contribute the relevant bits from a join of { RELA, SYMBOL, SECTION } */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < nrels; loop++) { -+ Elf32_Section st_shndx; -+ Elf32_Word r_info; -+ -+ /* decode the relocation */ -+ r_info = get32(&relatab[loop].r_info); -+ relocation.r_offset = relatab[loop].r_offset; -+ relocation.r_addend = relatab[loop].r_addend; -+ relocation.r_type = ELF32_R_TYPE(r_info); -+ -+ if (ELF32_R_SYM(r_info) >= nsyms) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid symbol ID %x in relocation %zu\n", -+ ELF32_R_SYM(r_info), loop); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ /* decode the symbol referenced by the relocation */ -+ symbol = &symbols[ELF32_R_SYM(r_info)]; -+ relocation.st_info = symbol->st_info; -+ relocation.st_other = symbol->st_other; -+ relocation.st_value = symbol->st_value; -+ relocation.st_size = symbol->st_size; -+ relocation.st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ st_shndx = get16(&symbol->st_shndx); -+ -+ /* canonicalise the section used by the symbol */ -+ if (st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && st_shndx < nsects) -+ set16(&relocation.st_shndx, canonmap[st_shndx]); -+ -+ write_out_val(relocation); -+ -+ /* undefined symbols must be named if referenced */ -+ if (st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) { -+ const char *name = strings + get32(&symbol->st_name); -+ write_out(name, strlen(name) + 1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s [canon]\n", csum, secix, sh_name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * extract a REL table -+ * - need to canonicalise the entries in case section addition/removal has -+ * rearranged the symbol table and the section table -+ */ -+static void extract_elf32_rel(const void *buffer, int secix, int targetix, -+ const Elf32_Rel *relatab, size_t nrels, -+ const Elf32_Sym *symbols, size_t nsyms, -+ const Elf32_Shdr *sections, size_t nsects, -+ int *canonmap, -+ const char *strings, size_t nstrings, -+ const char *sh_name) -+{ -+ struct { -+ uint32_t r_offset; -+ uint32_t st_value; -+ uint32_t st_size; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t r_type; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+ -+ } __attribute__((packed)) relocation; -+ -+ const Elf32_Sym *symbol; -+ size_t loop; -+ -+ /* contribute the relevant bits from a join of { RELA, SYMBOL, SECTION } */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < nrels; loop++) { -+ Elf32_Section st_shndx; -+ Elf32_Word r_info; -+ -+ /* decode the relocation */ -+ r_info = get32(&relatab[loop].r_info); -+ relocation.r_offset = relatab[loop].r_offset; -+ relocation.r_type = ELF32_R_TYPE(r_info); -+ -+ if (ELF32_R_SYM(r_info) >= nsyms) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid symbol ID %x in relocation %zu\n", -+ ELF32_R_SYM(r_info), loop); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ -+ /* decode the symbol referenced by the relocation */ -+ symbol = &symbols[ELF32_R_SYM(r_info)]; -+ relocation.st_info = symbol->st_info; -+ relocation.st_other = symbol->st_other; -+ relocation.st_value = symbol->st_value; -+ relocation.st_size = symbol->st_size; -+ relocation.st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ st_shndx = get16(&symbol->st_shndx); -+ -+ /* canonicalise the section used by the symbol */ -+ if (st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && st_shndx < nsects) -+ set16(&relocation.st_shndx, canonmap[st_shndx]); -+ -+ write_out_val(relocation); -+ -+ /* undefined symbols must be named if referenced */ -+ if (st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) { -+ const char *name = strings + get32(&symbol->st_name); -+ write_out(name, strlen(name) + 1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s [canon]\n", csum, secix, sh_name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * extract the data from a 32-bit module -+ */ -+static void extract_elf32(void *buffer, size_t len, Elf32_Ehdr *hdr) -+{ -+ const Elf32_Sym *symbols; -+ Elf32_Shdr *sections; -+ const char *secstrings, *strings; -+ size_t nsyms, nstrings; -+ int loop, shnum, *canonlist, *canonmap, canon, changed, tmp; -+ -+ sections = buffer + get32(&hdr->e_shoff); -+ secstrings = buffer + get32(§ions[get16(&hdr->e_shstrndx)].sh_offset); -+ shnum = get16(&hdr->e_shnum); -+ -+ /* find the symbol table and the string table and produce a list of -+ * index numbers of sections that contribute to the kernel's module -+ * image -+ */ -+ canonlist = calloc(sizeof(int), shnum * 2); -+ if (!canonlist) { -+ perror("calloc"); -+ exit(1); -+ } -+ canonmap = canonlist + shnum; -+ canon = 0; -+ -+ symbols = NULL; -+ strings = NULL; -+ nstrings = 0; -+ nsyms = 0; -+ -+ for (loop = 1; loop < shnum; loop++) { -+ const char *sh_name = secstrings + get32(§ions[loop].sh_name); -+ Elf32_Word sh_type = get32(§ions[loop].sh_type); -+ Elf32_Xword sh_size = get32(§ions[loop].sh_size); -+ Elf32_Xword sh_flags = get32(§ions[loop].sh_flags); -+ Elf64_Word sh_info = get32(§ions[loop].sh_info); -+ Elf32_Off sh_offset = get32(§ions[loop].sh_offset); -+ void *data = buffer + sh_offset; -+ -+ /* quick sanity check */ -+ if (sh_type != SHT_NOBITS && len < sh_offset + sh_size) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Section goes beyond EOF\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ /* we only need to canonicalise allocatable sections */ -+ if (sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) -+ canonlist[canon++] = loop; -+ else if ((sh_type == SHT_REL || sh_type == SHT_RELA) && -+ get32(§ions[sh_info].sh_flags) & SHF_ALLOC) -+ canonlist[canon++] = loop; -+ -+ /* keep track of certain special sections */ -+ switch (sh_type) { -+ case SHT_SYMTAB: -+ if (strcmp(sh_name, ".symtab") == 0) { -+ symbols = data; -+ nsyms = sh_size / sizeof(Elf32_Sym); -+ } -+ break; -+ -+ case SHT_STRTAB: -+ if (strcmp(sh_name, ".strtab") == 0) { -+ strings = data; -+ nstrings = sh_size; -+ } -+ break; -+ -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (!symbols) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't locate symbol table\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ if (!strings) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't locate strings table\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ /* canonicalise the index numbers of the contributing section */ -+ do { -+ changed = 0; -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon - 1; loop++) { -+ const char *x = secstrings + get32(§ions[canonlist[loop + 0]].sh_name); -+ const char *y = secstrings + get32(§ions[canonlist[loop + 1]].sh_name); -+ if (strcmp(x, y) > 0) { -+ tmp = canonlist[loop + 0]; -+ canonlist[loop + 0] = canonlist[loop + 1]; -+ canonlist[loop + 1] = tmp; -+ changed = 1; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ } while (changed); -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) -+ canonmap[canonlist[loop]] = loop + 1; -+ -+ if (is_verbose > 1) { -+ printf("\nSection canonicalisation map:\n"); -+ for (loop = 1; loop < shnum; loop++) { -+ const char *x = secstrings + get32(§ions[loop].sh_name); -+ printf("%4d %s\n", canonmap[loop], x); -+ } -+ -+ printf("\nAllocated section list in canonical order:\n"); -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) { -+ const char *x = secstrings + get32(§ions[canonlist[loop]].sh_name); -+ printf("%4d %s\n", canonlist[loop], x); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* iterate through the section table looking for sections we want to -+ * contribute to the signature */ -+ verbose("\n"); -+ verbose("CAN FILE POS CS SECT NAME\n"); -+ verbose("=== ======== == ==== ==============================\n"); -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) { -+ int sect = canonlist[loop]; -+ const char *sh_name = secstrings + get32(§ions[sect].sh_name); -+ Elf32_Word sh_type = get32(§ions[sect].sh_type); -+ Elf32_Xword sh_size = get32(§ions[sect].sh_size); -+ Elf32_Xword sh_flags = get32(§ions[sect].sh_flags); -+ Elf32_Word sh_info = get32(§ions[sect].sh_info); -+ Elf32_Off sh_offset = get32(§ions[sect].sh_offset); -+ void *data = buffer + sh_offset; -+ -+ csum = 0; -+ -+ /* quick sanity check */ -+ if (sh_type != SHT_NOBITS && len < sh_offset + sh_size) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "section goes beyond EOF\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ /* include canonicalised relocation sections */ -+ if (sh_type == SHT_REL || sh_type == SHT_RELA) { -+ Elf32_Word canon_sh_info; -+ -+ if (sh_info <= 0 && sh_info >= hdr->e_shnum) { -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "Invalid ELF - REL/RELA sh_info does" -+ " not refer to a valid section\n"); -+ exit(3); -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%3u %08lx ", loop, ftell(outfd)); -+ -+ set32(&canon_sh_info, canonmap[sh_info]); -+ -+ /* write out selected portions of the section header */ -+ write_out(sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_type); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_flags); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_size); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_addralign); -+ write_out_val(canon_sh_info); -+ -+ if (sh_type == SHT_RELA) -+ extract_elf32_rela(buffer, sect, sh_info, -+ data, sh_size / sizeof(Elf32_Rela), -+ symbols, nsyms, -+ sections, shnum, canonmap, -+ strings, nstrings, -+ sh_name); -+ else -+ extract_elf32_rel(buffer, sect, sh_info, -+ data, sh_size / sizeof(Elf32_Rel), -+ symbols, nsyms, -+ sections, shnum, canonmap, -+ strings, nstrings, -+ sh_name); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ /* include the headers of BSS sections */ -+ if (sh_type == SHT_NOBITS && sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) { -+ verbose("%3u %08lx ", loop, ftell(outfd)); -+ -+ /* write out selected portions of the section header */ -+ write_out(sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_type); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_flags); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_size); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_addralign); -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s\n", csum, sect, sh_name); -+ } -+ -+ /* include allocatable loadable sections */ -+ if (sh_type != SHT_NOBITS && sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) -+ goto include_section; -+ -+ /* not this section */ -+ continue; -+ -+ include_section: -+ verbose("%3u %08lx ", loop, ftell(outfd)); -+ -+ /* write out selected portions of the section header */ -+ write_out(sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_type); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_flags); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_size); -+ write_out_val(sections[sect].sh_addralign); -+ -+ /* write out the section data */ -+ write_out(data, sh_size); -+ -+ verbose("%02x %4d %s\n", csum, sect, sh_name); -+ } -+ -+ verbose("%08lx (%lu bytes csum 0x%02x)\n", -+ ftell(outfd), ftell(outfd), xcsum); -+} -diff --git a/scripts/mod/modsign-note.sh b/scripts/mod/modsign-note.sh -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..bca67c0 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/scripts/mod/modsign-note.sh -@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ -+#!/bin/sh -+# -+# Generate a module signature note source file -+# -+# mod-sign.sh <sig-file> ><note-src-file> -+# -+ -+SIG=$1 -+ -+cat <<EOF -+#include <linux/modsign.h> -+ -+ELFNOTE(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME, MODSIGN_NOTE_TYPE, .incbin "$SIG") -+EOF -+ -+exit 0 --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From ee3ca99bcf972f0d072d91f9256c39a197153b8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 23/32] MODSIGN: Module signature verification stub - -Create a stub for the module signature verifier and link it into module.c so -that it gets called. A field is added to struct module to record whether or -not a valid module signature was detected. - -The stub also implements the policy for handling unsigned modules and the -printing of error messages to indicate various problems with the module. - -If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled or "enforcemodulesig=1" is supplied on -the kernel command line, the kernel will _only_ load validly signed modules -for which it has a public key. Otherwise, it will also load modules that are -unsigned. Any module for which the kernel has a key, but which proves to have -a signature mismatch will not be permitted to load. - -This table indicates the behaviours in the various situations: - - MODULE STATE PERMISSIVE MODE ENFORCING MODE - ======================================= =============== =============== - Unsigned Ok EKEYREJECTED - Signed, no public key ENOKEY ENOKEY - Validly signed, public key Ok Ok - Invalidly signed, public key EKEYREJECTED EKEYREJECTED - Validly signed, expired key EKEYEXPIRED EKEYEXPIRED - Signed, hash algorithm unavailable ENOPKG ENOPKG - Corrupt signature EBADMSG EBADMSG - Corrupt ELF ELIBBAD ELIBBAD - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - include/linux/module.h | 3 ++ - kernel/Makefile | 1 + - kernel/module-verify-defs.h | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - kernel/module-verify.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - kernel/module-verify.h | 20 ++++++++ - kernel/module.c | 26 +++++++++-- - 6 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 kernel/module-verify-defs.h - create mode 100644 kernel/module-verify.c - create mode 100644 kernel/module-verify.h - -diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h -index fbcafe2..7391833 100644 ---- a/include/linux/module.h -+++ b/include/linux/module.h -@@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ struct module - /* Unique handle for this module */ - char name[MODULE_NAME_LEN]; - -+ /* Is this module GPG signed */ -+ bool gpgsig_ok; -+ - /* Sysfs stuff. */ - struct module_kobject mkobj; - struct module_attribute *modinfo_attrs; -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index c0cc67a..cec222a 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module-verify.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o - obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify-defs.h b/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..141ddab ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ -+/* Module verification internal definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+ -+/* -+ * Internal state -+ */ -+struct module_verify_data { -+ struct crypto_key_verify_context *mod_sig; /* Module signing context */ -+ union { -+ const void *buffer; /* module buffer */ -+ const Elf_Ehdr *hdr; /* ELF header */ -+ }; -+ const Elf_Shdr *sections; /* ELF section table */ -+ const char *secstrings; /* ELF section string table */ -+ const void *sig; /* Signature note content */ -+ size_t size; /* module object size */ -+ size_t nsects; /* number of sections */ -+ size_t sig_size; /* Size of signature */ -+ size_t signed_size; /* count of bytes contributed to digest */ -+ unsigned *canonlist; /* list of canonicalised sections */ -+ unsigned *canonmap; /* section canonicalisation map */ -+ unsigned ncanon; /* number of canonicalised sections */ -+ unsigned sig_index; /* module signature section index */ -+ uint8_t xcsum; /* checksum of bytes contributed to digest */ -+ uint8_t csum; /* checksum of bytes representing a section */ -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Whether or not we support various types of ELF relocation record -+ */ -+#if defined(MODULE_HAS_ELF_REL_ONLY) -+#define is_elf_rel(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_REL) -+#define is_elf_rela(sh_type) (0) -+#elif defined(MODULE_HAS_ELF_RELA_ONLY) -+#define is_elf_rel(sh_type) (0) -+#define is_elf_rela(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_RELA) -+#else -+#define is_elf_rel(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_REL) -+#define is_elf_rela(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_RELA) -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Debugging. Define DEBUG to enable. -+ */ -+#define _debug(FMT, ...) \ -+ do { \ -+ if (unlikely(modsign_debug)) \ -+ pr_debug(FMT, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ -+ } while (0) -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+#define count_and_csum(C, __p, __n) \ -+ do { \ -+ int __loop; \ -+ for (__loop = 0; __loop < __n; __loop++) { \ -+ (C)->csum += __p[__loop]; \ -+ (C)->xcsum += __p[__loop]; \ -+ } \ -+ (C)->signed_size += __n; \ -+ } while (0) -+#else -+#define count_and_csum(C, __p, __n) \ -+ do { \ -+ } while (0) -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..4bf857e ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ -+/* Module signature verification -+ * -+ * The code in this file examines a signed kernel module and attempts to -+ * determine if the PGP signature inside the module matches a digest of the -+ * allocatable sections and the canonicalised relocation tables for those -+ * allocatable sections. -+ * -+ * The module signature is included in an ELF note within the ELF structure of -+ * the module blob. This, combined with the minimal canonicalisation performed -+ * here, permits the module to pass through "strip -x", "strip -g" and -+ * "eu-strip" without becoming corrupt. "strip" and "strip -s" will render a -+ * module unusable by removing the symbol table. -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2004, 2011, 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * - Derived from GregKH's RSA module signer -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#undef DEBUG -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/slab.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <linux/elf.h> -+#include <linux/elfnote.h> -+#include <linux/sched.h> -+#include <linux/cred.h> -+#include <linux/modsign.h> -+#include <linux/moduleparam.h> -+#include <keys/crypto-type.h> -+#include "module-verify.h" -+#include "module-verify-defs.h" -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+static int modsign_debug; -+core_param(modsign_debug, modsign_debug, int, 0644); -+#else -+#define modsign_debug false -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE -+#define modsign_signedonly true -+#else -+static bool modsign_signedonly; -+#endif -+ -+static const char modsign_note_name[] = ELFNOTE_NAME(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME); -+static const char modsign_note_section[] = ELFNOTE_SECTION(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME); -+ -+/* -+ * Verify a module's integrity -+ */ -+int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) -+{ -+ struct module_verify_data mvdata; -+ int ret; -+ -+ memset(&mvdata, 0, sizeof(mvdata)); -+ mvdata.buffer = hdr; -+ mvdata.size = size; -+ -+ if (mvdata.sig_index <= 0) { -+ /* Deal with an unsigned module */ -+ if (modsign_signedonly) { -+ pr_err("An attempt to load unsigned module was rejected\n"); -+ return -EKEYREJECTED; -+ } else { -+ return 0; -+ } -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ ret = 0; -+ -+out: -+ switch (ret) { -+ case 0: /* Good signature */ -+ *_gpgsig_ok = true; -+ break; -+ case -ELIBBAD: -+ pr_err("Module format error encountered\n"); -+ break; -+ case -EBADMSG: -+ pr_err("Module signature error encountered\n"); -+ break; -+ case -EKEYREJECTED: /* Signature mismatch or number format error */ -+ pr_err("Module signature verification failed\n"); -+ break; -+ case -ENOKEY: /* Signed, but we don't have the public key */ -+ pr_err("Module signed with unknown public key\n"); -+ break; -+ default: /* Other error (probably ENOMEM) */ -+ break; -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static int __init sign_setup(char *str) -+{ -+#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE -+ modsign_signedonly = true; -+#endif -+ return 0; -+} -+__setup("enforcemodulesig", sign_setup); -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.h b/kernel/module-verify.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..c640634 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.h -@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ -+/* Module verification definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2004, 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+extern int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok); -+#else -+static inline int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, -+ bool *_gpgsig_ok) -+{ -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif -diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c -index 087aeed..a59a9da 100644 ---- a/kernel/module.c -+++ b/kernel/module.c -@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ - #include <linux/jump_label.h> - #include <linux/pfn.h> - #include <linux/bsearch.h> -+#include "module-verify.h" - - #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS - #include <trace/events/module.h> -@@ -2382,7 +2383,8 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, - /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ - static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info, - const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, -- const char __user *uargs) -+ const char __user *uargs, -+ bool *_gpgsig_ok) - { - int err; - Elf_Ehdr *hdr; -@@ -2415,6 +2417,12 @@ static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info, - goto free_hdr; - } - -+ /* Verify the module's contents */ -+ *_gpgsig_ok = false; -+ err = module_verify(hdr, len, _gpgsig_ok); -+ if (err < 0) -+ goto free_hdr; -+ - info->hdr = hdr; - info->len = len; - return 0; -@@ -2757,7 +2765,8 @@ int __weak module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr, - return 0; - } - --static struct module *layout_and_allocate(struct load_info *info) -+static struct module *layout_and_allocate(struct load_info *info, -+ bool gpgsig_ok) - { - /* Module within temporary copy. */ - struct module *mod; -@@ -2767,6 +2776,7 @@ static struct module *layout_and_allocate(struct load_info *info) - mod = setup_load_info(info); - if (IS_ERR(mod)) - return mod; -+ mod->gpgsig_ok = gpgsig_ok; - - err = check_modinfo(mod, info); - if (err) -@@ -2850,17 +2860,18 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, - struct load_info info = { NULL, }; - struct module *mod; - long err; -+ bool gpgsig_ok; - - pr_debug("load_module: umod=%p, len=%lu, uargs=%p\n", - umod, len, uargs); - - /* Copy in the blobs from userspace, check they are vaguely sane. */ -- err = copy_and_check(&info, umod, len, uargs); -+ err = copy_and_check(&info, umod, len, uargs, &gpgsig_ok); - if (err) - return ERR_PTR(err); - - /* Figure out module layout, and allocate all the memory. */ -- mod = layout_and_allocate(&info); -+ mod = layout_and_allocate(&info, gpgsig_ok); - if (IS_ERR(mod)) { - err = PTR_ERR(mod); - goto free_copy; -@@ -3497,8 +3508,13 @@ void print_modules(void) - printk(KERN_DEFAULT "Modules linked in:"); - /* Most callers should already have preempt disabled, but make sure */ - preempt_disable(); -- list_for_each_entry_rcu(mod, &modules, list) -+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(mod, &modules, list) { - printk(" %s%s", mod->name, module_flags(mod, buf)); -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+ if (!mod->gpgsig_ok) -+ printk("(U)"); -+#endif -+ } - preempt_enable(); - if (last_unloaded_module[0]) - printk(" [last unloaded: %s]", last_unloaded_module); --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 0f8f372047d8220e1d918797972746bb9fe345d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 24/32] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if - missing - -Automatically generate keys for module signing if they're absent so that -allyesconfig doesn't break. The builder should consider generating their own -keyrings, however, so that the keys are appropriately named and any extra keys -required get imported. - -Also change the names of the keyring files to modsign.pub and modsign.sec so -that they are then a more obvious what they're about and add a dependency for -the signing rules on the keyring files so that the signatures get regenerated -if the keyrings change. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/Makefile | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index cec222a..28cd248 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -132,3 +132,52 @@ quiet_cmd_timeconst = TIMEC $@ - targets += timeconst.h - $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE - $(call if_changed,timeconst) -+ -+############################################################################### -+# -+# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been -+# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not -+# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards. -+# -+############################################################################### -+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) -+modsign.pub modsign.sec: genkey -+ @echo "###" -+ @echo "### Now generating a PGP key pair to be used for signing modules." -+ @echo "###" -+ @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the" -+ @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It" -+ @echo "### needs to be run as root and should use a hardware random" -+ @echo "### number generator if one is available, eg:" -+ @echo "###" -+ @echo "### rngd -r /dev/hwrandom" -+ @echo "###" -+ gpg --homedir . --batch --gen-key genkey -+ @echo "###" -+ @echo "### Key pair generated." -+ @echo "###" -+ rm -f pubring.gpg secring.gpg trustdb.gpg -+ -+genkey: -+ @echo "###" >&2 -+ @echo "### Now generating a sample key generation script." >&2 -+ @echo "###" >&2 -+ @echo "### IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT YOU SUPPLY YOUR OWN" >&2 -+ @echo "### SCRIPT WITH APPROPRIATE NAME FIELDS FILLED IN." >&2 -+ @echo "###" >&2 -+ @echo "### If you have a hardware random number generator feeding" >&2 -+ @echo "### into /dev/random, you should drop the %no-protection" >&2 -+ @echo "### and %transient-key lines from the script." >&2 -+ @echo "###" >&2 -+ echo "%pubring modsign.pub" >genkey -+ echo "%secring modsign.sec" >>genkey -+ echo "%no-protection: yes" >> genkey -+ echo "%transient-key: yes" >>genkey -+ echo "Key-Type: RSA" >>genkey -+ echo "Key-Length: 4096" >>genkey -+ echo "Name-Real: Sample kernel key" >>genkey -+ echo "Name-Comment: Sample kernel module signing key" >>genkey -+ echo "%commit" >>genkey -+ -+endif -+CLEAN_FILES += modsign.pub modsign.sec genkey random_seed --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From be5544dce081ccb49fd452a6273c5024208b2f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 25/32] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the - kernel - -Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module -verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring -during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public -keys found in the PGP keyring. - -These can be seen by root: - -[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys -07ad4ee0 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd [] -15c7f8c3 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4 -... - -It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in -their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/Makefile | 25 ++++++++------- - kernel/modsign-pubkey.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - kernel/module-verify-defs.h | 4 +++ - kernel/module-verify.c | 2 -- - 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 kernel/modsign-pubkey.c - -diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile -index 28cd248..1d20704 100644 ---- a/kernel/Makefile -+++ b/kernel/Makefile -@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o - obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o - obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o --obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module-verify.o -+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module-verify.o modsign-pubkey.o -+kernel/modsign-pubkey.o: modsign.pub - obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o - obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o - obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o -@@ -159,16 +160,18 @@ modsign.pub modsign.sec: genkey - rm -f pubring.gpg secring.gpg trustdb.gpg - - genkey: -- @echo "###" >&2 -- @echo "### Now generating a sample key generation script." >&2 -- @echo "###" >&2 -- @echo "### IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT YOU SUPPLY YOUR OWN" >&2 -- @echo "### SCRIPT WITH APPROPRIATE NAME FIELDS FILLED IN." >&2 -- @echo "###" >&2 -- @echo "### If you have a hardware random number generator feeding" >&2 -- @echo "### into /dev/random, you should drop the %no-protection" >&2 -- @echo "### and %transient-key lines from the script." >&2 -- @echo "###" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ###" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is enabled so a public key is needed." >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ###" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### Now generating a sample key generation script." >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ###" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT YOU SUPPLY YOUR OWN" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### SCRIPT WITH APPROPRIATE NAME FIELDS FILLED IN." >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ###" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### If you have a hardware random number generator feeding" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### into /dev/random, you should drop the %no-protection" >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ### and %transient-key lines from the script." >&2 -+ @echo "kernel/Makefile:163: ###" >&2 - echo "%pubring modsign.pub" >genkey - echo "%secring modsign.sec" >>genkey - echo "%no-protection: yes" >> genkey -diff --git a/kernel/modsign-pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign-pubkey.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..5fdb082 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kernel/modsign-pubkey.c -@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ -+/* Public keys for module signature verification -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/sched.h> -+#include <linux/cred.h> -+#include <linux/err.h> -+#include <keys/crypto-type.h> -+#include "module-verify-defs.h" -+ -+struct key *modsign_keyring; -+ -+extern __initdata const u8 modsign_public_keys[]; -+extern __initdata const u8 modsign_public_keys_end[]; -+asm(".section .init.data,\"aw\"\n" -+ "modsign_public_keys:\n" -+ ".incbin \"modsign.pub\"\n" -+ "modsign_public_keys_end:" -+ ); -+ -+/* -+ * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice -+ * if modsign.pub changes. -+ */ -+static __initdata const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo"; -+ -+/* -+ * Load the compiled-in keys -+ */ -+static __init int module_verify_init(void) -+{ -+ pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n"); -+ -+ modsign_keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".module_sign", -+ 0, 0, current_cred(), -+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); -+ if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring)) -+ panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n"); -+ -+ if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0) -+ panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n"); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. -+ */ -+device_initcall(module_verify_init); -+ -+/* -+ * Load the compiled-in keys -+ */ -+static __init int modsign_pubkey_init(void) -+{ -+ pr_notice("Load module verification keys\n"); -+ -+ if (preload_pgp_keys(modsign_public_keys, -+ modsign_public_keys_end - modsign_public_keys, -+ modsign_keyring) < 0) -+ panic("Can't load module signing keys\n"); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+late_initcall(modsign_pubkey_init); -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify-defs.h b/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -index 141ddab..2fe31e1 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -+++ b/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ - - #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG - -+#include <linux/module.h> -+ -+extern struct key *modsign_keyring; -+ - /* - * Internal state - */ -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index 4bf857e..05473e6 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ - #include <linux/err.h> - #include <linux/elf.h> - #include <linux/elfnote.h> --#include <linux/sched.h> --#include <linux/cred.h> - #include <linux/modsign.h> - #include <linux/moduleparam.h> - #include <keys/crypto-type.h> --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 34c918aacc002f8a7226a26a0d8af614c6f4430e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 26/32] MODSIGN: Check the ELF container - -Check the ELF container of the kernel module to prevent the kernel from -crashing or getting corrupted whilst trying to use it and locate the module -signature note if present. - -We try to check as little as possible. We check the metadata that the -signature checker actually has to use, and leave anything that it doesn't -actually need to the signature to catch. - -The stuff we need to check is: - - (1) The locations and offsets in the ELF header of important parts like the - section table. - - (2) The section table. Note that we only check sh_info for section types that - we're actually interested in (string, symbol and relocation tables). We - also check that alignments are what we expect for those tables. - - (3) That non-empty string tables have the required NUL at the end so that we - can be sure that all strings therein are NUL-terminated. We don't bother - checking for the required NUL at the beginning as it shouldn't cause a - problem to us. - - (4) The name offset and section index in each symbol. We could defer this to - when we deal with the relocation tables so that we only check symbols that - are used by relocations - but we would then end up checking some symbols - multiple times. - - (5) The module signature note section and the first note in it if present. - - (6) That relocations applied to an allocatable section only refer to - symbols in allocatable sections and absolute symbols (done in the module - signing code rather than here). - -Note that these checks survive "strip -x", "strip -g" and "eu-strip" being -applied to a module and detect if the module was given to "strip" or "strip -s" -and report an error. - -We can skip some direct checks that turn out unnecessary or redundant: - - (1) That sh_link has a greater than 0 value for symbol tables and relocation - tables. These require the index of a string table and a symbol table - respectively - and since we have already checked section 0 is of SHT_NULL - type, checking the symbol type renders the sh_link > 0 check redundant. - - (2) That a non-empty string table begins with a NUL. Since we check the - string table ends with a NUL, any string in there will be NUL-terminated - and shouldn't cause us to transgress beyond the bounds of the string table - when using strlen(). - - (3) That strings in a string table actually make sense. We don't care, so - long as it is NUL terminated. Any string that refers to an undefined - symbol is added to the crypto digest and will be checked that way. - Strings that we directly look for (such as ".modinfo") will be validated - by that. - - (4) That sections don't overlap. We don't actually care if sections overlap - in the file, provided we don't see bad metadata. If the sections holding - the allocatable content overlap, then the signature check is likely to - fail. - - (5) That symbol values and relocation offsets and addends make sense. We just - add this data to the digest if it pertains to an allocatable section. - - (6) That allocatable note sections, other than the signature note, make sense. - The contents of these get added to the digest in their entirety, so we - don't need to check them manually. - -If bad ELF is detected, ELIBBAD is indicated. - -Note! The "noinline" attribute on the module_verify_elf() function results in -somewhat smaller code. Similarly, having separate loops to check basic section -parameters and to check type-specific features of sections results in smaller -code, presumably because some local variables can be discarded. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify.c | 230 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 230 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index 05473e6..2161d11 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -51,6 +51,228 @@ static const char modsign_note_name[] = ELFNOTE_NAME(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME); - static const char modsign_note_section[] = ELFNOTE_SECTION(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME); - - /* -+ * Verify the minimum amount of ELF structure of a module needed to check the -+ * module's signature without bad ELF crashing the kernel. -+ */ -+static noinline int module_verify_elf(struct module_verify_data *mvdata) -+{ -+ const struct elf_note *note; -+ const Elf_Ehdr *hdr = mvdata->hdr; -+ const Elf_Shdr *section, *secstop; -+ const Elf_Sym *symbols, *symbol, *symstop; -+ const char *strtab; -+ size_t size, secstrsize, strsize, notesize, notemetasize; -+ unsigned line; -+ -+ size = mvdata->size; -+ -+#define elfcheck(X) \ -+do { if (unlikely(!(X))) { line = __LINE__; goto elfcheck_error; } } while (0) -+ -+#define seccheck(X) \ -+do { if (unlikely(!(X))) { line = __LINE__; goto seccheck_error; } } while (0) -+ -+#define symcheck(X) \ -+do { if (unlikely(!(X))) { line = __LINE__; goto symcheck_error; } } while (0) -+ -+ /* Validate the ELF header */ -+ elfcheck(size > sizeof(Elf_Ehdr)); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_ehsize < size); -+ -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shnum < SHN_LORESERVE); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shstrndx < hdr->e_shnum); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shentsize == sizeof(Elf_Shdr)); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff < size); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff >= hdr->e_ehsize); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff % sizeof(long) == 0); -+ elfcheck(hdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr) <= size - hdr->e_shoff); -+ -+ /* Validate the section table contents */ -+ mvdata->nsects = hdr->e_shnum; -+ mvdata->sections = mvdata->buffer + hdr->e_shoff; -+ secstop = mvdata->sections + mvdata->nsects; -+ -+ /* Section 0 is special, usually indicating an undefined symbol */ -+ section = &mvdata->sections[SHN_UNDEF]; -+ seccheck(section->sh_type == SHT_NULL); -+ -+ /* We also want access to the section name table */ -+ section = &mvdata->sections[hdr->e_shstrndx]; -+ seccheck(section->sh_type == SHT_STRTAB); -+ secstrsize = mvdata->sections[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_size; -+ -+ for (section = mvdata->sections + 1; section < secstop; section++) { -+ seccheck(section->sh_name < secstrsize); -+ seccheck(section->sh_link < hdr->e_shnum); -+ -+ /* Section file offsets must reside within the file, though -+ * they don't have to actually consume file space (.bss for -+ * example). -+ */ -+ seccheck(section->sh_offset >= hdr->e_ehsize); -+ if (section->sh_addralign > 1) -+ seccheck((section->sh_offset & -+ (section->sh_addralign - 1)) == 0); -+ seccheck(section->sh_offset <= size); -+ if (section->sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) -+ seccheck(section->sh_size <= size - section->sh_offset); -+ -+ /* Some types of section should contain arrays of fixed-length -+ * records of a predetermined size and mustn't contain partial -+ * records. Also, records we're going to access directly must -+ * have appropriate alignment that we don't get a misalignment -+ * exception. -+ */ -+ if (section->sh_entsize > 1) -+ seccheck(section->sh_size % section->sh_entsize == 0); -+ -+ switch (section->sh_type) { -+ case SHT_SYMTAB: -+ seccheck(section->sh_entsize == sizeof(Elf_Sym)); -+ seccheck(section->sh_addralign % sizeof(long) == 0); -+ break; -+ case SHT_REL: -+#ifdef Elf_Rel -+ seccheck(section->sh_entsize == sizeof(Elf_Rel)); -+ seccheck(section->sh_addralign % sizeof(long) == 0); -+ break; -+#else -+ seccheck(false); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case SHT_RELA: -+#ifdef Elf_Rela -+ seccheck(section->sh_entsize == sizeof(Elf_Rela)); -+ seccheck(section->sh_addralign % sizeof(long) == 0); -+ break; -+#else -+ seccheck(false); -+ break; -+#endif -+ case SHT_NOTE: -+ seccheck(section->sh_addralign % 4 == 0); -+ break; -+ case SHT_STRTAB: -+ /* We require all string tables to be non-empty. If -+ * not empty, a string table must end in a NUL (it -+ * should also begin with a NUL, but it's not a problem -+ * for us if it doesn't). -+ */ -+ seccheck(section->sh_size >= 2); -+ strtab = mvdata->buffer + section->sh_offset; -+ seccheck(strtab[section->sh_size - 1] == '\0'); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Check features specific to the type of each section. -+ * -+ * Note that having a separate loop here allows the compiler to discard -+ * some local variables used in the above loop thus making the code -+ * smaller. -+ */ -+ for (section = mvdata->sections + 1; section < secstop; section++) { -+ switch (section->sh_type) { -+ case SHT_SYMTAB: -+ /* Symbol tables nominate a string table. */ -+ seccheck(mvdata->sections[section->sh_link].sh_type == -+ SHT_STRTAB); -+ -+ /* Validate the symbols in the table. The first symbol -+ * (STN_UNDEF) is special. -+ */ -+ symbol = symbols = mvdata->buffer + section->sh_offset; -+ symstop = mvdata->buffer + -+ (section->sh_offset + section->sh_size); -+ -+ symcheck(ELF_ST_TYPE(symbols[0].st_info) == STT_NOTYPE); -+ symcheck(symbol[0].st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF); -+ -+ strsize = mvdata->sections[section->sh_link].sh_size; -+ for (symbol++; symbol < symstop; symbol++) { -+ symcheck(symbol->st_name < strsize); -+ symcheck(symbol->st_shndx < hdr->e_shnum || -+ symbol->st_shndx >= SHN_LORESERVE); -+ } -+ break; -+ -+#ifdef Elf_Rel -+ case SHT_REL: -+#endif -+#ifdef Elf_Rela -+ case SHT_RELA: -+#endif -+ /* Relocation tables nominate a symbol table and a -+ * target section to which the relocations will be -+ * applied. -+ */ -+ seccheck(mvdata->sections[section->sh_link].sh_type == -+ SHT_SYMTAB); -+ seccheck(section->sh_info > 0); -+ seccheck(section->sh_info < hdr->e_shnum); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* We can now use section name string table section as we checked its -+ * bounds in the loop above. -+ * -+ * Each name is NUL-terminated, and the table as a whole should have a -+ * NUL at either end as there to be at least one named section for the -+ * module information. -+ */ -+ section = &mvdata->sections[hdr->e_shstrndx]; -+ mvdata->secstrings = mvdata->buffer + section->sh_offset; -+ -+ for (section = mvdata->sections + 1; section < secstop; section++) { -+ const char *name = mvdata->secstrings + section->sh_name; -+ -+ switch (section->sh_type) { -+ case SHT_NOTE: -+ if (strcmp(name, modsign_note_section) != 0) -+ continue; -+ -+ /* We've found a note purporting to contain a signature -+ * so we should check the structure of that. -+ */ -+ notemetasize = sizeof(struct elf_note) + -+ roundup(sizeof(modsign_note_name), 4); -+ -+ seccheck(mvdata->sig_index == 0); -+ seccheck(section->sh_size > notemetasize); -+ note = mvdata->buffer + section->sh_offset; -+ seccheck(note->n_type == MODSIGN_NOTE_TYPE); -+ seccheck(note->n_namesz == sizeof(modsign_note_name)); -+ -+ notesize = section->sh_size - notemetasize; -+ seccheck(note->n_descsz <= notesize); -+ -+ seccheck(memcmp(note + 1, modsign_note_name, -+ note->n_namesz) == 0); -+ -+ mvdata->sig_size = note->n_descsz; -+ mvdata->sig = (void *)note + notemetasize; -+ mvdata->sig_index = section - mvdata->sections; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+ -+elfcheck_error: -+ _debug("Verify ELF error (check %u)\n", line); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+seccheck_error: -+ _debug("Verify ELF error [sec %ld] (check %u)\n", -+ (long)(section - mvdata->sections), line); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+symcheck_error: -+ _debug("Verify ELF error [sym %ld] (check %u)\n", -+ (long)(symbol - symbols), line); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+} -+ -+/* - * Verify a module's integrity - */ - int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) -@@ -62,6 +284,14 @@ int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) - mvdata.buffer = hdr; - mvdata.size = size; - -+ /* Minimally check the ELF to make sure building the signature digest -+ * won't crash the kernel. -+ */ -+ ret = module_verify_elf(&mvdata); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* The ELF checker found the sig for us if it exists */ - if (mvdata.sig_index <= 0) { - /* Deal with an unsigned module */ - if (modsign_signedonly) { --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 2de4559e24c416e6813c10edbe3cc433ecd0dd50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 27/32] MODSIGN: Produce a filtered and canonicalised section - list - -Build a list of the sections in which we're interested and canonicalise the -section indices to avoid the problems of the section table being altered by ld -when the signature is linked into the binary and by strip. - -The only sections in which we're actually interested are those that are marked -allocatable (which will be kept in memory) and relocation tables that are -applicable to those sections. - -Canonicalisation is done by sorting the filtered list in order of section name. