Rework Secure Boot support to use the secure_modules approach

- Drop pekey

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1434 deletions

diff --git a/secure-boot-20130218.patch b/secure-boot-20130218.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 29ac46cd9..000000000
--- a/secure-boot-20130218.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1434 +0,0 @@
-From 0c5837031a4e996877930fd023a5877dd1d615ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 01/19] Secure boot: Add new capability
-
-Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
-be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
-The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability
-and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial
-capability set if required.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
-index ba478fa..7109e65 100644
---- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
-+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
-@@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
- 
- #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND    36
- 
--#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
-+/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */
-+
-+#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL  37
-+
-+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
- 
- #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
- 
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 87c8fddbcb3042fc4174b53763adbf66045a12be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 02/19] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
-
-Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability.  This allows SELinux
-policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
-capability class.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-index 14d04e6..ed99a2d 100644
---- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
- 	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
- 	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
- 	{ "capability2",
--	  { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
--	    NULL } },
-+	  { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
-+	    "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } },
- 	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
- 	{ "tun_socket",
- 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From df14b5319bf3ed2110839e233ac61e6136745be8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 03/19] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
- switch on Secure Boot mode
-
-This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
-in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from.  This works on
-any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |  7 +++++++
- kernel/cred.c                       | 17 +++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-index 6c72381..7dffdd5 100644
---- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-@@ -2654,6 +2654,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
- 			Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
- 			enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
- 
-+	secureboot_enable=
-+			[KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode.  This
-+			locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the
-+			CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.  This includes things
-+			like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas.  It can
-+			be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes.
-+
- 	security=	[SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
- 			If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
- 			security module asking for security registration will be
-diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
-index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644
---- a/kernel/cred.c
-+++ b/kernel/cred.c
-@@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
- 				     0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- }
- 
-+void __init secureboot_enable()
-+{
-+	pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
-+	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+}
-+
-+/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
-+static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str)
-+{
-+	int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
-+	if (sb_enable)
-+		secureboot_enable();
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt);
-+
- /**
-  * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
-  * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 49c76a665e8a09da48cbe271ea40266ca1a226c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 04/19] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
- enabled in firmware
-
-The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
-and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
-down.  We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the
-EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  7 +++++++
- include/linux/cred.h                  |  2 ++
- include/linux/efi.h                   |  1 +
- 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-index 199f453..ff651d3 100644
---- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
- 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
- 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
- 				(below)
-+1EB/001	ALL	kbd_status	Numlock is enabled
-+1EC/001	ALL	secure_boot	Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns
- 1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
- 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
- 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index f8fa411..96bd86b 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -849,6 +849,36 @@ fail:
- 	return status;
- }
- 
-+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
-+{
-+	u8 sb, setup;
-+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
-+	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+
-+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
-+
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (sb == 0)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+
-+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
-+				&setup);
-+
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (setup == 1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
-  * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
-@@ -1143,6 +1173,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
- 	if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
- 		goto fail;
- 
-+	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table);
-+
- 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
- 
- 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct boot_params {
- 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
- 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
- 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
--	__u8  _pad5[3];					/* 0x1ec */
-+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
-+	__u8  _pad5[2];					/* 0x1ed */
- 	/*
- 	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
- 	 *
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 8b24289..d74b441 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1042,6 +1042,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
- 
- 	io_delay_init();
- 
-+	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
-+		set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility);
-+#endif
-+		secureboot_enable();
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
- 	 */
-diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
-index 04421e8..9e69542 100644
---- a/include/linux/cred.h
-+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
-@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
- extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
- extern void __init cred_init(void);
- 
-+extern void secureboot_enable(void);
-+
- /*
-  * check for validity of credentials
-  */
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 7a9498a..1ae16b6 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
- #define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES	3	/* Can we use runtime services? */
- #define EFI_MEMMAP		4	/* Can we use EFI memory map? */
- #define EFI_64BIT		5	/* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
-+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT	6	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
- # ifdef CONFIG_X86
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From d4d1b3ad3e1a553c807b4ecafcbde4bf816e4db2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 05/19] Add EFI signature data types
-
-Add the data types that are used for containing hashes, keys and certificates
-for cryptographic verification.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 1ae16b6..de7021d 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
- #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
-     EFI_GUID(  0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
- 
-+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
-+    EFI_GUID(  0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 )
-+
-+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
-+    EFI_GUID(  0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
-+
- typedef struct {
- 	efi_guid_t guid;
- 	u64 table;
-@@ -523,6 +529,20 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- #define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR		(~0UL)
- 
-+typedef struct  {
-+	efi_guid_t signature_owner;
-+	u8 signature_data[];
-+} efi_signature_data_t;
-+
-+typedef struct {
-+	efi_guid_t signature_type;
-+	u32 signature_list_size;
-+	u32 signature_header_size;
-+	u32 signature_size;
-+	u8 signature_header[];
-+	/* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
-+} efi_signature_list_t;
-+
- /*
-  * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
-  */
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 3cffca89eadf7e0f0a266c370f8034f33723831a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 06/19] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.
