diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch | 96 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel.spec | 9 |
3 files changed, 61 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch b/KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1da06a1dd..000000000 --- a/KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -From 7ec379c439ea60507804f96910d25196ab838ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:56 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to - secondary keyring - -Allow keys to be added to the system secondary certificates keyring during -kernel initialisation in an unrestricted fashion. Such keys are implicitly -trusted and don't have their trust chains checked on link. - -This allows keys in the UEFI database to be added in secure boot mode for -the purposes of module signing. - -Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> ---- - certs/internal.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ - certs/system_keyring.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 certs/internal.h - -diff --git a/certs/internal.h b/certs/internal.h -new file mode 100644 -index 000000000000..5dcbefb0c23a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/certs/internal.h -@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ -+/* Internal definitions -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence -+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. -+ */ -+ -+/* -+ * system_keyring.c -+ */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING -+extern void __init add_trusted_secondary_key(const char *source, -+ const void *data, size_t len); -+#endif -diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c -index c05c29ae4d5d..183e73cc81f7 100644 ---- a/certs/system_keyring.c -+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c -@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ - #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> - #include <keys/system_keyring.h> - #include <crypto/pkcs7.h> -+#include "internal.h" - - static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; - #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING -@@ -287,3 +288,35 @@ void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring) - platform_trusted_keys = keyring; - } - #endif -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING -+/** -+ * add_trusted_secondary_key - Add to secondary keyring with no validation -+ * @source: Source of key -+ * @data: The blob holding the key -+ * @len: The length of the data blob -+ * -+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring without checking its trust chain. This -+ * is available only during kernel initialisation. -+ */ -+void __init add_trusted_secondary_key(const char *source, -+ const void *data, size_t len) -+{ -+ key_ref_t key; -+ -+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1), -+ "asymmetric", -+ NULL, data, len, -+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | -+ KEY_USR_VIEW, -+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | -+ KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION); -+ -+ if (IS_ERR(key)) -+ pr_err("Problem loading %s X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", -+ source, PTR_ERR(key)); -+ else -+ pr_notice("Loaded %s cert '%s' linked to secondary sys keyring\n", -+ source, key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); -+} -+#endif /* CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ --- -2.20.1 - diff --git a/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch b/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a13dcdba5 --- /dev/null +++ b/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 70cecc97a4fc1667472224558a50dd7b6c42c789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com> +Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:39:29 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for module signature + verify + +This patch completes commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of +platform keyring for signature verify") which, while adding the +platform keyring for bzImage verification, neglected to also add +this keyring for module verification. + +As such, kernel modules signed with keys from the MokList variable +were not successfully verified. + +Signed-off-by: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com> +--- + kernel/module_signing.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c +index 6b9a926fd86b..cf94220e9154 100644 +--- a/kernel/module_signing.c ++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c +@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) + { + struct module_signature ms; + size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; ++ int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen); + +@@ -82,8 +83,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) + return -EBADMSG; + } + +- return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, +- VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, +- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, +- NULL, NULL); ++ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, ++ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, ++ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, ++ NULL, NULL); ++ if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) { ++ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, ++ VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, ++ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, ++ NULL, NULL); ++ } ++ return ret; + } +-- +2.21.0 + diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index ada3efa8b..ea7952969 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -532,8 +532,6 @@ Patch122: Input-synaptics-pin-3-touches-when-the-firmware-repo.patch Patch201: efi-lockdown.patch -Patch202: KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch - # bz 1497559 - Make kernel MODSIGN code not error on missing variables Patch207: 0001-Make-get_cert_list-not-complain-about-cert-lists-tha.patch Patch208: 0002-Add-efi_status_to_str-and-rework-efi_status_to_err.patch @@ -585,6 +583,10 @@ Patch501: input-rmi4-remove-the-need-for-artifical-IRQ.patch Patch506: 0001-s390-jump_label-Correct-asm-contraint.patch Patch507: 0001-Drop-that-for-now.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1701096 +# Submitted upstream at https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/4/23/89 +Patch508: KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch + # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS %endif @@ -1858,6 +1860,9 @@ fi # # %changelog +* Tue Apr 23 2019 Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> +- Allow modules signed by keys in the platform keyring (rbhz 1701096) + * Mon Apr 22 2019 Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> - 5.1.0-0.rc6.git0.1 - Linux v5.1-rc6 |