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index 2161d11..646b104 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -273,6 +273,80 @@ symcheck_error: - } - - /* -+ * Canonicalise the section table index numbers. -+ * -+ * We build a list of the sections we want to add to the digest and sort it by -+ * name. We're only interested in adding two types of section: -+ * -+ * (1) Allocatable sections. These should have no references to other -+ * sections. -+ * -+ * (2) Relocation tables for allocatable sections. The section table entry -+ * has a reference to the target section to which the relocations will be -+ * applied. The relocation entries have references to symbols in -+ * non-allocatable sections. Symbols can be replaced by their contents, -+ * but do include a further reference to a section - which must be -+ * canonicalised. -+ * -+ * We also build a map of raw section index to canonical section index. -+ */ -+static int module_verify_canonicalise(struct module_verify_data *mvdata) -+{ -+ const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs = mvdata->sections; -+ unsigned *canonlist, canon, loop, tmp; -+ bool changed; -+ -+ canonlist = kmalloc(sizeof(unsigned) * mvdata->nsects * 2, GFP_KERNEL); -+ if (!canonlist) -+ return -ENOMEM; -+ -+ mvdata->canonlist = canonlist; -+ mvdata->canonmap = canonlist + mvdata->nsects; -+ canon = 0; -+ -+ for (loop = 1; loop < mvdata->nsects; loop++) { -+ const Elf_Shdr *section = mvdata->sections + loop; -+ -+ if (loop == mvdata->sig_index) -+ continue; -+ -+ /* We only want allocatable sections and relocation tables */ -+ if (section->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) -+ canonlist[canon++] = loop; -+ else if ((is_elf_rel(section->sh_type) || -+ is_elf_rela(section->sh_type)) && -+ mvdata->sections[section->sh_info].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) -+ canonlist[canon++] = loop; -+ } -+ -+ /* Sort the canonicalisation list */ -+ do { -+ changed = false; -+ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon - 1; loop++) { -+ const char *x, *y; -+ -+ x = mvdata->secstrings + sechdrs[canonlist[loop + 0]].sh_name; -+ y = mvdata->secstrings + sechdrs[canonlist[loop + 1]].sh_name; -+ -+ if (strcmp(x, y) > 0) { -+ tmp = canonlist[loop + 0]; -+ canonlist[loop + 0] = canonlist[loop + 1]; -+ canonlist[loop + 1] = tmp; -+ changed = true; -+ } -+ } -+ } while (changed); -+ -+ /* What we really want is a raw-to-canon lookup table */ -+ memset(mvdata->canonmap, 0xff, mvdata->nsects * sizeof(unsigned)); -+ for (loop = 0; loop < canon; loop++) -+ mvdata->canonmap[mvdata->canonlist[loop]] = loop + 1; -+ mvdata->ncanon = canon; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* - * Verify a module's integrity - */ - int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) -@@ -303,7 +377,13 @@ int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) - goto out; - } - -+ /* Produce a canonicalisation map for the sections */ -+ ret = module_verify_canonicalise(&mvdata); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto out; -+ - ret = 0; -+ kfree(mvdata.canonlist); - - out: - switch (ret) { --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 3c8e71a46663f1fc3ee49fe3f6fa5c3bb85b704c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 28/32] MODSIGN: Create digest of module content and check - signature - -Apply signature checking to modules on module load, checking the signature -against the ring of public keys compiled into the kernel (if enabled by -CONFIG_MODULE_SIG). Turning on signature checking will also force the module's -ELF metadata to be verified first. - -There are several reasons why these patches are useful, amongst which are: - - (1) to prevent accidentally corrupted modules from causing damage; - - (2) to prevent maliciously modified modules from causing damage; - - (3) to allow a sysadmin (or more likely an IT department) to enforce a policy - that only known and approved modules shall be loaded onto machines which - they're expected to support; - - (4) to allow other support providers to do likewise, or at least to _detect_ - the fact that unsupported modules are loaded; - - (5) to allow the detection of modules replaced by a second-order distro or a - preloaded Linux purveyor. - -These patches have two main appeals: (a) preventing malicious modules from -being loaded, and (b) reducing support workload by pointing out modules on a -crashing box that aren't what they're expected to be. - -Note that this is not a complete solution by any means: the core kernel is not -protected, and nor are /dev/mem or /dev/kmem, but it denies (or at least -controls) one relatively simple attack vector. To protect the kernel image -would be the responsibility of the boot loader or the system BIOS. - -This facility is optional: the builder of a kernel is by no means under any -requirement to actually enable it, let alone force the set of loadable modules -to be restricted to just those that the builder provides (there are degrees of -restriction available). - -Note! The "noinline" attribute on module_verify_signature() results in -somewhat smaller code. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify-defs.h | 13 +- - kernel/module-verify.c | 332 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - 2 files changed, 338 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify-defs.h b/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -index 2fe31e1..cb477a2 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -+++ b/kernel/module-verify-defs.h -@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ extern struct key *modsign_keyring; - * Internal state - */ - struct module_verify_data { -- struct crypto_key_verify_context *mod_sig; /* Module signing context */ -+ struct crypto_sig_verify_context *mod_sig; /* Module signing context */ - union { - const void *buffer; /* module buffer */ - const Elf_Ehdr *hdr; /* ELF header */ -@@ -42,15 +42,16 @@ struct module_verify_data { - /* - * Whether or not we support various types of ELF relocation record - */ --#if defined(MODULE_HAS_ELF_REL_ONLY) -+#ifdef Elf_Rel - #define is_elf_rel(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_REL) --#define is_elf_rela(sh_type) (0) --#elif defined(MODULE_HAS_ELF_RELA_ONLY) -+#else - #define is_elf_rel(sh_type) (0) -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef Elf_Rela - #define is_elf_rela(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_RELA) - #else --#define is_elf_rel(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_REL) --#define is_elf_rela(sh_type) ((sh_type) == SHT_RELA) -+#define is_elf_rela(sh_type) (0) - #endif - - /* -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index 646b104..bee7e04 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -50,6 +50,22 @@ static bool modsign_signedonly; - static const char modsign_note_name[] = ELFNOTE_NAME(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME); - static const char modsign_note_section[] = ELFNOTE_SECTION(MODSIGN_NOTE_NAME); - -+#define crypto_digest_update_data(C, PTR, N) \ -+do { \ -+ uint8_t *__p = (uint8_t *)(PTR); \ -+ size_t __n = (N); \ -+ count_and_csum((C), __p, __n); \ -+ verify_sig_add_data((C)->mod_sig, __p, __n); \ -+} while (0) -+ -+#define crypto_digest_update_val(C, VAL) \ -+do { \ -+ uint8_t *__p = (uint8_t *)&(VAL); \ -+ size_t __n = sizeof(VAL); \ -+ count_and_csum((C), __p, __n); \ -+ verify_sig_add_data((C)->mod_sig, __p, __n); \ -+} while (0) -+ - /* - * Verify the minimum amount of ELF structure of a module needed to check the - * module's signature without bad ELF crashing the kernel. -@@ -346,6 +362,320 @@ static int module_verify_canonicalise(struct module_verify_data *mvdata) - return 0; - } - -+#ifdef Elf_Rel -+/* -+ * Extract an ELF REL table -+ * -+ * We need to canonicalise the entries in case section/symbol addition/removal -+ * has rearranged the symbol table and the section table. -+ */ -+static int extract_elf_rel(struct module_verify_data *mvdata, -+ unsigned secix, -+ const Elf_Rel *reltab, size_t nrels, -+ const char *sh_name) -+{ -+ struct { -+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT -+ uint64_t r_offset; -+ uint64_t st_value; -+ uint64_t st_size; -+ uint32_t r_type; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+#else -+ uint32_t r_offset; -+ uint32_t st_value; -+ uint32_t st_size; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t r_type; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+#endif -+ } __packed relocation; -+ -+ const Elf_Shdr *relsec, *symsec, *strsec; -+ const Elf_Rel *reloc; -+ const Elf_Sym *symbols, *symbol; -+ const char *strings; -+ unsigned long r_sym; -+ size_t nsyms, loop; -+ -+ relsec = &mvdata->sections[secix]; -+ symsec = &mvdata->sections[relsec->sh_link]; -+ strsec = &mvdata->sections[symsec->sh_link]; -+ nsyms = symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); -+ symbols = mvdata->buffer + symsec->sh_offset; -+ strings = mvdata->buffer + strsec->sh_offset; -+ -+ /* Contribute the relevant bits from a join of -+ * { REL, SYMBOL, SECTION } -+ */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < nrels; loop++) { -+ unsigned st_shndx; -+ -+ reloc = &reltab[loop]; -+ -+ /* Decode the relocation */ -+ relocation.r_offset = reloc->r_offset; -+ relocation.r_type = ELF_R_TYPE(reloc->r_info); -+ -+ /* Decode the symbol referenced by the relocation */ -+ r_sym = ELF_R_SYM(reloc->r_info); -+ if (r_sym >= nsyms) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ symbol = &symbols[r_sym]; -+ relocation.st_info = symbol->st_info; -+ relocation.st_other = symbol->st_other; -+ relocation.st_value = symbol->st_value; -+ relocation.st_size = symbol->st_size; -+ relocation.st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ -+ /* Canonicalise the section used by the symbol */ -+ if (st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && st_shndx < mvdata->nsects) { -+ if (!(mvdata->sections[st_shndx].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ relocation.st_shndx = mvdata->canonmap[st_shndx]; -+ } -+ -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, relocation); -+ -+ /* Undefined symbols must be named if referenced */ -+ if (st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) { -+ const char *name = strings + symbol->st_name; -+ crypto_digest_update_data(mvdata, -+ name, strlen(name) + 1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ _debug("%08zx %02x digested the %s section, nrels %zu\n", -+ mvdata->signed_size, mvdata->csum, sh_name, nrels); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef Elf_Rela -+/* -+ * Extract an ELF RELA table -+ * -+ * We need to canonicalise the entries in case section/symbol addition/removal -+ * has rearranged the symbol table and the section table. -+ */ -+static int extract_elf_rela(struct module_verify_data *mvdata, -+ unsigned secix, -+ const Elf_Rela *relatab, size_t nrels, -+ const char *sh_name) -+{ -+ struct { -+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT -+ uint64_t r_offset; -+ uint64_t r_addend; -+ uint64_t st_value; -+ uint64_t st_size; -+ uint32_t r_type; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+#else -+ uint32_t r_offset; -+ uint32_t r_addend; -+ uint32_t st_value; -+ uint32_t st_size; -+ uint16_t st_shndx; -+ uint8_t r_type; -+ uint8_t st_info; -+ uint8_t st_other; -+#endif -+ } __packed relocation; -+ -+ const Elf_Shdr *relsec, *symsec, *strsec; -+ const Elf_Rela *reloc; -+ const Elf_Sym *symbols, *symbol; -+ unsigned long r_sym; -+ const char *strings; -+ size_t nsyms, loop; -+ -+ relsec = &mvdata->sections[secix]; -+ symsec = &mvdata->sections[relsec->sh_link]; -+ strsec = &mvdata->sections[symsec->sh_link]; -+ nsyms = symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); -+ symbols = mvdata->buffer + symsec->sh_offset; -+ strings = mvdata->buffer + strsec->sh_offset; -+ -+ /* Contribute the relevant bits from a join of -+ * { RELA, SYMBOL, SECTION } -+ */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < nrels; loop++) { -+ unsigned st_shndx; -+ -+ reloc = &relatab[loop]; -+ -+ /* Decode the relocation */ -+ relocation.r_offset = reloc->r_offset; -+ relocation.r_addend = reloc->r_addend; -+ relocation.r_type = ELF_R_TYPE(reloc->r_info); -+ -+ /* Decode the symbol referenced by the relocation */ -+ r_sym = ELF_R_SYM(reloc->r_info); -+ if (r_sym >= nsyms) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ symbol = &symbols[r_sym]; -+ relocation.st_info = symbol->st_info; -+ relocation.st_other = symbol->st_other; -+ relocation.st_value = symbol->st_value; -+ relocation.st_size = symbol->st_size; -+ relocation.st_shndx = 0; -+ st_shndx = symbol->st_shndx; -+ -+ /* Canonicalise the section used by the symbol */ -+ if (st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && st_shndx < mvdata->nsects) { -+ if (!(mvdata->sections[st_shndx].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+ relocation.st_shndx = mvdata->canonmap[st_shndx]; -+ } -+ -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, relocation); -+ -+ /* Undefined symbols must be named if referenced */ -+ if (st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) { -+ const char *name = strings + symbol->st_name; -+ crypto_digest_update_data(mvdata, -+ name, strlen(name) + 1); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ _debug("%08zx %02x digested the %s section, nrels %zu\n", -+ mvdata->signed_size, mvdata->csum, sh_name, nrels); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif -+ -+/* -+ * Verify a module's signature -+ */ -+static noinline int module_verify_signature(struct module_verify_data *mvdata) -+{ -+ struct crypto_sig_verify_context *mod_sig; -+ const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs = mvdata->sections; -+ const char *secstrings = mvdata->secstrings; -+ const u8 *sig = mvdata->sig; -+ size_t sig_size = mvdata->sig_size; -+ int loop, ret; -+ -+ _debug("sig in section %u (size %zu)\n", -+ mvdata->sig_index, mvdata->sig_size); -+ _debug("%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", -+ sig[0], sig[1], sig[2], sig[3], -+ sig[4], sig[5], sig[6], sig[7]); -+ -+ /* Find the crypto key for the module signature -+ * - !!! if this tries to load the required hash algorithm module, -+ * we will deadlock!!! -+ */ -+ mod_sig = verify_sig_begin(modsign_keyring, sig, sig_size); -+ if (IS_ERR(mod_sig)) { -+ pr_err("Couldn't initiate module signature verification: %ld\n", -+ PTR_ERR(mod_sig)); -+ return PTR_ERR(mod_sig); -+ } -+ -+ mvdata->mod_sig = mod_sig; -+#ifdef DEBUG -+ mvdata->xcsum = 0; -+#endif -+ -+ /* Load data from each relevant section into the digest. Note that -+ * canonlist[] is a filtered list and only contains the sections we -+ * actually want. -+ */ -+ for (loop = 0; loop < mvdata->ncanon; loop++) { -+ int sect = mvdata->canonlist[loop]; -+ unsigned long sh_type = sechdrs[sect].sh_type; -+ unsigned long sh_info = sechdrs[sect].sh_info; -+ unsigned long sh_size = sechdrs[sect].sh_size; -+ const char *sh_name = secstrings + sechdrs[sect].sh_name; -+ const void *data = mvdata->buffer + sechdrs[sect].sh_offset; -+ -+#ifdef DEBUG -+ mvdata->csum = 0; -+#endif -+ -+ /* Digest the headers of any section we include. */ -+ crypto_digest_update_data(mvdata, sh_name, strlen(sh_name)); -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, sechdrs[sect].sh_type); -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, sechdrs[sect].sh_flags); -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, sechdrs[sect].sh_size); -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, sechdrs[sect].sh_addralign); -+ -+ /* Relocation record sections refer to the section to be -+ * relocated, but this needs to be canonicalised to survive -+ * stripping. -+ */ -+ if (is_elf_rel(sh_type) || is_elf_rela(sh_type)) -+ crypto_digest_update_val(mvdata, -+ mvdata->canonmap[sh_info]); -+ -+ /* Since relocation records give details of how we have to -+ * alter the allocatable sections, we need to digest these too. -+ * -+ * These, however, refer to metadata (symbols and sections) -+ * that may have been altered by the process of adding the -+ * signature section or the process of being stripped. -+ * -+ * To deal with this, we substitute the referenced metadata for -+ * the references to that metadata. So, for instance, the -+ * symbol ref from the relocation record is replaced with the -+ * contents of the symbol to which it refers, and the symbol's -+ * section ref is replaced with a canonicalised section number. -+ */ -+#ifdef Elf_Rel -+ if (is_elf_rel(sh_type)) { -+ ret = extract_elf_rel(mvdata, sect, -+ data, -+ sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Rel), -+ sh_name); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto format_error; -+ continue; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef Elf_Rela -+ if (is_elf_rela(sh_type)) { -+ ret = extract_elf_rela(mvdata, sect, -+ data, -+ sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Rela), -+ sh_name); -+ if (ret < 0) -+ goto format_error; -+ continue; -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* Include allocatable loadable sections */ -+ if (sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) -+ crypto_digest_update_data(mvdata, data, sh_size); -+ -+ _debug("%08zx %02x digested the %s section, size %ld\n", -+ mvdata->signed_size, mvdata->csum, sh_name, sh_size); -+ } -+ -+ _debug("Contributed %zu bytes to the digest (csum 0x%02x)\n", -+ mvdata->signed_size, mvdata->xcsum); -+ -+ /* Do the actual signature verification */ -+ ret = verify_sig_end(mvdata->mod_sig, sig, sig_size); -+ _debug("verify-sig : %d\n", ret); -+ return ret; -+ -+format_error: -+ verify_sig_cancel(mvdata->mod_sig); -+ return -ELIBBAD; -+} -+ - /* - * Verify a module's integrity - */ -@@ -382,7 +712,7 @@ int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - -- ret = 0; -+ ret = module_verify_signature(&mvdata); - kfree(mvdata.canonlist); - - out: --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 53142a9c74e2922885d03555d26213fc38553b90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 29/32] MODSIGN: Suppress some redundant ELF checks - -Suppress some redundant ELF checks in module_verify_elf() that are also done -by copy_and_check() in the core module loader code prior to calling -module_verify(). - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index bee7e04..f3a694f 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ do { if (unlikely(!(X))) { line = __LINE__; goto symcheck_error; } } while (0) - - elfcheck(hdr->e_shnum < SHN_LORESERVE); - elfcheck(hdr->e_shstrndx < hdr->e_shnum); -- elfcheck(hdr->e_shentsize == sizeof(Elf_Shdr)); -- elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff < size); -+ /* elfcheck(hdr->e_shentsize == sizeof(Elf_Shdr)); */ -+ /* elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff < size); */ - elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff >= hdr->e_ehsize); - elfcheck(hdr->e_shoff % sizeof(long) == 0); -- elfcheck(hdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr) <= size - hdr->e_shoff); -+ /* elfcheck(hdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr) <= size - hdr->e_shoff); */ - - /* Validate the section table contents */ - mvdata->nsects = hdr->e_shnum; --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 14d36171021b1c16f6c664bd4ab31e1d989ab282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 30/32] MODSIGN: Panic the kernel if FIPS is enabled upon - module signing failure - -If module signing fails when the kernel is running with FIPS enabled then the -kernel should panic lest the crypto layer be compromised. Possibly a panic -shouldn't happen on cases like ENOMEM. - -Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index f3a694f..896c0ff 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ - #include <linux/elfnote.h> - #include <linux/modsign.h> - #include <linux/moduleparam.h> -+#include <linux/fips.h> - #include <keys/crypto-type.h> - #include "module-verify.h" - #include "module-verify-defs.h" -@@ -716,6 +717,10 @@ int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) - kfree(mvdata.canonlist); - - out: -+ if (ret < 0 && fips_enabled) -+ panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n", -+ ret); -+ - switch (ret) { - case 0: /* Good signature */ - *_gpgsig_ok = true; --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 1e8e625508f013acfb8ade3b5c30dcc7ff710ce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 31/32] MODSIGN: Allow modules to be signed with an unknown - key unless enforcing - -Currently we fail the loading of modules that are signed with a public key -that is not in the modsign keyring even if we are not in enforcing mode. -This is somewhat at odds with the fact that we allow a completely unsigned -module to load in such a case. - -We should allow modules signed with an unknown key to load in cases -where we are not enforcing and not in FIPS mode. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index 896c0ff..041506f 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -736,6 +736,13 @@ out: - break; - case -ENOKEY: /* Signed, but we don't have the public key */ - pr_err("Module signed with unknown public key\n"); -+ if (!modsign_signedonly) { -+ /* Allow a module to be signed with an unknown public -+ * key unless we're enforcing. -+ */ -+ pr_info("Allowing\n"); -+ ret = 0; -+ } - break; - default: /* Other error (probably ENOMEM) */ - break; --- -1.7.11.4 - - -From 7ac7095ee6624789c6a971d16f5ca823ebbde3c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:38:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 32/32] MODSIGN: Fix documentation of signed-nokey behavior - when not enforcing. - -jwboyer's previous commit changes the behavior of module signing when -there's a valid signature but we don't know the public key and are in -permissive mode. This updates the documentation to match. - -Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> -Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> ---- - Documentation/module-signing.txt | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt -index d75d473..8c4bef9 100644 ---- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt -+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt -@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ This table indicates the behaviours of the various situations: - MODULE STATE PERMISSIVE MODE ENFORCING MODE - ======================================= =============== =============== - Unsigned Ok EKEYREJECTED -- Signed, no public key ENOKEY ENOKEY -+ Signed, no public key Ok ENOKEY - Validly signed, public key Ok Ok - Invalidly signed, public key EKEYREJECTED EKEYREJECTED - Validly signed, expired key EKEYEXPIRED EKEYEXPIRED --- -1.7.11.4 - diff --git a/modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch b/modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6dd81ffa0 --- /dev/null +++ b/modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,9153 @@ +From 2cdfd353ac1a5b9f62398ef59b4a08b5b55ac089 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> +Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 12:32:17 +0930 +Subject: [PATCH 01/26] module: signature checking hook + +We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module +(which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config +option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept (and taint) or +fail with unsigned modules. + +Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> +--- + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +++ + include/linux/module.h | 8 ++++ + init/Kconfig | 14 ++++++ + kernel/module.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +index ad7e2e5..9b2b8d3 100644 +--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -1582,6 +1582,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. + log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG + so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified. + ++ module.sig_enforce ++ [KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that ++ modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load. ++ Note that if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE is set, that ++ is always true, so this option does nothing. ++ + mousedev.tap_time= + [MOUSE] Maximum time between finger touching and + leaving touchpad surface for touch to be considered +diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h +index fbcafe2..7760c6d 100644 +--- a/include/linux/module.h ++++ b/include/linux/module.h +@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ + #include <linux/percpu.h> + #include <asm/module.h> + ++/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ ++#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" ++ + /* Not Yet Implemented */ + #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name) + +@@ -260,6 +263,11 @@ struct module + const unsigned long *unused_gpl_crcs; + #endif + ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++ /* Signature was verified. */ ++ bool sig_ok; ++#endif ++ + /* symbols that will be GPL-only in the near future. */ + const struct kernel_symbol *gpl_future_syms; + const unsigned long *gpl_future_crcs; +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index af6c7f8..7452e19 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -1585,6 +1585,20 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL + the version). With this option, such a "srcversion" field + will be created for all modules. If unsure, say N. + ++config MODULE_SIG ++ bool "Module signature verification" ++ depends on MODULES ++ help ++ Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature ++ is simply appended to the module. For more information see ++ Documentation/module-signing.txt. ++ ++config MODULE_SIG_FORCE ++ bool "Require modules to be validly signed" ++ depends on MODULE_SIG ++ help ++ Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a ++ key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel. + endif # MODULES + + config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE +diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c +index 4edbd9c..5c6f65c 100644 +--- a/kernel/module.c ++++ b/kernel/module.c +@@ -102,6 +102,43 @@ static LIST_HEAD(modules); + struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */ + #endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_KDB */ + ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE ++static bool sig_enforce = true; ++#else ++static bool sig_enforce = false; ++ ++static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val, ++ const struct kernel_param *kp) ++{ ++ int err; ++ bool test; ++ struct kernel_param dummy_kp = *kp; ++ ++ dummy_kp.arg = &test; ++ ++ err = param_set_bool(val, &dummy_kp); ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ ++ /* Don't let them unset it once it's set! */ ++ if (!test && sig_enforce) ++ return -EROFS; ++ ++ if (test) ++ sig_enforce = true; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bool_enable_only = { ++ .set = param_set_bool_enable_only, ++ .get = param_get_bool, ++}; ++#define param_check_bool_enable_only param_check_bool ++ ++module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644); ++#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE */ ++#endif /* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ + + /* Block module loading/unloading? */ + int modules_disabled = 0; +@@ -136,6 +173,7 @@ struct load_info { + unsigned long symoffs, stroffs; + struct _ddebug *debug; + unsigned int num_debug; ++ bool sig_ok; + struct { + unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu; + } index; +@@ -2399,7 +2437,45 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, + } + #endif + +-/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, ++ const void *mod, unsigned long *len) ++{ ++ int err = 0; ++ const unsigned long markerlen = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING); ++ const void *p = mod, *end = mod + *len; ++ ++ /* Poor man's memmem. */ ++ while ((p = memchr(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING[0], end - p))) { ++ if (p + markerlen > end) ++ break; ++ ++ if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { ++ const void *sig = p + markerlen; ++ /* Truncate module up to signature. */ ++ *len = p - mod; ++ err = mod_verify_sig(mod, *len, ++ sig, end - sig, ++ &info->sig_ok); ++ break; ++ } ++ p++; ++ } ++ ++ /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ ++ if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce) ++ err = -EKEYREJECTED; ++ return err; ++} ++#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ ++static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, ++ void *mod, unsigned long *len) ++{ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ ++ ++/* Sets info->hdr, info->len and info->sig_ok. */ + static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info, + const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, + const char __user *uargs) +@@ -2419,6 +2495,10 @@ static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info, + goto free_hdr; + } + ++ err = module_sig_check(info, hdr, &len); ++ if (err) ++ goto free_hdr; ++ + /* Sanity checks against insmoding binaries or wrong arch, + weird elf version */ + if (memcmp(hdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0 +@@ -2886,6 +2966,12 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, + goto free_copy; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++ mod->sig_ok = info.sig_ok; ++ if (!mod->sig_ok) ++ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); ++#endif ++ + /* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */ + err = module_unload_init(mod); + if (err) +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From d4f65b5d2497b2fd9c45f06b71deb4ab084a5b66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 13:06:29 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 02/26] KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key + instantiate or update + +Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the +instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the +provision of two new key type operations: + + int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + +If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in +the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and +instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first +was called. + +preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: + + struct key_preparsed_payload { + char *description; + void *type_data[2]; + void *payload; + const void *data; + size_t datalen; + size_t quotalen; + }; + +Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, +the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default +quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. + +The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in +the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() +ops. + +The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a +string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" +description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() +function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description +to tell the upcall about the key to be created. + +This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own +name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. + +The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: + + int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + +and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + Documentation/security/keys.txt | 50 +++++++++++++- + fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 6 +- + fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 8 +-- + include/keys/user-type.h | 6 +- + include/linux/key-type.h | 35 +++++++++- + net/ceph/crypto.c | 9 +-- + net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 6 +- + net/rxrpc/ar-key.c | 40 +++++------ + security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 16 +++-- + security/keys/key.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 +++-- + security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +- + security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 8 +-- + security/keys/trusted.c | 16 +++-- + security/keys/user_defined.c | 14 ++-- + 15 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt +index aa0dbd7..7d9ca92 100644 +--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt ++++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt +@@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ The main syscalls are: + to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the process + does not have permission to write to the keyring. + ++ If the key type supports it, if the description is NULL or an empty ++ string, the key type will try and generate a description from the content ++ of the payload. ++ + The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by + the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty + payload. +@@ -1114,12 +1118,53 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: + it should return 0. + + +- (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); ++ (*) int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++ ++ This optional method permits the key type to attempt to parse payload ++ before a key is created (add key) or the key semaphore is taken (update or ++ instantiate key). The structure pointed to by prep looks like: ++ ++ struct key_preparsed_payload { ++ char *description; ++ void *type_data[2]; ++ void *payload; ++ const void *data; ++ size_t datalen; ++ size_t quotalen; ++ }; ++ ++ Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with ++ the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default ++ quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared. ++ ++ If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be ++ attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the ++ key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "". ++ ++ The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These ++ are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. ++ ++ The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code ++ otherwise. ++ ++ ++ (*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++ ++ This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided, ++ otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the ++ description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload ++ struct as filled in by the preparse() method. ++ ++ ++ (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + + This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction. + The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to this + function. + ++ The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload ++ blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. ++ + If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in + keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called. + +@@ -1135,6 +1180,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: + If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be provided. + It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data provided. + ++ The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload ++ blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. ++ + key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change + before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the type + is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered, so all +diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c +index e622863..086f381 100644 +--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c ++++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c +@@ -31,18 +31,18 @@ + + /* create a new cifs key */ + static int +-cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + char *payload; + int ret; + + ret = -ENOMEM; +- payload = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); ++ payload = kmalloc(prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!payload) + goto error; + + /* attach the data */ +- memcpy(payload, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); + key->payload.data = payload; + ret = 0; + +diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +index 05f4dc2..f3c60e2 100644 +--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c ++++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +@@ -167,17 +167,17 @@ static struct shrinker cifs_shrinker = { + }; + + static int +-cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + char *payload; + +- payload = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); ++ payload = kmalloc(prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!payload) + return -ENOMEM; + +- memcpy(payload, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); + key->payload.data = payload; +- key->datalen = datalen; ++ key->datalen = prep->datalen; + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h +index bc9ec1d..5e452c8 100644 +--- a/include/keys/user-type.h ++++ b/include/keys/user-type.h +@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ struct user_key_payload { + extern struct key_type key_type_user; + extern struct key_type key_type_logon; + +-extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); +-extern int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); ++struct key_preparsed_payload; ++ ++extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + extern int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *criterion); + extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); + extern void user_destroy(struct key *key); +diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h +index f0c651c..518a53a 100644 +--- a/include/linux/key-type.h ++++ b/include/linux/key-type.h +@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct key_construction { + struct key *authkey;/* authorisation for key being constructed */ + }; + ++/* ++ * Pre-parsed payload, used by key add, update and instantiate. ++ * ++ * This struct will be cleared and data and datalen will be set with the data ++ * and length parameters from the caller and quotalen will be set from ++ * def_datalen from the key type. Then if the preparse() op is provided by the ++ * key type, that will be called. Then the struct will be passed to the ++ * instantiate() or the update() op. ++ * ++ * If the preparse() op is given, the free_preparse() op will be called to ++ * clear the contents. ++ */ ++struct key_preparsed_payload { ++ char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */ ++ void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */ ++ void *payload; /* Proposed payload */ ++ const void *data; /* Raw data */ ++ size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ ++ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ ++}; ++ + typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, + const char *op, void *aux); + +@@ -45,18 +66,28 @@ struct key_type { + /* vet a description */ + int (*vet_description)(const char *description); + ++ /* Preparse the data blob from userspace that is to be the payload, ++ * generating a proposed description and payload that will be handed to ++ * the instantiate() and update() ops. ++ */ ++ int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++ ++ /* Free a preparse data structure. ++ */ ++ void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++ + /* instantiate a key of this type + * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to determine if the + * user's quota will hold the payload + */ +- int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); ++ int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + + /* update a key of this type (optional) + * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to recalculate the + * quota consumption + * - the key must be locked against read when modifying + */ +- int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); ++ int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + + /* match a key against a description */ + int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc); +diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c +index 9da7fdd..af14cb4 100644 +--- a/net/ceph/crypto.c ++++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c +@@ -423,14 +423,15 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, + } + } + +-int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + int ret; + void *p; + + ret = -EINVAL; +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + goto err; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); +@@ -443,8 +444,8 @@ int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + goto err; + + /* TODO ceph_crypto_key_decode should really take const input */ +- p = (void *)data; +- ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)data+datalen); ++ p = (void *)prep->data; ++ ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)prep->data+datalen); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_ckey; + +diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +index d9507dd..859ab8b 100644 +--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c ++++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +@@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache; + * "ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar" + */ + static int +-dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *_data, size_t datalen) ++dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct user_key_payload *upayload; + unsigned long derrno; + int ret; +- size_t result_len = 0; +- const char *data = _data, *end, *opt; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0; ++ const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt; + + kenter("%%%d,%s,'%*.