-
-X.509 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type
-keys.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig      |   8 +++
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile     |   1 +
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- include/linux/efi.h                 |   4 ++
- 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
-index 6d2c2ea..ace9c30 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
-@@ -35,4 +35,12 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
- 	  data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
- 	  public key packet found inside the certificate.
- 
-+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+	bool "EFI signature list parser"
-+	depends on EFI
-+	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
-+	help
-+	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
-+	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
-+
- endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
-index 0727204..cd8388e 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
-@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
- 
- obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
- 
- #
- # X.509 Certificate handling
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..636feb1
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
-+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/printk.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
-+
-+/**
-+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
-+ * @data: The data blob to parse
-+ * @size: The size of the data blob
-+ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to
-+ */
-+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring)
-+{
-+	unsigned offs = 0;
-+	size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
-+
-+	while (size > 0) {
-+		efi_signature_list_t list;
-+		const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
-+		key_ref_t key;
-+
-+		if (size < sizeof(list))
-+			return -EBADMSG;
-+
-+		memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
-+		pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
-+			 offs,
-+			 list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size,
-+			 list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
-+
-+		lsize = list.signature_list_size;
-+		hsize = list.signature_header_size;
-+		esize = list.signature_size;
-+		elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
-+
-+		if (lsize > size) {
-+			pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
-+				 __func__, offs);
-+			return -EBADMSG;
-+		}
-+		if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
-+		    lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
-+		    esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
-+		    elsize < esize ||
-+		    elsize % esize != 0) {
-+			pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
-+			return -EBADMSG;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
-+			data += lsize;
-+			size -= lsize;
-+			offs += lsize;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+		size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+		offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+
-+		for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
-+			elem = data;
-+
-+			pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
-+
-+			key = key_create_or_update(
-+				make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
-+				"asymmetric",
-+				NULL,
-+				&elem->signature_data,
-+				esize - sizeof(*elem),
-+				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+				KEY_USR_VIEW,
-+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
-+
-+			if (IS_ERR(key))
-+				pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
-+				       PTR_ERR(key));
-+			else
-+				pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s' linked to '%s'\n",
-+					  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description,
-+					  keyring->description);
-+
-+			data += esize;
-+			size -= esize;
-+			offs += esize;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index de7021d..64b3e55 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
- extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
- extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
- 
-+struct key;
-+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size,
-+					   struct key *keyring);
-+
- /**
-  * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
-  * @start: starting kvirt address
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 89ea7424726ae4f7265ab84e703cf2da77acda57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 07/19] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
-
-This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
-are blacklisted.  This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
-and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load.  This is
-useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- init/Kconfig             |  8 ++++++++
- kernel/modsign_pubkey.c  | 14 ++++++++++++++
- kernel/module-internal.h |  3 +++
- kernel/module_signing.c  | 12 ++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index be8b7f5..d972b77 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1665,6 +1665,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
- 	  Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
- 	  key.  Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
- 
-+config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+	bool "Support for blacklisting module signature certificates"
-+	depends on MODULE_SIG
-+	help
-+	  This adds support for keeping a blacklist of certificates that
-+	  should not pass module signature verification.  If a module is
-+	  signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
-+
- choice
- 	prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
- 	depends on MODULE_SIG
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-index 2b6e699..4cd408d 100644
---- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-+++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
- #include "module-internal.h"
- 
- struct key *modsign_keyring;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+struct key *modsign_blacklist;
-+#endif
- 
- extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
- extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
-@@ -43,6 +46,17 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void)
- 	if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
- 		panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+	modsign_blacklist = keyring_alloc(".modsign_blacklist",
-+				    KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
-+				    current_cred(),
-+				    (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
-+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
-+	if (IS_ERR(modsign_blacklist))
-+		panic("Can't allocate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
-+#endif
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
-index 24f9247..51a8380 100644
---- a/kernel/module-internal.h
-+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
-@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
-  */
- 
- extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+extern struct key *modsign_blacklist;
-+#endif
- 
- extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
-diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
-index f2970bd..5423195 100644
---- a/kernel/module_signing.c
-+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
-@@ -157,6 +157,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
- 
- 	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_blacklist, 1),
-+				   &key_type_asymmetric, id);
-+	if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
-+		/* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist.  reject */
-+		pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id);
-+		key_ref_put(key);
-+		kfree(id);
-+		return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
- 			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- 	if (IS_ERR(key))
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 733a5c25b896d8d5fa0051825a671911b50cb47d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 08/19] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
-
-Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
-This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring.  This
-allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
-with signed modules.  By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
-variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
-load.  The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
-in the 'MokListRT' variable.  We import those as well.
