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authorJosh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>2013-08-30 11:32:36 -0400
committerJosh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>2013-08-30 11:32:55 -0400
commitc9d9c5a37e289235f8897d43c5c4f1dcfc5e7a90 (patch)
treee2dc3f3af01ec47895411bd40d3e59f8b869496e /secure-boot-20130218.patch
parent6db14169b396af2e6f3dd567ce536cd869614e58 (diff)
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Rework Secure Boot support to use the secure_modules approach
- Drop pekey
Diffstat (limited to 'secure-boot-20130218.patch')
-rw-r--r--secure-boot-20130218.patch1434
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1434 deletions
diff --git a/secure-boot-20130218.patch b/secure-boot-20130218.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 29ac46cd9..000000000
--- a/secure-boot-20130218.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1434 +0,0 @@
-From 0c5837031a4e996877930fd023a5877dd1d615ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 01/19] Secure boot: Add new capability
-
-Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
-be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
-The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability
-and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial
-capability set if required.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
-index ba478fa..7109e65 100644
---- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
-+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
-@@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
-
- #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
-
--#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
-+/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */
-+
-+#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37
-+
-+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
-
- #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
-
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 87c8fddbcb3042fc4174b53763adbf66045a12be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 02/19] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
-
-Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux
-policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
-capability class.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-index 14d04e6..ed99a2d 100644
---- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
- { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
- { "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
- { "capability2",
-- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
-- NULL } },
-+ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
-+ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } },
- { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
- { "tun_socket",
- { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From df14b5319bf3ed2110839e233ac61e6136745be8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 03/19] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
- switch on Secure Boot mode
-
-This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
-in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from. This works on
-any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++++++
- kernel/cred.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-index 6c72381..7dffdd5 100644
---- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-@@ -2654,6 +2654,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
- Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
- enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
-
-+ secureboot_enable=
-+ [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This
-+ locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the
-+ CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things
-+ like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can
-+ be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes.
-+
- security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
- If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
- security module asking for security registration will be
-diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
-index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644
---- a/kernel/cred.c
-+++ b/kernel/cred.c
-@@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
- 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- }
-
-+void __init secureboot_enable()
-+{
-+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
-+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+}
-+
-+/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
-+static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str)
-+{
-+ int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
-+ if (sb_enable)
-+ secureboot_enable();
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt);
-+
- /**
- * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
- * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 49c76a665e8a09da48cbe271ea40266ca1a226c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 04/19] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
- enabled in firmware
-
-The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
-and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
-down. We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the
-EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++-
- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 7 +++++++
- include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++
- include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
- 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-index 199f453..ff651d3 100644
---- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
- 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
- 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
- (below)
-+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
-+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns
- 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
- 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
- 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index f8fa411..96bd86b 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -849,6 +849,36 @@ fail:
- return status;
- }
-
-+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
-+{
-+ u8 sb, setup;
-+ unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
-+ efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+ L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (sb == 0)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+ L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
-+ &setup);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (setup == 1)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
- * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
-@@ -1143,6 +1173,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
- if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
- goto fail;
-
-+ boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table);
-+
- setup_graphics(boot_params);
-
- setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct boot_params {
- __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
- __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
- __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
-- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
-+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
-+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
- /*
- * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
- *
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 8b24289..d74b441 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1042,6 +1042,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
-
- io_delay_init();
-
-+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
-+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility);
-+#endif
-+ secureboot_enable();
-+ }
-+
- /*
- * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
- */
-diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
-index 04421e8..9e69542 100644
---- a/include/linux/cred.h
-+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
-@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
- extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
- extern void __init cred_init(void);
-
-+extern void secureboot_enable(void);
-+
- /*
- * check for validity of credentials
- */
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 7a9498a..1ae16b6 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
- #define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES 3 /* Can we use runtime services? */
- #define EFI_MEMMAP 4 /* Can we use EFI memory map? */
- #define EFI_64BIT 5 /* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
-+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 6 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
- # ifdef CONFIG_X86
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From d4d1b3ad3e1a553c807b4ecafcbde4bf816e4db2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 05/19] Add EFI signature data types
-
-Add the data types that are used for containing hashes, keys and certificates
-for cryptographic verification.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 1ae16b6..de7021d 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
- #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
- EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
-
-+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
-+ EFI_GUID( 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 )
-+
-+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
-+ EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
-+
- typedef struct {
- efi_guid_t guid;
- u64 table;
-@@ -523,6 +529,20 @@ typedef struct {
-
- #define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR (~0UL)
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ efi_guid_t signature_owner;
-+ u8 signature_data[];
-+} efi_signature_data_t;
-+
-+typedef struct {
-+ efi_guid_t signature_type;
-+ u32 signature_list_size;
-+ u32 signature_header_size;
-+ u32 signature_size;
-+ u8 signature_header[];
-+ /* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
-+} efi_signature_list_t;
-+
- /*
- * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
- */
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 3cffca89eadf7e0f0a266c370f8034f33723831a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 06/19] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.