*s',%zu", + key->serial, key->description, +diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +index 8b1f9f4..106c5a6 100644 +--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c ++++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ + #include "ar-internal.h" + + static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *); +-static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); +-static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, const void *, size_t); ++static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); ++static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); + static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); + static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); + static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); +@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ error: + * + * if no data is provided, then a no-security key is made + */ +-static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + const struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 *v1; + struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pp; +@@ -686,26 +686,26 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + u32 kver; + int ret; + +- _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), datalen); ++ _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); + + /* handle a no-security key */ +- if (!data && datalen == 0) ++ if (!prep->data && prep->datalen == 0) + return 0; + + /* determine if the XDR payload format is being used */ +- if (datalen > 7 * 4) { +- ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, data, datalen); ++ if (prep->datalen > 7 * 4) { ++ ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, prep->data, prep->datalen); + if (ret != -EPROTO) + return ret; + } + + /* get the key interface version number */ + ret = -EINVAL; +- if (datalen <= 4 || !data) ++ if (prep->datalen <= 4 || !prep->data) + goto error; +- memcpy(&kver, data, sizeof(kver)); +- data += sizeof(kver); +- datalen -= sizeof(kver); ++ memcpy(&kver, prep->data, sizeof(kver)); ++ prep->data += sizeof(kver); ++ prep->datalen -= sizeof(kver); + + _debug("KEY I/F VERSION: %u", kver); + +@@ -715,11 +715,11 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + + /* deal with a version 1 key */ + ret = -EINVAL; +- if (datalen < sizeof(*v1)) ++ if (prep->datalen < sizeof(*v1)) + goto error; + +- v1 = data; +- if (datalen != sizeof(*v1) + v1->ticket_length) ++ v1 = prep->data; ++ if (prep->datalen != sizeof(*v1) + v1->ticket_length) + goto error; + + _debug("SCIX: %u", v1->security_index); +@@ -784,17 +784,17 @@ error: + * instantiate a server secret key + * data should be a pointer to the 8-byte secret key + */ +-static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, const void *data, +- size_t datalen) ++static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct crypto_blkcipher *ci; + +- _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), datalen); ++ _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); + +- if (datalen != 8) ++ if (prep->datalen != 8) + return -EINVAL; + +- memcpy(&key->type_data, data, 8); ++ memcpy(&key->type_data, prep->data, 8); + + ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(ci)) { +@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, const void *data, + return PTR_ERR(ci); + } + +- if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, data, 8) < 0) ++ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0) + BUG(); + + key->payload.data = ci; +diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +index 2d1bb8a..9e1e005 100644 +--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c ++++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +@@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +-static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, +- size_t datalen) ++static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; + char *datablob = NULL; +@@ -782,16 +782,17 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, + char *master_desc = NULL; + char *decrypted_datalen = NULL; + char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + int ret; + +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + datablob[datalen] = 0; +- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc, + &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv); + if (ret < 0) +@@ -834,16 +835,17 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +-static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; + char *buf; + char *new_master_desc = NULL; + const char *format = NULL; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + int ret = 0; + +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); +@@ -851,7 +853,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + return -ENOMEM; + + buf[datalen] = 0; +- memcpy(buf, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen); + ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; +diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c +index 50d96d4..1d039af 100644 +--- a/security/keys/key.c ++++ b/security/keys/key.c +@@ -412,8 +412,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); + * key_construction_mutex. + */ + static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, +- const void *data, +- size_t datalen, ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, + struct key *keyring, + struct key *authkey, + unsigned long *_prealloc) +@@ -431,7 +430,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, + /* can't instantiate twice */ + if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + /* instantiate the key */ +- ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen); ++ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); + + if (ret == 0) { + /* mark the key as being instantiated */ +@@ -482,22 +481,37 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, + struct key *keyring, + struct key *authkey) + { ++ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; + unsigned long prealloc; + int ret; + ++ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); ++ prep.data = data; ++ prep.datalen = datalen; ++ prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; ++ if (key->type->preparse) { ++ ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; ++ } ++ + if (keyring) { + ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, + &prealloc); + if (ret < 0) +- return ret; ++ goto error_free_preparse; + } + +- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey, ++ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, + &prealloc); + + if (keyring) + __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); + ++error_free_preparse: ++ if (key->type->preparse) ++ key->type->free_preparse(&prep); ++error: + return ret; + } + +@@ -706,7 +720,7 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype) + * if we get an error. + */ + static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, +- const void *payload, size_t plen) ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + int ret; +@@ -722,7 +736,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, + + down_write(&key->sem); + +- ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); ++ ret = key->type->update(key, prep); + if (ret == 0) + /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ + clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); +@@ -774,6 +788,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + unsigned long flags) + { + unsigned long prealloc; ++ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + struct key_type *ktype; + struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; +@@ -789,8 +804,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + } + + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); +- if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate) +- goto error_2; ++ if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate || ++ (!description && !ktype->preparse)) ++ goto error_put_type; + + keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); + +@@ -798,18 +814,37 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); + if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) +- goto error_2; ++ goto error_put_type; ++ ++ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); ++ prep.data = payload; ++ prep.datalen = plen; ++ prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen; ++ if (ktype->preparse) { ++ ret = ktype->preparse(&prep); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); ++ goto error_put_type; ++ } ++ if (!description) ++ description = prep.description; ++ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); ++ if (!description) ++ goto error_free_prep; ++ } + + ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); +- if (ret < 0) +- goto error_2; ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); ++ goto error_free_prep; ++ } + + /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have + * to modify the keyring */ + ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); +- goto error_3; ++ goto error_link_end; + } + + /* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing +@@ -840,25 +875,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + perm, flags); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); +- goto error_3; ++ goto error_link_end; + } + + /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ +- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL, +- &prealloc); ++ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc); + if (ret < 0) { + key_put(key); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); +- goto error_3; ++ goto error_link_end; + } + + key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); + +- error_3: ++error_link_end: + __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); +- error_2: ++error_free_prep: ++ if (ktype->preparse) ++ ktype->free_preparse(&prep); ++error_put_type: + key_type_put(ktype); +- error: ++error: + return key_ref; + + found_matching_key: +@@ -866,10 +903,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned + */ + __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); +- key_type_put(ktype); + +- key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen); +- goto error; ++ key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); ++ goto error_free_prep; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); + +@@ -888,6 +924,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); + */ + int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) + { ++ struct key_preparsed_payload prep; + struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + int ret; + +@@ -900,18 +937,31 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) + + /* attempt to update it if supported */ + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; +- if (key->type->update) { +- down_write(&key->sem); +- +- ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); +- if (ret == 0) +- /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ +- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); ++ if (!key->type->update) ++ goto error; + +- up_write(&key->sem); ++ memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); ++ prep.data = payload; ++ prep.datalen = plen; ++ prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; ++ if (key->type->preparse) { ++ ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; + } + +- error: ++ down_write(&key->sem); ++ ++ ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); ++ if (ret == 0) ++ /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ ++ clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); ++ ++ up_write(&key->sem); ++ ++ if (key->type->preparse) ++ key->type->free_preparse(&prep); ++error: + return ret; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); +diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c +index 3364fbf..505d40b 100644 +--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c ++++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c +@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type, + * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a + * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring. + * ++ * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to ++ * generate one from the payload. ++ * + * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it. + * + * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error +@@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + +- description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); +- if (IS_ERR(description)) { +- ret = PTR_ERR(description); +- goto error; ++ description = NULL; ++ if (_description) { ++ description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); ++ if (IS_ERR(description)) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(description); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ if (!*description) { ++ kfree(description); ++ description = NULL; ++ } + } + + /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ +diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c +index 81e7852..f04d8cf 100644 +--- a/security/keys/keyring.c ++++ b/security/keys/keyring.c +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) + * operations. + */ + static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, +- const void *data, size_t datalen); ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); + static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); + static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); +@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data. + */ + static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, +- const void *data, size_t datalen) ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + int ret; + + ret = -EINVAL; +- if (datalen == 0) { ++ if (prep->datalen == 0) { + /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ + keyring_publish_name(keyring); + ret = 0; +diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +index 60d4e3f..85730d5 100644 +--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c ++++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ + #include <asm/uaccess.h> + #include "internal.h" + +-static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); ++static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *); + static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); + static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); + static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); +@@ -42,10 +43,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = { + * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key. + */ + static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, +- const void *data, +- size_t datalen) ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { +- key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data; ++ key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c +index 2d5d041..42036c7 100644 +--- a/security/keys/trusted.c ++++ b/security/keys/trusted.c +@@ -927,22 +927,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +-static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, +- size_t datalen) ++static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, ++ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + int key_cmd; + +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; +- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + + options = trusted_options_alloc(); +@@ -1011,17 +1012,18 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) + /* + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values + */ +-static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; + struct trusted_key_options *new_o; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + + if (!p->migratable) + return -EPERM; +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); +@@ -1038,7 +1040,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + goto out; + } + +- memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); + if (ret != Opt_update) { +diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c +index c7660a2..55dc889 100644 +--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c ++++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c +@@ -58,13 +58,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon); + /* + * instantiate a user defined key + */ +-int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct user_key_payload *upayload; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + int ret; + + ret = -EINVAL; +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + goto error; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); +@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + + /* attach the data */ + upayload->datalen = datalen; +- memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); + ret = 0; + +@@ -92,13 +93,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); + * update a user defined key + * - the key's semaphore is write-locked + */ +-int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) ++int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { + struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap; ++ size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + int ret; + + ret = -EINVAL; +- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) ++ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + goto error; + + /* construct a replacement payload */ +@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) + goto error; + + upayload->datalen = datalen; +- memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); ++ memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); + + /* check the quota and attach the new data */ + zap = upayload; +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From a3f7dff6cbc2eb6be871a58fef34cacf7f78abf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 13:09:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 03/26] MPILIB: Provide count_leading/trailing_zeros() based + on arch functions + +Provide count_leading/trailing_zeros() macros based on extant arch bit scanning +functions rather than reimplementing from scratch in MPILIB. + +Whilst we're at it, turn count_foo_zeros(n, x) into n = count_foo_zeros(x). + +Also move the definition to asm-generic as other people may be interested in +using it. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> +Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> +Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.com> +--- + include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h | 57 +++++++++++++ + lib/mpi/longlong.h | 138 +------------------------------ + lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c | 2 +- + lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c | 4 +- + 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h + +diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h b/include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..97520d2 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h +@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ ++/* Count leading and trailing zeros functions ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_COUNT_ZEROS_H_ ++#define _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_COUNT_ZEROS_H_ ++ ++#include <asm/bitops.h> ++ ++/** ++ * count_leading_zeros - Count the number of zeros from the MSB back ++ * @x: The value ++ * ++ * Count the number of leading zeros from the MSB going towards the LSB in @x. ++ * ++ * If the MSB of @x is set, the result is 0. ++ * If only the LSB of @x is set, then the result is BITS_PER_LONG-1. ++ * If @x is 0 then the result is COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0. ++ */ ++static inline int count_leading_zeros(unsigned long x) ++{ ++ if (sizeof(x) == 4) ++ return BITS_PER_LONG - fls(x); ++ else ++ return BITS_PER_LONG - fls64(x); ++} ++ ++#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 BITS_PER_LONG ++ ++/** ++ * count_trailing_zeros - Count the number of zeros from the LSB forwards ++ * @x: The value ++ * ++ * Count the number of trailing zeros from the LSB going towards the MSB in @x. ++ * ++ * If the LSB of @x is set, the result is 0. ++ * If only the MSB of @x is set, then the result is BITS_PER_LONG-1. ++ * If @x is 0 then the result is COUNT_TRAILING_ZEROS_0. ++ */ ++static inline int count_trailing_zeros(unsigned long x) ++{ ++#define COUNT_TRAILING_ZEROS_0 (-1) ++ ++ if (sizeof(x) == 4) ++ return ffs(x); ++ else ++ return (x != 0) ? __ffs(x) : COUNT_TRAILING_ZEROS_0; ++} ++ ++#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_BITOPS_COUNT_ZEROS_H_ */ +diff --git a/lib/mpi/longlong.h b/lib/mpi/longlong.h +index 29f9862..678ce4f 100644 +--- a/lib/mpi/longlong.h ++++ b/lib/mpi/longlong.h +@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ + * the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, + * MA 02111-1307, USA. */ + ++#include <asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h> ++ + /* You have to define the following before including this file: + * + * UWtype -- An unsigned type, default type for operations (typically a "word") +@@ -146,12 +148,6 @@ do { \ + : "1" ((USItype)(n1)), \ + "r" ((USItype)(n0)), \ + "r" ((USItype)(d))) +- +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +- __asm__ ("clz %0,%1" \ +- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(x))) +-#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 32 + #endif /* __a29k__ */ + + #if defined(__alpha) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 64 +@@ -298,11 +294,6 @@ extern UDItype __udiv_qrnnd(); + : "1" ((USItype)(nh)), \ + "0" ((USItype)(nl)), \ + "g" ((USItype)(d))) +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +- __asm__ ("bsch/1 %1,%0" \ +- : "=g" (count) \ +- : "g" ((USItype)(x)), \ +- "0" ((USItype)0)) + #endif + + /*************************************** +@@ -354,27 +345,6 @@ do { USItype __r; \ + } while (0) + extern USItype __udiv_qrnnd(); + #endif /* LONGLONG_STANDALONE */ +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- USItype __tmp; \ +- __asm__ ( \ +- "ldi 1,%0\n" \ +- "extru,= %1,15,16,%%r0 ; Bits 31..16 zero?\n" \ +- "extru,tr %1,15,16,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ +- "ldo 16(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ +- "extru,= %1,23,8,%%r0 ; Bits 15..8 zero?\n" \ +- "extru,tr %1,23,8,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ +- "ldo 8(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ +- "extru,= %1,27,4,%%r0 ; Bits 7..4 zero?\n" \ +- "extru,tr %1,27,4,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ +- "ldo 4(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ +- "extru,= %1,29,2,%%r0 ; Bits 3..2 zero?\n" \ +- "extru,tr %1,29,2,%1 ; No. Shift down, skip add.\n" \ +- "ldo 2(%0),%0 ; Yes. Perform add.\n" \ +- "extru %1,30,1,%1 ; Extract bit 1.\n" \ +- "sub %0,%1,%0 ; Subtract it. " \ +- : "=r" (count), "=r" (__tmp) : "1" (x)); \ +-} while (0) + #endif /* hppa */ + + /*************************************** +@@ -457,15 +427,6 @@ do { \ + : "0" ((USItype)(n0)), \ + "1" ((USItype)(n1)), \ + "rm" ((USItype)(d))) +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- USItype __cbtmp; \ +- __asm__ ("bsrl %1,%0" \ +- : "=r" (__cbtmp) : "rm" ((USItype)(x))); \ +- (count) = __cbtmp ^ 31; \ +-} while (0) +-#define count_trailing_zeros(count, x) \ +- __asm__ ("bsfl %1,%0" : "=r" (count) : "rm" ((USItype)(x))) + #ifndef UMUL_TIME + #define UMUL_TIME 40 + #endif +@@ -536,15 +497,6 @@ do { \ + "dI" ((USItype)(d))); \ + (r) = __rq.__i.__l; (q) = __rq.__i.__h; \ + } while (0) +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- USItype __cbtmp; \ +- __asm__ ("scanbit %1,%0" \ +- : "=r" (__cbtmp) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(x))); \ +- (count) = __cbtmp ^ 31; \ +-} while (0) +-#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 (-32) /* sic */ + #if defined(__i960mx) /* what is the proper symbol to test??? */ + #define rshift_rhlc(r, h, l, c) \ + do { \ +@@ -603,11 +555,6 @@ do { \ + : "0" ((USItype)(n0)), \ + "1" ((USItype)(n1)), \ + "dmi" ((USItype)(d))) +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +- __asm__ ("bfffo %1{%b2:%b2},%0" \ +- : "=d" ((USItype)(count)) \ +- : "od" ((USItype)(x)), "n" (0)) +-#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 32 + #else /* not mc68020 */ + #define umul_ppmm(xh, xl, a, b) \ + do { USItype __umul_tmp1, __umul_tmp2; \ +@@ -664,15 +611,6 @@ do { USItype __umul_tmp1, __umul_tmp2; \ + "rJ" ((USItype)(bh)), \ + "rJ" ((USItype)(al)), \ + "rJ" ((USItype)(bl))) +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- USItype __cbtmp; \ +- __asm__ ("ff1 %0,%1" \ +- : "=r" (__cbtmp) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(x))); \ +- (count) = __cbtmp ^ 31; \ +-} while (0) +-#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 63 /* sic */ + #if defined(__m88110__) + #define umul_ppmm(wh, wl, u, v) \ + do { \ +@@ -779,12 +717,6 @@ do { \ + : "0" (__xx.__ll), \ + "g" ((USItype)(d))); \ + (r) = __xx.__i.__l; (q) = __xx.__i.__h; }) +-#define count_trailing_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- __asm__("ffsd %2,%0" \ +- : "=r"((USItype) (count)) \ +- : "0"((USItype) 0), "r"((USItype) (x))); \ +- } while (0) + #endif /* __ns32000__ */ + + /*************************************** +@@ -855,11 +787,6 @@ do { \ + "rI" ((USItype)(al)), \ + "r" ((USItype)(bl))); \ + } while (0) +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +- __asm__ ("{cntlz|cntlzw} %0,%1" \ +- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(x))) +-#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 32 + #if defined(_ARCH_PPC) + #define umul_ppmm(ph, pl, m0, m1) \ + do { \ +@@ -1001,19 +928,6 @@ do { \ + } while (0) + #define UMUL_TIME 20 + #define UDIV_TIME 200 +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- if ((x) >= 0x10000) \ +- __asm__ ("clz %0,%1" \ +- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(x) >> 16)); \ +- else { \ +- __asm__ ("clz %0,%1" \ +- : "=r" ((USItype)(count)) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(x))); \ +- (count) += 16; \ +- } \ +-} while (0) + #endif /* RT/ROMP */ + + /*************************************** +@@ -1142,13 +1056,6 @@ do { \ + "rI" ((USItype)(d)) \ + : "%g1" __AND_CLOBBER_CC) + #define UDIV_TIME 37 +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +- __asm__ ("scan %1,0,%0" \ +- : "=r" ((USItype)(x)) \ +- : "r" ((USItype)(count))) +-/* Early sparclites return 63 for an argument of 0, but they warn that future +- implementations might change this. Therefore, leave COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 +- undefined. */ + #endif /* __sparclite__ */ + #endif /* __sparc_v8__ */ + /* Default to sparc v7 versions of umul_ppmm and udiv_qrnnd. */ +@@ -1454,47 +1361,6 @@ do { \ + #define udiv_qrnnd __udiv_qrnnd_c + #endif + +-#undef count_leading_zeros +-#if !defined(count_leading_zeros) +- extern +-#ifdef __STDC__ +- const +-#endif +- unsigned char __clz_tab[]; +-#define count_leading_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- UWtype __xr = (x); \ +- UWtype __a; \ +- \ +- if (W_TYPE_SIZE <= 32) { \ +- __a = __xr < ((UWtype) 1 << 2*__BITS4) \ +- ? (__xr < ((UWtype) 1 << __BITS4) ? 0 : __BITS4) \ +- : (__xr < ((UWtype) 1 << 3*__BITS4) ? 2*__BITS4 : 3*__BITS4); \ +- } \ +- else { \ +- for (__a = W_TYPE_SIZE - 8; __a > 0; __a -= 8) \ +- if (((__xr >> __a) & 0xff) != 0) \ +- break; \ +- } \ +- \ +- (count) = W_TYPE_SIZE - (__clz_tab[__xr >> __a] + __a); \ +-} while (0) +- /* This version gives a well-defined value for zero. */ +-#define COUNT_LEADING_ZEROS_0 W_TYPE_SIZE +-#endif +- +-#if !defined(count_trailing_zeros) +-/* Define count_trailing_zeros using count_leading_zeros. The latter might be +- defined in asm, but if it is not, the C version above is good enough. */ +-#define count_trailing_zeros(count, x) \ +-do { \ +- UWtype __ctz_x = (x); \ +- UWtype __ctz_c; \ +- count_leading_zeros(__ctz_c, __ctz_x & -__ctz_x); \ +- (count) = W_TYPE_SIZE - 1 - __ctz_c; \ +-} while (0) +-#endif +- + #ifndef UDIV_NEEDS_NORMALIZATION + #define UDIV_NEEDS_NORMALIZATION 0 + #endif +diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c +index 5687248..503537e 100644 +--- a/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c ++++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c +@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ unsigned mpi_get_nbits(MPI a) + if (a->nlimbs) { + mpi_limb_t alimb = a->d[a->nlimbs - 1]; + if (alimb) +- count_leading_zeros(n, alimb); ++ n = count_leading_zeros(alimb); + else + n = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB; + n = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - n + (a->nlimbs - 1) * BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB; +diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c +index 67f3e79..5464c87 100644 +--- a/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c ++++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c +@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod) + mp = mp_marker = mpi_alloc_limb_space(msize); + if (!mp) + goto enomem; +- count_leading_zeros(mod_shift_cnt, mod->d[msize - 1]); ++ mod_shift_cnt = count_leading_zeros(mod->d[msize - 1]); + if (mod_shift_cnt) + mpihelp_lshift(mp, mod->d, msize, mod_shift_cnt); + else +@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod) + + i = esize - 1; + e = ep[i]; +- count_leading_zeros(c, e); ++ c = count_leading_zeros(e); + e = (e << c) << 1; /* shift the exp bits to the left, lose msb */ + c = BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1 - c; + +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 79e4c942f35117b405402acf0f075ff79260e546 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 15:17:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 04/26] KEYS: Document asymmetric key type + +In-source documentation for the asymmetric key type. This will be located in: + + Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt | 312 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 312 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt + +diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b767590 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt +@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ ++ ============================================= ++ ASYMMETRIC / PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY KEY TYPE ++ ============================================= ++ ++Contents: ++ ++ - Overview. ++ - Key identification. ++ - Accessing asymmetric keys. ++ - Signature verification. ++ - Asymmetric key subtypes. ++ - Instantiation data parsers. ++ ++ ++======== ++OVERVIEW ++======== ++ ++The "asymmetric" key type is designed to be a container for the keys used in ++public-key cryptography, without imposing any particular restrictions on the ++form or mechanism of the cryptography or form of the key. ++ ++The asymmetric key is given a subtype that defines what sort of data is ++associated with the key and provides operations to describe and destroy it. ++However, no requirement is made that the key data actually be stored in the ++key. ++ ++A completely in-kernel key retention and operation subtype can be defined, but ++it would also be possible to provide access to cryptographic hardware (such as ++a TPM) that might be used to both retain the relevant key and perform ++operations using that key. In such a case, the asymmetric key would then ++merely be an interface to the TPM driver. ++ ++Also provided is the concept of a data parser. Data parsers are responsible ++for extracting information from the blobs of data passed to the instantiation ++function. The first data parser that recognises the blob gets to set the ++subtype of the key and define the operations that can be done on that key. ++ ++A data parser may interpret the data blob as containing the bits representing a ++key, or it may interpret it as a reference to a key held somewhere else in the ++system (for example, a TPM). ++ ++ ++================== ++KEY IDENTIFICATION ++================== ++ ++If a key is added with an empty name, the instantiation data parsers are given ++the opportunity to pre-parse a key and to determine the description the key ++should be given from the content of the key. ++ ++This can then be used to refer to the key, either by complete match or by ++partial match. The key type may also use other criteria to refer to a key. ++ ++The asymmetric key type's match function can then perform a wider range of ++comparisons than just the straightforward comparison of the description with ++the criterion string: ++ ++ (1) If the criterion string is of the form "id:<hexdigits>" then the match ++ function will examine a key's fingerprint to see if the hex digits given ++ after the "id:" match the tail. For instance: ++ ++ keyctl search @s asymmetric id:5acc2142 ++ ++ will match a key with fingerprint: ++ ++ 1A00 2040 7601 7889 DE11 882C 3823 04AD 5ACC 2142 ++ ++ (2) If the criterion string is of the form "<subtype>:<hexdigits>" then the ++ match will match the ID as in (1), but with the added restriction that ++ only keys of the specified subtype (e.g. tpm) will be matched. For ++ instance: ++ ++ keyctl search @s asymmetric tpm:5acc2142 ++ ++Looking in /proc/keys, the last 8 hex digits of the key fingerprint are ++displayed, along with the subtype: ++ ++ 1a39e171 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 asymmetri modsign.0: DSA 5acc2142 [] ++ ++ ++========================= ++ACCESSING ASYMMETRIC KEYS ++========================= ++ ++For general access to asymmetric keys from within the kernel, the following ++inclusion is required: ++ ++ #include <crypto/public_key.h> ++ ++This gives access to functions for dealing with asymmetric / public keys. ++Three enums are defined there for representing public-key cryptography ++algorithms: ++ ++ enum pkey_algo ++ ++digest algorithms used by those: ++ ++ enum pkey_hash_algo ++ ++and key identifier representations: ++ ++ enum pkey_id_type ++ ++Note that the key type representation types are required because key ++identifiers from different standards aren't necessarily compatible. For ++instance, PGP generates key identifiers by hashing the key data plus some ++PGP-specific metadata, whereas X.509 has arbitrary certificate identifiers. ++ ++The operations defined upon a key are: ++ ++ (1) Signature verification. ++ ++Other operations are possible (such as encryption) with the same key data ++required for verification, but not currently supported, and others ++(eg. decryption and signature generation) require extra key data. ++ ++ ++SIGNATURE VERIFICATION ++---------------------- ++ ++An operation is provided to perform cryptographic signature verification, using ++an asymmetric key to provide or to provide access to the public key. ++ ++ int verify_signature(const struct key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig); ++ ++The caller must have already obtained the key from some source and can then use ++it to check the signature. The caller must have parsed the signature and ++transferred the relevant bits to the structure pointed to by sig. ++ ++ struct public_key_signature { ++ u8 *digest; ++ u8 digest_size; ++ enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; ++ u8 nr_mpi; ++ union { ++ MPI mpi[2]; ++ ... ++ }; ++ }; ++ ++The algorithm used must be noted in sig->pkey_hash_algo, and all the MPIs that ++make up the actual signature must be stored in sig->mpi[] and the count of MPIs ++placed in sig->nr_mpi. ++ ++In addition, the data must have been digested by the caller and the resulting ++hash must be pointed to by sig->digest and the size of the hash be placed in ++sig->digest_size. ++ ++The function will return 0 upon success or -EKEYREJECTED if the signature ++doesn't match. ++ ++The function may also return -ENOTSUPP if an unsupported public-key algorithm ++or public-key/hash algorithm combination is specified or the key doesn't ++support the operation; -EBADMSG or -ERANGE if some of the parameters have weird ++data; or -ENOMEM if an allocation can't be performed. -EINVAL can be returned ++if the key argument is the wrong type or is incompletely set up. ++ ++ ++======================= ++ASYMMETRIC KEY SUBTYPES ++======================= ++ ++Asymmetric keys have a subtype that defines the set of operations that can be ++performed on that key and that determines what data is attached as the key ++payload. The payload format is entirely at the whim of the subtype. ++ ++The subtype is selected by the key data parser and the parser must initialise ++the data required for it. The asymmetric key retains a reference on the ++subtype module. ++ ++The subtype definition structure can be found in: ++ ++ #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> ++ ++and looks like the following: ++ ++ struct asymmetric_key_subtype { ++ struct module *owner; ++ const char *name; ++ ++ void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m); ++ void (*destroy)(void *payload); ++ int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig); ++ }; ++ ++Asymmetric keys point to this with their type_data[0] member. ++ ++The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of ++the subtype. Currently, the name is only used for print statements. ++ ++There are a number of operations defined by the subtype: ++ ++ (1) describe(). ++ ++ Mandatory. This allows the subtype to display something in /proc/keys ++ against the key. For instance the name of the public key algorithm type ++ could be displayed. The key type will display the tail of the key ++ identity string after this. ++ ++ (2) destroy(). ++ ++ Mandatory. This should free the memory associated with the key. The ++ asymmetric key will look after freeing the fingerprint and releasing the ++ reference on the subtype module. ++ ++ (3) verify_signature(). ++ ++ Optional. These are the entry points for the key usage operations. ++ Currently there is only the one defined. If not set, the caller will be ++ given -ENOTSUPP. The subtype may do anything it likes to implement an ++ operation, including offloading to hardware. ++ ++ ++========================== ++INSTANTIATION DATA PARSERS ++========================== ++ ++The asymmetric key type doesn't generally want to store or to deal with a raw ++blob of data that holds the key data. It would have to parse it and error ++check it each time it wanted to use it. Further, the contents of the blob may ++have various checks that can be performed on it (eg. self-signatures, validity ++dates) and may contain useful data about the key (identifiers, capabilities). ++ ++Also, the blob may represent a pointer to some hardware containing the key ++rather than the key itself. ++ ++Examples of blob formats for which parsers could be implemented include: ++ ++ - OpenPGP packet stream [RFC 4880]. ++ - X.509 ASN.1 stream. ++ - Pointer to TPM key. ++ - Pointer to UEFI key. ++ ++During key instantiation each parser in the list is tried until one doesn't ++return -EBADMSG. ++ ++The parser definition structure can be found in: ++ ++ #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> ++ ++and looks like the following: ++ ++ struct asymmetric_key_parser { ++ struct module *owner; ++ const char *name; ++ ++ int (*parse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++ }; ++ ++The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of ++the parser. ++ ++There is currently only a single operation defined by the parser, and it is ++mandatory: ++ ++ (1) parse(). ++ ++ This is called to preparse the key from the key creation and update paths. ++ In particular, it is called during the key creation _before_ a key is ++ allocated, and as such, is permitted to provide the key's description in ++ the case that the caller declines to do so. ++ ++ The caller passes a pointer to the following struct with all of the fields ++ cleared, except for data, datalen and quotalen [see ++ Documentation/security/keys.txt]. ++ ++ struct key_preparsed_payload { ++ char *description; ++ void *type_data[2]; ++ void *payload; ++ const void *data; ++ size_t datalen; ++ size_t quotalen; ++ }; ++ ++ The instantiation data is in a blob pointed to by data and is datalen in ++ size. The parse() function is not permitted to change these two values at ++ all, and shouldn't change any of the other values _unless_ they are ++ recognise the blob format and will not return -EBADMSG to indicate it is ++ not theirs. ++ ++ If the parser is happy with the blob, it should propose a description for ++ the key and attach it to ->description, ->type_data[0] should be set to ++ point to the subtype to be used, ->payload should be set to point to the ++ initialised data for that subtype, ->type_data[1] should point to a hex ++ fingerprint and quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this ++ key should account for. ++ ++ When clearing up, the data attached to ->type_data[1] and ->description ++ will be kfree()'d and the data attached to ->payload will be passed to the ++ subtype's ->destroy() method to be disposed of. A module reference for ++ the subtype pointed to by ->type_data[0] will be put. ++ ++ ++ If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned. If it ++ is recognised, but the key cannot for some reason be set up, some other ++ negative error code should be returned. On success, 0 should be returned. ++ ++ The key's fingerprint string may be partially matched upon. For a ++ public-key algorithm such as RSA and DSA this will likely be a printable ++ hex version of the key's fingerprint. ++ ++Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers: ++ ++ int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser); ++ void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *subtype); ++ ++Parsers may not have the same name. The names are otherwise only used for ++displaying in debugging messages. +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 2fb78e0d337ac41f2cddad18fc5c34374e5298ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 15:17:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 05/26] KEYS: Implement asymmetric key type + +Create a key type that can be used to represent an asymmetric key type for use +in appropriate cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption, +signature generation and signature verification. + +The key type is "asymmetric" and can provide access to a variety of +cryptographic algorithms. + +Possibly, this would be better as "public_key" - but that has the disadvantage +that "public key" is an overloaded term. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/Kconfig | 1 + + crypto/Makefile | 1 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 13 +++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 7 ++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 15 +++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h | 55 +++++++++++ + include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 25 +++++ + 8 files changed, 273 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c + create mode 100644 include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h + create mode 100644 include/keys/asymmetric-type.h + +diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig +index a323805..1ca0b24 100644 +--- a/crypto/Kconfig ++++ b/crypto/Kconfig +@@ -1043,5 +1043,6 @@ config CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER + key cipher algorithms. + + source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig" ++source crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig + + endif # if CRYPTO +diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile +index 30f33d6..ced472e 100644 +--- a/crypto/Makefile ++++ b/crypto/Makefile +@@ -96,3 +96,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) += algif_skcipher.o + # + obj-$(CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS) += xor.o + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE) += async_tx/ ++obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys/ +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..cad29b3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ ++menuconfig ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE ++ tristate "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type" ++ depends on KEYS ++ help ++ This option provides support for a key type that holds the data for ++ the asymmetric keys used for public key cryptographic operations such ++ as encryption, decryption, signature generation and signature ++ verification. ++ ++if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE ++ ++ ++endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b725bcc +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ ++# ++# Makefile for asymmetric cryptographic keys ++# ++ ++obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o ++ ++asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..515b634 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ ++/* Internal definitions for asymmetric key type ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key) ++{ ++ return key->type_data.p[1]; ++} +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..bfb0424 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ ++/* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key type ++ * ++ * See Documentation/security/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> ++#include <linux/seq_file.