diff options
-rw-r--r-- | configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_LSM | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | efi-lockdown.patch | 496 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gitrev | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-aarch64-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-aarch64.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-armv7hl-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-armv7hl.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-i686-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-i686.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-ppc64le-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-ppc64le.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-s390x-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-s390x.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-x86_64-debug.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel-x86_64.config | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel.spec | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sources | 2 |
20 files changed, 241 insertions, 294 deletions
diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_LSM b/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_LSM new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fce4886eb --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_LSM @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID b/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ad72247ef --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set diff --git a/efi-lockdown.patch b/efi-lockdown.patch index 471f4222f..8bce057fa 100644 --- a/efi-lockdown.patch +++ b/efi-lockdown.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -From 73958cc1f78cfc69f3b1ec26a3406b3c45f6d202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e8b9c4420c929255708e0bff42142de49ff1971b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running +Subject: [PATCH 01/22] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system @@ -43,34 +43,34 @@ primarily applies to ISA hardware devices. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ - include/linux/kernel.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ - security/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++++++++- - security/Makefile | 3 +++ - security/lock_down.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/linux/kernel.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++ + security/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++++++- + security/Makefile | 3 ++ + security/lock_down.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -index 6285697b6e56..566f0f447053 100644 +index 3d872a527cd9..cf2f3df1b8d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -@@ -996,6 +996,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) +@@ -1005,6 +1005,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) efi_init(); - + + init_lockdown(); + dmi_scan_machine(); dmi_memdev_walk(); dmi_set_dump_stack_arch_desc(); diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h -index 4ae1dfd9bf05..7d085cca9cee 100644 +index a8868a32098c..4e63db72cfea 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h -@@ -306,6 +306,38 @@ static inline void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err) +@@ -350,6 +350,38 @@ static inline void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err) { } #endif - + +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL +extern void __init init_lockdown(void); +extern bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, bool first); @@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ index 4ae1dfd9bf05..7d085cca9cee 100644 int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res); int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res); diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig -index c4302067a3ad..a68e5bdebad5 100644 +index 1d6463fb1450..44c6a0da6f21 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig -@@ -231,6 +231,28 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH +@@ -229,6 +229,28 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled, specify an empty string here (i.e. ""). - + +config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL + bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'" + help @@ -139,16 +139,16 @@ index c4302067a3ad..a68e5bdebad5 100644 source "security/selinux/Kconfig" source "security/smack/Kconfig" source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig" -@@ -278,4 +300,3 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY - default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - +@@ -250,4 +272,3 @@ config LSM + If unsure, leave this as the default. + endmenu - diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile -index 4d2d3782ddef..507ac8c520ce 100644 +index c598b904938f..5ff090149c88 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile -@@ -30,3 +30,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o +@@ -32,3 +32,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ @@ -227,12 +227,12 @@ index 000000000000..f35ffdd096ad +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_is_locked_down); -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 13dada34d9aa56ac4ee5438c7ebefde2d30d5542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 2779f0447b80b3cf94fb0252a4b209aa36250ed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown +Subject: [PATCH 02/22] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Make an option to provide a sysrq key that will lift the kernel lockdown, thereby allowing the running kernel image to be accessed and modified. @@ -248,44 +248,44 @@ cc: x86@kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 ++ drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 + - drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 ++++++++++++------ - include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++ - include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 +++++++- + drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 ++++++++++----- + include/linux/input.h | 5 ++++ + include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 +++++- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +- - security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++ - security/lock_down.