diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch | 128 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs-userns-Change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_.patch | 209 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel.spec | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sources | 1 |
4 files changed, 5 insertions, 350 deletions
diff --git a/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch b/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1a7763767..000000000 --- a/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,128 +0,0 @@ -Bugzilla: 1102715 -Upstream-status: Submitted for 3.15 and CC'd to stable -Delivered-To: jwboyer@gmail.com -Received: by 10.76.6.212 with SMTP id d20csp285523oaa; - Wed, 28 May 2014 20:10:58 -0700 (PDT) -X-Received: by 10.66.250.166 with SMTP id zd6mr4872927pac.7.1401333057574; - Wed, 28 May 2014 20:10:57 -0700 (PDT) -Return-Path: <stable-owner@vger.kernel.org> -Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) - by mx.google.com with ESMTP id j1si26042371pbw.214.2014.05.28.20.10.31 - for <multiple recipients>; - Wed, 28 May 2014 20:10:57 -0700 (PDT) -Received-SPF: none (google.com: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org does not designate permitted sender hosts) client-ip=209.132.180.67; -Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; - spf=neutral (google.com: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org does not designate permitted sender hosts) smtp.mail=stable-owner@vger.kernel.org -Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand - id S1755059AbaE2DKa (ORCPT <rfc822;takashi.bg@gmail.com> - + 73 others); Wed, 28 May 2014 23:10:30 -0400 -Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:34907 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" - rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP - id S1753861AbaE2DK3 (ORCPT <rfc822;stable@vger.kernel.org>); - Wed, 28 May 2014 23:10:29 -0400 -Received: from int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.26]) - by mx1.redhat.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id s4T3AQfK017267 - (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); - Wed, 28 May 2014 23:10:26 -0400 -Received: from paris.rdu.redhat.com (paris.rdu.redhat.com [10.13.136.28]) - by int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id s4T3APd7019240; - Wed, 28 May 2014 23:10:26 -0400 -From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org -Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, - Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, stable@vger.kernel.org, - Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking -Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400 -Message-Id: <1401332999-15167-1-git-send-email-eparis@redhat.com> -X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.68 on 10.5.11.26 -Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org -Precedence: bulk -List-ID: <stable.vger.kernel.org> -X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org - -From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - -Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure. - -This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing. - -eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit -rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow... - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> -Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> ---- - kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c -index 254ce20..842f58a 100644 ---- a/kernel/auditsc.c -+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c -@@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) - return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; - } - -+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) -+{ -+ int word, bit; -+ -+ if (val > 0xffffffff) -+ return false; -+ -+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val); -+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) -+ return false; -+ -+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); -+ -+ return rule->mask[word] & bit; -+} -+ - /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the - * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is - * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit -@@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, - - rcu_read_lock(); - if (!list_empty(list)) { -- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); -- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); -- - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { -- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && -+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, - &state, false)) { - rcu_read_unlock(); -@@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, - static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct audit_names *n, - struct audit_context *ctx) { -- int word, bit; - int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); - struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; - struct audit_entry *e; - enum audit_state state; - -- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); -- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); -- - if (list_empty(list)) - return 0; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { -- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && -+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { - ctx->current_state = state; - return 1; --- -1.9.0 - --- -To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in -the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org -More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html diff --git a/fs-userns-Change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_.patch b/fs-userns-Change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b56e7171a..000000000 --- a/fs-userns-Change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,209 +0,0 @@ -Bugzilla: 1109836 -Upstream-status: 3.16-rc1 and CC'd to stable - -From 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> -Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 12:45:42 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - -The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes -exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode, -CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense. - -This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and -renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more -obvious what it does. - -Fixes CVE-2014-4014. - -Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> -Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> -Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> -Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> -Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> ---- - fs/attr.c | 8 ++++---- - fs/inode.c | 10 +++++++--- - fs/namei.c | 11 ++++++----- - fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +- - include/linux/capability.h | 2 +- - kernel/capability.c | 20 ++++++++------------ - 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c -index 5d4e59d..6530ced 100644 ---- a/fs/attr.c -+++ b/fs/attr.c -@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) - if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && - (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) || - !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) && -- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) -+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) - return -EPERM; - - /* Make sure caller can chgrp. */ - if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && - (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) || - (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) && -- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) -+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) - return -EPERM; - - /* Make sure a caller can chmod. */ -@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) - /* Also check the setgid bit! */ - if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid : - inode->i_gid) && -- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID)) -+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID)) - attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID; - } - -@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr) - umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode; - - if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && -- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID)) -+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID)) - mode &= ~S_ISGID; - inode->i_mode = mode; - } -diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c -index 2feb9b6..6eecb7f 100644 ---- a/fs/inode.c -+++ b/fs/inode.c -@@ -1839,14 +1839,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner); - * inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode - * @inode: inode being checked - * -- * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or -- * owns the file. -+ * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the -+ * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file. - */ - bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode) - { -+ struct user_namespace *ns; -+ - if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) - return true; -- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER)) -+ -+ ns = current_user_ns(); -+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid)) - return true; - return false; - } -diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c -index 8016827..985c6f3 100644 ---- a/fs/namei.c -+++ b/fs/namei.c -@@ -332,10 +332,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) - - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { - /* DACs are overridable for directories */ -- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) -+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) - return 0; - if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE)) -- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) -+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, -+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) - return 0; - return -EACCES; - } -@@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) - * at least one exec bit set. - */ - if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) -- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) -+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) - return 0; - - /* -@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) - */ - mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC; - if (mask == MAY_READ) -- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) -+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) - return 0; - - return -EACCES; -@@ -2379,7 +2380,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) - return 0; - if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid)) - return 0; -- return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER); -+ return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER); - } - - /* -diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c -index 0b18776..6152cbe 100644 ---- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c -+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c -@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr( - * cleared upon successful return from chown() - */ - if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) && -- !inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID)) -+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID)) - ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID); - - /* -diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h -index a6ee1f9..84b13ad 100644 ---- a/include/linux/capability.h -+++ b/include/linux/capability.h -@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - extern bool capable(int cap); - extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); --extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap); -+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); - extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - - /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ -diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c -index 84b2bbf..a5cf13c 100644 ---- a/kernel/capability.c -+++ b/kernel/capability.c -@@ -424,23 +424,19 @@ bool capable(int cap) - EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); - - /** -- * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode -+ * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped - * @inode: The inode in question - * @cap: The capability in question - * -- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability -- * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned -- * by the current user namespace or a child namespace. -- * -- * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current -- * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the -- * current user namespace. -- * -+ * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at -+ * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are -+ * mapped into the current user namespace. - */ --bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap) -+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap) - { - struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); - -- return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid); -+ return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && -+ kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid); - } --EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable); -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); --- -1.9.3 - diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index 6b007f133..0d7c91371 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel %if 0%{?released_kernel} # Do we have a -stable update to apply? -%define stable_update 0 +%define stable_update 1 # Is it a -stable RC? %define stable_rc 0 # Set rpm version accordingly @@ -703,9 +703,6 @@ Patch25069: 0001-acpi-video-Add-4-new-models-to-the-use_native_backli.patch Patch25071: s390-appldata-add-slab.h-for-kzalloc-kfree.patch -# CVE-2014-3917 rhbz 1102571 1102715 -Patch25093: auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch - # Patch series from Hans for various backlight and platform driver fixes Patch26001: thinkpad_acpi-Add-mappings-for-F9-F12-hotkeys-on-X24.patch Patch26002: samsung-laptop-Add-broken-acpi-video-quirk-for-NC210.patch @@ -737,9 +734,6 @@ Patch25100: dm-thin-update-discard_granularity-to-reflect-the-thin-pool-blocksiz #rhbz 1103528 Patch25101: elantech-Deal-with-clickpads-reporting-right-button-.patch -#CVE-2014-4014 rhbz 1107966 1109836 -Patch25102: fs-userns-Change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_.patch - # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS %endif @@ -1411,9 +1405,6 @@ ApplyPatch 0001-acpi-video-Add-4-new-models-to-the-use_native_backli.patch ApplyPatch s390-appldata-add-slab.h-for-kzalloc-kfree.patch -# CVE-2014-3917 rhbz 1102571 1102715 -ApplyPatch auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checking.patch - # Patch series from Hans for various backlight and platform driver fixes ApplyPatch thinkpad_acpi-Add-mappings-for-F9-F12-hotkeys-on-X24.patch ApplyPatch samsung-laptop-Add-broken-acpi-video-quirk-for-NC210.patch @@ -1445,9 +1436,6 @@ ApplyPatch dm-thin-update-discard_granularity-to-reflect-the-thin-pool-blocksize #rhbz 1103528 ApplyPatch elantech-Deal-with-clickpads-reporting-right-button-.patch -#CVE-2014-4014 rhbz 1107966 1109836 -ApplyPatch fs-userns-Change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_.patch - # END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS %endif @@ -2260,6 +2248,9 @@ fi # ||----w | # || || %changelog +* Tue Jun 17 2014 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> +- Linux v3.15.1 + * Mon Jun 16 2014 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> - CVE-2014-4014 possible priv escalation in userns (rhbz 1107966 1109836) @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ 97ca1625bb40368dc41b9a7971549071 linux-3.15.tar.xz ef8f4db937f521a7e323ec589536ba25 perf-man-3.15.tar.gz +78a944411af297b9e5e9aa430056de4c patch-3.15.1.xz |