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include "asymmetric_keys.h" ++ ++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); ++ ++/* ++ * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name ++ * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow: ++ * ++ * "<desc>" - request a key by description ++ * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID ++ * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype ++ */ ++static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) ++{ ++ const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); ++ const char *spec = description; ++ const char *id, *kid; ++ ptrdiff_t speclen; ++ size_t idlen, kidlen; ++ ++ if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* See if the full key description matches as is */ ++ if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) ++ return 1; ++ ++ /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a ++ * specifier, a colon and then an identifier. ++ */ ++ id = strchr(spec, ':'); ++ if (!id) ++ return 0; ++ ++ speclen = id - spec; ++ id++; ++ ++ /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */ ++ kid = asymmetric_key_id(key); ++ if (!kid) ++ return 0; ++ ++ idlen = strlen(id); ++ kidlen = strlen(kid); ++ if (idlen > kidlen) ++ return 0; ++ ++ kid += kidlen - idlen; ++ if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (speclen == 2 && ++ memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (speclen == subtype->name_len && ++ memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Describe the asymmetric key ++ */ ++static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) ++{ ++ const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); ++ const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key); ++ size_t n; ++ ++ seq_puts(m, key->description); ++ ++ if (subtype) { ++ seq_puts(m, ": "); ++ subtype->describe(key, m); ++ ++ if (kid) { ++ seq_putc(m, ' '); ++ n = strlen(kid); ++ if (n <= 8) ++ seq_puts(m, kid); ++ else ++ seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8); ++ } ++ ++ seq_puts(m, " ["); ++ /* put something here to indicate the key's capabilities */ ++ seq_putc(m, ']'); ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Instantiate a asymmetric_key defined key. The key was preparsed, so we just ++ * have to transfer the data here. ++ */ ++static int asymmetric_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ++{ ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key ++ */ ++static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key) ++{ ++ struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); ++ if (subtype) { ++ subtype->destroy(key->payload.data); ++ module_put(subtype->owner); ++ key->type_data.p[0] = NULL; ++ } ++ kfree(key->type_data.p[1]); ++ key->type_data.p[1] = NULL; ++} ++ ++struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { ++ .name = "asymmetric", ++ .instantiate = asymmetric_key_instantiate, ++ .match = asymmetric_key_match, ++ .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, ++ .describe = asymmetric_key_describe, ++}; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric); ++ ++/* ++ * Module stuff ++ */ ++static int __init asymmetric_key_init(void) ++{ ++ return register_key_type(&key_type_asymmetric); ++} ++ ++static void __exit asymmetric_key_cleanup(void) ++{ ++ unregister_key_type(&key_type_asymmetric); ++} ++ ++module_init(asymmetric_key_init); ++module_exit(asymmetric_key_cleanup); +diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..4b840e8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h +@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ ++/* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key subtype ++ * ++ * See Documentation/security/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H ++#define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H ++ ++#include <linux/seq_file.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> ++ ++struct public_key_signature; ++ ++/* ++ * Keys of this type declare a subtype that indicates the handlers and ++ * capabilities. ++ */ ++struct asymmetric_key_subtype { ++ struct module *owner; ++ const char *name; ++ unsigned short name_len; /* length of name */ ++ ++ /* Describe a key of this subtype for /proc/keys */ ++ void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m); ++ ++ /* Destroy a key of this subtype */ ++ void (*destroy)(void *payload); ++ ++ /* Verify the signature on a key of this subtype (optional) */ ++ int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig); ++}; ++ ++/** ++ * asymmetric_key_subtype - Get the subtype from an asymmetric key ++ * @key: The key of interest. ++ * ++ * Retrieves and returns the subtype pointer of the asymmetric key from the ++ * type-specific data attached to the key. ++ */ ++static inline ++struct asymmetric_key_subtype *asymmetric_key_subtype(const struct key *key) ++{ ++ return key->type_data.p[0]; ++} ++ ++#endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H */ +diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..7dd4734 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ ++/* Asymmetric Public-key cryptography key type interface ++ * ++ * See Documentation/security/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_TYPE_H ++#define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_TYPE_H ++ ++#include <linux/key-type.h> ++ ++extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric; ++ ++/* ++ * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. ++ */ ++ ++#endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_TYPE_H */ +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From d28ffd9e0c8987e5af59ae38bb48779b0d221f00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 15:17:32 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 06/26] KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers + +The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be +formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format +the data. + +The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter +is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful +when dealing with, say, eCryptfs. + +Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate +hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live +unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of +the hardware. + +From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example, +an X.509 binary certificate: + + keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem + +or a PGP key: + + keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub + +or a pointer into the contents of the TPM: + + keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s + +Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to +examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get +to: + + (1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL. + + (2) Specify the key subtype. + + (3) Provide the data for the subtype. + +The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus +before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data +into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is +successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h | 37 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +index bfb0424..cf80765 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> + #include <linux/seq_file.h> + #include <linux/module.h> + #include <linux/slab.h> +@@ -18,6 +19,9 @@ + + MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + ++static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers); ++static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ + /* + * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name + * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow: +@@ -107,12 +111,79 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) + } + + /* ++ * Preparse a asymmetric payload to get format the contents appropriately for the ++ * internal payload to cut down on the number of scans of the data performed. ++ * ++ * We also generate a proposed description from the contents of the key that ++ * can be used to name the key if the user doesn't want to provide one. ++ */ ++static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ++{ ++ struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser; ++ int ret; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ++ ++ if (prep->datalen == 0) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ down_read(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ ++ ret = -EBADMSG; ++ list_for_each_entry(parser, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) { ++ pr_debug("Trying parser '%s'\n", parser->name); ++ ++ ret = parser->parse(prep); ++ if (ret != -EBADMSG) { ++ pr_debug("Parser recognised the format (ret %d)\n", ++ ret); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ up_read(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Clean up the preparse data ++ */ ++static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ++{ ++ struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0]; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ++ ++ if (subtype) { ++ subtype->destroy(prep->payload); ++ module_put(subtype->owner); ++ } ++ kfree(prep->type_data[1]); ++ kfree(prep->description); ++} ++ ++/* + * Instantiate a asymmetric_key defined key. The key was preparsed, so we just + * have to transfer the data here. + */ + static int asymmetric_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) + { +- return -EOPNOTSUPP; ++ int ret; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ++ ++ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen); ++ if (ret == 0) { ++ key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0]; ++ key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1]; ++ key->payload.data = prep->payload; ++ prep->type_data[0] = NULL; ++ prep->type_data[1] = NULL; ++ prep->payload = NULL; ++ } ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); ++ return ret; + } + + /* +@@ -132,6 +203,8 @@ static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key) + + struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { + .name = "asymmetric", ++ .preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse, ++ .free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse, + .instantiate = asymmetric_key_instantiate, + .match = asymmetric_key_match, + .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, +@@ -139,6 +212,51 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { + }; + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric); + ++/** ++ * register_asymmetric_key_parser - Register a asymmetric key blob parser ++ * @parser: The parser to register ++ */ ++int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser) ++{ ++ struct asymmetric_key_parser *cursor; ++ int ret; ++ ++ down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ ++ list_for_each_entry(cursor, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) { ++ if (strcmp(cursor->name, parser->name) == 0) { ++ pr_err("Asymmetric key parser '%s' already registered\n", ++ parser->name); ++ ret = -EEXIST; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ list_add_tail(&parser->link, &asymmetric_key_parsers); ++ ++ pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' registered\n", parser->name); ++ ret = 0; ++ ++out: ++ up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ return ret; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_asymmetric_key_parser); ++ ++/** ++ * unregister_asymmetric_key_parser - Unregister a asymmetric key blob parser ++ * @parser: The parser to unregister ++ */ ++void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser) ++{ ++ down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ list_del(&parser->link); ++ up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); ++ ++ pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' unregistered\n", parser->name); ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_asymmetric_key_parser); ++ + /* + * Module stuff + */ +diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..09b3b48 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h +@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ ++/* Asymmetric public-key cryptography data parser ++ * ++ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_PARSER_H ++#define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_PARSER_H ++ ++/* ++ * Key data parser. Called during key instantiation. ++ */ ++struct asymmetric_key_parser { ++ struct list_head link; ++ struct module *owner; ++ const char *name; ++ ++ /* Attempt to parse a key from the data blob passed to add_key() or ++ * keyctl_instantiate(). Should also generate a proposed description ++ * that the caller can optionally use for the key. ++ * ++ * Return EBADMSG if not recognised. ++ */ ++ int (*parse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); ++}; ++ ++extern int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *); ++extern void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *); ++ ++#endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_PARSER_H */ +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 171881bb3693176db4d0f85f78066fcdb6266525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:24:55 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 07/26] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key + subtype + +Add a subtype for supporting asymmetric public-key encryption algorithms such +as DSA (FIPS-186) and RSA (PKCS#1 / RFC1337). + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 8 +++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 2 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h | 28 ++++++++++ + include/crypto/public_key.h | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 250 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h + create mode 100644 include/crypto/public_key.h + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +index cad29b3..bbfccaa 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +@@ -9,5 +9,13 @@ menuconfig ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + + if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + ++config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE ++ tristate "Asymmetric public-key crypto algorithm subtype" ++ select MPILIB ++ help ++ This option provides support for asymmetric public key type handling. ++ If signature generation and/or verification are to be used, ++ appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available. ++ ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. + + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +index b725bcc..5ed46ee 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +@@ -5,3 +5,5 @@ + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o + + asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o ++ ++obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..cb2e291 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ ++/* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype ++ * ++ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/export.h> ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/seq_file.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> ++#include "public_key.h" ++ ++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); ++ ++const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { ++ [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "DSA", ++ [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "RSA", ++}; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo); ++ ++const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { ++ [PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4", ++ [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5", ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = "sha1", ++ [PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = "rmd160", ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = "sha256", ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = "sha384", ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = "sha512", ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = "sha224", ++}; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo); ++ ++const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = { ++ [PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP", ++ [PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509", ++}; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type); ++ ++/* ++ * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys. ++ */ ++static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, ++ struct seq_file *m) ++{ ++ struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data; ++ ++ if (key) ++ seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", ++ pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy a public key algorithm key. ++ */ ++void public_key_destroy(void *payload) ++{ ++ struct public_key *key = payload; ++ int i; ++ ++ if (key) { ++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->mpi); i++) ++ mpi_free(key->mpi[i]); ++ kfree(key); ++ } ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy); ++ ++/* ++ * Verify a signature using a public key. ++ */ ++static int public_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig) ++{ ++ const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data; ++ ++ if (!pk->algo->verify_signature) ++ return -ENOTSUPP; ++ ++ if (sig->nr_mpi != pk->algo->n_sig_mpi) { ++ pr_debug("Signature has %u MPI not %u\n", ++ sig->nr_mpi, pk->algo->n_sig_mpi); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ return pk->algo->verify_signature(pk, sig); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Public key algorithm asymmetric key subtype ++ */ ++struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = { ++ .owner = THIS_MODULE, ++ .name = "public_key", ++ .describe = public_key_describe, ++ .destroy = public_key_destroy, ++ .verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature, ++}; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype); +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..1f86aad +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++/* Public key algorithm internals ++ * ++ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <crypto/public_key.h> ++ ++extern struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype; ++ ++/* ++ * Public key algorithm definition. ++ */ ++struct public_key_algorithm { ++ const char *name; ++ u8 n_pub_mpi; /* Number of MPIs in public key */ ++ u8 n_sec_mpi; /* Number of MPIs in secret key */ ++ u8 n_sig_mpi; /* Number of MPIs in a signature */ ++ int (*verify_signature)(const struct public_key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig); ++}; +diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..4b8b6c1 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h +@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ ++/* Asymmetric public-key algorithm definitions ++ * ++ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H ++#define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H ++ ++#include <linux/mpi.h> ++ ++enum pkey_algo { ++ PKEY_ALGO_DSA, ++ PKEY_ALGO_RSA, ++ PKEY_ALGO__LAST ++}; ++ ++extern const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST]; ++ ++enum pkey_hash_algo { ++ PKEY_HASH_MD4, ++ PKEY_HASH_MD5, ++ PKEY_HASH_SHA1, ++ PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160, ++ PKEY_HASH_SHA256, ++ PKEY_HASH_SHA384, ++ PKEY_HASH_SHA512, ++ PKEY_HASH_SHA224, ++ PKEY_HASH__LAST ++}; ++ ++extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST]; ++ ++enum pkey_id_type { ++ PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ ++ PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ ++ PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST ++}; ++ ++extern const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST]; ++ ++/* ++ * Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type. ++ * ++ * Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public ++ * part. ++ */ ++struct public_key { ++ const struct public_key_algorithm *algo; ++ u8 capabilities; ++#define PKEY_CAN_ENCRYPT 0x01 ++#define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT 0x02 ++#define PKEY_CAN_SIGN 0x04 ++#define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY 0x08 ++ enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; ++ union { ++ MPI mpi[5]; ++ struct { ++ MPI p; /* DSA prime */ ++ MPI q; /* DSA group order */ ++ MPI g; /* DSA group generator */ ++ MPI y; /* DSA public-key value = g^x mod p */ ++ MPI x; /* DSA secret exponent (if present) */ ++ } dsa; ++ struct { ++ MPI n; /* RSA public modulus */ ++ MPI e; /* RSA public encryption exponent */ ++ MPI d; /* RSA secret encryption exponent (if present) */ ++ MPI p; /* RSA secret prime (if present) */ ++ MPI q; /* RSA secret prime (if present) */ ++ } rsa; ++ }; ++}; ++ ++extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload); ++ ++/* ++ * Public key cryptography signature data ++ */ ++struct public_key_signature { ++ u8 *digest; ++ u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ ++ u8 nr_mpi; /* Occupancy of mpi[] */ ++ enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; ++ union { ++ MPI mpi[2]; ++ struct { ++ MPI s; /* m^d mod n */ ++ } rsa; ++ struct { ++ MPI r; ++ MPI s; ++ } dsa; ++ }; ++}; ++ ++#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */ +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 8e45e274bb3f8bb90306e0102a2c48ea1ef179fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:25:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/26] KEYS: Provide signature verification with an + asymmetric key + +Provide signature verification using an asymmetric-type key to indicate the +public key to be used. + +The API is a single function that can be found in crypto/public_key.h: + + int verify_signature(const struct key *key, + const struct public_key_signature *sig) + +The first argument is the appropriate key to be used and the second argument +is the parsed signature data: + + struct public_key_signature { + u8 *digest; + u16 digest_size; + enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; + union { + MPI mpi[2]; + struct { + MPI s; /* m^d mod n */ + } rsa; + struct { + MPI r; + MPI s; + } dsa; + }; + }; + +This should be filled in prior to calling the function. The hash algorithm +should already have been called and the hash finalised and the output should +be in a buffer pointed to by the 'digest' member. + +Any extra data to be added to the hash by the hash format (eg. PGP) should +have been added by the caller prior to finalising the hash. + +It is assumed that the signature is made up of a number of MPI values. If an +algorithm becomes available for which this is not the case, the above structure +will have to change. + +It is also assumed that it will have been checked that the signature algorithm +matches the key algorithm. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 2 +- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++++ + 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +index 5ed46ee..8dcdf0c 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +@@ -4,6 +4,6 @@ + + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o + +-asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o ++asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o + + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..50b3f88 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ ++/* Signature verification with an asymmetric key ++ * ++ * See Documentation/security/asymmetric-keys.txt ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <crypto/public_key.h> ++#include "asymmetric_keys.h" ++ ++/** ++ * verify_signature - Initiate the use of an asymmetric key to verify a signature ++ * @key: The asymmetric key to verify against ++ * @sig: The signature to check ++ * ++ * Returns 0 if successful or else an error. ++ */ ++int verify_signature(const struct key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig) ++{ ++ const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype; ++ int ret; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ++ ++ if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); ++ if (!subtype || ++ !key->payload.data) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ if (!subtype->verify_signature) ++ return -ENOTSUPP; ++ ++ ret = subtype->verify_signature(key, sig); ++ ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); ++ return ret; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_signature); +diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h +index 4b8b6c1..f5b0224 100644 +--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h ++++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h +@@ -101,4 +101,8 @@ struct public_key_signature { + }; + }; + ++struct key; ++extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig); ++ + #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */ +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 941e72448fc68f41a56798112a6f20df6bcd0ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:25:22 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 09/26] MPILIB: Reinstate mpi_cmp[_ui]() and export for RSA + signature verification + +Reinstate and export mpi_cmp() and mpi_cmp_ui() from the MPI library for use by +RSA signature verification as per RFC3447 section 5.2.2 step 1. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + lib/mpi/Makefile | 1 + + lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c + +diff --git a/lib/mpi/Makefile b/lib/mpi/Makefile +index 45ca90a..019a68c 100644 +--- a/lib/mpi/Makefile ++++ b/lib/mpi/Makefile +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ mpi-y = \ + generic_mpih-add1.o \ + mpicoder.o \ + mpi-bit.o \ ++ mpi-cmp.o \ + mpih-cmp.o \ + mpih-div.o \ + mpih-mul.o \ +diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..1871e7b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c +@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ ++/* mpi-cmp.c - MPI functions ++ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * ++ * This file is part of GnuPG. ++ * ++ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software ++ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA ++ */ ++ ++#include "mpi-internal.h" ++ ++int mpi_cmp_ui(MPI u, unsigned long v) ++{ ++ mpi_limb_t limb = v; ++ ++ mpi_normalize(u); ++ if (!u->nlimbs && !limb) ++ return 0; ++ if (u->sign) ++ return -1; ++ if (u->nlimbs > 1) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (u->d[0] == limb) ++ return 0; ++ else if (u->d[0] > limb) ++ return 1; ++ else ++ return -1; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_cmp_ui); ++ ++int mpi_cmp(MPI u, MPI v) ++{ ++ mpi_size_t usize, vsize; ++ int cmp; ++ ++ mpi_normalize(u); ++ mpi_normalize(v); ++ usize = u->nlimbs; ++ vsize = v->nlimbs; ++ if (!u->sign && v->sign) ++ return 1; ++ if (u->sign && !v->sign) ++ return -1; ++ if (usize != vsize && !u->sign && !v->sign) ++ return usize - vsize; ++ if (usize != vsize && u->sign && v->sign) ++ return vsize + usize; ++ if (!usize) ++ return 0; ++ cmp = mpihelp_cmp(u->d, v->d, usize); ++ if (!cmp) ++ return 0; ++ if ((cmp < 0 ? 1 : 0) == (u->sign ? 1 : 0)) ++ return 1; ++ return -1; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_cmp); +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From ca876ff8fde3c6febb8a8578ca0e1608576071bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:25:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 10/26] RSA: Implement signature verification algorithm + [PKCS#1 / RFC3447] + +Implement RSA public key cryptography [PKCS#1 / RFC3447]. At this time, only +the signature verification algorithm is supported. This uses the asymmetric +public key subtype to hold its key data. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 7 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h | 2 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 269 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 279 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +index bbfccaa..561759d 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +@@ -18,4 +18,11 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available. + ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. + ++config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA ++ tristate "RSA public-key algorithm" ++ depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE ++ select MPILIB_EXTRA ++ help ++ This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447). ++ + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +index 8dcdf0c..7c92691 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o + asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o + + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h +index 1f86aad..5e5e356 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h +@@ -26,3 +26,5 @@ struct public_key_algorithm { + int (*verify_signature)(const struct public_key *key, + const struct public_key_signature *sig); + }; ++ ++extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm; +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..9b31ee2 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ ++/* RSA asymmetric public-key algorithm [RFC3447] ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include "public_key.h" ++ ++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); ++MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RSA Public Key Algorithm"); ++ ++#define kenter(FMT, ...) \ ++ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) ++#define kleave(FMT, ...) \ ++ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) ++ ++/* ++ * Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2]. ++ */ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08, ++ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */ ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10 ++}; ++ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, ++ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 ++}; ++ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, ++ 0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 ++}; ++ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, ++ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C ++}; ++ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, ++ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20 ++}; ++ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, ++ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30 ++}; ++ ++static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = { ++ 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, ++ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, ++ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40 ++}; ++ ++static const struct { ++ const u8 *data; ++ size_t size; ++} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = { ++#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) } ++ [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = _(MD5), ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = _(SHA1), ++ [PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160), ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = _(SHA256), ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = _(SHA384), ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = _(SHA512), ++ [PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = _(SHA224), ++#undef _ ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2] ++ */ ++static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m) ++{ ++ MPI m; ++ int ret; ++ ++ /* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */ ++ if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) { ++ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]"); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) { ++ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]"); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ ++ m = mpi_alloc(0); ++ if (!m) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ /* (2) m = s^e mod n */ ++ ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ mpi_free(m); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ ++ *_m = m; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1] ++ */ ++static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X) ++{ ++ unsigned X_size, x_size; ++ int X_sign; ++ u8 *X; ++ ++ /* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin ++ * with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero ++ * bits not being reported by MPI. ++ */ ++ x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x); ++ pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8); ++ if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15) ++ return -ERANGE; ++ ++ X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign); ++ if (!X) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ if (X_sign < 0) { ++ kfree(X); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ if (X_size != xLen - 1) { ++ kfree(X); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ ++ *_X = X; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Perform the RSA signature verification. ++ * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata ++ * @EM: The computed signature value ++ * @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00) ++ * @hash_size: The size of H ++ * @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template ++ * @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[] ++ */ ++static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size, ++ const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size) ++{ ++ unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i; ++ ++ kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size); ++ ++ if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++ /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */ ++ if (EM[1] != 0x01) { ++ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ ++ T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size); ++ PS_end = T_offset - 1; ++ if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) { ++ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) { ++ if (EM[i] != 0xff) { ++ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) { ++ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]"); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ ++ if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) { ++ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]"); ++ return -EKEYREJECTED; ++ } ++ ++ kleave(" = 0"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2]. ++ */ ++static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, ++ const struct public_key_signature *sig) ++{ ++ size_t tsize; ++ int ret; ++ ++ /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */ ++ const u8 *H = sig->digest; ++ u8 *EM = NULL; ++ MPI m = NULL; ++ size_t k; ++ ++ kenter(""); ++ ++ if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data) ++ return -ENOTSUPP; ++ ++ /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */ ++ k = (mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n) + 7) / 8; ++ ++ tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s) + 7) / 8; ++ pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize); ++ if (tsize != k) { ++ ret = -EBADMSG; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */ ++ ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message ++ * (EM) of length k octets. ++ * ++ * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a ++ * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()! ++ */ ++ ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size, ++ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data, ++ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size); ++ ++error: ++ kfree(EM); ++ mpi_free(m); ++ kleave(" = %d", ret); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = { ++ .name = "RSA", ++ .n_pub_mpi = 2, ++ .n_sec_mpi = 3, ++ .n_sig_mpi = 1, ++ .verify_signature = RSA_verify_signature, ++}; ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm); +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From e179a9b04469ea018a8fdb53f11c57222ba540a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:28:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 11/26] RSA: Fix signature verification for shorter signatures + +gpg can produce a signature file where length of signature is less than the +modulus size because the amount of space an MPI takes up is kept as low as +possible by discarding leading zeros. This regularly happens for several +modules during the build. + +Fix it by relaxing check in RSA verification code. + +Thanks to Tomas Mraz and Miloslav Trmac for help. + +Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 14 +++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +index 9b31ee2..4a6a069 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +@@ -224,15 +224,23 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, + return -ENOTSUPP; + + /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */ +- k = (mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n) + 7) / 8; ++ k = mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n); ++ tsize = mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s); + +- tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s) + 7) / 8; ++ /* According to RFC 4880 sec 3.2, length of MPI is computed starting ++ * from most significant bit. So the RFC 3447 sec 8.2.2 size check ++ * must be relaxed to conform with shorter signatures - so we fail here ++ * only if signature length is longer than modulus size. ++ */ + pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize); +- if (tsize != k) { ++ if (k < tsize) { + ret = -EBADMSG; + goto error; + } + ++ /* Round up and convert to octets */ ++ k = (k + 7) / 8; ++ + /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */ + ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m); + if (ret < 0) +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From d412c256ea6170b6aeceb9f1eb1737d991473634 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:30:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 12/26] X.509: Implement simple static OID registry + +Implement a simple static OID registry that allows the mapping of an encoded +OID to an enum value for ease of use. + +The OID registry index enum appears in the: + + linux/oid_registry.h + +header file. A script generates the registry from lines in the header file +that look like: + + <sp*>OID_foo,<sp*>/*<sp*>1.2.3.4<sp*>*/ + +The actual OID is taken to be represented by the numbers with interpolated +dots in the comment. + +All other lines in the header are ignored. + +The registry is queries by calling: + + OID look_up_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize); + +This returns a number from the registry enum representing the OID if found or +OID__NR if not. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/oid_registry.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++++ + lib/.gitignore | 2 +- + lib/Kconfig | 5 ++ + lib/Makefile | 16 ++++ + lib/build_OID_registry | 209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + lib/oid_registry.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++ + 6 files changed, 410 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 include/linux/oid_registry.h + create mode 100755 lib/build_OID_registry + create mode 100644 lib/oid_registry.c + +diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..5928546 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h +@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ ++/* ASN.1 Object identifier (OID) registry ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _LINUX_OID_REGISTRY_H ++#define _LINUX_OID_REGISTRY_H ++ ++#include <linux/types.h> ++ ++/* ++ * OIDs are turned into these values if possible, or OID__NR if not held here. ++ * ++ * NOTE! Do not mess with the format of each line as this is read by ++ * build_OID_registry.pl to generate the data for look_up_OID(). ++ */ ++enum OID { ++ OID_id_dsa_with_sha1, /* 1.2.840.10030.4.3 */ ++ OID_id_dsa, /* 1.2.840.10040.4.1 */ ++ OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1, /* 1.2.840.10045.4.1 */ ++ OID_id_ecPublicKey, /* 1.2.840.10045.2.1 */ ++ ++ /* PKCS#1 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)} */ ++ OID_rsaEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */ ++ OID_md2WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2 */ ++ OID_md3WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.3 */ ++ OID_md4WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4 */ ++ OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 */ ++ OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 */ ++ OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 */ ++ OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 */ ++ OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.14 */ ++ /* PKCS#7 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-7(7)} */ ++ OID_data, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */ ++ OID_signed_data, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 */ ++ /* PKCS#9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)} */ ++ OID_email_address, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 */ ++ OID_content_type, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */ ++ OID_messageDigest, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 */ ++ OID_signingTime, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 */ ++ OID_smimeCapabilites, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 */ ++ OID_smimeAuthenticatedAttrs, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.11 */ ++ ++ /* {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2)} */ ++ OID_md2, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.2 */ ++ OID_md4, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.4 */ ++ OID_md5, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.5 */ ++ ++ OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ ++ OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */ ++ OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */ ++ ++ /* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */ ++ OID_commonName, /* 2.5.4.3 */ ++ OID_surname, /* 2.5.4.4 */ ++ OID_countryName, /* 2.5.4.6 */ ++ OID_locality, /* 2.5.4.7 */ ++ OID_stateOrProvinceName, /* 2.5.4.8 */ ++ OID_organizationName, /* 2.5.4.10 */ ++ OID_organizationUnitName, /* 2.5.4.11 */ ++ OID_title, /* 2.5.4.12 */ ++ OID_description, /* 2.5.4.13 */ ++ OID_name, /* 2.5.4.41 */ ++ OID_givenName, /* 2.5.4.42 */ ++ OID_initials, /* 2.5.4.43 */ ++ OID_generationalQualifier, /* 2.5.4.44 */ ++ ++ /* Certificate extension IDs */ ++ OID_subjectKeyIdentifier, /* 2.5.29.14 */ ++ OID_keyUsage, /* 2.5.29.15 */ ++ OID_subjectAltName, /* 2.5.29.17 */ ++ OID_issuerAltName, /* 2.5.29.18 */ ++ OID_basicConstraints, /* 2.5.29.19 */ ++ OID_crlDistributionPoints, /* 2.5.29.31 */ ++ OID_certPolicies, /* 2.5.29.32 */ ++ OID_authorityKeyIdentifier, /* 2.5.29.35 */ ++ OID_extKeyUsage, /* 2.5.29.37 */ ++ ++ OID__NR ++}; ++ ++extern enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize); ++ ++#endif /* _LINUX_OID_REGISTRY_H */ +diff --git a/lib/.gitignore b/lib/.gitignore +index 3bef1ea..09aae85 100644 +--- a/lib/.gitignore ++++ b/lib/.gitignore +@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ + # + gen_crc32table + crc32table.h +- ++oid_registry_data.c +diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig +index bb94c1b..4b31a46 100644 +--- a/lib/Kconfig ++++ b/lib/Kconfig +@@ -396,4 +396,9 @@ config SIGNATURE + config LIBFDT + bool + ++config OID_REGISTRY ++ tristate ++ help ++ Enable fast lookup object identifier registry. ++ + endmenu +diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile +index 42d283e..b042896 100644 +--- a/lib/Makefile ++++ b/lib/Makefile +@@ -150,3 +150,19 @@ quiet_cmd_crc32 = GEN $@ + + $(obj)/crc32table.h: $(obj)/gen_crc32table + $(call cmd,crc32) ++ ++# ++# Build a fast OID lookip registry from include/linux/oid_registry.h ++# ++obj-$(CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY) += oid_registry.o ++ ++$(obj)/oid_registry.c: $(obj)/oid_registry_data.c ++ ++$(obj)/oid_registry_data.c: $(srctree)/include/linux/oid_registry.h \ ++ $(src)/build_OID_registry ++ $(call cmd,build_OID_registry) ++ ++quiet_cmd_build_OID_registry = GEN $@ ++ cmd_build_OID_registry = perl $(srctree)/$(src)/build_OID_registry $< $@ ++ ++clean-files += oid_registry_data.c +diff --git a/lib/build_OID_registry b/lib/build_OID_registry +new file mode 100755 +index 0000000..dfbdaab +--- /dev/null ++++ b/lib/build_OID_registry +@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ ++#!/usr/bin/perl -w ++# ++# Build a static ASN.1 Object Identified (OID) registry ++# ++# Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++# Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++# ++# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++# 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++# ++ ++use strict; ++ ++my @names = (); ++my @oids = (); ++ ++if ($#ARGV != 1) { ++ print STDERR "Format: ", $0, " <in-h-file> <out-c-file>\n"; ++ exit(2); ++} ++ ++# ++# Open the file to read from ++# ++open IN_FILE, "<$ARGV[0]" || die; ++while (<IN_FILE>) { ++ chomp; ++ if (m!