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++ + security/lock_down.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h -index ae13bc974416..3108e297d87d 100644 +index ed8ec011a9fd..8daf633a5347 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> - + +#define LOCKDOWN_LIFT_KEY 'x' + #ifdef __i386__ - + #include <linux/pfn.h> diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c -index 96a887f33698..027c730631cc 100644 +index 26ec603fe220..a73e92490286 100644 --- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c +++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c -@@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ static int uinput_create_device(struct uinput_device *udev) +@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ static int uinput_create_device(struct uinput_device *udev) dev->flush = uinput_dev_flush; } - + + dev->flags |= INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC; dev->event = uinput_dev_event; - + input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev); diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c -index 6364890575ec..ffeb3aa86cd1 100644 +index fa0ce7dd9e24..06c60fed7656 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c +++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c -@@ -487,6 +487,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = { +@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = { /* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */ /* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */ /* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */ @@ -293,17 +293,17 @@ index 6364890575ec..ffeb3aa86cd1 100644 NULL, /* x */ /* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */ NULL, /* y */ -@@ -530,7 +531,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p) +@@ -523,7 +524,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p) sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p; } - + -void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask) +void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from) { struct sysrq_key_op *op_p; int orig_log_level; -@@ -550,11 +551,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask) - +@@ -542,11 +543,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask) + op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key); if (op_p) { + /* Ban synthetic events from some sysrq functionality */ @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ index 6364890575ec..ffeb3aa86cd1 100644 pr_info("%s\n", op_p->action_msg); console_loglevel = orig_log_level; op_p->handler(key); -@@ -586,7 +591,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask) +@@ -579,7 +584,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask) void handle_sysrq(int key) { if (sysrq_on()) @@ -327,18 +327,18 @@ index 6364890575ec..ffeb3aa86cd1 100644 + __handle_sysrq(key, SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq); - -@@ -667,7 +672,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(struct timer_list *t) + +@@ -659,7 +664,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(struct timer_list *t) static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state) { if (state->reset_requested) - __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], false); + __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL); - + if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms) mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer, -@@ -818,8 +823,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq, - +@@ -812,8 +817,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq, + default: if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) { + int from = sysrq->handle.dev->flags & INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC ? @@ -349,14 +349,14 @@ index 6364890575ec..ffeb3aa86cd1 100644 } break; } -@@ -1102,7 +1109,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - +@@ -1096,7 +1103,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + if (get_user(c, buf)) return -EFAULT; - __handle_sysrq(c, false); + __handle_sysrq(c, SYSRQ_FROM_PROC); } - + return count; diff --git a/include/linux/input.h b/include/linux/input.h index 7c7516eb7d76..38cd0ea72c37 100644 @@ -373,16 +373,16 @@ index 7c7516eb7d76..38cd0ea72c37 100644 @@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ struct input_dev { const char *uniq; struct input_id id; - + + unsigned int flags; + unsigned long propbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(INPUT_PROP_CNT)]; - + unsigned long evbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(EV_CNT)]; @@ -190,6 +193,8 @@ struct input_dev { }; #define to_input_dev(d) container_of(d, struct input_dev, dev) - + +#define INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC 0x000000001 + /* @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ index 8c71874e8485..7de1f08b60a9 100644 @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #define SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT 0x0080 #define SYSRQ_ENABLE_RTNICE 0x0100 - + +#define SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE 0x00010000 + struct sysrq_key_op { @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ index 8c71874e8485..7de1f08b60a9 100644 @@ -43,8 +45,12 @@ struct sysrq_key_op { * are available -- else NULL's). */ - + +#define SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL 0x0001 +#define SYSRQ_FROM_PROC 0x0002 +#define SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC 0x0004 @@ -416,26 +416,26 @@ index 8c71874e8485..7de1f08b60a9 100644 int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op); struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key); diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c -index dbb0781a0533..aae9a0f44058 100644 +index 82a3b32a7cfc..efee1abf5e8e 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c -@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv) +@@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv) return