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authorJustin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>2017-02-21 11:48:46 -0600
committerJustin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>2017-02-21 11:48:46 -0600
commitcd3596bbfcc403afa6f35e1a770fa8c2e6fca668 (patch)
tree139597856ce84fc3ff5bc49f64ab86e63a87fb8e /efi-lockdown.patch
parent0af610531ccf4f2e6018cf0c6b52716b5713d890 (diff)
downloadkernel-cd3596bbfcc403afa6f35e1a770fa8c2e6fca668.tar.gz
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Update efi-lockdown for 4.11 merge
Diffstat (limited to 'efi-lockdown.patch')
-rw-r--r--efi-lockdown.patch716
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 696 deletions
diff --git a/efi-lockdown.patch b/efi-lockdown.patch
index 6bbc24fa1..dcdd2e99a 100644
--- a/efi-lockdown.patch
+++ b/efi-lockdown.patch
@@ -1,666 +1,3 @@
-From d1d5053106cd1f8b2ae52fb6ffb2962f76053bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
-Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 10:42:44 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 01/32] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services
- table
-
-Instead of using void pointers, and casting them to correctly typed
-function pointers upon use, declare the runtime services pointers
-as function pointers using their respective prototypes, for which
-typedefs are already available.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/efi.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index a07a476..93a82de 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -508,24 +508,6 @@ typedef struct {
- u64 query_variable_info;
- } efi_runtime_services_64_t;
-
--typedef struct {
-- efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
-- void *get_time;
-- void *set_time;
-- void *get_wakeup_time;
-- void *set_wakeup_time;
-- void *set_virtual_address_map;
-- void *convert_pointer;
-- void *get_variable;
-- void *get_next_variable;
-- void *set_variable;
-- void *get_next_high_mono_count;
-- void *reset_system;
-- void *update_capsule;
-- void *query_capsule_caps;
-- void *query_variable_info;
--} efi_runtime_services_t;
--
- typedef efi_status_t efi_get_time_t (efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc);
- typedef efi_status_t efi_set_time_t (efi_time_t *tm);
- typedef efi_status_t efi_get_wakeup_time_t (efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending,
-@@ -560,6 +542,24 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes,
- unsigned long size,
- bool nonblocking);
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
-+ efi_get_time_t *get_time;
-+ efi_set_time_t *set_time;
-+ efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time;
-+ efi_set_wakeup_time_t *set_wakeup_time;
-+ efi_set_virtual_address_map_t *set_virtual_address_map;
-+ void *convert_pointer;
-+ efi_get_variable_t *get_variable;
-+ efi_get_next_variable_t *get_next_variable;
-+ efi_set_variable_t *set_variable;
-+ efi_get_next_high_mono_count_t *get_next_high_mono_count;
-+ efi_reset_system_t *reset_system;
-+ efi_update_capsule_t *update_capsule;
-+ efi_query_capsule_caps_t *query_capsule_caps;
-+ efi_query_variable_info_t *query_variable_info;
-+} efi_runtime_services_t;
-+
- void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
-
- /*
---
-2.9.3
-
-From 150ebd38630a3ac558b8ab839a7c7e5fd41cc5a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:36:31 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 02/32] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
-
-Provide the ability to perform mixed-mode runtime service calls for x86 in
-the same way that commit 0a637ee61247bd4bed9b2a07568ef7a1cfc76187
-("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services") provides the
-ability to invoke arbitrary boot services.
-
-Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 1 +
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +++---
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 ++++----
- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 5 +++++
- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index ff01c8f..c8c32eb 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c) \
- \
- table = (typeof(table))sys_table; \
- \
-+ c->runtime_services = table->runtime; \
- c->boot_services = table->boottime; \
- c->text_output = table->con_out; \
- }
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
-index fd0b6a2..d85b962 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
-
- /* Relocate efi_config->call() */
- leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
-- add %esi, 32(%eax)
-+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
- pushl %eax
-
- call make_boot_params
-@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
-
- /* Relocate efi_config->call() */
- leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
-- add %esi, 32(%eax)
-+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
- pushl %eax
- 2:
- call efi_main
-@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ relocated:
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
- .data
- efi32_config:
-- .fill 4,8,0
-+ .fill 5,8,0
- .long efi_call_phys
- .long 0
- .byte 0
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
-index efdfba2..beab832 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
-@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
- /*
- * Relocate efi_config->call().