-
-X.509 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type
-keys.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 8 +++
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 +
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- include/linux/efi.h | 4 ++
- 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
-index 6d2c2ea..ace9c30 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
-@@ -35,4 +35,12 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
- data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
- public key packet found inside the certificate.
-
-+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+ bool "EFI signature list parser"
-+ depends on EFI
-+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
-+ help
-+ This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
-+ X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
-+
- endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
-index 0727204..cd8388e 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
-@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
-
- obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
-
- #
- # X.509 Certificate handling
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..636feb1
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
-+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/printk.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
-+
-+/**
-+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
-+ * @data: The data blob to parse
-+ * @size: The size of the data blob
-+ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to
-+ */
-+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring)
-+{
-+ unsigned offs = 0;
-+ size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
-+
-+ pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
-+
-+ while (size > 0) {
-+ efi_signature_list_t list;
-+ const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
-+ key_ref_t key;
-+
-+ if (size < sizeof(list))
-+ return -EBADMSG;
-+
-+ memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
-+ pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
-+ offs,
-+ list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size,
-+ list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
-+
-+ lsize = list.signature_list_size;
-+ hsize = list.signature_header_size;
-+ esize = list.signature_size;
-+ elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
-+
-+ if (lsize > size) {
-+ pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
-+ __func__, offs);
-+ return -EBADMSG;
-+ }
-+ if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
-+ lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
-+ esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
-+ elsize < esize ||
-+ elsize % esize != 0) {
-+ pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
-+ return -EBADMSG;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
-+ data += lsize;
-+ size -= lsize;
-+ offs += lsize;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+
-+ data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+ size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+ offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+
-+ for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
-+ elem = data;
-+
-+ pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
-+
-+ key = key_create_or_update(
-+ make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
-+ "asymmetric",
-+ NULL,
-+ &elem->signature_data,
-+ esize - sizeof(*elem),
-+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+ KEY_USR_VIEW,
-+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
-+
-+ if (IS_ERR(key))
-+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
-+ PTR_ERR(key));
-+ else
-+ pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s' linked to '%s'\n",
-+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description,
-+ keyring->description);
-+
-+ data += esize;
-+ size -= esize;
-+ offs += esize;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index de7021d..64b3e55 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
- extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
- extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
-
-+struct key;
-+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size,
-+ struct key *keyring);
-+
- /**
- * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
- * @start: starting kvirt address
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 89ea7424726ae4f7265ab84e703cf2da77acda57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 07/19] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
-
-This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
-are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
-and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load. This is
-useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- init/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
- kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
- kernel/module-internal.h | 3 +++
- kernel/module_signing.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index be8b7f5..d972b77 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1665,6 +1665,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
- Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
- key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
-
-+config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+ bool "Support for blacklisting module signature certificates"
-+ depends on MODULE_SIG
-+ help
-+ This adds support for keeping a blacklist of certificates that
-+ should not pass module signature verification. If a module is
-+ signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
-+
- choice
- prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
- depends on MODULE_SIG
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-index 2b6e699..4cd408d 100644
---- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-+++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
- #include "module-internal.h"
-
- struct key *modsign_keyring;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+struct key *modsign_blacklist;
-+#endif
-
- extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
- extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
-@@ -43,6 +46,17 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void)
- if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
- panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+ modsign_blacklist = keyring_alloc(".modsign_blacklist",
-+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
-+ current_cred(),
-+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
-+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
-+ if (IS_ERR(modsign_blacklist))
-+ panic("Can't allocate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
-+#endif
-+
- return 0;
- }
-
-diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
-index 24f9247..51a8380 100644
---- a/kernel/module-internal.h
-+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
-@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
- */
-
- extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+extern struct key *modsign_blacklist;
-+#endif
-
- extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
-diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
-index f2970bd..5423195 100644
---- a/kernel/module_signing.c
-+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
-@@ -157,6 +157,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
-
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_blacklist, 1),
-+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
-+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
-+ /* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist. reject */
-+ pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id);
-+ key_ref_put(key);
-+ kfree(id);
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 733a5c25b896d8d5fa0051825a671911b50cb47d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 08/19] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
-
-Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
-This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring. This
-allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
-with signed modules. By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
-variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
-load. The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
-in the 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well.