\s+OID_([a-zA-z][a-zA-Z0-9_]+),\s+/[*]\s+([012][.0-9]*)\s+[*]/!) { ++ push @names, $1; ++ push @oids, $2; ++ } ++} ++close IN_FILE || die; ++ ++# ++# Open the files to write into ++# ++open C_FILE, ">$ARGV[1]" or die; ++print C_FILE "/*\n"; ++print C_FILE " * Automatically generated by ", $0, ". Do not edit\n"; ++print C_FILE " */\n"; ++ ++# ++# Split the data up into separate lists and also determine the lengths of the ++# encoded data arrays. ++# ++my @indices = (); ++my @lengths = (); ++my $total_length = 0; ++ ++print "Compiling ", $#names + 1, " OIDs\n"; ++ ++for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++ my $name = $names[$i]; ++ my $oid = $oids[$i]; ++ ++ my @components = split(/[.]/, $oid); ++ ++ # Determine the encoded length of this OID ++ my $size = $#components; ++ for (my $loop = 2; $loop <= $#components; $loop++) { ++ my $c = $components[$loop]; ++ ++ # We will base128 encode the number ++ my $tmp = ($c == 0) ? 0 : int(log($c)/log(2)); ++ $tmp = int($tmp / 7); ++ $size += $tmp; ++ } ++ push @lengths, $size; ++ push @indices, $total_length; ++ $total_length += $size; ++} ++ ++# ++# Emit the look-up-by-OID index table ++# ++print C_FILE "\n"; ++if ($total_length <= 255) { ++ print C_FILE "static const unsigned char oid_index[OID__NR + 1] = {\n"; ++} else { ++ print C_FILE "static const unsigned short oid_index[OID__NR + 1] = {\n"; ++} ++for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++ print C_FILE "\t[OID_", $names[$i], "] = ", $indices[$i], ",\n" ++} ++print C_FILE "\t[OID__NR] = ", $total_length, "\n"; ++print C_FILE "};\n"; ++ ++# ++# Encode the OIDs ++# ++my @encoded_oids = (); ++ ++for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++ my @octets = (); ++ ++ my @components = split(/[.]/, $oids[$i]); ++ ++ push @octets, $components[0] * 40 + $components[1]; ++ ++ for (my $loop = 2; $loop <= $#components; $loop++) { ++ my $c = $components[$loop]; ++ ++ # Base128 encode the number ++ my $tmp = ($c == 0) ? 0 : int(log($c)/log(2)); ++ $tmp = int($tmp / 7); ++ ++ for (; $tmp > 0; $tmp--) { ++ push @octets, (($c >> $tmp * 7) & 0x7f) | 0x80; ++ } ++ push @octets, $c & 0x7f; ++ } ++ ++ push @encoded_oids, \@octets; ++} ++ ++# ++# Create a hash value for each OID ++# ++my @hash_values = (); ++for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++ my @octets = @{$encoded_oids[$i]}; ++ ++ my $hash = $#octets; ++ foreach (@octets) { ++ $hash += $_ * 33; ++ } ++ ++ $hash = ($hash >> 24) ^ ($hash >> 16) ^ ($hash >> 8) ^ ($hash); ++ ++ push @hash_values, $hash & 0xff; ++} ++ ++# ++# Emit the OID data ++# ++print C_FILE "\n"; ++print C_FILE "static const unsigned char oid_data[", $total_length, "] = {\n"; ++for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++ my @octets = @{$encoded_oids[$i]}; ++ print C_FILE "\t"; ++ print C_FILE $_, ", " foreach (@octets); ++ print C_FILE "\t// ", $names[$i]; ++ print C_FILE "\n"; ++} ++print C_FILE "};\n"; ++ ++# ++# Build the search index table (ordered by length then hash then content) ++# ++my @index_table = ( 0 .. $#names ); ++ ++@index_table = sort { ++ my @octets_a = @{$encoded_oids[$a]}; ++ my @octets_b = @{$encoded_oids[$b]}; ++ ++ return $hash_values[$a] <=> $hash_values[$b] ++ if ($hash_values[$a] != $hash_values[$b]); ++ return $#octets_a <=> $#octets_b ++ if ($#octets_a != $#octets_b); ++ for (my $i = $#octets_a; $i >= 0; $i--) { ++ return $octets_a[$i] <=> $octets_b[$i] ++ if ($octets_a[$i] != $octets_b[$i]); ++ } ++ return 0; ++ ++} @index_table; ++ ++# ++# Emit the search index and hash value table ++# ++print C_FILE "\n"; ++print C_FILE "static const struct {\n"; ++print C_FILE "\tunsigned char hash;\n"; ++if ($#names <= 255) { ++ print C_FILE "\tenum OID oid : 8;\n"; ++} else { ++ print C_FILE "\tenum OID oid : 16;\n"; ++} ++print C_FILE "} oid_search_table[OID__NR] = {\n"; ++for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++ my @octets = @{$encoded_oids[$index_table[$i]]}; ++ printf(C_FILE "\t[%3u] = { %3u, OID_%-35s }, // ", ++ $i, ++ $hash_values[$index_table[$i]], ++ $names[$index_table[$i]]); ++ printf C_FILE "%02x", $_ foreach (@octets); ++ print C_FILE "\n"; ++} ++print C_FILE "};\n"; ++ ++# ++# Emit the OID debugging name table ++# ++#print C_FILE "\n"; ++#print C_FILE "const char *const oid_name_table[OID__NR + 1] = {\n"; ++# ++#for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#names; $i++) { ++# print C_FILE "\t\"", $names[$i], "\",\n" ++#} ++#print C_FILE "\t\"Unknown-OID\"\n"; ++#print C_FILE "};\n"; ++ ++# ++# Polish off ++# ++close C_FILE or die; +diff --git a/lib/oid_registry.c b/lib/oid_registry.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..33cfd17 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/lib/oid_registry.c +@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ ++/* ASN.1 Object identifier (OID) registry ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/export.h> ++#include <linux/oid_registry.h> ++#include "oid_registry_data.c" ++ ++/** ++ * look_up_OID - Find an OID registration for the specified data ++ * @data: Binary representation of the OID ++ * @datasize: Size of the binary representation ++ */ ++enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize) ++{ ++ const unsigned char *octets = data; ++ enum OID oid; ++ unsigned char xhash; ++ unsigned i, j, k, hash; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ /* Hash the OID data */ ++ hash = datasize - 1; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < datasize; i++) ++ hash += octets[i] * 33; ++ hash = (hash >> 24) ^ (hash >> 16) ^ (hash >> 8) ^ hash; ++ hash &= 0xff; ++ ++ /* Binary search the OID registry. OIDs are stored in ascending order ++ * of hash value then ascending order of size and then in ascending ++ * order of reverse value. ++ */ ++ i = 0; ++ k = OID__NR; ++ while (i < k) { ++ j = (i + k) / 2; ++ ++ xhash = oid_search_table[j].hash; ++ if (xhash > hash) { ++ k = j; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (xhash < hash) { ++ i = j + 1; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ oid = oid_search_table[j].oid; ++ len = oid_index[oid + 1] - oid_index[oid]; ++ if (len > datasize) { ++ k = j; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (len < datasize) { ++ i = j + 1; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* Variation is most likely to be at the tail end of the ++ * OID, so do the comparison in reverse. ++ */ ++ while (len > 0) { ++ unsigned char a = oid_data[oid_index[oid] + --len]; ++ unsigned char b = octets[len]; ++ if (a > b) { ++ k = j; ++ goto next; ++ } ++ if (a < b) { ++ i = j + 1; ++ goto next; ++ } ++ } ++ return oid; ++ next: ++ ; ++ } ++ ++ return OID__NR; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(look_up_OID); +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 098335ed1edc5ec7ae7a346416654e12bb9bcd65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:30:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 13/26] X.509: Add utility functions to render OIDs as strings + +Add a pair of utility functions to render OIDs as strings. The first takes an +encoded OID and turns it into a "a.b.c.d" form string: + + int sprint_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize, + char *buffer, size_t bufsize); + +The second takes an OID enum index and calls the first on the data held +therein: + + int sprint_OID(enum OID oid, char *buffer, size_t bufsize); + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/oid_registry.h | 2 ++ + lib/oid_registry.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h +index 5928546..6926db7 100644 +--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h ++++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h +@@ -86,5 +86,7 @@ enum OID { + }; + + extern enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize); ++extern int sprint_oid(const void *, size_t, char *, size_t); ++extern int sprint_OID(enum OID, char *, size_t); + + #endif /* _LINUX_OID_REGISTRY_H */ +diff --git a/lib/oid_registry.c b/lib/oid_registry.c +index 33cfd17..d8de11f 100644 +--- a/lib/oid_registry.c ++++ b/lib/oid_registry.c +@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ + + #include <linux/export.h> + #include <linux/oid_registry.h> ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/errno.h> ++#include <linux/bug.h> + #include "oid_registry_data.c" + + /** +@@ -87,3 +90,81 @@ enum OID look_up_OID(const void *data, size_t datasize) + return OID__NR; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(look_up_OID); ++ ++/* ++ * sprint_OID - Print an Object Identifier into a buffer ++ * @data: The encoded OID to print ++ * @datasize: The size of the encoded OID ++ * @buffer: The buffer to render into ++ * @bufsize: The size of the buffer ++ * ++ * The OID is rendered into the buffer in "a.b.c.d" format and the number of ++ * bytes is returned. -EBADMSG is returned if the data could not be intepreted ++ * and -ENOBUFS if the buffer was too small. ++ */ ++int sprint_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize, char *buffer, size_t bufsize) ++{ ++ const unsigned char *v = data, *end = v + datasize; ++ unsigned long num; ++ unsigned char n; ++ size_t ret; ++ int count; ++ ++ if (v >= end) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++ n = *v++; ++ ret = count = snprintf(buffer, bufsize, "%u.%u", n / 40, n % 40); ++ buffer += count; ++ bufsize -= count; ++ if (bufsize == 0) ++ return -ENOBUFS; ++ ++ while (v < end) { ++ num = 0; ++ n = *v++; ++ if (!(n & 0x80)) { ++ num = n; ++ } else { ++ num = n & 0x7f; ++ do { ++ if (v >= end) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ n = *v++; ++ num <<= 7; ++ num |= n & 0x7f; ++ } while (n & 0x80); ++ } ++ ret += count = snprintf(buffer, bufsize, ".%lu", num); ++ buffer += count; ++ bufsize -= count; ++ if (bufsize == 0) ++ return -ENOBUFS; ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sprint_oid); ++ ++/** ++ * sprint_OID - Print an Object Identifier into a buffer ++ * @oid: The OID to print ++ * @buffer: The buffer to render into ++ * @bufsize: The size of the buffer ++ * ++ * The OID is rendered into the buffer in "a.b.c.d" format and the number of ++ * bytes is returned. ++ */ ++int sprint_OID(enum OID oid, char *buffer, size_t bufsize) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ ++ BUG_ON(oid >= OID__NR); ++ ++ ret = sprint_oid(oid_data + oid_index[oid], ++ oid_index[oid + 1] - oid_index[oid], ++ buffer, bufsize); ++ BUG_ON(ret == -EBADMSG); ++ return ret; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sprint_OID); +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 3ddb8a2f1fe420777491641d39328741d9a28565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 23:31:13 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 14/26] X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler + +Add a simple ASN.1 grammar compiler. This produces a bytecode output that can +be fed to a decoder to inform the decoder how to interpret the ASN.1 stream it +is trying to parse. + +Action functions can be specified in the grammar by interpolating: + + ({ foo }) + +after a type, for example: + + SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + subjectPublicKey BIT STRING ({ do_key_data }) + } + +The decoder is expected to call these after matching this type and parsing the +contents if it is a constructed type. + +The grammar compiler does not currently support the SET type (though it does +support SET OF) as I can't see a good way of tracking which members have been +encountered yet without using up extra stack space. + +Currently, the grammar compiler will fail if more than 256 bytes of bytecode +would be produced or more than 256 actions have been specified as it uses +8-bit jump values and action indices to keep space usage down. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/asn1.h | 67 ++ + include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h | 87 +++ + init/Kconfig | 8 + + scripts/.gitignore | 1 + + scripts/Makefile | 2 + + scripts/Makefile.build | 11 + + scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 1545 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 7 files changed, 1721 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1.h + create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h + create mode 100644 scripts/asn1_compiler.c + +diff --git a/include/linux/asn1.h b/include/linux/asn1.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..5c3f4e4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/linux/asn1.h +@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ ++/* ASN.1 BER/DER/CER encoding definitions ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_H ++#define _LINUX_ASN1_H ++ ++/* Class */ ++enum asn1_class { ++ ASN1_UNIV = 0, /* Universal */ ++ ASN1_APPL = 1, /* Application */ ++ ASN1_CONT = 2, /* Context */ ++ ASN1_PRIV = 3 /* Private */ ++}; ++#define ASN1_CLASS_BITS 0xc0 ++ ++ ++enum asn1_method { ++ ASN1_PRIM = 0, /* Primitive */ ++ ASN1_CONS = 1 /* Constructed */ ++}; ++#define ASN1_CONS_BIT 0x20 ++ ++/* Tag */ ++enum asn1_tag { ++ ASN1_EOC = 0, /* End Of Contents or N/A */ ++ ASN1_BOOL = 1, /* Boolean */ ++ ASN1_INT = 2, /* Integer */ ++ ASN1_BTS = 3, /* Bit String */ ++ ASN1_OTS = 4, /* Octet String */ ++ ASN1_NULL = 5, /* Null */ ++ ASN1_OID = 6, /* Object Identifier */ ++ ASN1_ODE = 7, /* Object Description */ ++ ASN1_EXT = 8, /* External */ ++ ASN1_REAL = 9, /* Real float */ ++ ASN1_ENUM = 10, /* Enumerated */ ++ ASN1_EPDV = 11, /* Embedded PDV */ ++ ASN1_UTF8STR = 12, /* UTF8 String */ ++ ASN1_RELOID = 13, /* Relative OID */ ++ /* 14 - Reserved */ ++ /* 15 - Reserved */ ++ ASN1_SEQ = 16, /* Sequence and Sequence of */ ++ ASN1_SET = 17, /* Set and Set of */ ++ ASN1_NUMSTR = 18, /* Numerical String */ ++ ASN1_PRNSTR = 19, /* Printable String */ ++ ASN1_TEXSTR = 20, /* T61 String / Teletext String */ ++ ASN1_VIDSTR = 21, /* Videotex String */ ++ ASN1_IA5STR = 22, /* IA5 String */ ++ ASN1_UNITIM = 23, /* Universal Time */ ++ ASN1_GENTIM = 24, /* General Time */ ++ ASN1_GRASTR = 25, /* Graphic String */ ++ ASN1_VISSTR = 26, /* Visible String */ ++ ASN1_GENSTR = 27, /* General String */ ++ ASN1_UNISTR = 28, /* Universal String */ ++ ASN1_CHRSTR = 29, /* Character String */ ++ ASN1_BMPSTR = 30, /* BMP String */ ++ ASN1_LONG_TAG = 31 /* Long form tag */ ++}; ++ ++#endif /* _LINUX_ASN1_H */ +diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h b/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..945d44a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h +@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ ++/* ASN.1 BER/DER/CER parsing state machine internal definitions ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_BER_BYTECODE_H ++#define _LINUX_ASN1_BER_BYTECODE_H ++ ++#ifdef __KERNEL__ ++#include <linux/types.h> ++#endif ++#include <linux/asn1.h> ++ ++typedef int (*asn1_action_t)(void *context, ++ size_t hdrlen, /* In case of ANY type */ ++ unsigned char tag, /* In case of ANY type */ ++ const void *value, size_t vlen); ++ ++struct asn1_decoder { ++ const unsigned char *machine; ++ size_t machlen; ++ const asn1_action_t *actions; ++}; ++ ++enum asn1_opcode { ++ /* The tag-matching ops come first and the odd-numbered slots ++ * are for OR_SKIP ops. ++ */ ++#define ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP 0x01 ++#define ASN1_OP_MATCH__ACT 0x02 ++#define ASN1_OP_MATCH__JUMP 0x04 ++#define ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY 0x08 ++#define ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND 0x10 ++ ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH = 0x00, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP = 0x01, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT = 0x02, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x03, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP = 0x04, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP = 0x05, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY = 0x08, ++ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT = 0x0a, ++ /* Everything before here matches unconditionally */ ++ ++ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP = 0x11, ++ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x13, ++ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP = 0x15, ++ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY = 0x18, ++ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT = 0x1a, ++ ++ /* Everything before here will want a tag from the data */ ++#define ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT ++ ++ /* These are here to help fill up space */ ++ ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL = 0x1b, ++ ASN1_OP_COMPLETE = 0x1c, ++ ASN1_OP_ACT = 0x1d, ++ ASN1_OP_RETURN = 0x1e, ++ ++ /* The following eight have bit 0 -> SET, 1 -> OF, 2 -> ACT */ ++ ASN1_OP_END_SEQ = 0x20, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SET = 0x21, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF = 0x22, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF = 0x23, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT = 0x24, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT = 0x25, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT = 0x26, ++ ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT = 0x27, ++#define ASN1_OP_END__SET 0x01 ++#define ASN1_OP_END__OF 0x02 ++#define ASN1_OP_END__ACT 0x04 ++ ++ ASN1_OP__NR ++}; ++ ++#define _tag(CLASS, CP, TAG) ((ASN1_##CLASS << 6) | (ASN1_##CP << 5) | ASN1_##TAG) ++#define _tagn(CLASS, CP, TAG) ((ASN1_##CLASS << 6) | (ASN1_##CP << 5) | TAG) ++#define _jump_target(N) (N) ++#define _action(N) (N) ++ ++#endif /* _LINUX_ASN1_BER_BYTECODE_H */ +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index af6c7f8..66cc885 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -1612,4 +1612,12 @@ config PADATA + depends on SMP + bool + ++config ASN1 ++ tristate ++ help ++ Build a simple ASN.1 grammar compiler that produces a bytecode output ++ that can be interpreted by the ASN.1 stream decoder and used to ++ inform it as to what tags are to be expected in a stream and what ++ functions to call on what tags. ++ + source "kernel/Kconfig.locks" +diff --git a/scripts/.gitignore b/scripts/.gitignore +index 65f362d..fb070fa 100644 +--- a/scripts/.gitignore ++++ b/scripts/.gitignore +@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ ihex2fw + recordmcount + docproc + sortextable ++asn1_compiler +diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile +index a55b006..01e7adb 100644 +--- a/scripts/Makefile ++++ b/scripts/Makefile +@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash + hostprogs-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += bin2c + hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount + hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable ++hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler + + HOSTCFLAGS_sortextable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include ++HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include + + always := $(hostprogs-y) $(hostprogs-m) + +diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.build b/scripts/Makefile.build +index ff1720d..0e801c3 100644 +--- a/scripts/Makefile.build ++++ b/scripts/Makefile.build +@@ -354,6 +354,17 @@ quiet_cmd_cpp_lds_S = LDS $@ + $(obj)/%.lds: $(src)/%.lds.S FORCE + $(call if_changed_dep,cpp_lds_S) + ++# ASN.1 grammar ++# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ++quiet_cmd_asn1_compiler = ASN.1 $@ ++ cmd_asn1_compiler = $(objtree)/scripts/asn1_compiler $< \ ++ $(subst .h,.c,$@) $(subst .c,.h,$@) ++ ++.PRECIOUS: $(objtree)/$(obj)/%-asn1.c $(objtree)/$(obj)/%-asn1.h ++ ++$(obj)/%-asn1.c $(obj)/%-asn1.h: $(src)/%.asn1 $(objtree)/scripts/asn1_compiler ++ $(call cmd,asn1_compiler) ++ + # Build the compiled-in targets + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +diff --git a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..db0e5cd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c +@@ -0,0 +1,1545 @@ ++/* Simplified ASN.1 notation parser ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <stdarg.h> ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++#include <stdint.h> ++#include <string.h> ++#include <ctype.h> ++#include <unistd.h> ++#include <fcntl.h> ++#include <sys/stat.h> ++#include <linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h> ++ ++enum token_type { ++ DIRECTIVE_ABSENT, ++ DIRECTIVE_ALL, ++ DIRECTIVE_ANY, ++ DIRECTIVE_APPLICATION, ++ DIRECTIVE_AUTOMATIC, ++ DIRECTIVE_BEGIN, ++ DIRECTIVE_BIT, ++ DIRECTIVE_BMPString, ++ DIRECTIVE_BOOLEAN, ++ DIRECTIVE_BY, ++ DIRECTIVE_CHARACTER, ++ DIRECTIVE_CHOICE, ++ DIRECTIVE_CLASS, ++ DIRECTIVE_COMPONENT, ++ DIRECTIVE_COMPONENTS, ++ DIRECTIVE_CONSTRAINED, ++ DIRECTIVE_CONTAINING, ++ DIRECTIVE_DEFAULT, ++ DIRECTIVE_DEFINED, ++ DIRECTIVE_DEFINITIONS, ++ DIRECTIVE_EMBEDDED, ++ DIRECTIVE_ENCODED, ++ DIRECTIVE_ENCODING_CONTROL, ++ DIRECTIVE_END, ++ DIRECTIVE_ENUMERATED, ++ DIRECTIVE_EXCEPT, ++ DIRECTIVE_EXPLICIT, ++ DIRECTIVE_EXPORTS, ++ DIRECTIVE_EXTENSIBILITY, ++ DIRECTIVE_EXTERNAL, ++ DIRECTIVE_FALSE, ++ DIRECTIVE_FROM, ++ DIRECTIVE_GeneralString, ++ DIRECTIVE_GeneralizedTime, ++ DIRECTIVE_GraphicString, ++ DIRECTIVE_IA5String, ++ DIRECTIVE_IDENTIFIER, ++ DIRECTIVE_IMPLICIT, ++ DIRECTIVE_IMPLIED, ++ DIRECTIVE_IMPORTS, ++ DIRECTIVE_INCLUDES, ++ DIRECTIVE_INSTANCE, ++ DIRECTIVE_INSTRUCTIONS, ++ DIRECTIVE_INTEGER, ++ DIRECTIVE_INTERSECTION, ++ DIRECTIVE_ISO646String, ++ DIRECTIVE_MAX, ++ DIRECTIVE_MIN, ++ DIRECTIVE_MINUS_INFINITY, ++ DIRECTIVE_NULL, ++ DIRECTIVE_NumericString, ++ DIRECTIVE_OBJECT, ++ DIRECTIVE_OCTET, ++ DIRECTIVE_OF, ++ DIRECTIVE_OPTIONAL, ++ DIRECTIVE_ObjectDescriptor, ++ DIRECTIVE_PATTERN, ++ DIRECTIVE_PDV, ++ DIRECTIVE_PLUS_INFINITY, ++ DIRECTIVE_PRESENT, ++ DIRECTIVE_PRIVATE, ++ DIRECTIVE_PrintableString, ++ DIRECTIVE_REAL, ++ DIRECTIVE_RELATIVE_OID, ++ DIRECTIVE_SEQUENCE, ++ DIRECTIVE_SET, ++ DIRECTIVE_SIZE, ++ DIRECTIVE_STRING, ++ DIRECTIVE_SYNTAX, ++ DIRECTIVE_T61String, ++ DIRECTIVE_TAGS, ++ DIRECTIVE_TRUE, ++ DIRECTIVE_TeletexString, ++ DIRECTIVE_UNION, ++ DIRECTIVE_UNIQUE, ++ DIRECTIVE_UNIVERSAL, ++ DIRECTIVE_UTCTime, ++ DIRECTIVE_UTF8String, ++ DIRECTIVE_UniversalString, ++ DIRECTIVE_VideotexString, ++ DIRECTIVE_VisibleString, ++ DIRECTIVE_WITH, ++ NR__DIRECTIVES, ++ TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT = NR__DIRECTIVES, ++ TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY, ++ TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY, ++ TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE, ++ TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE, ++ TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION, ++ TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION, ++ TOKEN_COMMA, ++ TOKEN_NUMBER, ++ TOKEN_TYPE_NAME, ++ TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME, ++ NR__TOKENS ++}; ++ ++static const unsigned char token_to_tag[NR__TOKENS] = { ++ /* EOC goes first */ ++ [DIRECTIVE_BOOLEAN] = ASN1_BOOL, ++ [DIRECTIVE_INTEGER] = ASN1_INT, ++ [DIRECTIVE_BIT] = ASN1_BTS, ++ [DIRECTIVE_OCTET] = ASN1_OTS, ++ [DIRECTIVE_NULL] = ASN1_NULL, ++ [DIRECTIVE_OBJECT] = ASN1_OID, ++ [DIRECTIVE_ObjectDescriptor] = ASN1_ODE, ++ [DIRECTIVE_EXTERNAL] = ASN1_EXT, ++ [DIRECTIVE_REAL] = ASN1_REAL, ++ [DIRECTIVE_ENUMERATED] = ASN1_ENUM, ++ [DIRECTIVE_EMBEDDED] = 0, ++ [DIRECTIVE_UTF8String] = ASN1_UTF8STR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_RELATIVE_OID] = ASN1_RELOID, ++ /* 14 */ ++ /* 15 */ ++ [DIRECTIVE_SEQUENCE] = ASN1_SEQ, ++ [DIRECTIVE_SET] = ASN1_SET, ++ [DIRECTIVE_NumericString] = ASN1_NUMSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_PrintableString] = ASN1_PRNSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_T61String] = ASN1_TEXSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_TeletexString] = ASN1_TEXSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_VideotexString] = ASN1_VIDSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_IA5String] = ASN1_IA5STR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_UTCTime] = ASN1_UNITIM, ++ [DIRECTIVE_GeneralizedTime] = ASN1_GENTIM, ++ [DIRECTIVE_GraphicString] = ASN1_GRASTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_VisibleString] = ASN1_VISSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_GeneralString] = ASN1_GENSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_UniversalString] = ASN1_UNITIM, ++ [DIRECTIVE_CHARACTER] = ASN1_CHRSTR, ++ [DIRECTIVE_BMPString] = ASN1_BMPSTR, ++}; ++ ++static const char asn1_classes[4][5] = { ++ [ASN1_UNIV] = "UNIV", ++ [ASN1_APPL] = "APPL", ++ [ASN1_CONT] = "CONT", ++ [ASN1_PRIV] = "PRIV" ++}; ++ ++static const char asn1_methods[2][5] = { ++ [ASN1_UNIV] = "PRIM", ++ [ASN1_APPL] = "CONS" ++}; ++ ++static const char *const asn1_universal_tags[32] = { ++ "EOC", ++ "BOOL", ++ "INT", ++ "BTS", ++ "OTS", ++ "NULL", ++ "OID", ++ "ODE", ++ "EXT", ++ "REAL", ++ "ENUM", ++ "EPDV", ++ "UTF8STR", ++ "RELOID", ++ NULL, /* 14 */ ++ NULL, /* 15 */ ++ "SEQ", ++ "SET", ++ "NUMSTR", ++ "PRNSTR", ++ "TEXSTR", ++ "VIDSTR", ++ "IA5STR", ++ "UNITIM", ++ "GENTIM", ++ "GRASTR", ++ "VISSTR", ++ "GENSTR", ++ "UNISTR", ++ "CHRSTR", ++ "BMPSTR", ++ NULL /* 31 */ ++}; ++ ++static const char *filename; ++static const char *grammar_name; ++static const char *outputname; ++static const char *headername; ++ ++static const char *const directives[NR__DIRECTIVES] = { ++#define _(X) [DIRECTIVE_##X] = #X ++ _(ABSENT), ++ _(ALL), ++ _(ANY), ++ _(APPLICATION), ++ _(AUTOMATIC), ++ _(BEGIN), ++ _(BIT), ++ _(BMPString), ++ _(BOOLEAN), ++ _(BY), ++ _(CHARACTER), ++ _(CHOICE), ++ _(CLASS), ++ _(COMPONENT), ++ _(COMPONENTS), ++ _(CONSTRAINED), ++ _(CONTAINING), ++ _(DEFAULT), ++ _(DEFINED), ++ _(DEFINITIONS), ++ _(EMBEDDED), ++ _(ENCODED), ++ [DIRECTIVE_ENCODING_CONTROL] = "ENCODING-CONTROL", ++ _(END), ++ _(ENUMERATED), ++ _(EXCEPT), ++ _(EXPLICIT), ++ _(EXPORTS), ++ _(EXTENSIBILITY), ++ _(EXTERNAL), ++ _(FALSE), ++ _(FROM), ++ _(GeneralString), ++ _(GeneralizedTime), ++ _(GraphicString), ++ _(IA5String), ++ _(IDENTIFIER), ++ _(IMPLICIT), ++ _(IMPLIED), ++ _(IMPORTS), ++ _(INCLUDES), ++ _(INSTANCE), ++ _(INSTRUCTIONS), ++ _(INTEGER), ++ _(INTERSECTION), ++ _(ISO646String), ++ _(MAX), ++ _(MIN), ++ [DIRECTIVE_MINUS_INFINITY] = "MINUS-INFINITY", ++ [DIRECTIVE_NULL] = "NULL", ++ _(NumericString), ++ _(OBJECT), ++ _(OCTET), ++ _(OF), ++ _(OPTIONAL), ++ _(ObjectDescriptor), ++ _(PATTERN), ++ _(PDV), ++ [DIRECTIVE_PLUS_INFINITY] = "PLUS-INFINITY", ++ _(PRESENT), ++ _(PRIVATE), ++ _(PrintableString), ++ _(REAL), ++ [DIRECTIVE_RELATIVE_OID] = "RELATIVE-OID", ++ _(SEQUENCE), ++ _(SET), ++ _(SIZE), ++ _(STRING), ++ _(SYNTAX), ++ _(T61String), ++ _(TAGS), ++ _(TRUE), ++ _(TeletexString), ++ _(UNION), ++ _(UNIQUE), ++ _(UNIVERSAL), ++ _(UTCTime), ++ _(UTF8String), ++ _(UniversalString), ++ _(VideotexString), ++ _(VisibleString), ++ _(WITH) ++}; ++ ++struct action { ++ struct action *next; ++ unsigned char index; ++ char name[]; ++}; ++ ++static struct action *action_list; ++static unsigned nr_actions; ++ ++struct token { ++ unsigned short line; ++ enum token_type token_type : 8; ++ unsigned char size; ++ struct action *action; ++ const char *value; ++ struct type *type; ++}; ++ ++static struct token *token_list; ++static unsigned nr_tokens; ++ ++static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir) ++{ ++ const struct token *token = _key; ++ const char *const *pdir = _pdir, *dir = *pdir; ++ size_t dlen, clen; ++ int val; ++ ++ dlen = strlen(dir); ++ clen = (dlen < token->size) ? dlen : token->size; ++ ++ //printf("cmp(%*.*s,%s) = ", ++ // (int)token->size, (int)token->size, token->value, ++ // dir); ++ ++ val = memcmp(token->value, dir, clen); ++ if (val != 0) { ++ //printf("%d [cmp]\n", val); ++ return val; ++ } ++ ++ if (dlen == token->size) { ++ //printf("0\n"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ //printf("%d\n", (int)dlen - (int)token->size); ++ return dlen - token->size; /* shorter -> negative */ ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Tokenise an ASN.1 grammar ++ */ ++static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end) ++{ ++ struct token *tokens; ++ char *line, *nl, *p, *q; ++ unsigned tix, lineno; ++ ++ /* Assume we're going to have half as many tokens as we have ++ * characters ++ */ ++ token_list = tokens = calloc((end - buffer) / 2, sizeof(struct token)); ++ if (!tokens) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ tix = 0; ++ ++ lineno = 0; ++ while (buffer < end) { ++ /* First of all, break out a line */ ++ lineno++; ++ line = buffer; ++ nl = memchr(line, '\n', end - buffer); ++ if (!nl) { ++ buffer = nl = end; ++ } else { ++ buffer = nl + 1; ++ *nl = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ /* Remove "--" comments */ ++ p = line; ++ next_comment: ++ while ((p = memchr(p, '-', nl - p))) { ++ if (p[1] == '-') { ++ /* Found a comment; see if there's a terminator */ ++ q = p + 2; ++ while ((q = memchr(q, '-', nl - q))) { ++ if (q[1] == '-') { ++ /* There is - excise the comment */ ++ q += 2; ++ memmove(p, q, nl - q); ++ goto next_comment; ++ } ++ q++; ++ } ++ *p = '\0'; ++ nl = p; ++ break; ++ } else { ++ p++; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ p = line; ++ while (p < nl) { ++ /* Skip white space */ ++ while (p < nl && isspace(*p)) ++ *(p++) = 0; ++ if (p >= nl) ++ break; ++ ++ tokens[tix].line = lineno; ++ tokens[tix].value = p; ++ ++ /* Handle string tokens */ ++ if (isalpha(*p)) { ++ const char **dir; ++ ++ /* Can be a directive, type name or element ++ * name. Find the end of the name. ++ */ ++ q = p + 1; ++ while (q < nl && (isalnum(*q) || *q == '-' || *q == '_')) ++ q++; ++ tokens[tix].size = q - p; ++ p = q; ++ ++ /* If it begins with a lowercase letter then ++ * it's an element name ++ */ ++ if (islower(tokens[tix].value[0])) { ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* Otherwise we need to search the directive ++ * table ++ */ ++ dir = bsearch(&tokens[tix], directives, ++ sizeof(directives) / sizeof(directives[1]), ++ sizeof(directives[1]), ++ directive_compare); ++ if (dir) { ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = dir - directives; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_TYPE_NAME; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* Handle numbers */ ++ if (isdigit(*p)) { ++ /* Find the end of the number */ ++ q = p + 1; ++ while (q < nl && (isdigit(*q))) ++ q++; ++ tokens[tix].size = q - p; ++ p = q; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_NUMBER; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ if (nl - p >= 3) { ++ if (memcmp(p, "::=", 3) == 0) { ++ p += 3; ++ tokens[tix].size = 3; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (nl - p >= 2) { ++ if (memcmp(p, "({", 2) == 0) { ++ p += 2; ++ tokens[tix].size = 2; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (memcmp(p, "})", 2) == 0) { ++ p += 2; ++ tokens[tix].size = 2; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (nl - p >= 1) { ++ tokens[tix].size = 1; ++ switch (*p) { ++ case '{': ++ p += 1; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY; ++ continue; ++ case '}': ++ p += 1; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY; ++ continue; ++ case '[': ++ p += 1; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE; ++ continue; ++ case ']': ++ p += 1; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE; ++ continue; ++ case ',': ++ p += 1; ++ tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_COMMA; ++ continue; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%u: Unknown character in grammar: '%c'\n", ++ filename, lineno, *p); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ nr_tokens = tix; ++ printf("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens); ++ ++#if 0 ++ { ++ int n; ++ for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens; n++) ++ printf("Token %3u: '%*.*s'\n", ++ n, ++ (int)token_list[n].size, (int)token_list[n].size, ++ token_list[n].value); ++ } ++#endif ++} ++ ++static void build_type_list(void); ++static void parse(void); ++static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr); ++ ++/* ++ * ++ */ ++int main(int argc, char **argv) ++{ ++ struct stat st; ++ ssize_t readlen; ++ FILE *out, *hdr; ++ char *buffer, *p; ++ int fd; ++ ++ if (argc != 4) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n", ++ argv[0]); ++ exit(2); ++ } ++ ++ filename = argv[1]; ++ outputname = argv[2]; ++ headername = argv[3]; ++ ++ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); ++ if (fd < 0) { ++ perror(filename); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { ++ perror(filename); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(buffer = malloc(st.st_size + 1))) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if ((readlen = read(fd, buffer, st.st_size)) < 0) { ++ perror(filename); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if (close(fd) < 0) { ++ perror(filename); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if (readlen != st.st_size) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Short read\n", filename); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ p = strrchr(argv[1], '/'); ++ p = p ? p + 1 : argv[1]; ++ grammar_name = strdup(p); ++ if (!p) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ p = strchr(grammar_name, '.'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ ++ buffer[readlen] = 0; ++ tokenise(buffer, buffer + readlen); ++ build_type_list(); ++ parse(); ++ ++ out = fopen(outputname, "w"); ++ if (!out) { ++ perror(outputname); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ hdr = fopen(headername, "w"); ++ if (!out) { ++ perror(headername); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ render(out, hdr); ++ ++ if (fclose(out) < 0) { ++ perror(outputname); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if (fclose(hdr) < 0) { ++ perror(headername); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++enum compound { ++ NOT_COMPOUND, ++ SET, ++ SET_OF, ++ SEQUENCE, ++ SEQUENCE_OF, ++ CHOICE, ++ ANY, ++ TYPE_REF, ++ TAG_OVERRIDE ++}; ++ ++struct element { ++ struct type *type_def; ++ struct token *name; ++ struct token *type; ++ struct action *action; ++ struct element *children; ++ struct element *next; ++ struct element *render_next; ++ struct element *list_next; ++ uint8_t n_elements; ++ enum compound compound : 8; ++ enum asn1_class class : 8; ++ enum asn1_method method : 8; ++ uint8_t tag; ++ unsigned entry_index; ++ unsigned flags; ++#define ELEMENT_IMPLICIT 0x0001 ++#define ELEMENT_EXPLICIT 0x0002 ++#define ELEMENT_MARKED 0x0004 ++#define ELEMENT_RENDERED 0x0008 ++#define ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE 0x0010 ++#define ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL 0x0020 ++}; ++ ++struct type { ++ struct token *name; ++ struct token *def; ++ struct element *element; ++ unsigned ref_count; ++ unsigned flags; ++#define TYPE_STOP_MARKER 0x0001 ++#define TYPE_BEGIN 0x0002 ++}; ++ ++static struct type *type_list; ++static struct type **type_index; ++static unsigned nr_types; ++ ++static int type_index_compare(const void *_a, const void *_b) ++{ ++ const struct type *const *a = _a, *const *b = _b; ++ ++ if ((*a)->name->size != (*b)->name->size) ++ return (*a)->name->size - (*b)->name->size; ++ else ++ return memcmp((*a)->name->value, (*b)->name->value, ++ (*a)->name->size); ++} ++ ++static int type_finder(const void *_key, const void *_ti) ++{ ++ const struct token *token = _key; ++ const struct type *const *ti = _ti; ++ const struct type *type = *ti; ++ ++ if (token->size != type->name->size) ++ return token->size - type->name->size; ++ else ++ return memcmp(token->value, type->name->value, ++ token->size); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Build up a list of types and a sorted index to that list. ++ */ ++static void build_type_list(void) ++{ ++ struct type *types; ++ unsigned nr, t, n; ++ ++ nr = 0; ++ for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens - 1; n++) ++ if (token_list[n + 0].token_type == TOKEN_TYPE_NAME && ++ token_list[n + 1].token_type == TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT) ++ nr++; ++ ++ if (nr == 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: No defined types\n", filename); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ nr_types = nr; ++ types = type_list = calloc(nr + 1, sizeof(type_list[0])); ++ if (!type_list) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ type_index = calloc(nr, sizeof(type_index[0])); ++ if (!type_index) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ t = 0; ++ types[t].flags |= TYPE_BEGIN; ++ for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens - 1; n++) { ++ if (token_list[n + 0].token_type == TOKEN_TYPE_NAME && ++ token_list[n + 1].token_type == TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT) { ++ types[t].name = &token_list[n]; ++ type_index[t] = &types[t]; ++ t++; ++ } ++ } ++ types[t].name = &token_list[n + 1]; ++ types[t].flags |= TYPE_STOP_MARKER; ++ ++ qsort(type_index, nr, sizeof(type_index[0]), type_index_compare); ++ ++ printf("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types); ++#if 0 ++ for (n = 0; n < nr_types; n++) { ++ struct type *type = type_index[n]; ++ printf("- %*.*s\n", ++ (int)type->name->size, ++ (int)type->name->size, ++ type->name->value); ++ } ++#endif ++} ++ ++static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *stop, ++ struct token *name); ++ ++/* ++ * Parse the token stream ++ */ ++static void parse(void) ++{ ++ struct token *cursor; ++ struct type *type; ++ ++ /* Parse one type definition statement at a time */ ++ type = type_list; ++ do { ++ cursor = type->name; ++ ++ if (cursor[0].token_type != TOKEN_TYPE_NAME || ++ cursor[1].token_type != TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT) ++ abort(); ++ cursor += 2; ++ ++ type->element = parse_type(&cursor, type[1].name, NULL); ++ type->element->type_def = type; ++ ++ if (cursor != type[1].name) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ } while (type++, !(type->flags & TYPE_STOP_MARKER)); ++ ++ printf("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions); ++} ++ ++static struct element *element_list; ++ ++static struct element *alloc_elem(struct token *type) ++{ ++ struct element *e = calloc(1, sizeof(*e)); ++ if (!e) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ e->list_next = element_list; ++ element_list = e; ++ return e; ++} ++ ++static struct element *parse_compound(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end, ++ int alternates); ++ ++/* ++ * Parse one type definition statement ++ */ ++static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end, ++ struct token *name) ++{ ++ struct element *top, *element; ++ struct action *action, **ppaction; ++ struct token *cursor = *_cursor; ++ struct type **ref; ++ char *p; ++ int labelled = 0, implicit = 0; ++ ++ top = element = alloc_elem(cursor); ++ element->class = ASN1_UNIV; ++ element->method = ASN1_PRIM; ++ element->tag = token_to_tag[cursor->token_type]; ++ element->name = name; ++ ++ /* Extract the tag value if one given */ ++ if (cursor->token_type == TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE) { ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ switch (cursor->token_type) { ++ case DIRECTIVE_UNIVERSAL: ++ element->class = ASN1_UNIV; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ case DIRECTIVE_APPLICATION: ++ element->class = ASN1_APPL; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ case TOKEN_NUMBER: ++ element->class = ASN1_CONT; ++ break; ++ case DIRECTIVE_PRIVATE: ++ element->class = ASN1_PRIV; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ default: ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_NUMBER) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ element->tag &= ~0x1f; ++ element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->value, &p, 10); ++ if (p - cursor->value != cursor->size) ++ abort(); ++ cursor++; ++ ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ labelled = 1; ++ } ++ ++ /* Handle implicit and explicit markers */ ++ if (cursor->token_type == DIRECTIVE_IMPLICIT) { ++ element->flags |= ELEMENT_IMPLICIT; ++ implicit = 1; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ } else if (cursor->token_type == DIRECTIVE_EXPLICIT) { ++ element->flags |= ELEMENT_EXPLICIT; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ } ++ ++ if (labelled) { ++ if (!implicit) ++ element->method |= ASN1_CONS; ++ element->compound = implicit ? TAG_OVERRIDE : SEQUENCE; ++ element->children = alloc_elem(cursor); ++ element = element->children; ++ element->class = ASN1_UNIV; ++ element->method = ASN1_PRIM; ++ element->tag = token_to_tag[cursor->token_type]; ++ element->name = name; ++ } ++ ++ /* Extract the type we're expecting here */ ++ element->type = cursor; ++ switch (cursor->token_type) { ++ case DIRECTIVE_ANY: ++ element->compound = ANY; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_NULL: ++ case DIRECTIVE_BOOLEAN: ++ case DIRECTIVE_ENUMERATED: ++ case DIRECTIVE_INTEGER: ++ element->compound = NOT_COMPOUND; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_EXTERNAL: ++ element->method = ASN1_CONS; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_BMPString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_GeneralString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_GraphicString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_IA5String: ++ case DIRECTIVE_ISO646String: ++ case DIRECTIVE_NumericString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_PrintableString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_T61String: ++ case DIRECTIVE_TeletexString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_UniversalString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_UTF8String: ++ case DIRECTIVE_VideotexString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_VisibleString: ++ case DIRECTIVE_ObjectDescriptor: ++ case DIRECTIVE_GeneralizedTime: ++ case DIRECTIVE_UTCTime: ++ element->compound = NOT_COMPOUND; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_BIT: ++ case DIRECTIVE_OCTET: ++ element->compound = NOT_COMPOUND; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != DIRECTIVE_STRING) ++ goto parse_error; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_OBJECT: ++ element->compound = NOT_COMPOUND; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != DIRECTIVE_IDENTIFIER) ++ goto parse_error; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ ++ case TOKEN_TYPE_NAME: ++ element->compound = TYPE_REF; ++ ref = bsearch(cursor, type_index, nr_types, sizeof(type_index[0]), ++ type_finder); ++ if (!ref) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%*.