- */
-- addq %rbp, efi64_config+32(%rip)
-+ addq %rbp, efi64_config+40(%rip)
-
- movq %rax, %rdi
- call make_boot_params
-@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ handover_entry:
- * Relocate efi_config->call().
- */
- movq efi_config(%rip), %rax
-- addq %rbp, 32(%rax)
-+ addq %rbp, 40(%rax)
- 2:
- movq efi_config(%rip), %rdi
- call efi_main
-@@ -457,14 +457,14 @@ efi_config:
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
- .global efi32_config
- efi32_config:
-- .fill 4,8,0
-+ .fill 5,8,0
- .quad efi64_thunk
- .byte 0
- #endif
-
- .global efi64_config
- efi64_config:
-- .fill 4,8,0
-+ .fill 5,8,0
- .quad efi_call
- .byte 1
- #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
-index e99675b..2f77bce 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
-@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static inline efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(
- struct efi_config {
- u64 image_handle;
- u64 table;
-+ u64 runtime_services;
- u64 boot_services;
- u64 text_output;
- efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...);
-@@ -226,6 +227,10 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
- #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) \
- __efi_early()->call((unsigned long)f, __VA_ARGS__);
-
-+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) \
-+ __efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f, \
-+ __efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__)
-+
- extern bool efi_reboot_required(void);
-
- #else
---
-2.9.3
-
-From 1342301133b5619b79f3288acf7e39450f8ba34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:20:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 03/32] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
-
-efi_call_runtime() is provided for x86 to be able abstract mixed mode
-support. Provide this for ARM also so that common code work in mixed mode
-also.
-
-Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
- arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
-index 0b06f53..e4e6a9d6 100644
---- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
-+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
-
- #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
- #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
-+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
- #define efi_is_64bit() (false)
-
- #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
-diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
-index 771b3f0..d74ae22 100644
---- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
-+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
-
- #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
- #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
-+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
- #define efi_is_64bit() (true)
-
- #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
---
-2.9.3
-
-From 2e25c5beef2a97abbb660e707bced77c0eb0ace9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:10:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 04/32] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID
- definitions
-
-Add the definitions for shim and image security database, both of which
-are used widely in various Linux distros.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
----
- include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 93a82de..c790455 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
- #define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4, 0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
- #define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
-
-+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
-+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
-+
- /*
- * This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
- * structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
---
-2.9.3
-
-From 820d2f84670080c406bad4c8469e80e1e5f8a191 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 05/32] efi: Get the secure boot status
-
-Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
-it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
-
-The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a)
-generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
-efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
-
-Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 +
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 2 +
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 1 +
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 1 +
- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 5 ++-
- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +-
- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +-
- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 58 ++-------------------------
- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++
- 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-index 95a4d34..b8527c6 100644
---- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
-@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
- 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
- 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
- (below)
-+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
-+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
- 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
- 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
- 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index c8c32eb..5b151c2 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -1158,6 +1158,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
- else
- setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
-
-+ boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
-+
- setup_graphics(boot_params);
-
- setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
-index d85b962..c635f7e 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
-@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
-
- __HEAD
- ENTRY(startup_32)
-+ movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%esi)
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
- jmp preferred_addr
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
-index beab832..ccd2c74 100644
---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
-+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
-@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_64)
- * that maps our entire kernel(text+data+bss+brk), zero page
- * and command line.