-
-In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed
-certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into
-the newly introduced module blacklist keyring and forbid any module
-signed with those from loading.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++
- init/Kconfig | 9 ++++++
- kernel/Makefile | 3 ++
- kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 64b3e55..76fe526 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
- #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
- EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
-
-+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
-+ EFI_GUID( 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f )
-+
-+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
-+ EFI_GUID( 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 )
-+
- typedef struct {
- efi_guid_t guid;
- u64 table;
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index d972b77..27e3a82 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1673,6 +1673,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
- should not pass module signature verification. If a module is
- signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
-
-+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI
-+ bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI"
-+ depends on MODULE_SIG && MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST && EFI
-+ select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+ help
-+ This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules
-+ signed with those to be loaded. It will also disallow loading
-+ of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable.
-+
- choice
- prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
- depends on MODULE_SIG
-diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index 6c072b6..8848829 100644
---- a/kernel/Makefile
-+++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
-@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
-
- $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
-
-+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-+
- # config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped.
- # Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config*
- targets += config_data.gz
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b9237d7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
-+#include <linux/kernel.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+#include "module-internal.h"
-+
-+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size)
-+{
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+ unsigned long lsize = 4;
-+ unsigned long tmpdb[4];
-+ void *db = NULL;
-+
-+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
-+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!db) {
-+ pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-+ kfree(db);
-+ db = NULL;
-+ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+ }
-+out:
-+ *size = lsize;
-+ return db;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
-+ * */
-+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
-+{
-+ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
-+ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
-+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
-+ int rc = 0;
-+
-+ /* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
-+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
-+ * an error if we can't get them.
-+ */
-+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
-+ if (!db) {
-+ pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
-+ } else {
-+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, modsign_keyring);
-+ if (rc)
-+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+ kfree(db);
-+ }
-+
-+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
-+ if (!mok) {
-+ pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
-+ } else {
-+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, modsign_keyring);
-+ if (rc)
-+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+ kfree(mok);
-+ }
-+
-+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
-+ if (!dbx) {
-+ pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
-+ } else {
-+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
-+ modsign_blacklist);
-+ if (rc)
-+ pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+ kfree(dbx);
-+ }
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 16027d676baed34a9de804dac68d48096a688b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 09/19] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
-
-Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
-userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
-arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can
-potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
- drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++-
- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
- loff_t init_off = off;
- u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (off > dev->cfg_size)
- return 0;
- if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
-@@ -928,6 +931,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
- resource_size_t start, end;
- int i;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
- if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
- break;
-@@ -1035,6 +1041,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
- struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
- loff_t off, size_t count)
- {
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
- }
-
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
- int size = dp->size;
- int cnt;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (pos >= size)
- return 0;
- if (nbytes >= size)
-@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
- #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
- int ret = 0;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- switch (cmd) {
- case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
- ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
-@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
- struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
- int i, ret;
-
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
-
- /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
- u32 dword;
- int err = 0;
-
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
-
- dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 9ff1537bbe8c22bbf7f992027da43d4fe8da0860 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 10/19] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
- environments
-
-IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
-registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
-space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
-it down by default.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
- drivers/char/mem.c | 3 +++
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
-
- if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
- return -EINVAL;
-- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
- return -EPERM;
-
- /*
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs)
- return -EINVAL;
- /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
- if (level > old) {
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
- }
- regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
-diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index c6fa3bc..fc28099 100644
---- a/drivers/char/mem.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- unsigned long i = *ppos;
- const char __user * tmp = buf;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
- return -EFAULT;
- while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 3b27408b1ced1ec83a3ce27f9d51161dbf7cea9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 11/19] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
-
-It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
-under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
-access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644
---- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
- struct acpi_table_header table;
- acpi_status status;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (!(*ppos)) {
- /* parse the table header to get the table length */
- if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From fb618a04089d454b7ade68c00a2b9c7dbac013f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 12/19] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
-
-We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
-given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
-be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
-kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-index f80ae4d..059195f 100644
---- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- int err;
- u32 retval = -1;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
-
- if (err < 0)
-@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- int err;
- u32 retval = -1;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
- &retval);
-
-@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- union acpi_object *obj;