-
-In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed
-certificates in the 'dbx' variable.  We load those certificates into
-the newly introduced module blacklist keyring and forbid any module
-signed with those from loading.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/efi.h   |  6 ++++
- init/Kconfig          |  9 ++++++
- kernel/Makefile       |  3 ++
- kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 64b3e55..76fe526 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
- #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
-     EFI_GUID(  0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
- 
-+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
-+    EFI_GUID(  0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f )
-+
-+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
-+    EFI_GUID(  0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 )
-+
- typedef struct {
- 	efi_guid_t guid;
- 	u64 table;
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index d972b77..27e3a82 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1673,6 +1673,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
- 	  should not pass module signature verification.  If a module is
- 	  signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
- 
-+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI
-+	bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI"
-+	depends on MODULE_SIG && MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST && EFI
-+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+	help
-+	  This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules
-+	  signed with those to be loaded.  It will also disallow loading
-+	  of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable.
-+
- choice
- 	prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
- 	depends on MODULE_SIG
-diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index 6c072b6..8848829 100644
---- a/kernel/Makefile
-+++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
-@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
- 
- $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
- 
-+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-+
- # config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped.
- # Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config*
- targets += config_data.gz
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b9237d7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
-+#include <linux/kernel.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+#include "module-internal.h"
-+
-+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size)
-+{
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+	unsigned long lsize = 4;
-+	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
-+	void *db = NULL;
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
-+	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!db) {
-+		pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-+		kfree(db);
-+		db = NULL;
-+		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+	}
-+out:
-+	*size = lsize;
-+	return db;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ *  * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
-+ *   */
-+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
-+{
-+	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
-+	efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
-+	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
-+	int rc = 0;
-+
-+	/* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
-+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
-+	 * an error if we can't get them.
-+	 */
-+	db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
-+	if (!db) {
-+		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, modsign_keyring);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(db);
-+	}
-+
-+	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
-+	if (!mok) {
-+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, modsign_keyring);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(mok);
-+	}
-+
-+	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
-+	if (!dbx) {
-+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
-+			modsign_blacklist);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(dbx);
-+	}
-+
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 16027d676baed34a9de804dac68d48096a688b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 09/19] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
-
-Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
-userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
-arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can
-potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
- drivers/pci/proc.c      | 8 +++++++-
- drivers/pci/syscall.c   | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
- 	loff_t init_off = off;
- 	u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
- 		return 0;
- 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
-@@ -928,6 +931,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
- 	resource_size_t start, end;
- 	int i;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
- 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
- 			break;
-@@ -1035,6 +1041,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
- 		      struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
- 		      loff_t off, size_t count)
- {
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
- 	int size = dp->size;
- 	int cnt;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (pos >= size)
- 		return 0;
- 	if (nbytes >= size)
-@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
- #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
- 	int ret = 0;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	switch (cmd) {
- 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
- 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
-@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
- 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
- 	int i, ret;
- 
--	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
- 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
- 	u32 dword;
- 	int err = 0;
- 
--	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
- 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 9ff1537bbe8c22bbf7f992027da43d4fe8da0860 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 10/19] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
- environments
-
-IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
-registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
-space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
-it down by default.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
- drivers/char/mem.c       | 3 +++
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
- 
- 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
- 		return -EINVAL;
--	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
- 	if (level > old) {
--		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- 			return -EPERM;
- 	}
- 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
-diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index c6fa3bc..fc28099 100644
---- a/drivers/char/mem.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
- 	const char __user * tmp = buf;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
- 		return -EFAULT;
- 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 3b27408b1ced1ec83a3ce27f9d51161dbf7cea9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 11/19] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
-
-It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
-under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
-access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644
---- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
- 	struct acpi_table_header table;
- 	acpi_status status;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (!(*ppos)) {
- 		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
- 		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From fb618a04089d454b7ade68c00a2b9c7dbac013f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 12/19] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
-
-We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
-given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
-be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
-kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-index f80ae4d..059195f 100644
---- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- 	int err;
- 	u32 retval = -1;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
- 
- 	if (err < 0)
-@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- 	int err;
- 	u32 retval = -1;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
- 				    &retval);
- 
-@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- 	union acpi_object *obj;
- 	acpi_status status;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
- 				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
- 				     &input, &output);
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From e515bbd5410d00835390fd8981aa9029e7b22b73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 13/19] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
-
-Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
-to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index fc28099..b5df7a8 100644
---- a/drivers/char/mem.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- 	unsigned long copied;
- 	void *ptr;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
- 		return -EFAULT;
- 
-@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- 	char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
- 	int err = 0;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
- 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
- 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From fe27dd192ef250abcbaba973a14d43b21d7be497 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 14/19] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
- boot environment
-
-This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel.  This
-could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
-We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-index bd22f86..88251d2 100644
---- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
- acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
- {
- #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
--	if (acpi_rsdp)
-+	if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- 		return acpi_rsdp;
- #endif
- 
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From c937b2c8e179bfdadb6617c0028f558e4d701e46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 15/19] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
-
-kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
-to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
-support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
-loading entirely in that situation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
-index 5e4bd78..dd464e0 100644
---- a/kernel/kexec.c
-+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
-@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
- 	int result;
- 
- 	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
--	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
-+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
- 	/*
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From f08e390045266d53543a55afa16ca4be5a1c6316 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 16/19] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
- environment
-
-If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
-protect the trust model.  This requires that all modules be signed
-with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring.  The checks for
-this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter.  Make
-this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/cred.c   | 8 ++++++++
- kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
-index c3f4e3e..c5554e0 100644
---- a/kernel/cred.c
-+++ b/kernel/cred.c
-@@ -565,11 +565,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
- 				     0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+extern bool sig_enforce;
-+#endif
-+
- void __init secureboot_enable()
- {
- 	pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- 	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
- 	cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+	/* Enable module signature enforcing */
-+	sig_enforce = true;
-+#endif
- }
- 
- /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
-diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
-index eab0827..93a16dc 100644
---- a/kernel/module.c
-+++ b/kernel/module.c
-@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
--static bool sig_enforce = true;
-+bool sig_enforce = true;
- #else
--static bool sig_enforce = false;
-+bool sig_enforce = false;
- 
- static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
- 				      const struct kernel_param *kp)
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 54ba1eec5847d964b1d458a240b50271b9a356a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 17/19] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
-
-There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
-from hibernate.  This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
-so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
-a Secure Boot environment.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/power/hibernate.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
- kernel/power/main.c      |  7 ++++++-
- kernel/power/user.c      |  3 +++
- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-index b26f5f1..7f63cb4 100644
---- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
- #include <linux/ctype.h>
- #include <linux/genhd.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
- 
- #include "power.h"
- 
-@@ -632,6 +633,10 @@ int hibernate(void)
- {
- 	int error;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
-+		return -EPERM;
-+	}
-+
- 	lock_system_sleep();
- 	/* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
- 	if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
-@@ -723,7 +728,7 @@ static int software_resume(void)
- 	/*
- 	 * If the user said "noresume".. bail out early.
- 	 */
--	if (noresume)
-+	if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- 		return 0;
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -889,6 +894,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
- 	int i;
- 	char *start = buf;
- 
-+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
-+		buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
-+		return buf-start;
-+	}
-+
- 	for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
- 		if (!hibernation_modes[i])
- 			continue;
-@@ -923,6 +933,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
- 	char *p;
- 	int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
- 	len = p ? p - buf : n;
- 
-diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c
-index 1c16f91..4f915fc 100644
---- a/kernel/power/main.c
-+++ b/kernel/power/main.c
-@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
- #include <linux/workqueue.h>
- #include <linux/debugfs.h>
- #include <linux/seq_file.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
- 
- #include "power.h"
- 
-@@ -301,7 +302,11 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
--	s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
-+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
-+		s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
-+	} else {
-+		s += sprintf(s, "\n");
-+	}
- #else
- 	if (s != buf)
- 		/* convert the last space to a newline */
-diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
-index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644
---- a/kernel/power/user.c
-+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
- 	struct snapshot_data *data;
- 	int error;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	lock_system_sleep();
- 
- 	if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 686090054f6c3784218b318c7adcc3c1f0ca5069 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 18/19] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
-
-A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
-images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
-MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set.  Given that the
-user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
-secure boot mode if that variable is set.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index 96bd86b..6e1331c 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -851,8 +851,9 @@ fail:
- 
- static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
- {
--	u8 sb, setup;
-+	u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
- 	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
-+	u32 attr;
- 	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- 	efi_status_t status;
- 
-@@ -876,6 +877,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
- 	if (setup == 1)
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	/* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode.  If so, and the variable
-+	 * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
-+	 */
-+	var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+				L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
-+				&moksbstate);
-+
-+	/* If it fails, we don't care why.  Default to secure */
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
-+		if (moksbstate == 1)
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From df607d2d5061b04f8a686cd74edd72c1f2836d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 19/19] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
-
-Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
-set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
-index 4929502..adaab3d 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
-@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- 	int err = 0;
- 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
- 
-+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	if (count % 8)
- 		return -EINVAL;	/* Invalid chunk size */
- 
-@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
- 			err = -EBADF;
- 			break;
- 		}
-+		if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
-+			err = -EPERM;
-+			break;
-+		}
- 		if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
- 			err = -EFAULT;
- 			break;
--- 
-1.8.1.2
-