KDB_ARGCOUNT; - + kdb_trap_printk++; - __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask); + __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask ? SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL : 0); kdb_trap_printk--; - + return 0; diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig -index a68e5bdebad5..46967ee77dfd 100644 +index 44c6a0da6f21..f885e88e0705 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig -@@ -253,6 +253,17 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_MANDATORY +@@ -251,6 +251,17 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_MANDATORY Makes the lockdown non-negotiable. It is always on and cannot be disabled. - + +config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ + bool "Allow the kernel lockdown to be lifted by SysRq" + depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL @@ -455,12 +455,12 @@ index f35ffdd096ad..2615669dbf03 100644 --- a/security/lock_down.c +++ b/security/lock_down.c @@ -11,9 +11,15 @@ - + #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sysrq.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> - + #ifndef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_MANDATORY +#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ +static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down; @@ -516,12 +516,12 @@ index f35ffdd096ad..2615669dbf03 100644 + +#endif /* CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ */ -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 7948946e19294e7560c81b177b2788d21ed79f59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 597069f3ba9dbf3537bd2ab5642f203fa24fd1f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 03/22] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible @@ -542,25 +542,25 @@ Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c -index ffeb60d3434c..b2fca26e5765 100644 +index b08dc50f9f26..0a2f2e75d5f4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c -@@ -784,6 +784,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig) - +@@ -786,6 +786,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig) + static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/mem,kmem,port")) + return -EPERM; return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; } - + -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From a19b6b9637f114388cc7087176860eee962cac79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 97b73030d3ccb2c4595c4fe948b0af368a6b10e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:46 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 04/22] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary @@ -576,6 +576,7 @@ Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> --- kernel/kexec.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) @@ -599,12 +600,12 @@ index 68559808fdfa..041d505070e1 100644 result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); if (result < 0) -- -2.17.1 +2.20.1 -From aed8ee965258e3926be6aaeb57aef8a9a03c9989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 1b27ccaab50813a5a3c29f7be294a3cf98966d3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:47 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down +Subject: [PATCH 05/22] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, @@ -615,30 +616,31 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> --- kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c -index 5454cc639a8d..629f158f5a0c 100644 +index abef759de7c8..802795becb88 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops; - + bool hibernation_available(void) { - return (nohibernate == 0); + return nohibernate == 0 && !kernel_is_locked_down("Hibernation"); } - + /** -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 8732c1663d7c0305ae01ba5a1ee4d2299b7b4612 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 65c098838ab0e21528ecbd5ad27e1b5174b42b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:47 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down +Subject: [PATCH 06/22] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which makes it possible to modify the running kernel. Disable this if the kernel @@ -654,26 +656,26 @@ cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c -index 75c959de4b29..959b336d8eca 100644 +index 2d8b60a3c86b..0305d513c274 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.c +++ b/kernel/power/user.c @@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) if (!hibernation_available()) return -EPERM; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/snapshot")) + return -EPERM; + lock_system_sleep(); - + if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 4f5f0aae410d1929872eec346954c85e3a85f4f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 05eecdf72d557817d7613733dca6eac08e61377e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 07/22] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in @@ -694,30 +696,30 @@ cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c -index 366d93af051d..1e149ec006a4 100644 +index 25794c27c7a4..0d969598e273 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c -@@ -903,6 +903,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, +@@ -904,6 +904,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { -@@ -1165,6 +1168,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, +@@ -1166,6 +1169,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) return -EINVAL; - -@@ -1240,6 +1246,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, + +@@ -1241,6 +1247,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { @@ -726,15 +728,15 @@ index 366d93af051d..1e149ec006a4 100644 + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } - + diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c -index 1ee8927a0635..469445a9019b 100644 +index 6fa1627ce08d..1549cdd0710e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + @@ -744,7 +746,7 @@ index 1ee8927a0635..469445a9019b 100644 @@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + @@ -754,12 +756,12 @@ index 1ee8927a0635..469445a9019b 100644 @@ -237,7 +243,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; - + - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; - + if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index