*s' undefined\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ cursor->type = *ref; ++ (*ref)->ref_count++; ++ cursor++; ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_CHOICE: ++ element->compound = CHOICE; ++ cursor++; ++ element->children = parse_compound(&cursor, end, 1); ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_SEQUENCE: ++ element->compound = SEQUENCE; ++ element->method = ASN1_CONS; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type == DIRECTIVE_OF) { ++ element->compound = SEQUENCE_OF; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ element->children = parse_type(&cursor, end, NULL); ++ } else { ++ element->children = parse_compound(&cursor, end, 0); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case DIRECTIVE_SET: ++ element->compound = SET; ++ element->method = ASN1_CONS; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type == DIRECTIVE_OF) { ++ element->compound = SET_OF; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto parse_error; ++ element->children = parse_type(&cursor, end, NULL); ++ } else { ++ element->children = parse_compound(&cursor, end, 1); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' does not introduce a type\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ /* Handle elements that are optional */ ++ if (cursor < end && (cursor->token_type == DIRECTIVE_OPTIONAL || ++ cursor->token_type == DIRECTIVE_DEFAULT) ++ ) { ++ cursor++; ++ top->flags |= ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE; ++ } ++ ++ if (cursor < end && cursor->token_type == TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION) { ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' is not an action function name\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ action = malloc(sizeof(struct action) + cursor->size + 1); ++ if (!action) { ++ perror(NULL); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ action->index = 0; ++ memcpy(action->name, cursor->value, cursor->size); ++ action->name[cursor->size] = 0; ++ ++ for (ppaction = &action_list; ++ *ppaction; ++ ppaction = &(*ppaction)->next ++ ) { ++ int cmp = strcmp(action->name, (*ppaction)->name); ++ if (cmp == 0) { ++ free(action); ++ action = *ppaction; ++ goto found; ++ } ++ if (cmp < 0) { ++ action->next = *ppaction; ++ *ppaction = action; ++ nr_actions++; ++ goto found; ++ } ++ } ++ action->next = NULL; ++ *ppaction = action; ++ nr_actions++; ++ found: ++ ++ element->action = action; ++ cursor->action = action; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ cursor++; ++ } ++ ++ *_cursor = cursor; ++ return top; ++ ++parse_error: ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ ++overrun_error: ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unexpectedly hit EOF\n", filename); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Parse a compound type list ++ */ ++static struct element *parse_compound(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end, ++ int alternates) ++{ ++ struct element *children, **child_p = &children, *element; ++ struct token *cursor = *_cursor, *name; ++ ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ ++ if (cursor->token_type == TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Empty compound\n", ++ filename, cursor->line); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ for (;;) { ++ name = NULL; ++ if (cursor->token_type == TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME) { ++ name = cursor; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ } ++ ++ element = parse_type(&cursor, end, name); ++ if (alternates) ++ element->flags |= ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE | ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL; ++ ++ *child_p = element; ++ child_p = &element->next; ++ ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_COMMA) ++ break; ++ cursor++; ++ if (cursor >= end) ++ goto overrun_error; ++ } ++ ++ children->flags &= ~ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL; ++ ++ if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%*.*s'\n", ++ filename, cursor->line, ++ (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ cursor++; ++ ++ *_cursor = cursor; ++ return children; ++ ++overrun_error: ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unexpectedly hit EOF\n", filename); ++ exit(1); ++} ++ ++static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag); ++static void render_out_of_line_list(FILE *out); ++ ++static int nr_entries; ++static int render_depth = 1; ++static struct element *render_list, **render_list_p = &render_list; ++ ++__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))) ++static void render_opcode(FILE *out, const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ va_list va; ++ ++ if (out) { ++ fprintf(out, "\t[%4d] =%*s", nr_entries, render_depth, ""); ++ va_start(va, fmt); ++ vfprintf(out, fmt, va); ++ va_end(va); ++ } ++ nr_entries++; ++} ++ ++__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))) ++static void render_more(FILE *out, const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ va_list va; ++ ++ if (out) { ++ va_start(va, fmt); ++ vfprintf(out, fmt, va); ++ va_end(va); ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Render the grammar into a state machine definition. ++ */ ++static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr) ++{ ++ struct element *e; ++ struct action *action; ++ struct type *root; ++ int index; ++ ++ fprintf(hdr, "/*\n"); ++ fprintf(hdr, " * Automatically generated by asn1_compiler. Do not edit\n"); ++ fprintf(hdr, " *\n"); ++ fprintf(hdr, " * ASN.1 parser for %s\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(hdr, " */\n"); ++ fprintf(hdr, "#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>\n"); ++ fprintf(hdr, "\n"); ++ fprintf(hdr, "extern const struct asn1_decoder %s_decoder;\n", grammar_name); ++ if (ferror(hdr)) { ++ perror(headername); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ fprintf(out, "/*\n"); ++ fprintf(out, " * Automatically generated by asn1_compiler. Do not edit\n"); ++ fprintf(out, " *\n"); ++ fprintf(out, " * ASN.1 parser for %s\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(out, " */\n"); ++ fprintf(out, "#include <linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h>\n"); ++ fprintf(out, "#include \"%s-asn1.h\"\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(out, "\n"); ++ if (ferror(out)) { ++ perror(outputname); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ /* Tabulate the action functions we might have to call */ ++ fprintf(hdr, "\n"); ++ index = 0; ++ for (action = action_list; action; action = action->next) { ++ action->index = index++; ++ fprintf(hdr, ++ "extern int %s(void *, size_t, unsigned char," ++ " const void *, size_t);\n", ++ action->name); ++ } ++ fprintf(hdr, "\n"); ++ ++ fprintf(out, "enum %s_actions {\n", grammar_name); ++ for (action = action_list; action; action = action->next) ++ fprintf(out, "\tACT_%s = %u,\n", ++ action->name, action->index); ++ fprintf(out, "\tNR__%s_actions = %u\n", grammar_name, nr_actions); ++ fprintf(out, "};\n"); ++ ++ fprintf(out, "\n"); ++ fprintf(out, "static const asn1_action_t %s_action_table[NR__%s_actions] = {\n", ++ grammar_name, grammar_name); ++ for (action = action_list; action; action = action->next) ++ fprintf(out, "\t[%4u] = %s,\n", action->index, action->name); ++ fprintf(out, "};\n"); ++ ++ if (ferror(out)) { ++ perror(outputname); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ /* We do two passes - the first one calculates all the offsets */ ++ printf("Pass 1\n"); ++ nr_entries = 0; ++ root = &type_list[0]; ++ render_element(NULL, root->element, NULL); ++ render_opcode(NULL, "ASN1_OP_COMPLETE,\n"); ++ render_out_of_line_list(NULL); ++ ++ for (e = element_list; e; e = e->list_next) ++ e->flags &= ~ELEMENT_RENDERED; ++ ++ /* And then we actually render */ ++ printf("Pass 2\n"); ++ fprintf(out, "\n"); ++ fprintf(out, "static const unsigned char %s_machine[] = {\n", ++ grammar_name); ++ ++ nr_entries = 0; ++ root = &type_list[0]; ++ render_element(out, root->element, NULL); ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_COMPLETE,\n"); ++ render_out_of_line_list(out); ++ ++ fprintf(out, "};\n"); ++ ++ fprintf(out, "\n"); ++ fprintf(out, "const struct asn1_decoder %s_decoder = {\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(out, "\t.machine = %s_machine,\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(out, "\t.machlen = sizeof(%s_machine),\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(out, "\t.actions = %s_action_table,\n", grammar_name); ++ fprintf(out, "};\n"); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Render the out-of-line elements ++ */ ++static void render_out_of_line_list(FILE *out) ++{ ++ struct element *e, *ce; ++ const char *act; ++ int entry; ++ ++ while ((e = render_list)) { ++ render_list = e->render_next; ++ if (!render_list) ++ render_list_p = &render_list; ++ ++ render_more(out, "\n"); ++ e->entry_index = entry = nr_entries; ++ render_depth++; ++ for (ce = e->children; ce; ce = ce->next) ++ render_element(out, ce, NULL); ++ render_depth--; ++ ++ act = e->action ? "_ACT" : ""; ++ switch (e->compound) { ++ case SEQUENCE: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SEQ%s,\n", act); ++ break; ++ case SEQUENCE_OF: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF%s,\n", act); ++ render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),\n", entry); ++ break; ++ case SET: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SET%s,\n", act); ++ break; ++ case SET_OF: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF%s,\n", act); ++ render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),\n", entry); ++ break; ++ } ++ if (e->action) ++ render_opcode(out, "_action(ACT_%s),\n", ++ e->action->name); ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_RETURN,\n"); ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Render an element. ++ */ ++static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag) ++{ ++ struct element *ec; ++ const char *cond, *act; ++ int entry, skippable = 0, outofline = 0; ++ ++ if (e->flags & ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE || ++ (tag && tag->flags & ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE)) ++ skippable = 1; ++ ++ if ((e->type_def && e->type_def->ref_count > 1) || ++ skippable) ++ outofline = 1; ++ ++ if (e->type_def && out) { ++ render_more(out, "\t// %*.*s\n", ++ (int)e->type_def->name->size, (int)e->type_def->name->size, ++ e->type_def->name->value); ++ } ++ ++ /* Render the operation */ ++ cond = (e->flags & ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL || ++ (tag && tag->flags & ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL)) ? "COND_" : ""; ++ act = e->action ? "_ACT" : ""; ++ switch (e->compound) { ++ case ANY: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s,", cond, act); ++ if (e->name) ++ render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s", ++ (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size, ++ e->name->value); ++ render_more(out, "\n"); ++ goto dont_render_tag; ++ ++ case TAG_OVERRIDE: ++ render_element(out, e->children, e); ++ return; ++ ++ case SEQUENCE: ++ case SEQUENCE_OF: ++ case SET: ++ case SET_OF: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH%s%s,", ++ cond, ++ outofline ? "_JUMP" : "", ++ skippable ? "_OR_SKIP" : ""); ++ break; ++ ++ case CHOICE: ++ goto dont_render_tag; ++ ++ case TYPE_REF: ++ if (e->class == ASN1_UNIV && e->method == ASN1_PRIM && e->tag == 0) ++ goto dont_render_tag; ++ default: ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH%s%s,", ++ cond, act, ++ skippable ? "_OR_SKIP" : ""); ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (e->name) ++ render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s", ++ (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size, ++ e->name->value); ++ render_more(out, "\n"); ++ ++ /* Render the tag */ ++ if (!tag) ++ tag = e; ++ if (tag->class == ASN1_UNIV && ++ tag->tag != 14 && ++ tag->tag != 15 && ++ tag->tag != 31) ++ render_opcode(out, "_tag(%s, %s, %s),\n", ++ asn1_classes[tag->class], ++ asn1_methods[tag->method | e->method], ++ asn1_universal_tags[tag->tag]); ++ else ++ render_opcode(out, "_tagn(%s, %s, %2u),\n", ++ asn1_classes[tag->class], ++ asn1_methods[tag->method | e->method], ++ tag->tag); ++ tag = NULL; ++dont_render_tag: ++ ++ /* Deal with compound types */ ++ switch (e->compound) { ++ case TYPE_REF: ++ render_element(out, e->type->type->element, tag); ++ if (e->action) ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_ACT,\n"); ++ break; ++ ++ case SEQUENCE: ++ if (outofline) { ++ /* Render out-of-line for multiple use or ++ * skipability */ ++ render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index); ++ if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name) ++ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s", ++ (int)e->type_def->name->size, ++ (int)e->type_def->name->size, ++ e->type_def->name->value); ++ render_more(out, "\n"); ++ if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) { ++ e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED; ++ *render_list_p = e; ++ render_list_p = &e->render_next; ++ } ++ return; ++ } else { ++ /* Render inline for single use */ ++ render_depth++; ++ for (ec = e->children; ec; ec = ec->next) ++ render_element(out, ec, NULL); ++ render_depth--; ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SEQ%s,\n", act); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case SEQUENCE_OF: ++ case SET_OF: ++ if (outofline) { ++ /* Render out-of-line for multiple use or ++ * skipability */ ++ render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index); ++ if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name) ++ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s", ++ (int)e->type_def->name->size, ++ (int)e->type_def->name->size, ++ e->type_def->name->value); ++ render_more(out, "\n"); ++ if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) { ++ e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED; ++ *render_list_p = e; ++ render_list_p = &e->render_next; ++ } ++ return; ++ } else { ++ /* Render inline for single use */ ++ entry = nr_entries; ++ render_depth++; ++ render_element(out, e->children, NULL); ++ render_depth--; ++ if (e->compound == SEQUENCE_OF) ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF%s,\n", act); ++ else ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF%s,\n", act); ++ render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),\n", entry); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case SET: ++ /* I can't think of a nice way to do SET support without having ++ * a stack of bitmasks to make sure no element is repeated. ++ * The bitmask has also to be checked that no non-optional ++ * elements are left out whilst not preventing optional ++ * elements from being left out. ++ */ ++ fprintf(stderr, "The ASN.1 SET type is not currently supported.\n"); ++ exit(1); ++ ++ case CHOICE: ++ for (ec = e->children; ec; ec = ec->next) ++ render_element(out, ec, NULL); ++ if (!skippable) ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL,\n"); ++ if (e->action) ++ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_ACT,\n"); ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (e->action) ++ render_opcode(out, "_action(ACT_%s),\n", e->action->name); ++} +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 8ea3f94cc16a23e3edbebf12f4223e654eb8219d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:11:16 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 15/26] X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder + +Add an ASN.1 BER/DER/CER decoder. This uses the bytecode from the ASN.1 +compiler in the previous patch to inform it as to what to expect to find in the +encoded byte stream. The output from the compiler also tells it what functions +to call on what tags, thus allowing the caller to retrieve information. + +The decoder is called as follows: + + int asn1_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder, + void *context, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen); + +The decoder argument points to the bytecode from the ASN.1 compiler. context +is the caller's context and is passed to the action functions. data and +datalen define the byte stream to be decoded. + + +Note that the decoder is currently limited to datalen being less than 64K. +This reduces the amount of stack space used by the decoder because ASN.1 is a +nested construct. Similarly, the decoder is limited to a maximum of 10 levels +of constructed data outside of a leaf node also in an effort to keep stack +usage down. + +These restrictions can be raised if necessary. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/asn1_decoder.h | 24 +++ + lib/Makefile | 2 + + lib/asn1_decoder.c | 477 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 503 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_decoder.h + create mode 100644 lib/asn1_decoder.c + +diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_decoder.h b/include/linux/asn1_decoder.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..fa2ff5b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/linux/asn1_decoder.h +@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ ++/* ASN.1 decoder ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_DECODER_H ++#define _LINUX_ASN1_DECODER_H ++ ++#include <linux/asn1.h> ++ ++struct asn1_decoder; ++ ++extern int asn1_ber_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder, ++ void *context, ++ const unsigned char *data, ++ size_t datalen); ++ ++#endif /* _LINUX_ASN1_DECODER_H */ +diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile +index b042896..ca856b6 100644 +--- a/lib/Makefile ++++ b/lib/Makefile +@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ $(foreach file, $(libfdt_files), \ + $(eval CFLAGS_$(file) = -I$(src)/../scripts/dtc/libfdt)) + lib-$(CONFIG_LIBFDT) += $(libfdt_files) + ++obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o ++ + hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table + clean-files := crc32table.h + +diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..2e4196d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c +@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@ ++/* Decoder for ASN.1 BER/DER/CER encoded bytestream ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/export.h> ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/errno.h> ++#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h> ++#include <linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h> ++ ++static const unsigned char asn1_op_lengths[ASN1_OP__NR] = { ++ /* OPC TAG JMP ACT */ ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_COMPLETE] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_ACT] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_RETURN] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SEQ] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SET] = 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT] = 1 + 1, ++ [ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT] = 1 + 1 + 1, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * Find the length of an indefinite length object ++ */ ++static int asn1_find_indefinite_length(const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, ++ const char **_errmsg, size_t *_err_dp) ++{ ++ unsigned char tag, tmp; ++ size_t dp = 0, len, n; ++ int indef_level = 1; ++ ++next_tag: ++ if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2)) { ++ if (datalen == dp) ++ goto missing_eoc; ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ } ++ ++ /* Extract a tag from the data */ ++ tag = data[dp++]; ++ if (tag == 0) { ++ /* It appears to be an EOC. */ ++ if (data[dp++] != 0) ++ goto invalid_eoc; ++ if (--indef_level <= 0) ++ return dp; ++ goto next_tag; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely((tag & 0x1f) == 0x1f)) { ++ do { ++ if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ tmp = data[dp++]; ++ } while (tmp & 0x80); ++ } ++ ++ /* Extract the length */ ++ len = data[dp++]; ++ if (len < 0x7f) { ++ dp += len; ++ goto next_tag; ++ } ++ ++ if (unlikely(len == 0x80)) { ++ /* Indefinite length */ ++ if (unlikely((tag & ASN1_CONS_BIT) == ASN1_PRIM << 5)) ++ goto indefinite_len_primitive; ++ indef_level++; ++ goto next_tag; ++ } ++ ++ n = len - 0x80; ++ if (unlikely(n > sizeof(size_t) - 1)) ++ goto length_too_long; ++ if (unlikely(n > datalen - dp)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) { ++ len <<= 8; ++ len |= data[dp++]; ++ } ++ dp += len; ++ goto next_tag; ++ ++length_too_long: ++ *_errmsg = "Unsupported length"; ++ goto error; ++indefinite_len_primitive: ++ *_errmsg = "Indefinite len primitive not permitted"; ++ goto error; ++invalid_eoc: ++ *_errmsg = "Invalid length EOC"; ++ goto error; ++data_overrun_error: ++ *_errmsg = "Data overrun error"; ++ goto error; ++missing_eoc: ++ *_errmsg = "Missing EOC in indefinite len cons"; ++error: ++ *_err_dp = dp; ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++/** ++ * asn1_ber_decoder - Decoder BER/DER/CER ASN.1 according to pattern ++ * @decoder: The decoder definition (produced by asn1_compiler) ++ * @context: The caller's context (to be passed to the action functions) ++ * @data: The encoded data ++ * @datasize: The size of the encoded data ++ * ++ * Decode BER/DER/CER encoded ASN.1 data according to a bytecode pattern ++ * produced by asn1_compiler. Action functions are called on marked tags to ++ * allow the caller to retrieve significant data. ++ * ++ * LIMITATIONS: ++ * ++ * To keep down the amount of stack used by this function, the following limits ++ * have been imposed: ++ * ++ * (1) This won't handle datalen > 65535 without increasing the size of the ++ * cons stack elements and length_too_long checking. ++ * ++ * (2) The stack of constructed types is 10 deep. If the depth of non-leaf ++ * constructed types exceeds this, the decode will fail. ++ * ++ * (3) The SET type (not the SET OF type) isn't really supported as tracking ++ * what members of the set have been seen is a pain. ++ */ ++int asn1_ber_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder, ++ void *context, ++ const unsigned char *data, ++ size_t datalen) ++{ ++ const unsigned char *machine = decoder->machine; ++ const asn1_action_t *actions = decoder->actions; ++ size_t machlen = decoder->machlen; ++ enum asn1_opcode op; ++ unsigned char tag = 0, csp = 0, jsp = 0, optag = 0, hdr = 0; ++ const char *errmsg; ++ size_t pc = 0, dp = 0, tdp = 0, len = 0; ++ int ret; ++ ++ unsigned char flags = 0; ++#define FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 0x01 ++#define FLAG_MATCHED 0x02 ++#define FLAG_CONS 0x20 /* Corresponds to CONS bit in the opcode tag ++ * - ie. whether or not we are going to parse ++ * a compound type. ++ */ ++ ++#define NR_CONS_STACK 10 ++ unsigned short cons_dp_stack[NR_CONS_STACK]; ++ unsigned short cons_datalen_stack[NR_CONS_STACK]; ++ unsigned char cons_hdrlen_stack[NR_CONS_STACK]; ++#define NR_JUMP_STACK 10 ++ unsigned char jump_stack[NR_JUMP_STACK]; ++ ++ if (datalen > 65535) ++ return -EMSGSIZE; ++ ++next_op: ++ pr_debug("next_op: pc=\e[32m%zu\e[m/%zu dp=\e[33m%zu\e[m/%zu C=%d J=%d\n", ++ pc, machlen, dp, datalen, csp, jsp); ++ if (unlikely(pc >= machlen)) ++ goto machine_overrun_error; ++ op = machine[pc]; ++ if (unlikely(pc + asn1_op_lengths[op] > machlen)) ++ goto machine_overrun_error; ++ ++ /* If this command is meant to match a tag, then do that before ++ * evaluating the command. ++ */ ++ if (op <= ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG) { ++ unsigned char tmp; ++ ++ /* Skip conditional matches if possible */ ++ if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND && ++ flags & FLAG_MATCHED) || ++ dp == datalen) { ++ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ goto next_op; ++ } ++ ++ flags = 0; ++ hdr = 2; ++ ++ /* Extract a tag from the data */ ++ if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - 1)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ tag = data[dp++]; ++ if (unlikely((tag & 0x1f) == 0x1f)) ++ goto long_tag_not_supported; ++ ++ if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY) { ++ pr_debug("- any %02x\n", tag); ++ } else { ++ /* Extract the tag from the machine ++ * - Either CONS or PRIM are permitted in the data if ++ * CONS is not set in the op stream, otherwise CONS ++ * is mandatory. ++ */ ++ optag = machine[pc + 1]; ++ flags |= optag & FLAG_CONS; ++ ++ /* Determine whether the tag matched */ ++ tmp = optag ^ tag; ++ tmp &= ~(optag & ASN1_CONS_BIT); ++ pr_debug("- match? %02x %02x %02x\n", tag, optag, tmp); ++ if (tmp != 0) { ++ /* All odd-numbered tags are MATCH_OR_SKIP. */ ++ if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP) { ++ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ dp--; ++ goto next_op; ++ } ++ goto tag_mismatch; ++ } ++ } ++ flags |= FLAG_MATCHED; ++ ++ len = data[dp++]; ++ if (len > 0x7f) { ++ if (unlikely(len == 0x80)) { ++ /* Indefinite length */ ++ if (unlikely(!(tag & ASN1_CONS_BIT))) ++ goto indefinite_len_primitive; ++ flags |= FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH; ++ if (unlikely(2 > datalen - dp)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ } else { ++ int n = len - 0x80; ++ if (unlikely(n > 2)) ++ goto length_too_long; ++ if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - n)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ hdr += n; ++ for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) { ++ len <<= 8; ++ len |= data[dp++]; ++ } ++ if (unlikely(len > datalen - dp)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (flags & FLAG_CONS) { ++ /* For expected compound forms, we stack the positions ++ * of the start and end of the data. ++ */ ++ if (unlikely(csp >= NR_CONS_STACK)) ++ goto cons_stack_overflow; ++ cons_dp_stack[csp] = dp; ++ cons_hdrlen_stack[csp] = hdr; ++ if (!(flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) { ++ cons_datalen_stack[csp] = datalen; ++ datalen = dp + len; ++ } else { ++ cons_datalen_stack[csp] = 0; ++ } ++ csp++; ++ } ++ ++ pr_debug("- TAG: %02x %zu%s\n", ++ tag, len, flags & FLAG_CONS ? " CONS" : ""); ++ tdp = dp; ++ } ++ ++ /* Decide how to handle the operation */ ++ switch (op) { ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT: ++ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT: ++ ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ return ret; ++ goto skip_data; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT: ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP: ++ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP: ++ ret = actions[machine[pc + 2]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ return ret; ++ goto skip_data; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH: ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP: ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY: ++ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP: ++ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY: ++ skip_data: ++ if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) { ++ if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) { ++ len = asn1_find_indefinite_length( ++ data + dp, datalen - dp, &errmsg, &dp); ++ if (len < 0) ++ goto error; ++ } ++ pr_debug("- LEAF: %zu\n", len); ++ dp += len; ++ } ++ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ goto next_op; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP: ++ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP: ++ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP: ++ pr_debug("- MATCH_JUMP\n"); ++ if (unlikely(jsp == NR_JUMP_STACK)) ++ goto jump_stack_overflow; ++ jump_stack[jsp++] = pc + asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ pc = machine[pc + 2]; ++ goto next_op; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL: ++ if (unlikely(!(flags & FLAG_MATCHED))) ++ goto tag_mismatch; ++ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ goto next_op; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_COMPLETE: ++ if (unlikely(jsp != 0 || csp != 0)) { ++ pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Stacks not empty at completion (%u, %u)\n", ++ jsp, csp); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ return 0; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SET: ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT: ++ if (unlikely(!(flags & FLAG_MATCHED))) ++ goto tag_mismatch; ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ: ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF: ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF: ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT: ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT: ++ case ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT: ++ if (unlikely(csp <= 0)) ++ goto cons_stack_underflow; ++ csp--; ++ tdp = cons_dp_stack[csp]; ++ hdr = cons_hdrlen_stack[csp]; ++ len = datalen; ++ datalen = cons_datalen_stack[csp]; ++ pr_debug("- end cons t=%zu dp=%zu l=%zu/%zu\n", ++ tdp, dp, len, datalen); ++ if (datalen == 0) { ++ /* Indefinite length - check for the EOC. */ ++ datalen = len; ++ if (unlikely(datalen - dp < 2)) ++ goto data_overrun_error; ++ if (data[dp++] != 0) { ++ if (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF) { ++ dp--; ++ csp++; ++ pc = machine[pc + 1]; ++ pr_debug("- continue\n"); ++ goto next_op; ++ } ++ goto missing_eoc; ++ } ++ if (data[dp++] != 0) ++ goto invalid_eoc; ++ len = dp - tdp - 2; ++ } else { ++ if (dp < len && (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF)) { ++ datalen = len; ++ csp++; ++ pc = machine[pc + 1]; ++ pr_debug("- continue\n"); ++ goto next_op; ++ } ++ if (dp != len) ++ goto cons_length_error; ++ len -= tdp; ++ pr_debug("- cons len l=%zu d=%zu\n", len, dp - tdp); ++ } ++ ++ if (op & ASN1_OP_END__ACT) { ++ unsigned char act; ++ if (op & ASN1_OP_END__OF) ++ act = machine[pc + 2]; ++ else ++ act = machine[pc + 1]; ++ ret = actions[act](context, hdr, 0, data + tdp, len); ++ } ++ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ goto next_op; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_ACT: ++ ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + tdp, len); ++ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op]; ++ goto next_op; ++ ++ case ASN1_OP_RETURN: ++ if (unlikely(jsp <= 0)) ++ goto jump_stack_underflow; ++ pc = jump_stack[--jsp]; ++ goto next_op; ++ ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ /* Shouldn't reach here */ ++ pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u)\n", op); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++data_overrun_error: ++ errmsg = "Data overrun error"; ++ goto error; ++machine_overrun_error: ++ errmsg = "Machine overrun error"; ++ goto error; ++jump_stack_underflow: ++ errmsg = "Jump stack underflow"; ++ goto error; ++jump_stack_overflow: ++ errmsg = "Jump stack overflow"; ++ goto error; ++cons_stack_underflow: ++ errmsg = "Cons stack underflow"; ++ goto error; ++cons_stack_overflow: ++ errmsg = "Cons stack overflow"; ++ goto error; ++cons_length_error: ++ errmsg = "Cons length error"; ++ goto error; ++missing_eoc: ++ errmsg = "Missing EOC in indefinite len cons"; ++ goto error; ++invalid_eoc: ++ errmsg = "Invalid length EOC"; ++ goto error; ++length_too_long: ++ errmsg = "Unsupported length"; ++ goto error; ++indefinite_len_primitive: ++ errmsg = "Indefinite len primitive not permitted"; ++ goto error; ++tag_mismatch: ++ errmsg = "Unexpected tag"; ++ goto error; ++long_tag_not_supported: ++ errmsg = "Long tag not supported"; ++error: ++ pr_debug("\nASN1: %s [m=%zu d=%zu ot=%02x t=%02x l=%zu]\n", ++ errmsg, pc, dp, optag, tag, len); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_ber_decoder); +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From f055a9091c35be0171d39ca8e76bb4677d89eef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:11:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 16/26] MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an + MPI + +Provide a function to read raw data of a predetermined size into an MPI rather +than expecting the size to be encoded within the data. The data is assumed to +represent an unsigned integer, and the resulting MPI will be positive. + +The function looks like this: + + MPI mpi_read_raw_data(const void *, size_t); + +This is useful for reading ASN.1 integer primitives where the length is encoded +in the ASN.1 metadata. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + include/linux/mpi.h | 1 + + lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/linux/mpi.h b/include/linux/mpi.h +index d02cca6..5af1b81 100644 +--- a/include/linux/mpi.h ++++ b/include/linux/mpi.h +@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ void mpi_swap(MPI a, MPI b); + + /*-- mpicoder.c --*/ + MPI do_encode_md(const void *sha_buffer, unsigned nbits); ++MPI mpi_read_raw_data(const void *xbuffer, size_t nbytes); + MPI mpi_read_from_buffer(const void *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread); + int mpi_fromstr(MPI val, const char *str); + u32 mpi_get_keyid(MPI a, u32 *keyid); +diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c b/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c +index f0fa659..3962b7f 100644 +--- a/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c ++++ b/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c +@@ -18,10 +18,65 @@ + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA + */ + ++#include <linux/bitops.h> ++#include <asm-generic/bitops/count_zeros.h> + #include "mpi-internal.h" + + #define MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS 16384 + ++/** ++ * mpi_read_raw_data - Read a raw byte stream as a positive integer ++ * @xbuffer: The data to read ++ * @nbytes: The amount of data to read ++ */ ++MPI mpi_read_raw_data(const void *xbuffer, size_t nbytes) ++{ ++ const uint8_t *buffer = xbuffer; ++ int i, j; ++ unsigned nbits, nlimbs; ++ mpi_limb_t a; ++ MPI val = NULL; ++ ++ while (nbytes >= 0 && buffer[0] == 0) { ++ buffer++; ++ nbytes--; ++ } ++ ++ nbits = nbytes * 8; ++ if (nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS) { ++ pr_info("MPI: mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (nbytes > 0) ++ nbits -= count_leading_zeros(buffer[0]); ++ else ++ nbits = 0; ++ ++ nlimbs = (nbytes + BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; ++ val = mpi_alloc(nlimbs); ++ if (!val) ++ return NULL; ++ val->nbits = nbits; ++ val->sign = 0; ++ val->nlimbs = nlimbs; ++ ++ if (nbytes > 0) { ++ i = BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB - nbytes % BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; ++ i %= BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; ++ for (j = nlimbs; j > 0; j--) { ++ a = 0; ++ for (; i < BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; i++) { ++ a <<= 8; ++ a |= *buffer++; ++ } ++ i = 0; ++ val->d[j - 1] = a; ++ } ++ } ++ return val; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_read_raw_data); ++ + MPI mpi_read_from_buffer(const void *xbuffer, unsigned *ret_nread) + { + const uint8_t *buffer = xbuffer; +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 3d816cdad8cdd5412ecc8f539bb09daef52ba361 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:11:48 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 17/26] X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 + certificates + +Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) encoded X.509 certificates. The +certificate is parsed and, if possible, the signature is verified. + +An X.509 key can be added like this: + + # keyctl padd crypto bar @s </tmp/x509.cert + 15768135 + +and displayed like this: + + # cat /proc/keys + 00f09a47 I--Q--- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 asymmetri bar: X509.RSA e9fd6d08 [] + +Note that this only works with binary certificates. PEM encoded certificates +are ignored by the parser. + +Note also that the X.509 key ID is not congruent with the PGP key ID, but for +the moment, they will match. + +If a NULL or "" name is given to add_key(), then the parser will generate a key +description from the CertificateSerialNumber and Name fields of the +TBSCertificate: + + 00aefc4e I--Q--- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 asymmetri bfbc0cd76d050ea4:/C=GB/L=Cambridge/O=Red Hat/CN=kernel key: X509.RSA 0c688c7b [] + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + crypto/asymmetric_keys/.gitignore | 1 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 10 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 17 + + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 60 ++++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 497 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 36 +++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 207 +++++++++++++ + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_rsakey.asn1 | 4 + + 8 files changed, 832 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/.gitignore + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c + create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_rsakey.asn1 + +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/.gitignore b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/.gitignore +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..ee32837 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/.gitignore +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++*-asn1.[ch] +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +index 561759d..6d2c2ea 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +@@ -25,4 +25,14 @@ config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA + help + This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447). + ++config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER ++ tristate "X.509 certificate parser" ++ depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE ++ select ASN1 ++ select OID_REGISTRY ++ help ++ This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key ++ data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a ++ public key packet found inside the certificate. ++ + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +index 7c92691..0727204 100644 +--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +@@ -8,3 +8,20 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o + + obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o + obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o ++ ++# ++# X.509 Certificate handling ++# ++obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o ++x509_key_parser-y := \ ++ x509-asn1.o \ ++ x509_rsakey-asn1.o \ ++ x509_cert_parser.o \ ++ x509_public_key.o ++ ++$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h ++$(obj)/x509-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.c $(obj)/x509-asn1.h ++$(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h ++ ++clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h ++clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..bf32b3d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 +@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ ++Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { ++ tbsCertificate TBSCertificate ({ x509_note_tbs_certificate }), ++ signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, ++ signature BIT STRING ({ x509_note_signature }) ++ } ++ ++TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { ++ version [ 0 ] Version DEFAULT, ++ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, ++ signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }), ++ issuer Name ({ x509_note_issuer }), ++ validity Validity, ++ subject Name ({ x509_note_subject }), ++ subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, ++ issuerUniqueID [ 1 ] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, ++ subjectUniqueID [ 2 ] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, ++ extensions [ 3 ] Extensions OPTIONAL ++ } ++ ++Version ::= INTEGER ++CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER ++ ++AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { ++ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }), ++ parameters ANY OPTIONAL ++} ++ ++Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName ++ ++RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion ++ ++AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE { ++ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }), ++ attributeValue ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment }) ++ } ++ ++Validity ::= SEQUENCE { ++ notBefore Time ({ x509_note_not_before }), ++ notAfter Time ({ x509_note_not_after }) ++ } ++ ++Time ::= CHOICE { ++ utcTime UTCTime, ++ generalTime GeneralizedTime ++ } ++ ++SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ++ algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, ++ subjectPublicKey BIT STRING ({ x509_extract_key_data }) ++ } ++ ++UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING ++ ++Extensions ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension ++ ++Extension ::= SEQUENCE { ++ extnid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }), ++ critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT, ++ extnValue OCTET STRING ({ x509_process_extension }) ++ } +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..8fcac94 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@ ++/* X.509 certificate parser ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <linux/oid_registry.h> ++#include "public_key.h" ++#include "x509_parser.h" ++#include "x509-asn1.h" ++#include "x509_rsakey-asn1.h" ++ ++struct x509_parse_context { ++ struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */ ++ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */ ++ const void *cert_start; /* Start of cert content */ ++ const void *key; /* Key data */ ++ size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */ ++ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */ ++ enum OID algo_oid; /* Algorithm OID */ ++ unsigned char nr_mpi; /* Number of MPIs stored */ ++ u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */ ++ u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */ ++ u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */ ++ u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */ ++ u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */ ++ u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */ ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * Free an X.509 certificate ++ */ ++void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) ++{ ++ if (cert) { ++ public_key_destroy(cert->pub); ++ kfree(cert->issuer); ++ kfree(cert->subject); ++ kfree(cert->fingerprint); ++ kfree(cert->authority); ++ kfree(cert); ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Parse an X.509 certificate ++ */ ++struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) ++{ ++ struct x509_certificate *cert; ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx; ++ long ret; ++ ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!cert) ++ goto error_no_cert; ++ cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!cert->pub) ++ goto error_no_ctx; ++ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!ctx) ++ goto error_no_ctx; ++ ++ ctx->cert = cert; ++ ctx->data = (unsigned long)data; ++ ++ /* Attempt to decode the certificate */ ++ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_decoder, ctx, data, datalen); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error_decode; ++ ++ /* Decode the public key */ ++ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx, ++ ctx->key, ctx->key_size); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error_decode; ++ ++ kfree(ctx); ++ return cert; ++ ++error_decode: ++ kfree(ctx); ++error_no_ctx: ++ x509_free_certificate(cert); ++error_no_cert: ++ return ERR_PTR(ret); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how ++ * to interpret it. ++ */ ++int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ ++ ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); ++ if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) { ++ char buffer[50]; ++ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); ++ pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%zu] %s\n", ++ (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer); ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Save the position of the TBS data so that we can check the signature over it ++ * later. ++ */ ++int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ ++ pr_debug("x509_note_tbs_certificate(,%zu,%02x,%ld,%zu)!