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-rw-r--r--0001-random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-CPU-s-hwrng.patch78
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 78 deletions
diff --git a/0001-random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-CPU-s-hwrng.patch b/0001-random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-CPU-s-hwrng.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a2f68f82..000000000
--- a/0001-random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-CPU-s-hwrng.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-From 39a8883a2b989d1d21bd8dd99f5557f0c5e89694 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
-Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 18:24:27 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
-
-This gives the user building their own kernel (or a Linux
-distribution) the option of deciding whether or not to trust the CPU's
-hardware random number generator (e.g., RDRAND for x86 CPU's) as being
-correctly implemented and not having a back door introduced (perhaps
-courtesy of a Nation State's law enforcement or intelligence
-agencies).
-
-This will prevent getrandom(2) from blocking, if there is a
-willingness to trust the CPU manufacturer.
-
-Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
----
- drivers/char/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++
- drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
-index 212f447938ae..ce277ee0a28a 100644
---- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
-+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
-@@ -554,3 +554,17 @@ config ADI
-
- endmenu
-
-+config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
-+ bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG"
-+ depends on X86 || S390 || PPC
-+ default n
-+ help
-+ Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or
-+ RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy
-+ for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not
-+ something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting
-+ that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate
-+ of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies)
-+ has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
-+ random number generation facilities.
-+
-diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
-index 34ddfd57419b..f4013b8a711b 100644
---- a/drivers/char/random.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
-@@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
- static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
- {
- int i;
-+ int arch_init = 1;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
-@@ -792,10 +793,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
- _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
-+ !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
- rv = random_get_entropy();
-+ arch_init = 0;
-+ }
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
- }
-+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
-+ if (arch_init) {
-+ crng_init = 2;
-+ pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
-+ }
-+#endif
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
- }
-
---
-2.17.1
-