d96626c614f5..b8a08d3166a1 100644 @@ -768,20 +770,20 @@ index d96626c614f5..b8a08d3166a1 100644 @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - + - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; - + dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn); -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 677537cdec42804f1936b57ffaa6181f633bc015 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 00ead3a144b821267a941a26c646a1fd07d8163a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 08/22] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration @@ -806,14 +808,14 @@ index 0fe1c8782208..abc702a6ae9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ long ksys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on) - + if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) return -EINVAL; - if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + kernel_is_locked_down("ioperm"))) return -EPERM; - + /* @@ -126,7 +127,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level) return -EINVAL; @@ -826,12 +828,12 @@ index 0fe1c8782208..abc702a6ae9c 100644 } regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From f005be07fababf8c698a556fe465871ad168c9d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 6efd2de8172dac74fbea76d7205657c4cf22ef6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 09/22] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since @@ -852,13 +854,13 @@ cc: x86@kernel.org 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c -index ef688804f80d..dfb61d358196 100644 +index 4588414e2561..f5a2cf07972f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c @@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int err = 0; ssize_t bytes = 0; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct MSR access")) { + pr_info("Direct access to MSR %x\n", reg); + return -EPERM; @@ -866,7 +868,7 @@ index ef688804f80d..dfb61d358196 100644 + if (count % 8) return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */ - + @@ -135,6 +140,11 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg) err = -EFAULT; break; @@ -880,12 +882,12 @@ index ef688804f80d..dfb61d358196 100644 if (err) break; -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 0a48b7c936757dda851ab2d3ecde7f6a79de7a5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 7e4c9369ca56ec7508ad851fb3f8af7b7e83c4e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is +Subject: [PATCH 10/22] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making @@ -901,13 +903,13 @@ cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c -index e967c1173ba3..a07fbe999eb6 100644 +index aa972dc5cb7e..af1d161f188f 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, struct acpi_table_header table; acpi_status status; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI custom methods")) + return -EPERM; + @@ -915,12 +917,12 @@ index e967c1173ba3..a07fbe999eb6 100644 /* parse the table header to get the table length */ if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 2ed74b084366d7dba7b4a611ba13d99b82c4e11e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 20f5e7cfa6d01d10a5bb83a6b276d6f403aa012c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:49 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has +Subject: [PATCH 11/22] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which @@ -937,12 +939,12 @@ cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c -index 7ca41bf023c9..34e4ce7939f4 100644 +index f29e427d0d1d..3e44cef7a0cd 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c -@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) acpi_physical_address pa; - + #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC - if (acpi_rsdp) + if (acpi_rsdp && !kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI RSDP specification")) @@ -950,12 +952,12 @@ index 7ca41bf023c9..34e4ce7939f4 100644 #endif pa = acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(); -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 7fb2ddf683c23cc4b227d7d75a5d039970ca910e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 700ce42e36ac0b7387c55d8fe13dd1dda3d4f178 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:49 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is +Subject: [PATCH 12/22] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt): @@ -977,13 +979,13 @@ cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c -index 849c4fb19b03..6c5ee7e66842 100644 +index 8fccbe49612a..1794f5b4afae 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c -@@ -527,6 +527,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void) +@@ -539,6 +539,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void) if (table_nr == 0) return; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI table override")) { + pr_notice("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n"); + return; @@ -993,12 +995,12 @@ index 849c4fb19b03..6c5ee7e66842 100644 memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS, all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE); -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From d1ff6505c76cec9438217f2c284f024a1ac2ac59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 795cc6dc11944a24309cd29b02efc6ff6eea241e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com> Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 09:52:50 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is +Subject: [PATCH 13/22] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing @@ -1025,13 +1027,13 @@ cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c -index b38737c83a24..6d71e1e97b20 100644 +index 2d4be94f8c00..6ee4ad207e8b 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c @@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2, int rc; u64 base_addr, size; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI error injection")) + return -EPERM; + @@ -1039,12 +1041,12 @@ index b38737c83a24..6d71e1e97b20 100644 if (flags && (flags & ~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF))) -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 