\n", ++ hdrlen, tag, (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, vlen); ++ ++ ctx->cert->tbs = value - hdrlen; ++ ctx->cert->tbs_size = vlen + hdrlen; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Record the public key algorithm ++ */ ++int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ ++ pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); ++ ++ switch (ctx->last_oid) { ++ case OID_md2WithRSAEncryption: ++ case OID_md3WithRSAEncryption: ++ default: ++ return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */ ++ ++ case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption: ++ ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5; ++ ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ break; ++ ++ case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption: ++ ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1; ++ ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ break; ++ ++ case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: ++ ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; ++ ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ break; ++ ++ case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption: ++ ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384; ++ ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ break; ++ ++ case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption: ++ ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512; ++ ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ break; ++ ++ case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption: ++ ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224; ++ ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Note the whereabouts and type of the signature. ++ */ ++int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ ++ pr_debug("Signature type: %u size %zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen); ++ ++ if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->algo_oid) { ++ pr_warn("Got cert with pkey (%u) and sig (%u) algorithm OIDs\n", ++ ctx->algo_oid, ctx->last_oid); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ ctx->cert->sig = value; ++ ctx->cert->sig_size = vlen; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name. ++ */ ++int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ ++ switch (ctx->last_oid) { ++ case OID_commonName: ++ ctx->cn_size = vlen; ++ ctx->cn_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data; ++ break; ++ case OID_organizationName: ++ ctx->o_size = vlen; ++ ctx->o_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data; ++ break; ++ case OID_email_address: ++ ctx->email_size = vlen; ++ ctx->email_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data; ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Fabricate and save the issuer and subject names ++ */ ++static int x509_fabricate_name(struct x509_parse_context *ctx, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ char **_name, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ const void *name, *data = (const void *)ctx->data; ++ size_t namesize; ++ char *buffer; ++ ++ if (*_name) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ /* Empty name string if no material */ ++ if (!ctx->cn_size && !ctx->o_size && !ctx->email_size) { ++ buffer = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!buffer) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ buffer[0] = 0; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ ++ if (ctx->cn_size && ctx->o_size) { ++ /* Consider combining O and CN, but use only the CN if it is ++ * prefixed by the O, or a significant portion thereof. ++ */ ++ namesize = ctx->cn_size; ++ name = data + ctx->cn_offset; ++ if (ctx->cn_size >= ctx->o_size && ++ memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, ++ ctx->o_size) == 0) ++ goto single_component; ++ if (ctx->cn_size >= 7 && ++ ctx->o_size >= 7 && ++ memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, 7) == 0) ++ goto single_component; ++ ++ buffer = kmalloc(ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size + 1, ++ GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!buffer) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ memcpy(buffer, ++ data + ctx->o_offset, ctx->o_size); ++ buffer[ctx->o_size + 0] = ':'; ++ buffer[ctx->o_size + 1] = ' '; ++ memcpy(buffer + ctx->o_size + 2, ++ data + ctx->cn_offset, ctx->cn_size); ++ buffer[ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size] = 0; ++ goto done; ++ ++ } else if (ctx->cn_size) { ++ namesize = ctx->cn_size; ++ name = data + ctx->cn_offset; ++ } else if (ctx->o_size) { ++ namesize = ctx->o_size; ++ name = data + ctx->o_offset; ++ } else { ++ namesize = ctx->email_size; ++ name = data + ctx->email_offset; ++ } ++ ++single_component: ++ buffer = kmalloc(namesize + 1, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!buffer) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ memcpy(buffer, name, namesize); ++ buffer[namesize] = 0; ++ ++done: ++ *_name = buffer; ++ ctx->cn_size = 0; ++ ctx->o_size = 0; ++ ctx->email_size = 0; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen); ++} ++ ++int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Extract the data for the public key algorithm ++ */ ++int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ ++ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption) ++ return -ENOPKG; ++ ++ /* There seems to be an extraneous 0 byte on the front of the data */ ++ ctx->cert->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; ++ ctx->key = value + 1; ++ ctx->key_size = vlen - 1; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Extract a RSA public key value ++ */ ++int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ MPI mpi; ++ ++ if (ctx->nr_mpi >= ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->cert->pub->mpi)) { ++ pr_err("Too many public key MPIs in certificate\n"); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ } ++ ++ mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen); ++ if (!mpi) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ ++ ctx->cert->pub->mpi[ctx->nr_mpi++] = mpi; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate. ++ */ ++int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ const unsigned char *v = value; ++ char *f; ++ int i; ++ ++ pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); ++ ++ if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) { ++ /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */ ++ if (vlen < 3) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ v += 2; ++ vlen -= 2; ++ ++ f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!f) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) ++ sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]); ++ pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f); ++ ctx->cert->fingerprint = f; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { ++ /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ ++ if (vlen < 5) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)) || ++ v[1] != vlen - 2 || ++ v[2] != (ASN1_CONT << 6) || ++ v[3] != vlen - 4) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ v += 4; ++ vlen -= 4; ++ ++ f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!f) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) ++ sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]); ++ pr_debug("authority %s\n", f); ++ ctx->cert->authority = f; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Record a certificate time. ++ */ ++static int x509_note_time(time_t *_time, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ unsigned YY, MM, DD, hh, mm, ss; ++ const unsigned char *p = value; ++ ++#define dec2bin(X) ((X) - '0') ++#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; }) ++ ++ if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) { ++ /* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */ ++ if (vlen != 13) ++ goto unsupported_time; ++ YY = DD2bin(p); ++ if (YY > 50) ++ YY += 1900; ++ else ++ YY += 2000; ++ } else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) { ++ /* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */ ++ if (vlen != 15) ++ goto unsupported_time; ++ YY = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p); ++ } else { ++ goto unsupported_time; ++ } ++ ++ MM = DD2bin(p); ++ DD = DD2bin(p); ++ hh = DD2bin(p); ++ mm = DD2bin(p); ++ ss = DD2bin(p); ++ ++ if (*p != 'Z') ++ goto unsupported_time; ++ ++ *_time = mktime(YY, MM, DD, hh, mm, ss); ++ return 0; ++ ++unsupported_time: ++ pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*.*s'\n", ++ tag, (int)vlen, (int)vlen, value); ++ return -EBADMSG; ++} ++ ++int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen); ++} ++ ++int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen, ++ unsigned char tag, ++ const void *value, size_t vlen) ++{ ++ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; ++ return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen); ++} +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..635053f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ ++/* X.509 certificate parser internal definitions ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <crypto/public_key.h> ++ ++struct x509_certificate { ++ struct x509_certificate *next; ++ struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */ ++ char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ ++ char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ ++ char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */ ++ char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */ ++ time_t valid_from; ++ time_t valid_to; ++ enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; /* Public key algorithm */ ++ enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */ ++ enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */ ++ const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ ++ size_t tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ ++ const void *sig; /* Signature data */ ++ size_t sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * x509_cert_parser.c ++ */ ++extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert); ++extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen); +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..716917c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ ++/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt ++#include <linux/module.h> ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/slab.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <linux/mpi.h> ++#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> ++#include <crypto/hash.h> ++#include "asymmetric_keys.h" ++#include "public_key.h" ++#include "x509_parser.h" ++ ++static const ++struct public_key_algorithm *x509_public_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { ++ [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = NULL, ++#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \ ++ defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE) ++ [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm, ++#endif ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key ++ */ ++static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, ++ const struct x509_certificate *cert) ++{ ++ struct public_key_signature *sig; ++ struct crypto_shash *tfm; ++ struct shash_desc *desc; ++ size_t digest_size, desc_size; ++ int ret; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ++ ++ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how ++ * big the hash operational data will be. ++ */ ++ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0); ++ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) ++ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); ++ ++ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); ++ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); ++ ++ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our ++ * context data. ++ */ ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!sig) ++ goto error_no_sig; ++ ++ sig->pkey_hash_algo = cert->sig_hash_algo; ++ sig->digest = (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size; ++ sig->digest_size = digest_size; ++ ++ desc = (void *)sig + sizeof(*sig); ++ desc->tfm = tfm; ++ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; ++ ++ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ sig->rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->sig, cert->sig_size); ++ if (!sig->rsa.s) ++ goto error; ++ ++ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error_mpi; ++ ++ ret = pub->algo->verify_signature(pub, sig); ++ ++ pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret); ++ ++error_mpi: ++ mpi_free(sig->rsa.s); ++error: ++ kfree(sig); ++error_no_sig: ++ crypto_free_shash(tfm); ++ ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. ++ */ ++static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ++{ ++ struct x509_certificate *cert; ++ time_t now; ++ size_t srlen, sulen; ++ char *desc = NULL; ++ int ret; ++ ++ cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen); ++ if (IS_ERR(cert)) ++ return PTR_ERR(cert); ++ ++ pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); ++ pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); ++ pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]); ++ pr_devel("Cert Valid: %lu - %lu\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to); ++ pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", ++ pkey_algo[cert->sig_pkey_algo], ++ pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo]); ++ ++ if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) { ++ pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n", ++ cert->subject); ++ ret = -EKEYREJECTED; ++ goto error_free_cert; ++ } ++ ++ now = CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec; ++ if (now < cert->valid_from) { ++ pr_warn("Cert %s is not yet valid\n", cert->fingerprint); ++ ret = -EKEYREJECTED; ++ goto error_free_cert; ++ } ++ if (now >= cert->valid_to) { ++ pr_warn("Cert %s has expired\n", cert->fingerprint); ++ ret = -EKEYEXPIRED; ++ goto error_free_cert; ++ } ++ ++ cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo]; ++ cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; ++ ++ /* Check the signature on the key */ ++ if (strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) { ++ ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error_free_cert; ++ } ++ ++ /* Propose a description */ ++ sulen = strlen(cert->subject); ++ srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint); ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!desc) ++ goto error_free_cert; ++ memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen); ++ desc[sulen] = ':'; ++ desc[sulen + 1] = ' '; ++ memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen); ++ desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0; ++ ++ /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ ++ __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); ++ prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype; ++ prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint; ++ prep->payload = cert->pub; ++ prep->description = desc; ++ prep->quotalen = 100; ++ ++ /* We've finished with the certificate */ ++ cert->pub = NULL; ++ cert->fingerprint = NULL; ++ desc = NULL; ++ ret = 0; ++ ++error_free_cert: ++ x509_free_certificate(cert); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = { ++ .owner = THIS_MODULE, ++ .name = "x509", ++ .parse = x509_key_preparse, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * Module stuff ++ */ ++static int __init x509_key_init(void) ++{ ++ return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser); ++} ++ ++static void __exit x509_key_exit(void) ++{ ++ unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser); ++} ++ ++module_init(x509_key_init); ++module_exit(x509_key_exit); +diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_rsakey.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_rsakey.asn1 +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..4ec7cc6 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_rsakey.asn1 +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { ++ modulus INTEGER ({ rsa_extract_mpi }), -- n ++ publicExponent INTEGER ({ rsa_extract_mpi }) -- e ++ } +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 955fc6ec995f6bec6c487eb46027e108e240ebe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 18/26] MOD: Fix Rusty's module_sig_check() + +Make the following fixes to Rusty's module_sig_check() function: + + (1) mod_verify_sig() is not defined, resulting in a compilation error and + thereby breaking git bisect, so provide a dummy that returns an error. + + (2) Using strlen() on a static string is a waste of resources. Further, you + may end up with two copies of the string emitted. + + (3) Doing a memchr() of the bytes beyond the last position that the marker + can be in is a waste of resources. + +While we're at it, push responsibility for the return value entirely off to +mod_verify_sig() if we find a signature. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/Makefile | 1 + + kernel/module-internal.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ + kernel/module.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + kernel/module_signing.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 kernel/module-internal.h + create mode 100644 kernel/module_signing.c + +diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile +index c0cc67a..08ba8a6 100644 +--- a/kernel/Makefile ++++ b/kernel/Makefile +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o + obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o + obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o + obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o + obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o + obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o + obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o +diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..14da0ea +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kernel/module-internal.h +@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ ++/* Module internals ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, ++ const void *sig, unsigned long siglen, ++ bool *_sig_ok); +diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c +index 5c6f65c..ab69599 100644 +--- a/kernel/module.c ++++ b/kernel/module.c +@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ + #include <linux/jump_label.h> + #include <linux/pfn.h> + #include <linux/bsearch.h> ++#include "module-internal.h" + + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS + #include <trace/events/module.h> +@@ -2438,34 +2439,38 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, + #endif + + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ++ + static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, + const void *mod, unsigned long *len) + { ++ static const char module_sig_string[] = MODULE_SIG_STRING; + int err = 0; +- const unsigned long markerlen = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING); +- const void *p = mod, *end = mod + *len; +- +- /* Poor man's memmem. */ +- while ((p = memchr(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING[0], end - p))) { +- if (p + markerlen > end) +- break; +- +- if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { +- const void *sig = p + markerlen; +- /* Truncate module up to signature. */ +- *len = p - mod; +- err = mod_verify_sig(mod, *len, +- sig, end - sig, +- &info->sig_ok); +- break; +- } +- p++; ++ const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(module_sig_string) - 1; ++ const void *p = mod, *end = mod + *len, *sig; ++ const void *limit = end - markerlen - 1; ++ ++ if (markerlen < *len) { ++ /* Poor man's memmem. */ ++ do { ++ p = memchr(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING[0], limit - p); ++ if (!p) ++ break; ++ if (memcmp(p, module_sig_string, markerlen) != 0) ++ continue; ++ goto found_marker; ++ } while (++p < limit); + } + + /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ + if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce) + err = -EKEYREJECTED; + return err; ++ ++found_marker: ++ sig = p + markerlen; ++ /* Truncate module up to signature. */ ++ *len = p - mod; ++ return mod_verify_sig(mod, *len, sig, end - sig, &info->sig_ok); + } + #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ + static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, +diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0af10a5 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c +@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ ++/* Module signature checker ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include "module-internal.h" ++ ++/* ++ * Verify the signature on a module. ++ */ ++int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, ++ const void *sig, unsigned long siglen, ++ bool *_sig_ok) ++{ ++ return -EKEYREJECTED; ++} +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 4c31831859550149cdba65a37d72416c87dbbef6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 19/26] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for + extra files + +Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files to hide and clean up the +extra files produced by module signing stuff once it is added. Also add a +clean up rule for the module content extractor program used to extract the data +to be signed. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + .gitignore | 13 +++++++++++++ + Makefile | 1 + + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore +index 57af07c..9736304 100644 +--- a/.gitignore ++++ b/.gitignore +@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ + *.o.* + *.a + *.s ++*.ko.unsigned ++*.ko.stripped ++*.ko.stripped.dig ++*.ko.stripped.sig + *.ko + *.so + *.so.dbg +@@ -84,3 +88,12 @@ GTAGS + *.orig + *~ + \#*# ++ ++# ++# Leavings from module signing ++# ++extra_certificates ++signing_key.priv ++signing_key.x509 ++signing_key.x509.keyid ++signing_key.x509.signer +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index 371ce88..644048d 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -1239,6 +1239,7 @@ clean: $(clean-dirs) + $(call cmd,rmfiles) + @find $(if $(KBUILD_EXTMOD), $(KBUILD_EXTMOD), .) $(RCS_FIND_IGNORE) \ + \( -name '*.[oas]' -o -name '*.ko' -o -name '.*.cmd' \ ++ -o -name '*.ko.*' \ + -o -name '.*.d' -o -name '.*.tmp' -o -name '*.mod.c' \ + -o -name '*.symtypes' -o -name 'modules.order' \ + -o -name modules.builtin -o -name '.tmp_*.o.*' \ +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 6977e69eef4379f34a2ad264856d74ac292284df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 20/26] MODSIGN: Provide Kconfig options + +Provide kernel configuration options for module signing. + +The following configuration options are added: + + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1 + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224 + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256 + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384 + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 + +These select the cryptographic hash used to digest the data prior to signing. +Additionally, the crypto module selected will be built into the kernel as it +won't be possible to load it as a module without incurring a circular +dependency when the kernel tries to check its signature. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + init/Kconfig | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index fa8ccad..00d4579 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -1593,12 +1593,50 @@ config MODULE_SIG + is simply appended to the module. For more information see + Documentation/module-signing.txt. + ++ !!!WARNING!!! If you enable this option, you MUST make sure that the ++ module DOES NOT get stripped after being signed. This includes the ++ debuginfo strip done by some packagers (such as rpmbuild) and ++ inclusion into an initramfs that wants the module size reduced. ++ + config MODULE_SIG_FORCE + bool "Require modules to be validly signed" + depends on MODULE_SIG + help + Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a + key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel. ++ ++choice ++ prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" ++ depends on MODULE_SIG ++ help ++ This determines which sort of hashing algorithm will be used during ++ signature generation. This algorithm _must_ be built into the kernel ++ directly so that signature verification can take place. It is not ++ possible to load a signed module containing the algorithm to check ++ the signature on that module. ++ ++config MODULE_SIG_SHA1 ++ bool "Sign modules with SHA-1" ++ select CRYPTO_SHA1 ++ ++config MODULE_SIG_SHA224 ++ bool "Sign modules with SHA-224" ++ select CRYPTO_SHA256 ++ ++config MODULE_SIG_SHA256 ++ bool "Sign modules with SHA-256" ++ select CRYPTO_SHA256 ++ ++config MODULE_SIG_SHA384 ++ bool "Sign modules with SHA-384" ++ select CRYPTO_SHA512 ++ ++config MODULE_SIG_SHA512 ++ bool "Sign modules with SHA-512" ++ select CRYPTO_SHA512 ++ ++endchoice ++ + endif # MODULES + + config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 60378703cf88ed221ee602727c37ae241565d44a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 21/26] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if + missing + +Automatically generate keys for module signing if they're absent so that +allyesconfig doesn't break. The builder should consider generating their own +key and certificate, however, so that the keys are appropriately named. + +The private key for the module signer should be placed in signing_key.priv +(unencrypted!) and the public key in an X.509 certificate as signing_key.x509. + +If a transient key is desired for signing the modules, a config file for +'openssl req' can be placed in x509.genkey, looking something like the +following: + + [ req ] + default_bits = 4096 + distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name + prompt = no + x509_extensions = myexts + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + O = Magarathea + CN = Glacier signing key + emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2 + + [ myexts ] + basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE + keyUsage=digitalSignature + subjectKeyIdentifier=hash + authorityKeyIdentifier=hash + +The build process will use this to configure: + + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 -batch \ + -x509 -config x509.genkey \ + -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \ + -keyout signing_key.priv + +to generate the key. + +Note that it is required that the X.509 certificate have a subjectKeyIdentifier +and an authorityKeyIdentifier. Without those, the certificate will be +rejected. These can be used to check the validity of a certificate. + +Note that 'make distclean' will remove signing_key.{priv,x509} and x509.genkey, +whether or not they were generated automatically. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/Makefile | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile +index 08ba8a6..83f1565 100644 +--- a/kernel/Makefile ++++ b/kernel/Makefile +@@ -132,3 +132,52 @@ quiet_cmd_timeconst = TIMEC $@ + targets += timeconst.h + $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE + $(call if_changed,timeconst) ++ ++ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) ++ ++############################################################################### ++# ++# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been ++# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not ++# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards. ++# ++############################################################################### ++signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey ++ @echo "###" ++ @echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules." ++ @echo "###" ++ @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the" ++ @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It" ++ @echo "### needs to be run as root, and should use a hardware random" ++ @echo "### number generator if one is available, eg:" ++ @echo "###" ++ @echo "### rngd -r /dev/hwrandom" ++ @echo "###" ++ openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 -batch \ ++ -x509 -config x509.genkey \ ++ -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \ ++ -keyout signing_key.priv ++ @echo "###" ++ @echo "### Key pair generated." ++ @echo "###" ++ ++x509.genkey: ++ @echo Generating X.509 key generation config ++ @echo >x509.genkey "[ req ]" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "default_bits = 4096" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "prompt = no" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "x509_extensions = myexts" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "[ req_distinguished_name ]" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "O = Magarathea" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "CN = Glacier signing key" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "[ myexts ]" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "keyUsage=digitalSignature" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ++endif ++CLEAN_FILES += signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 x509.genkey +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 798049d9df83c8fd87fd5ddb97a77054558f4361 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 22/26] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the + kernel + +Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module +verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring +during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public +keys found in the PGP keyring. + +These can be seen by root: + +[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys +07ad4ee0 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd [] +15c7f8c3 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4 +... + +It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in +their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/Makefile | 11 ++++- + kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + kernel/module-internal.h | 2 + + 3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c + +diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile +index 83f1565..63f8386 100644 +--- a/kernel/Makefile ++++ b/kernel/Makefile +@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o + obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o + obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o + obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o +-obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o ++obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o + obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o + obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o + obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o +@@ -134,6 +134,13 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE + $(call if_changed,timeconst) + + ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) ++# ++# Pull the signing certificate and any extra certificates into the kernel ++# ++extra_certificates: ++ touch $@ ++ ++kernel/modsign_pubkey.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates + + ############################################################################### + # +@@ -180,4 +187,4 @@ x509.genkey: + @echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" + @echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" + endif +-CLEAN_FILES += signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 x509.genkey ++CLEAN_FILES += signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 x509.genkey extra_certificates +diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..f504d9f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c +@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ ++/* Public keys for module signature verification ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence ++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version ++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. ++ */ ++ ++#include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/sched.h> ++#include <linux/cred.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> ++#include "module-internal.h" ++ ++struct key *modsign_keyring; ++ ++extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[]; ++extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[]; ++asm(".section .init.data,\"aw\"\n" ++ "modsign_certificate_list:\n" ++ ".incbin \"signing_key.x509\"\n" ++ ".incbin \"extra_certificates\"\n" ++ "modsign_certificate_list_end:" ++ ); ++ ++/* ++ * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice ++ * if modsign.pub changes. ++ */ ++static __initdata const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo"; ++ ++/* ++ * Load the compiled-in keys ++ */ ++static __init int module_verify_init(void) ++{ ++ pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n"); ++ ++ modsign_keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".module_sign", ++ 0, 0, current_cred(), ++ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | ++ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, ++ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); ++ if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring)) ++ panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n"); ++ ++ if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0) ++ panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n"); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. ++ */ ++device_initcall(module_verify_init); ++ ++/* ++ * Load the compiled-in keys ++ */ ++static __init int load_module_signing_keys(void) ++{ ++ key_ref_t key; ++ const u8 *p, *end; ++ size_t plen; ++ ++ pr_notice("Loading module verification certificates\n"); ++ ++ end = modsign_certificate_list_end; ++ p = modsign_certificate_list; ++ while (p < end) { ++ /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more ++ * than 256 bytes in size. ++ */ ++ if (end - p < 4) ++ goto dodgy_cert; ++ if (p[0] != 0x30 && ++ p[1] != 0x82) ++ goto dodgy_cert; ++ plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; ++ plen += 4; ++ if (plen > end - p) ++ goto dodgy_cert; ++ ++ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), ++ "asymmetric", ++ NULL, ++ p, ++ plen, ++ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | ++ KEY_USR_VIEW, ++ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); ++ if (IS_ERR(key)) ++ pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", ++ PTR_ERR(key)); ++ else ++ pr_notice("MODSIGN: Loaded cert '%s'\n", ++ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); ++ p += plen; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++ ++dodgy_cert: ++ pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); ++ return 0; ++} ++late_initcall(load_module_signing_keys); +diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h +index 14da0ea..648f481 100644 +--- a/kernel/module-internal.h ++++ b/kernel/module-internal.h +@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + ++extern struct key *modsign_keyring; ++ + extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, + const void *sig, unsigned long siglen, + bool *_sig_ok); +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From dcac300c703bc9a237deab7c7f0301f3803a3a9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 23/26] MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking + +Check the signature on the module against the keys compiled into the kernel or +available in a hardware key store. + +Currently, only RSA keys are supported - though that's easy enough to change, +and the signature is expected to contain raw components (so not a PGP or +PKCS#7 formatted blob). + +The signature blob is expected to consist of the following pieces in order: + + (1) The binary identifier for the key. This is expected to match the + SubjectKeyIdentifier from an X.509 certificate. Only X.509 type + identifiers are currently supported. + + (2) The signature data, consisting of a series of MPIs in which each is in + the format of a 2-byte BE word sizes followed by the content data. + + (3) A 12 byte information block of the form: + + struct module_signature { + enum pkey_algo algo : 8; + enum pkey_hash_algo hash : 8; + enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; + u8 __pad; + __be32 id_length; + __be32 sig_length; + }; + + The three enums are defined in crypto/public_key.h. + + 'algo' contains the public-key algorithm identifier (0->DSA, 1->RSA). + + 'hash' contains the digest algorithm identifier (0->MD4, 1->MD5, 2->SHA1, + etc.). + + 'id_type' contains the public-key identifier type (0->PGP, 1->X.509). + + '__pad' should be 0. + + 'id_length' should contain in the binary identifier length in BE form. + + 'sig_length' should contain in the signature data length in BE form. + + The lengths are in BE order rather than CPU order to make dealing with + cross-compilation easier. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + init/Kconfig | 8 ++ + kernel/module_signing.c | 223 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 230 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig +index 00d4579..63fcbeb 100644 +--- a/init/Kconfig ++++ b/init/Kconfig +@@ -1588,6 +1588,14 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL + config MODULE_SIG + bool "Module signature verification" + depends on MODULES ++ select CONFIG_KEYS ++ select CONFIG_CRYPTO ++ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE ++ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE ++ select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA ++ select ASN1 ++ select OID_REGISTRY ++ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + help + Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature + is simply appended to the module. For more information see +diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c +index 0af10a5..83eb505 100644 +--- a/kernel/module_signing.c ++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c +@@ -10,14 +10,235 @@ + */ + + #include <linux/kernel.h> ++#include <linux/err.h> ++#include <crypto/public_key.h> ++#include <crypto/hash.h> ++#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + #include "module-internal.h" + + /* ++ * Module signature information block. ++ * ++ * The constituents of the signature section are, in order: ++ * ++ * - Signer's name ++ * - Key identifier ++ * - Signature data ++ * - Information block ++ */ ++struct module_signature { ++ enum pkey_algo algo : 8; /* Public-key crypto algorithm */ ++ enum pkey_hash_algo hash : 8; /* Digest algorithm */ ++ enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; /* Key identifier type */ ++ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */ ++ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */ ++ u8 __pad[3]; ++ __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * Digest the module contents. ++ */ ++static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash, ++ const void *mod, ++ unsigned long modlen) ++{ ++ struct public_key_signature *pks; ++ struct crypto_shash *tfm; ++ struct shash_desc *desc; ++ size_t digest_size, desc_size; ++ int ret; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ++ ++ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how ++ * big the hash operational data will be. ++ */ ++ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0); ++ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) ++ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm); ++ ++ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); ++ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); ++ ++ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our ++ * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that. ++ */ ++ ret = -ENOMEM; ++ pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!pks) ++ goto error_no_pks; ++ ++ pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash; ++ pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size; ++ pks->digest_size = digest_size; ++ ++ desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks); ++ desc->tfm = tfm; ++ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; ++ ++ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error; ++ ++ crypto_free_shash(tfm); ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__); ++ return pks; ++ ++error: ++ kfree(pks); ++error_no_pks: ++ crypto_free_shash(tfm); ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); ++ return ERR_PTR(ret); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual ++ * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the ++ * size of the MPI in bytes. ++ * ++ * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one. ++ */ ++static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks, ++ const void *data, size_t len) ++{ ++ size_t nbytes; ++ MPI mpi; ++ ++ if (len < 3) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1]; ++ data += 2; ++ len -= 2; ++ if (len != nbytes) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++ mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes); ++ if (!mpi) ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ pks->mpi[0] = mpi; ++ pks->nr_mpi = 1; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Request an asymmetric key. ++ */ ++static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, ++ const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len) ++{ ++ key_ref_t key; ++ size_t i; ++ char *id, *q; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len); ++ ++ /* Construct an identifier. */ ++ id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); ++ if (!id) ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); ++ ++ memcpy(id, signer, signer_len); ++ ++ q = id + signer_len; ++ *q++ = ':'; ++ *q++ = ' '; ++ for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) { ++ *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4]; ++ *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f]; ++ } ++ ++ *q = 0; ++ ++ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); ++ ++ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), ++ &key_type_asymmetric, id); ++ kfree(id); ++ ++ if (IS_ERR(key)) { ++ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { ++ /* Hide some search errors */ ++ case -EACCES: ++ case -ENOTDIR: ++ case -EAGAIN: ++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); ++ default: ++ return ERR_CAST(key); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); ++ return key_ref_to_ptr(key); ++} ++ ++/* + * Verify the signature on a module. + */ + int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, + const void *sig, unsigned long siglen, + bool *_sig_ok) + { +- return -EKEYREJECTED; ++ struct public_key_signature *pks; ++ struct module_signature ms; ++ struct key *key; ++ size_t sig_len; ++ int ret; ++ ++ pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu,,%lu,)\n", __func__, modlen, siglen); ++ ++ if (siglen <= sizeof(ms)) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++ memcpy(&ms, sig + (siglen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); ++ siglen -= sizeof(ms); ++ ++ sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); ++ if (sig_len >= siglen || ++ siglen - sig_len != (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len) ++ return -EBADMSG; ++ ++ /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */ ++ if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA || ++ ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509) ++ return -ENOPKG; ++ ++ if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || ++ !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash]) ++ return -ENOPKG; ++ ++ key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len, ++ sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len); ++ if (IS_ERR(key)) ++ return PTR_ERR(key); ++ ++ pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen); ++ if (IS_ERR(pks)) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(pks); ++ goto error_put_key; ++ } ++ ++ ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len, ++ sig_len); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ goto error_free_pks; ++ ++ ret = verify_signature(key, pks); ++ pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret); ++ ++ if (ret == 0) ++ *_sig_ok = true; ++ ++error_free_pks: ++ mpi_free(pks->rsa.s); ++ kfree(pks); ++error_put_key: ++ key_put(key); ++ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); ++ return ret; + } +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 89fbf1de73ed1ef29a3943d9f3bcf69a433191da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:13:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 24/26] MODSIGN: Provide a script for generating a key ID from + an X.509 cert + +Provide a script to parse an X.509 certificate and certain pieces of +information from it in order to generate a key identifier to be included within +a module signature. + +The script takes the Subject Name and extracts (if present) the +organizationName (O), the commonName (CN) and the emailAddress and fabricates +the signer's name from them: + + (1) If both O and CN exist, then the name will be "O: CN", unless: + + (a) CN is prefixed by O, in which case only CN is used. + + (b) CN and O share at least the first 7 characters, in which case only CN + is used. + + (2) Otherwise, CN is used if present. + + (3) Otherwise, O is used if present. + + (4) Otherwise the emailAddress is used, if present. + + (5) Otherwise a blank name is used. + +The script emits a binary encoded identifier in the following form: + + - 2 BE bytes indicating the length of the signer's name. + + - 2 BE bytes indicating the length of the subject key identifier. + + - The characters of the signer's name. + + - The bytes of the subject key identifier. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + scripts/x509keyid | 268 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 268 insertions(+) + create mode 100755 scripts/x509keyid + +diff --git a/scripts/x509keyid b/scripts/x509keyid +new file mode 100755 +index 0000000..c8e91a4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/scripts/x509keyid +@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ ++#!/usr/bin/perl -w ++# ++# Generate an identifier from an X.509 certificate that can be placed in a ++# module signature to indentify the key to use. ++# ++# Format: ++# ++# ./scripts/x509keyid <x509-cert> <signer's-name> <key-id> ++# ++# We read the DER-encoded X509 certificate and parse it to extract the Subject ++# name and Subject Key Identifier. The provide the data we need to build the ++# certificate identifier. ++# ++# The signer's name part of the identifier is fabricated from the commonName, ++# the organizationName or the emailAddress components of the X.509 subject ++# name and written to the second named file. ++# ++# The subject key ID to select which of that signer's certificates we're ++# intending to use to sign the module is written to the third named file. ++# ++use strict; ++ ++my $raw_data; ++ ++die "Need three filenames\n" if ($#ARGV != 2); ++ ++my $src = $ARGV[0]; ++ ++open(FD, "<$src") || die $src; ++binmode FD; ++my @st = stat(FD); ++die $src if (!@st); ++read(FD, $raw_data, $st[7]) || die $src; ++close(FD); ++ ++my $UNIV = 0 << 6; ++my $APPL = 1 << 6; ++my $CONT = 2 << 6; ++my $PRIV = 3 << 6; ++ ++my $CONS = 0x20; ++ ++my $BOOLEAN = 0x01; ++my $INTEGER = 0x02; ++my $BIT_STRING = 0x03; ++my $OCTET_STRING = 0x04; ++my $NULL = 0x05; ++my $OBJ_ID = 0x06; ++my $UTF8String = 0x0c; ++my $SEQUENCE = 0x10; ++my $SET = 0x11; ++my $UTCTime = 0x17; ++my $GeneralizedTime = 0x18; ++ ++my %OIDs = ( ++ pack("CCC", 85, 4, 3) => "commonName", ++ pack("CCC", 85, 4, 6) => "countryName", ++ pack("CCC", 85, 4, 10) => "organizationName", ++ pack("CCC", 85, 4, 11) => "organizationUnitName", ++ pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 1) => "rsaEncryption", ++ pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 5) => "sha1WithRSAEncryption", ++ pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 9, 1) => "emailAddress", ++ pack("CCC", 85, 29, 35) => "authorityKeyIdentifier", ++ pack("CCC", 85, 29, 14) => "subjectKeyIdentifier", ++ pack("CCC", 85, 29, 19) => "basicConstraints" ++); ++ ++############################################################################### ++# ++# Extract an ASN.1 element from a string and return information about it. ++# ++############################################################################### ++sub asn1_extract($$@) ++{ ++ my ($cursor, $expected_tag, $optional) = @_; ++ ++ return [ -1 ] ++ if ($cursor->[1] == 0 && $optional); ++ ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (elem ", $cursor->[1], ")\n" ++ if ($cursor->[1] < 2); ++ ++ my ($tag, $len) = unpack("CC", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2)); ++ ++ if ($expected_tag != -1 && $tag != $expected_tag) { ++ return [ -1 ] ++ if ($optional); ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 unexpected tag (", $tag, ++ " not ", $expected_tag, ")\n"; ++ } ++ ++ $cursor->[0] += 2; ++ $cursor->[1] -= 2; ++ ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 long tag\n" ++ if (($tag & 0x1f) == 0x1f); ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 indefinite length\n" ++ if ($len == 0x80); ++ ++ if ($len > 0x80) { ++ my $l = $len - 0x80; ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (len len $l)\n" ++ if ($cursor->[1] < $l); ++ ++ if ($l == 0x1) { ++ $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1)); ++ } elsif ($l = 0x2) { ++ $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2)); ++ } elsif ($l = 0x3) { ++ $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1)) << 16; ++ $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0] + 1, 2)); ++ } elsif ($l = 0x4) { ++ $len = unpack("N", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 4)); ++ } else { ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 element too long (", $l, ")\n"; ++ } ++ ++ $cursor->[0] += $l; ++ $cursor->[1] -= $l; ++ } ++ ++ die $src, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (", $len, ")\n" ++ if ($cursor->[1] < $len); ++ ++ my $ret = [ $tag, [ $cursor->[0], $len, $cursor->[2] ] ]; ++ $cursor->[0] += $len; ++ $cursor->[1] -= $len; ++ ++ return $ret; ++} ++ ++############################################################################### ++# ++# Retrieve the data referred to by a cursor ++# ++############################################################################### ++sub asn1_retrieve($) ++{ ++ my ($cursor) = @_; ++ my ($offset, $len, $data) = @$cursor; ++ return substr($$data, $offset, $len); ++} ++ ++############################################################################### ++# ++# Roughly parse the X.509 certificate ++# ++############################################################################### ++my $cursor = [ 0, length($raw_data), \$raw_data ]; ++ ++my $cert = asn1_extract($cursor, $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $tbs = asn1_extract($cert->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $version = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 0, 1); ++my $serial_number = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $INTEGER); ++my $sig_type = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $issuer = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $validity = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $subject = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $key = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++my $issuer_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 1, 1); ++my $subject_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 2, 1); ++my $extension_list = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 3, 1); ++ ++my $subject_key_id = (); ++my $authority_key_id = (); ++ ++# ++# Parse the extension list ++# ++if ($extension_list->[0] != -1) { ++ my $extensions = asn1_extract($extension_list->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++ ++ while ($extensions->[1]->[1] > 0) { ++ my $ext = asn1_extract($extensions->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++ my $x_oid = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID); ++ my $x_crit = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $BOOLEAN, 1); ++ my $x_val = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING); ++ ++ my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($x_oid->[1]); ++ next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid})); ++ my $x_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid}; ++ ++ my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($x_val->[1]); ++ ++ if ($x_type eq "subjectKeyIdentifier") { ++ my $vcursor = [ 0, length($raw_value), \$raw_value ]; ++ ++ $subject_key_id = asn1_extract($vcursor, $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING); ++ } ++ } ++} ++ ++############################################################################### ++# ++# Determine what we're going to use as the signer's name. In order of ++# preference, take one of: commonName, organizationName or emailAddress. ++# ++############################################################################### ++my $org = ""; ++my $cn = ""; ++my $email = ""; ++ ++while ($subject->[1]->[1] > 0) { ++ my $rdn = asn1_extract($subject->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SET); ++ my $attr = asn1_extract($rdn->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE); ++ my $n_oid = asn1_extract($attr->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID); ++ my $n_val = asn1_extract($attr->[1], -1); ++ ++ my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($n_oid->[1]); ++ next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid})); ++ my $n_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid}; ++ ++ my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($n_val->[1]); ++ ++ if ($n_type eq "organizationName") { ++ $org = $raw_value; ++ } elsif ($n_type eq "commonName") { ++ $cn = $raw_value; ++ } elsif ($n_type eq "emailAddress") { ++ $email = $raw_value; ++ } ++} ++ ++my $id_name = $email; ++ ++if ($org && $cn) { ++ # Don't use the organizationName if the commonName repeats it ++ if (length($org) <= length($cn) && ++ substr($cn, 0, length($org)) eq $org) { ++ $id_name = $cn; ++ goto got_id_name; ++ } ++ ++ # Or a signifcant chunk of it ++ if (length($org) >= 7 && ++ length($cn) >= 7 && ++ substr($cn, 0, 7) eq substr($org, 0, 7)) { ++ $id_name = $cn; ++ goto got_id_name; ++ } ++ ++ $id_name = $org . ": " . $cn; ++} elsif ($org) { ++ $id_name = $org; ++} elsif ($cn) { ++ $id_name = $cn; ++} ++ ++got_id_name: ++ ++############################################################################### ++# ++# Output the signer's name and the key identifier that we're going to include ++# in module signatures. ++# ++############################################################################### ++die $src, ": ", "X.509: Couldn't find the Subject Key Identifier extension\n" ++ if (!$subject_key_id); ++ ++my $id_key_id = asn1_retrieve($subject_key_id->[1]); ++ ++open(OUTFD, ">$ARGV[1]") || die $ARGV[1]; ++print OUTFD $id_name; ++close OUTFD || die $ARGV[1]; ++ ++open(OUTFD, ">$ARGV[2]") || die $ARGV[2]; ++print OUTFD $id_key_id; ++close OUTFD || die $ARGV[2]; +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 007c8fc3412f0a55cd3a32c5e42236703a17d1c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 10:46:36 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 25/26] MODSIGN: Add modules_sign make target + +If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, and 'make modules_sign' is called then this +patch will cause the modules to get a signature installed. The make target +is intended to be run after 'make modules_install', and will modify the +modules in-place in the installed location. + +The signature will be appended to the module, along with some information +about the signature size and a magic string that indicates the presence of +the signature. This requires private and public keys to be available. By +default these are expected to be found in files: + + signing_key.priv + signing_key.x509 + +in the base directory of the build. The first is the private key in PEM +form and the second is the X.509 certificate in DER form as can be generated +from openssl: + + openssl req \ + -new -x509 -outform PEM -out signing_key.x509 \ + -keyout signing_key.priv -nodes \ + -subj "/CN=H2G2/O=Magrathea/CN=Slartibartfast" + +If the secret key is not found then signing will be skipped and the unsigned +module from (1) will just be copied to foo.ko. + +If signing occurs, lines like the following will be seen: + + SIGN [M] <install path>/fs/foo/foo.ko + +will appear in the build log. If the signature step will be skipped and the +following will be seen: + + NO SIGN [M] <install path>/fs/foo/foo.ko + +NOTE! After the signature step, the signed module must not be passed through +strip. If you wish to strip or otherwise modify the kernel modules, use the +built-in stripping capabilities with 'make modules_install' or perform said +modifications before calling this make target. This restriction may affect +packaging tools (such as rpmbuild) and initramfs composition tools. + +Based heavily on work by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + Makefile | 6 +++ + scripts/Makefile.modsign | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + scripts/sign-file | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 193 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.modsign + create mode 100644 scripts/sign-file + +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index 644048d..4479147 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -965,6 +965,12 @@ _modinst_post: _modinst_ + $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/scripts/Makefile.fwinst obj=firmware __fw_modinst + $(call cmd,depmod) + ++ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG), y) ++PHONY += modules_sign ++modules_sign: ++ $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/scripts/Makefile.modsign ++endif ++ + else # CONFIG_MODULES + + # Modules not configured +diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modsign b/scripts/Makefile.modsign +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..17326bc +--- /dev/null ++++ b/scripts/Makefile.modsign +@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ ++# ========================================================================== ++# Signing modules ++# ========================================================================== ++ ++PHONY := __modsign ++__modsign: ++ ++include scripts/Kbuild.include ++ ++__modules := $(sort $(shell grep -h '\.ko' /dev/null $(wildcard $(MODVERDIR)/*.mod))) ++modules := $(patsubst %.o,%.ko,$(wildcard $(__modules:.ko=.o))) ++ ++PHONY += $(modules) ++__modsign: $(modules) ++ @: ++ ++MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv ++MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509 ++ ++ifeq ($(wildcard $(MODSECKEY))+$(wildcard $(MODPUBKEY)),$(MODSECKEY)+$(MODPUBKEY)) ++ifeq ($(KBUILD_SRC),) ++ # no O= is being used ++ SCRIPTS_DIR := scripts ++else ++ SCRIPTS_DIR := $(KBUILD_SRC)/scripts ++endif ++SIGN_MODULES := 1 ++else ++SIGN_MODULES := 0 ++endif ++ ++# only sign if it's an in-tree module ++ifneq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),) ++SIGN_MODULES := 0 ++endif ++ ++ifeq ($(SIGN_MODULES),1) ++ ++quiet_cmd_genkeyid = GENKEYID $@ ++ cmd_genkeyid = \ ++ perl $(SCRIPTS_DIR)/x509keyid $< $<.signer $<.keyid ++ ++%.signer %.keyid: % ++ $(call if_changed,genkeyid) ++ ++KEYRING_DEP := $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY) $(MODPUBKEY).signer $(MODPUBKEY).keyid ++quiet_cmd_sign_ko = SIGN [M] $(2)/$(notdir $@) ++ cmd_sign_ko = \ ++ sh $(SCRIPTS_DIR)/sign-file $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY) \ ++ $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(2)/$(notdir $@).signed && \ ++ mv $(2)/$(notdir $@).signed $(2)/$(notdir $@) && \ ++ rm -rf $(2)/$(notdir $@).{dig,sig} ++else ++KEYRING_DEP := ++quiet_cmd_sign_ko = NO SIGN [M] $@ ++ cmd_sign_ko = \ ++ true ++endif ++ ++# Modules built outside the kernel source tree go into extra by default ++INSTALL_MOD_DIR ?= extra ++ext-mod-dir = $(INSTALL_MOD_DIR)$(subst $(patsubst %/,%,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)),,$(@D)) ++ ++modinst_dir = $(if $(KBUILD_EXTMOD),$(ext-mod-dir),kernel/$(@D)) ++ ++$(modules): $(KEYRING_DEP) ++ $(call cmd,sign_ko,$(MODLIB)/$(modinst_dir)) ++ ++# Declare the contents of the .PHONY variable as phony. We keep that ++# # information in a variable se we can use it in if_changed and friends. ++ ++.PHONY: $(PHONY) +diff --git a/scripts/sign-file b/scripts/sign-file +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..1a472bb +--- /dev/null ++++ b/scripts/sign-file +@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++# ++# Sign a module file using the given key. ++# ++# Format: sign-file <key> <x509> <src-file> <dst-file> ++# ++ ++scripts=`dirname $0` ++ ++CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512=y ++if [ -r .config ] ++then ++ source ./.config ++fi ++ ++key="$1" ++x509="$2" ++src="$3" ++dst="$4" ++ ++if [ ! -r "$key" ] ++then ++ echo "Can't read private key" >&2 ++ exit 2 ++fi ++ ++if [ ! -r "$x509" ] ++then ++ echo "Can't read X.509 certificate" >&2 ++ exit 2 ++fi ++if [ ! -r "$x509.signer" ] ++then ++ echo "Can't read Signer name" >&2 ++ exit 2; ++fi ++if [ ! -r "$x509.keyid" ] ++then ++ echo "Can't read Key identifier" >&2 ++ exit 2; ++fi ++ ++# ++# Signature parameters ++# ++algo=1 # Public-key crypto algorithm: RSA ++hash= # Digest algorithm ++id_type=1 # Identifier type: X.509 ++ ++# ++# Digest the data ++# ++dgst= ++if [ "$CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1" = "y" ] ++then ++ prologue="0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14" ++ dgst=-sha1 ++ hash=2 ++elif [ "$CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224" = "y" ] ++then ++ prologue="0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C" ++ dgst=-sha224 ++ hash=7 ++elif [ "$CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256" = "y" ] ++then ++ prologue="0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20" ++ dgst=-sha256 ++ hash=4 ++elif [ "$CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384" = "y" ] ++then ++ prologue="0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30" ++ dgst=-sha384 ++ hash=5 ++elif [ "$CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512" = "y" ] ++then ++ prologue="0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40" ++ dgst=-sha512 ++ hash=6 ++else ++ echo "$0: Can't determine hash algorithm" >&2 ++ exit 2 ++fi ++ ++( ++perl -e "binmode STDOUT; print pack(\"C*\", $prologue)" || exit $? ++openssl dgst $dgst -binary $src || exit $? ++) >$src.dig || exit $? ++ ++# ++# Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that comprises ++# the signature with no metadata attached. ++# ++openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $key -keyform PEM -in $src.dig -out $src.sig || exit $? ++signerlen=`stat -c %s $x509.signer` ++keyidlen=`stat -c %s $x509.keyid` ++siglen=`stat -c %s $src.sig` ++ ++# ++# Build the signed binary ++# ++( ++ cat $src || exit $? ++ echo '~Module signature appended~' || exit $? ++ cat $x509.signer $x509.keyid || exit $? ++ ++ # Preface each signature integer with a 2-byte BE length ++ perl -e "binmode STDOUT; print pack(\"n\", $siglen)" || exit $? ++ cat $src.sig || exit $? ++ ++ # Generate the information block ++ perl -e "binmode STDOUT; print pack(\"CCCCCxxxN\", $algo, $hash, $id_type, $signerlen, $keyidlen, $siglen + 2)" || exit $? ++) >$dst~ || exit $? ++ ++# Permit in-place signing ++mv $dst~ $dst || exit $? +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 33c6737b352ec10a7e0d7b053fbb084c0b7a9d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 20:51:59 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 26/26] MODSIGN: Extend the policy on signature check failure + +Extend the policy on handling various sorts of signature check failure such as +not having the requisite key available or being in FIPS mode. + +If the key specified is not known (ENOKEY) permit the module to be loaded in +non-enforcing mode, otherwise reject it. + +If in FIPS mode, any loading failure shall cause a panic. + +Also print a warning if we try and fail to find a module signing key: + + Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier signing key: 5dd0839552bd6af498253f8af1e65da3472941c6' err -11 + +This contains the identity field and the key ID from the signature as well as +the error code. The error codes are the raw return from keyring_search() and +may be translated to -ENOKEY. + +Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/Makefile | 2 +- + kernel/module.c | 9 ++++++++- + kernel/module_signing.c | 3 +++ + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile +index 63f8386..111a845 100644 +--- a/kernel/Makefile ++++ b/kernel/Makefile +@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ x509.genkey: + @echo >>x509.genkey "x509_extensions = myexts" + @echo >>x509.genkey + @echo >>x509.genkey "[ req_distinguished_name ]" +- @echo >>x509.genkey "O = Magarathea" ++ @echo >>x509.genkey "O = Magrathea" + @echo >>x509.genkey "CN = Glacier signing key" + @echo >>x509.genkey "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" + @echo >>x509.genkey +diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c +index ab69599..de16959 100644 +--- a/kernel/module.c ++++ b/kernel/module.c +@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ + #include <linux/jump_label.h> + #include <linux/pfn.h> + #include <linux/bsearch.h> ++#include <linux/fips.h> + #include "module-internal.h" + + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS +@@ -2470,7 +2471,13 @@ found_marker: + sig = p + markerlen; + /* Truncate module up to signature. */ + *len = p - mod; +- return mod_verify_sig(mod, *len, sig, end - sig, &info->sig_ok); ++ err = mod_verify_sig(mod, *len, sig, end - sig, &info->sig_ok); ++ if (err < 0 && fips_enabled) ++ panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n", ++ err); ++ if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) ++ err = 0; ++ return err; + } + #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ + static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, +diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c +index 83eb505..2beea56 100644 +--- a/kernel/module_signing.c ++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c +@@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, + + key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, id); ++ if (IS_ERR(key)) ++ pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n", ++ id, PTR_ERR(key)); + kfree(id); + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { +-- +1.7.11.4 + diff --git a/secure-boot-20120809.patch b/secure-boot-20120924.patch index 0d6a837cf..37beb41b2 100644 --- a/secure-boot-20120809.patch +++ b/secure-boot-20120924.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 617309bdd75bbce794ae2d41d44e7b76fb8c6d8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 57c0dbcbafaa724313c672830ff0087f56a84c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 09:56:33 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 01/13] Secure boot: Add new capability +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Secure boot: Add new capability Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code. @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h -index d10b7ed..6a39163 100644 +index d10b7ed..4345bc8 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { @@ -23,22 +23,22 @@ index d10b7ed..6a39163 100644 #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND -+/* Allow things that are dangerous under secure boot */ ++/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */ + -+#define CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE 37 ++#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37 + -+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE ++#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From ac892cb2320872717005736c8ef88208c12e61ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 95fd8148be46036e20fc64c480104d2a2b454e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 02/13] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 02/14] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause @@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c -index 6869009..a1ad0f7 100644 +index 6869009..c03fb85 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8*) buf; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 6869009..a1ad0f7 100644 resource_size_t start, end; int i; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) @@ -80,21 +80,21 @@ index 6869009..a1ad0f7 100644 struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c -index 27911b5..01d4753 100644 +index 27911b5..ac8c9a5 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof int size = dp->size; int cnt; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ index 27911b5..01d4753 100644 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { @@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ index 27911b5..01d4753 100644 int i, ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) return -EPERM; /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */ diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c -index e1c1ec5..a778ba9 100644 +index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, @@ -128,18 +128,18 @@ index e1c1ec5..a778ba9 100644 int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn); -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From 4c02feefb934d587f03c74cc48e8d58904416c68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 2d23d2726583d79062e58abcc32c7dd027d312aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 03/13] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 03/14] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot environments IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c -index 8c96897..c3a1bb2 100644 +index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on) @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ index 8c96897..c3a1bb2 100644 if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) return -EINVAL; - if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) -+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE))) ++ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))) return -EPERM; /* @@ -171,32 +171,32 @@ index 8c96897..c3a1bb2 100644 /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ if (level > old) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) return -EPERM; } regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12); diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c -index e5eedfa..8f5f872 100644 +index e5eedfa..1e0a660 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, unsigned long i = *ppos; const char __user * tmp = buf; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count)) return -EFAULT; while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) { -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From d379d102316075d51011b81748433530d294a70c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e063cb2f3a667d2540682d4bdbef91fdb23b1a84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 04/13] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 04/14] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary @@ -208,27 +208,27 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c -index 5d42c24..3e78014 100644 +index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, struct acpi_table_header table; acpi_status status; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + if (!(*ppos)) { /* parse the table header to get the table length */ if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From afc7c002eb264fc745a38fb6ec322be4928338dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From a1cccbd084c7355dcb2be7ae2934f168ce9ba9d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 05/13] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 05/14] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to @@ -241,47 +241,47 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c -index c7a36f6..0fb58bc 100644 +index 2eb9fe8..61e055d 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c -@@ -1509,6 +1509,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data) +@@ -1523,6 +1523,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data) int err; u32 retval = -1; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval); if (err < 0) -@@ -1525,6 +1528,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) +@@ -1539,6 +1542,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) int err; u32 retval = -1; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param, &retval); -@@ -1549,6 +1555,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) +@@ -1563,6 +1569,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) union acpi_object *obj; acpi_status status; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID, 1, asus->debug.method_id, &input, &output); -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From 21bd1f0da09b40a0ba50636267f7eac8f839a336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 1c9e53b626268f82509062751eda14e8572717cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 06/13] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 06/14] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel. @@ -292,14 +292,14 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c -index 8f5f872..c1de8e1 100644 +index 1e0a660..33eb947 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, unsigned long copied; void *ptr; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count)) @@ -309,96 +309,86 @@ index 8f5f872..c1de8e1 100644 char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ int err = 0; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count, (unsigned long)high_memory - p); -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From 1940a18cd651113f5b46f5a41290065963d6fbad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 11:47:56 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 07/13] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment - -kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel -to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to -support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable -loading entirely in that situation. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/kexec.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c -index 0668d58..48852ec 100644 ---- a/kernel/kexec.c -+++ b/kernel/kexec.c -@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, - int result; - - /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ -- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) - return -EPERM; - - /* --- -1.7.11.2 - - -From c83bad5d60b8f02ebbedf9b4c4b69cdee49a7976 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From fbf919bf372b9a7a08bdacac8129d47ced1b1f19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:45:15 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 08/13] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 07/14] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode -This forcibly drops CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE from both cap_permitted and cap_bset +This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from. This works on any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> --- - kernel/cred.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++++++ + kernel/cred.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) +diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +index 9b2b8d3..93978d5 100644 +--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -2562,6 +2562,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. + Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be + enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads. + ++ secureboot_enable= ++ [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This ++ locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the ++ CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things ++ like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can ++ be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes. ++ + security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot. + If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first + security module asking for security registration will be diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c -index de728ac..0d71d02 100644 +index de728ac..7e6e83f 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c -@@ -623,6 +623,20 @@ void __init cred_init(void) +@@ -623,6 +623,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void) 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); } -+/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ -+static int __init secureboot_enable(char *str) ++void __init secureboot_enable() +{ ++ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); ++ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); ++ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); ++} + ++/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ ++static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str) ++{ + int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); -+ pr_info("Secure Boot mode %s\n", (sb_enable ? "enabled" : "disabled")); -+ if (sb_enable) { -+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE); -+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE); -+ } ++ if (sb_enable) ++ secureboot_enable(); + return 1; +} -+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable); ++__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt); + /** * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From b70595f1523ecadc4ce9d43e9a0c465436ed1007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 43ed7865d867ae692e30227d66fa58cdecbd9269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2012 11:28:00 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 09/13] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 08/14] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled @@ -407,13 +397,26 @@ down. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> --- + Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 +++ include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ - kernel/cred.c | 18 +++++++++++------- - 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - + 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644 +--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt ++++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning + 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) + 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer + (below) ++1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled ++1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns + 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures + 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table + (array of struct e820entry) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index b3e0227..3789356 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -505,54 +508,19 @@ index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644 /* * check for validity of credentials */ -diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c -index 0d71d02..c43e2b0 100644 ---- a/kernel/cred.c -+++ b/kernel/cred.c -@@ -623,19 +623,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void) - 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - } - -+void __init secureboot_enable() -+{ -+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); -+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE); -+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE); -+} -+ - /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ --static int __init secureboot_enable(char *str) -+static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str) - { - - int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); -- pr_info("Secure Boot mode %s\n", (sb_enable ? "enabled" : "disabled")); -- if (sb_enable) { -- cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE); -- cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE); -- } -+ if (sb_enable) -+ secureboot_enable(); - return 1; - } --__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable); -+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt); - - /** - * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 -From 411c18c35ccacb1a9e3f3dc67383a6431e110e17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 3acf1ceb5f6f3be9103c9da16ddc24afc6d8b02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 10/13] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 09/14] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model. -We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE capability. +We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> --- @@ -560,7 +528,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c -index 9eaf708..50c94e4 100644 +index 9eaf708..f94341b 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp); @@ -568,18 +536,83 @@ index 9eaf708..50c94e4 100644 { #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC - if (acpi_rsdp) -+ if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) ++ if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) return acpi_rsdp; #endif -- -1.7.11.2 +1.7.11.4 + + +From 03fb06d272ddc1062e610521c5cfdbe42f251209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 10/14] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability + +Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux +policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate +capability class. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +index df2de54..70e2834 100644 +--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h ++++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { + { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, + { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, + { "capability2", +- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", +- NULL } }, ++ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", ++ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } }, + { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, + { "tun_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From 0cfaa5ecf01f8eaaa2a84d88b7258a94ac9a1bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 11/14] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment + +kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel +to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to +support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable +loading entirely in that situation. + +Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/kexec.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c +index 0668d58..8b976a5 100644 +--- a/kernel/kexec.c ++++ b/kernel/kexec.c +@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, + int result; + + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ +- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + return -EPERM; + + /* +-- +1.7.11.4 -From 7bf87e8da8c7b57ba7f9448855c8ec84c684fb65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 895c46276788b3711aee05a1a1d685eff69d48b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:29:46 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 11/13] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove +Subject: [PATCH 12/14] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove capability.disable Remove the documentation for capability.disable. The code supporting this @@ -597,7 +630,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt -index ad7e2e5..33c4029 100644 +index 93978d5..e3e5f8c 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -446,12 +446,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. @@ -614,98 +647,13 @@ index ad7e2e5..33c4029 100644 See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. -- -1.7.11.2 - - -From ec0ca55ba3d1c2a59b0c0b6e38f7ae9966d676aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 14:15:51 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 12/13] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability - -Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux -policies to properly map CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE to the appropriate -capability class. +1.7.11.4 -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h -index df2de54..0a1e348 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h -+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h -@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { - { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, - { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, - { "capability2", -- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", -- NULL } }, -+ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", -+ "block_suspend", "secure_firmware", NULL } }, - { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, - { "tun_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, --- -1.7.11.2 - - -From 0a90e99e45f5c8eddd3b8cfcd63a4c6355c5688d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 16:27:26 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 13/13] modsign: Reject unsigned modules in a Secure Boot - environment - -If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to -protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed -with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. We add a -capability check and reject modules that are not signed. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/module-verify.c | 5 +++-- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/module-verify.c b/kernel/module-verify.c -index 22036d4..f6821b3 100644 ---- a/kernel/module-verify.c -+++ b/kernel/module-verify.c -@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ - #include <linux/modsign.h> - #include <linux/moduleparam.h> - #include <linux/fips.h> -+#include <linux/capability.h> - #include <keys/crypto-type.h> - #include "module-verify.h" - #include "module-verify-defs.h" -@@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ int module_verify(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, size_t size, bool *_gpgsig_ok) - /* The ELF checker found the sig for us if it exists */ - if (mvdata.sig_index <= 0) { - /* Deal with an unsigned module */ -- if (modsign_signedonly) { -+ if (modsign_signedonly || !capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) { - pr_err("An attempt to load unsigned module was rejected\n"); - return -EKEYREJECTED; - } else { -@@ -736,7 +737,7 @@ out: - break; - case -ENOKEY: /* Signed, but we don't have the public key */ - pr_err("Module signed with unknown public key\n"); -- if (!modsign_signedonly) { -+ if (!modsign_signedonly && capable(CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE)) { - /* Allow a module to be signed with an unknown public - * key unless we're enforcing. - */ --- -1.7.11.2 - -From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -To: matt.fleming@intel.com -Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, - x86@kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2012 18:00:00 -0400 -Message-Id: <1343340000-7587-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> -Subject: [PATCH] efi: Build EFI stub with EFI-appropriate options +From 294d339c63b0f67a362efaa62713f26d9f496da8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2012 18:00:00 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 13/14] efi: Build EFI stub with EFI-appropriate options We can't assume the presence of the red zone while we're still in a boot services environment, so we should build with -fno-red-zone to avoid @@ -714,7 +662,7 @@ simpler. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> --- - arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +++ + arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile @@ -731,4 +679,48 @@ index e398bb5..8a84501 100644 ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI_STUB), y) VMLINUX_OBJS += $(obj)/eboot.o $(obj)/efi_stub_$(BITS).o endif +-- +1.7.11.4 + + +From d1a225668878a3339adcd7ce0be256e857360ada Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 16:27:26 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 14/14] modsign: Reject unsigned modules in a Secure Boot + environment + +If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to +protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed +with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. We add a +capability check and reject modules that are not signed. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> +--- + kernel/module.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c +index de16959..5af69cc 100644 +--- a/kernel/module.c ++++ b/kernel/module.c +@@ -2463,7 +2463,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, + } + + /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ +- if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce) ++ if (!err && !info->sig_ok && (sig_enforce || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))) + err = -EKEYREJECTED; + return err; + +@@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ found_marker: + if (err < 0 && fips_enabled) + panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n", + err); +- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) ++ if (err == -ENOKEY && (!sig_enforce && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))) + err = 0; + return err; + } +-- +1.7.11.4 diff --git a/x509.genkey b/x509.genkey new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f90e1bce --- /dev/null +++ b/x509.genkey @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +[ req ] +default_bits = 4096 +distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name +prompt = no +x509_extensions = myexts + +[ req_distinguished_name ] +O = Fedora +CN = Fedora kernel signing key +emailAddress = kernel-team@fedoraproject.org + +[ myexts ] +basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE +keyUsage=digitalSignature +subjectKeyIdentifier=hash +authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid |