Fix CVE-2019-3900 (rhbz 1698757 1702940)

1 files changed, 200 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-vhost_net-fix-possible-infinite-loop.patch b/net-vhost_net-fix-possible-infinite-loop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f45d84bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-vhost_net-fix-possible-infinite-loop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+From patchwork Thu Apr 25 07:33:19 2019
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+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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+Cc: ppandit@redhat.com
+Subject: [PATCH net] vhost_net: fix possible infinite loop
+Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 03:33:19 -0400
+Message-Id: <1556177599-56248-1-git-send-email-jasowang@redhat.com>
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+
+When the rx buffer is too small for a packet, we will discard the vq
+descriptor and retry it for the next packet:
+
+while ((sock_len = vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(net, sock->sk,
+					      &busyloop_intr))) {
+...
+	/* On overrun, truncate and discard */
+	if (unlikely(headcount > UIO_MAXIOV)) {
+		iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, vq->iov, 1, 1);
+		err = sock->ops->recvmsg(sock, &msg,
+					 1, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
+		pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: len %zd\n", sock_len);
+		continue;
+	}
+...
+}
+
+This makes it possible to trigger a infinite while..continue loop
+through the co-opreation of two VMs like:
+
+1) Malicious VM1 allocate 1 byte rx buffer and try to slow down the
+   vhost process as much as possible e.g using indirect descriptors or
+   other.
+2) Malicious VM2 generate packets to VM1 as fast as possible
+
+Fixing this by checking against weight at the end of RX and TX
+loop. This also eliminate other similar cases when:
+
+- userspace is consuming the packets in the meanwhile
+- theoretical TOCTOU attack if guest moving avail index back and forth
+  to hit the continue after vhost find guest just add new buffers
+
+This addresses CVE-2019-3900.
+
+Fixes: d8316f3991d20 ("vhost: fix total length when packets are too short")
+Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/vhost/net.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c
+index df51a35..fb46e6b 100644
+--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
++++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
+@@ -778,8 +778,9 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock)
+ 	int err;
+ 	int sent_pkts = 0;
+ 	bool sock_can_batch = (sock->sk->sk_sndbuf == INT_MAX);
++	bool next_round = false;
+ 
+-	for (;;) {
++	do {
+ 		bool busyloop_intr = false;
+ 
+ 		if (nvq->done_idx == VHOST_NET_BATCH)
+@@ -845,11 +846,10 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock)
+ 		vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head);
+ 		vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0;
+ 		++nvq->done_idx;
+-		if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) {
+-			vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+-			break;
+-		}
+-	}
++	} while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)));
++
++	if (next_round)
++		vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+ 
+ 	vhost_tx_batch(net, nvq, sock, &msg);
+ }
+@@ -873,8 +873,9 @@ static void handle_tx_zerocopy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock)
+ 	struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *uninitialized_var(ubufs);
+ 	bool zcopy_used;
+ 	int sent_pkts = 0;
++	bool next_round = false;
+ 
+-	for (;;) {
++	do {
+ 		bool busyloop_intr;
+ 
+ 		/* Release DMAs done buffers first */
+@@ -951,11 +952,10 @@ static void handle_tx_zerocopy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock)
+ 		else
+ 			vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(net, vq);
+ 		vhost_net_tx_packet(net);
+-		if (unlikely(vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len))) {
+-			vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+-			break;
+-		}
+-	}
++	} while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)));
++
++	if (next_round)
++		vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Expects to be always run from workqueue - which acts as
+@@ -1134,6 +1134,7 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
+ 	struct iov_iter fixup;
+ 	__virtio16 num_buffers;
+ 	int recv_pkts = 0;
++	bool next_round = false;
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock_nested(&vq->mutex, VHOST_NET_VQ_RX);
+ 	sock = vq->private_data;
+@@ -1153,8 +1154,11 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
+ 		vq->log : NULL;
+ 	mergeable = vhost_has_feature(vq, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF);
+ 
+-	while ((sock_len = vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(net, sock->sk,
+-						      &busyloop_intr))) {
++	do {
++		sock_len = vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(net, sock->sk,
++						      &busyloop_intr);
++		if (!sock_len)
++			break;
+ 		sock_len += sock_hlen;
+ 		vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen;
+ 		headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads + nvq->done_idx,
+@@ -1239,12 +1243,9 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
+ 			vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len,
+ 					vq->iov, in);
+ 		total_len += vhost_len;
+-		if (unlikely(vhost_exceeds_weight(++recv_pkts, total_len))) {
+-			vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+-			goto out;
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (unlikely(busyloop_intr))
++	} while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++recv_pkts, total_len)));
++
++	if (unlikely(busyloop_intr || next_round))
+ 		vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+ 	else
+ 		vhost_net_enable_vq(net, vq);