3153be0328e3a752aacab95d503fbd460f517402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From fbdf91419289d47c747d5535bb92a8923a0fce97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:37 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 14/22] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the @@ -1058,26 +1060,26 @@ cc: linux-pcmcia@lists.infradead.org 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c -index 102646fedb56..e46c948d7246 100644 +index ac0672b8dfca..8adf092d0e18 100644 --- a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c +++ b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c @@ -1578,6 +1578,9 @@ static ssize_t pccard_store_cis(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct pcmcia_socket *s; int error; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCMCIA CIS storage")) + return -EPERM; + s = to_socket(container_of(kobj, struct device, kobj)); - + if (off) -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 9fedc1427e8589edf2e16a481f8588711adba69a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 9a3726b9bf16e62fce77570c972857abc303fcd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:37 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL +Subject: [PATCH 15/22] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial @@ -1092,13 +1094,13 @@ cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c -index 0466f9f08a91..360f8e4416c4 100644 +index 351843f847c0..3cffe2f5d132 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c -@@ -829,6 +829,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port, +@@ -852,6 +852,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port, new_flags = (__force upf_t)new_info->flags; old_custom_divisor = uport->custom_divisor; - + + if ((change_port || change_irq) && + kernel_is_locked_down("Using TIOCSSERIAL to change device addresses, irqs and dma channels")) { + retval = -EPERM; @@ -1109,12 +1111,12 @@ index 0466f9f08a91..360f8e4416c4 100644 retval = -EPERM; if (change_irq || change_port || -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From f8fd52e2b077ce5a993807f8fc6e27a17cf4d19f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 3602dd89747ed890d31fcb4d64a3fcd48490fff7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:37 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware +Subject: [PATCH 16/22] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware @@ -1128,13 +1130,13 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/params.c b/kernel/params.c -index cc9108c2a1fd..2c08c4aa376b 100644 +index ce89f757e6da..8ac751c938f8 100644 --- a/kernel/params.c +++ b/kernel/params.c @@ -108,13 +108,19 @@ bool parameq(const char *a, const char *b) return parameqn(a, b, strlen(a)+1); } - + -static void param_check_unsafe(const struct kernel_param *kp) +static bool param_check_unsafe(const struct kernel_param *kp, + const char *doing) @@ -1150,7 +1152,7 @@ index cc9108c2a1fd..2c08c4aa376b 100644 + return false; + return true; } - + static int parse_one(char *param, @@ -144,8 +150,10 @@ static int parse_one(char *param, pr_debug("handling %s with %p\n", param, @@ -1168,7 +1170,7 @@ index cc9108c2a1fd..2c08c4aa376b 100644 @@ -553,6 +561,12 @@ static ssize_t param_attr_show(struct module_attribute *mattr, return count; } - + +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +#define mod_name(mod) (mod)->name +#else @@ -1180,7 +1182,7 @@ index cc9108c2a1fd..2c08c4aa376b 100644 struct module_kobject *mk, @@ -565,8 +579,10 @@ static ssize_t param_attr_store(struct module_attribute *mattr, return -EPERM; - + kernel_param_lock(mk->mod); - param_check_unsafe(attribute->param); - err = attribute->param->ops->set(buf, attribute->param); @@ -1192,12 +1194,12 @@ index cc9108c2a1fd..2c08c4aa376b 100644 if (!err) return len; -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 9c88e2ab392f5ac9c80529e43175fe65d00cdb67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 5c8a455102b3ca36e84694d888fad219726bd268 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module +Subject: [PATCH 17/22] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. @@ -1220,7 +1222,7 @@ index f6ae6830b341..bbaad357f5d7 100644 @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ static int __init init(void) { unsigned long size = (read_far) ? (8 << 20) : (16 << 10); - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("MMIO trace testing")) + return -EPERM; + @@ -1228,12 +1230,12 @@ index f6ae6830b341..bbaad357f5d7 100644 pr_err("you have to use the module argument mmio_address.\n"); pr_err("DO NOT LOAD THIS MODULE UNLESS YOU REALLY KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!\n"); -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From 256e20401f9f5dd19028d4220095897a15daa67c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 711e6f9ef237fd513eddfc1f0e3796c419bc138e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore +Subject: [PATCH 18/22] Lock down /proc/kcore Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent access to cryptographic data. @@ -1245,25 +1247,25 @@ Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c -index d1e82761de81..cdebdee81719 100644 +index bbcc185062bb..d50ebfbf3dbb 100644 --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c +++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c -@@ -546,6 +546,8 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos) - +@@ -518,6 +518,8 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos) + static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("/proc/kcore")) + return -EPERM; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) return -EPERM; - + -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From f68ca24bc8d8a64cf30e59a595fad0e6782e933f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From f2a835a43a6463abfe6781156ebdb7346d7a3c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes +Subject: [PATCH 19/22] Lock down kprobes Disallow the creation of kprobes when the kernel is locked down by preventing their registration. This prevents kprobes from being used to @@ -1276,13 +1278,13 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c -index 