- acpi_status status;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
- 1, asus->debug.method_id,
- &input, &output);
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From e515bbd5410d00835390fd8981aa9029e7b22b73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 13/19] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
-
-Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
-to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index fc28099..b5df7a8 100644
---- a/drivers/char/mem.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- unsigned long copied;
- void *ptr;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
- return -EFAULT;
-
-@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
- int err = 0;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
- unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
- (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From fe27dd192ef250abcbaba973a14d43b21d7be497 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 14/19] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
- boot environment
-
-This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This
-could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
-We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-index bd22f86..88251d2 100644
---- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
- acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
- {
- #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
-- if (acpi_rsdp)
-+ if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return acpi_rsdp;
- #endif
-
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From c937b2c8e179bfdadb6617c0028f558e4d701e46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 15/19] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
-
-kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
-to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
-support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
-loading entirely in that situation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
-index 5e4bd78..dd464e0 100644
---- a/kernel/kexec.c
-+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
-@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
- int result;
-
- /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
-
- /*
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From f08e390045266d53543a55afa16ca4be5a1c6316 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 16/19] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
- environment
-
-If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
-protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed
-with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for
-this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make
-this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++
- kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
-index c3f4e3e..c5554e0 100644
---- a/kernel/cred.c
-+++ b/kernel/cred.c
-@@ -565,11 +565,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
- 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- }
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+extern bool sig_enforce;
-+#endif
-+
- void __init secureboot_enable()
- {
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
- cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+ /* Enable module signature enforcing */
-+ sig_enforce = true;
-+#endif
- }
-
- /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
-diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
-index eab0827..93a16dc 100644
---- a/kernel/module.c
-+++ b/kernel/module.c
-@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
--static bool sig_enforce = true;
-+bool sig_enforce = true;
- #else
--static bool sig_enforce = false;
-+bool sig_enforce = false;
-
- static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
- const struct kernel_param *kp)
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 54ba1eec5847d964b1d458a240b50271b9a356a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 17/19] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
-
-There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
-from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
-so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
-a Secure Boot environment.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/power/hibernate.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
- kernel/power/main.c | 7 ++++++-
- kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-index b26f5f1..7f63cb4 100644
---- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
- #include <linux/ctype.h>
- #include <linux/genhd.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-
- #include "power.h"
-
-@@ -632,6 +633,10 @@ int hibernate(void)
- {
- int error;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ }
-+
- lock_system_sleep();
- /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
- if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
-@@ -723,7 +728,7 @@ static int software_resume(void)
- /*
- * If the user said "noresume".. bail out early.
- */
-- if (noresume)
-+ if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return 0;
-
- /*
-@@ -889,6 +894,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
- int i;
- char *start = buf;
-
-+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
-+ buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
-+ return buf-start;
-+ }
-+
- for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
- if (!hibernation_modes[i])
- continue;
-@@ -923,6 +933,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
- char *p;
- int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
- len = p ? p - buf : n;
-
-diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c
-index 1c16f91..4f915fc 100644
---- a/kernel/power/main.c
-+++ b/kernel/power/main.c
-@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
- #include <linux/workqueue.h>
- #include <linux/debugfs.h>
- #include <linux/seq_file.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-
- #include "power.h"
-
-@@ -301,7 +302,11 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
- }
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
-- s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
-+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
-+ s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
-+ } else {
-+ s += sprintf(s, "\n");
-+ }
- #else
- if (s != buf)
- /* convert the last space to a newline */
-diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
-index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644
---- a/kernel/power/user.c
-+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
- struct snapshot_data *data;
- int error;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- lock_system_sleep();
-
- if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From 686090054f6c3784218b318c7adcc3c1f0ca5069 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 18/19] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
-
-A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
-images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
-MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
-user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
-secure boot mode if that variable is set.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index 96bd86b..6e1331c 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -851,8 +851,9 @@ fail:
-
- static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
- {
-- u8 sb, setup;
-+ u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
- unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
-+ u32 attr;
- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_status_t status;
-
-@@ -876,6 +877,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
- if (setup == 1)
- return 0;
-
-+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable
-+ * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
-+ */
-+ var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
-+ L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
-+ &moksbstate);
-+
-+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ return 1;
-+
-+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
-+ if (moksbstate == 1)
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- return 1;
- }
-
---
-1.8.1.2
-
-
-From df607d2d5061b04f8a686cd74edd72c1f2836d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 19/19] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
-
-Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
-set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
-index 4929502..adaab3d 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
-@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- int err = 0;
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (count % 8)
- return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
-
-@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
- err = -EBADF;
- break;
- }
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
-+ err = -EPERM;
-+ break;
-+ }
- if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
- err = -EFAULT;
- break;
---
-1.8.1.2
-