102160ff5c66..4f5757732553 100644 +index c83e54727131..743c40bd1982 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c -@@ -1561,6 +1561,9 @@ int register_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) +@@ -1571,6 +1571,9 @@ int register_kprobe(struct kprobe *p) struct module *probed_mod; kprobe_opcode_t *addr; - + + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Use of kprobes")) + return -EPERM; + @@ -1290,12 +1292,12 @@ index 102160ff5c66..4f5757732553 100644 addr = kprobe_addr(p); if (IS_ERR(addr)) -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From d44a6ae3a7cad5cd9b01f7b0a48b3c788af968e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 23afb750c60b6b2d8025eb4d52ce6ff565ca1a63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf +Subject: [PATCH 20/22] Lock down perf Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to access kernel data. @@ -1306,13 +1308,13 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c -index fc1c330c6bd6..1922f2e0980a 100644 +index 5f59d848171e..ddf0fa63cb80 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c -@@ -10407,6 +10407,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, +@@ -10727,6 +10727,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, return -EINVAL; } - + + if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR) && + kernel_is_locked_down("PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR")) + /* REGS_INTR can leak data, lockdown must prevent this */ @@ -1322,12 +1324,12 @@ index fc1c330c6bd6..1922f2e0980a 100644 if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -- -2.14.3 +2.20.1 -From fe5091f97838c8c64b891280bcd30367e71cd5c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From dc6da5e583b02c04a6e0518158ef3d82735aeb5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 14:45:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked +Subject: [PATCH 21/22] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when @@ -1371,13 +1373,13 @@ cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/debugfs/file.c b/fs/debugfs/file.c -index 1f99678ff5d3..51cb894c21f2 100644 +index 4fce1da7db23..c33042c1eff3 100644 --- a/fs/debugfs/file.c +++ b/fs/debugfs/file.c @@ -136,6 +136,25 @@ void debugfs_file_put(struct dentry *dentry) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debugfs_file_put); - + +/* + * Only permit access to world-readable files when the kernel is locked down. + * We also need to exclude any file that has ways to write or alter it as root @@ -1402,7 +1404,7 @@ index 1f99678ff5d3..51cb894c21f2 100644 struct dentry *dentry = F_DENTRY(filp); @@ -147,6 +166,11 @@ static int open_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r; - + real_fops = debugfs_real_fops(filp); + + r = -EPERM; @@ -1414,7 +1416,7 @@ index 1f99678ff5d3..51cb894c21f2 100644 /* Huh? Module did not clean up after itself at exit? */ @@ -272,6 +296,10 @@ static int full_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r; - + real_fops = debugfs_real_fops(filp); + r = -EPERM; + if (debugfs_is_locked_down(inode, filp, real_fops)) @@ -1424,13 +1426,13 @@ index 1f99678ff5d3..51cb894c21f2 100644 if (!real_fops) { /* Huh? Module did not cleanup after itself at exit? */ diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c -index 13b01351dd1c..4daec17b8215 100644 +index 95b5e78c22b1..ce99ea07fdb4 100644 --- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c @@ -32,6 +32,31 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount; static int debugfs_mount_count; static bool debugfs_registered; - + +/* + * Don't allow access attributes to be changed whilst the kernel is locked down + * so that we can use the file mode as part of a heuristic to determine whether @@ -1462,21 +1464,21 @@ index 13b01351dd1c..4daec17b8215 100644 @@ -356,6 +381,7 @@ static struct dentry *__debugfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode->i_mode = mode; inode->i_private = data; - + + inode->i_op = &debugfs_file_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)((unsigned long)real_fops | DEBUGFS_FSDATA_IS_REAL_FOPS_BIT); -@@ -515,7 +541,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) +@@ -516,7 +542,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) return failed_creating(dentry); inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO; - inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; + inode->i_op = &debugfs_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; - + /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */ -@@ -608,7 +634,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent, +@@ -611,7 +637,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent, return failed_creating(dentry); } inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO; @@ -1486,104 +1488,13 @@ index 13b01351dd1c..4daec17b8215 100644 d_instantiate(dentry, inode); return end_creating(dentry); -- -2.14.3 - -From patchwork Wed Nov 21 12:05:10 2018 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -X-Patchwork-Submitter: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> -X-Patchwork-Id: 1015495 -Return-Path: <SRS0=ejdu=OA=vger.kernel.org=linux-kernel-owner@kernel.org> -Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) - by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF80FC04EBA - for <linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 12:05:25 +0000 (UTC) -Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) - by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80EA921479 - for <linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 12:05:25 +0000 (UTC) -DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 80EA921479 -Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; - dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com -Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; - spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org -Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand - id S1730155AbeKUWjb (ORCPT - <rfc822;linux-kernel@archiver.kernel.org>); - Wed, 21 Nov 2018 17:39:31 -0500 -Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:33574 "EHLO - mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) - by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729128AbeKUWjb (ORCPT - <rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>); - Wed, 21 Nov 2018 17:39:31 -0500 -Received: from pps.filterd (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) - by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id - wALBx6kw056071 - for <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 07:05:22 -0500 -Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) - by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2nw5p847fp-1 - (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) - for <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>; Wed, 21 Nov 2018 07:05:22 -0500 -Received: from localhost - by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use - Only! 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CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -5130,6 +5131,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-aarch64.config b/kernel-aarch64.config index 0611c3e6b..d2d1f5103 100644 --- a/kernel-aarch64.config +++ b/kernel-aarch64.config @@ -3001,6 +3001,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -5109,6 +5110,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config b/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config index ed548bbb6..c616d4ef4 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config @@ -3100,6 +3100,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -5336,6 +5337,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config index b975f36b3..7b6f66eb8 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config @@ -2979,6 +2979,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -5056,6 +5057,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config index 8f48e0a62..0718ea1f1 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config @@ -2962,6 +2962,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -5036,6 +5037,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl.config b/kernel-armv7hl.config index 8c271ef8e..62ab9cc84 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl.config @@ -3083,6 +3083,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -5316,6 +5317,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-i686-debug.config b/kernel-i686-debug.config index 66054d079..37bc1158c 100644 --- a/kernel-i686-debug.config +++ b/kernel-i686-debug.config @@ -2837,6 +2837,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y CONFIG_LPC_SCH=m CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4730,6 +4731,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-i686.config b/kernel-i686.config index 5b05df6dc..040848406 100644 --- a/kernel-i686.config +++ b/kernel-i686.config @@ -2818,6 +2818,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y CONFIG_LPC_SCH=m CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4710,6 +4711,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config b/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config index bb972ff7d..1e4599b7b 100644 --- a/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config +++ b/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config @@ -2595,6 +2595,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4433,6 +4434,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-ppc64le.config b/kernel-ppc64le.config index babb0bdb4..2dc6e4518 100644 --- a/kernel-ppc64le.config +++ b/kernel-ppc64le.config @@ -2576,6 +2576,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4411,6 +4412,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-s390x-debug.config b/kernel-s390x-debug.config index 39a7e5c00..ff727a351 100644 --- a/kernel-s390x-debug.config +++ b/kernel-s390x-debug.config @@ -2569,6 +2569,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4381,6 +4382,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-s390x.config b/kernel-s390x.config index 9b4b06450..987bfb8f0 100644 --- a/kernel-s390x.config +++ b/kernel-s390x.config @@ -2550,6 +2550,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y # CONFIG_LPC_SCH is not set CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4359,6 +4360,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-x86_64-debug.config b/kernel-x86_64-debug.config index 45cc952f5..8c26a8dd9 100644 --- a/kernel-x86_64-debug.config +++ b/kernel-x86_64-debug.config @@ -2883,6 +2883,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y CONFIG_LPC_SCH=m CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4761,6 +4762,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel-x86_64.config b/kernel-x86_64.config index 19ee3ca57..36f14f9ea 100644 --- a/kernel-x86_64.config +++ b/kernel-x86_64.config @@ -2864,6 +2864,7 @@ CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE=y CONFIG_LPC_SCH=m CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 +CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" CONFIG_LTC1660=m # CONFIG_LTC2471 is not set # CONFIG_LTC2485 is not set @@ -4741,6 +4742,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set +# CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index a2e11ef5c..55660171f 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel # The rc snapshot level %global rcrev 0 # The git snapshot level -%define gitrev 3 +%define gitrev 4 # Set rpm version accordingly %define rpmversion 5.%{upstream_sublevel}.0 %endif @@ -1873,6 +1873,9 @@ fi # # %changelog +* Fri Mar 08 2019 Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> - 5.1.0-0.rc0.git4.1 +- Linux v5.0-7001-g610cd4eadec4 + * Thu Mar 07 2019 Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> - 5.1.0-0.rc0.git3.1 - Linux v5.0-6399-gf90d64483ebd @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ SHA512 (linux-5.0.tar.xz) = 3fbab70c7b03b1a10e9fa14d1e2e1f550faba4f5792b7699ca006951da74ab86e7d7f19c6a67849ab99343186e7d6f2752cd910d76222213b93c1eab90abf1b0 -SHA512 (patch-5.0-git3.xz) = 5d0173b40a31b0fd000c4c37e272ba754b387aaf359a9f42868db2b4a86a8431c91e2130c933538904691b86a53af1b166131d3b9958fdffd29814c7b961d689 +SHA512 (patch-5.0-git4.xz) = 8e51849571facbaa0585503f911deeaad308e95f3e692875db699489d46decb00577278f8a96ff2da10f058045c6f00b483f02519d261b9f33d4afe0436774f9 |