- */
-+ movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
- #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
- /*
- * The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
-index 4a8cb8d..7e16d53 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
-@@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params)
- memset(&boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image, 0,
- (char *)&boot_params->efi_info -
- (char *)&boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image);
-- memset(&boot_params->kbd_status, 0,
-+ boot_params->kbd_status = 0;
-+ memset(&boot_params->_pad5, 0,
- (char *)&boot_params->hdr -
-- (char *)&boot_params->kbd_status);
-+ (char *)&boot_params->_pad5);
- memset(&boot_params->_pad7[0], 0,
- (char *)&boot_params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer[0] -
- (char *)&boot_params->_pad7[0]);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-index b10bf31..5138dac 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
-@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
- __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
- __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
- __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
-- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
-+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
-+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
- /*
- * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
- *
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
-index c62e015..de827d6 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
-@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
-
- BLANK();
- OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
-+ OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
- OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
- OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
- OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
-index 6621b13..9af9668 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
- # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
- KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-
--lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
-+lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
-
- # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
- arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
-index b4f7d78..06d5034 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
-@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
-
- bool __nokaslr;
-
--static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
--{
-- static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
-- 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
-- static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
-- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
--
-- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-- efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
-- u8 val;
-- unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
-- efi_status_t status;
--
-- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
-- NULL, &size, &val);
--
-- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-- goto out_efi_err;
--
-- if (val == 0)
-- return 0;
--
-- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
-- NULL, &size, &val);
--
-- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-- goto out_efi_err;
--
-- if (val == 1)
-- return 0;
--
-- return 1;
--
--out_efi_err:
-- switch (status) {
-- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-- return 0;
-- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-- return -EIO;
-- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-- return -EACCES;
-- default:
-- return -EINVAL;
-- }
--}
--
- efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
- void *__image, void **__fh)
- {
-@@ -226,7 +180,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
- efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
- unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
- unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
-- int secure_boot = 0;
-+ enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot = efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- struct screen_info *si;
-
- /* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
-@@ -296,19 +250,13 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
- pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
-
- secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
-- if (secure_boot > 0)
-- pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
--
-- if (secure_boot < 0) {
-- pr_efi_err(sys_table,
-- "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
-- }
-
- /*
- * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
- * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
- */
-- if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
-+ if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
-+ strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
- pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
- } else {
- status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..70e2a36
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
-+/*
-+ * Secure boot handling.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
-+ * Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
-+ * Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
-+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <asm/efi.h>
-+
-+/* BIOS variables */
-+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
-+ 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
-+};
-+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
-+ 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
-+};
-+
-+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
-+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
-+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
-+ __VA_ARGS__);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode. We return:
-+ */
-+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-+{
-+ u8 secboot, setupmode;
-+ unsigned long size;
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+
-+ size = sizeof(secboot);
-+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
-+ NULL, &size, &secboot);
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto out_efi_err;
-+
-+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
-+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
-+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto out_efi_err;
-+
-+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
-+ goto secure_boot_disabled;
-+
-+ pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-+
-+secure_boot_disabled:
-+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
-+
-+out_efi_err:
-+ pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
-+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
-+ goto secure_boot_disabled;
-+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
-+}
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index c790455..92e23f0 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -1477,6 +1477,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
- bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
- extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
-
-+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
-+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
-+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
-+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
-+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
-+};
-+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
-+
- /*
- * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
- * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
---
-2.9.3
-
-From baa6cdc01e6017c6bd798b1af89458359e13155e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 06/32] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
-
-A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
-images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
-MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
-user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
-secure boot mode if that variable is set.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
-index 70e2a36..ba6ef71 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
- };
-
-+/* SHIM variables */
-+static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = {
-+ 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0
-+};
-+
- #define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
- efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
- (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
-@@ -33,7 +39,8 @@ static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
- */
- enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
- {
-- u8 secboot, setupmode;
-+ u32 attr;
-+ u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
- unsigned long size;
- efi_status_t status;
-
-@@ -52,6 +59,21 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
- goto secure_boot_disabled;
-
-+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
-+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
-+ * honor that.
-+ */
-+ size = sizeof(moksbstate);
-+ status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
-+ &attr, &size, &moksbstate);
-+
-+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto secure_boot_enabled;
-+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
-+ goto secure_boot_disabled;
-+
-+secure_boot_enabled:
- pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-
---
-2.9.3
-
From 9079547f4808ea5c8cd844bf40d3895994bd175e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
@@ -681,40 +18,26 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 9c337b0..d8972ec 100644
+index 69780ed..447905e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1152,6 +1152,21 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
- /* Allocate bigger log buffer */
- setup_log_buf(1);
-
-+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) {
-+ switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
-+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
-+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
-+ break;
-+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+@@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
-+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- reserve_initrd();
-
- acpi_table_upgrade();
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 92e23f0..135ca9c 100644
+index 94d34e0..6049600 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -1066,6 +1066,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
- #define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */
+@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
-+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 10 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
+ #define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
++#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 11 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -759,9 +82,9 @@ index ba6ef71..333b159 100644
unsigned long size;
efi_status_t status;
-@@ -59,6 +62,17 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+@@ -57,6 +57,17 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
- goto secure_boot_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ /* UEFI-2.6 requires DeployedMode to be 1. */
+ if (sys_table_arg->hdr.revision >= EFI_2_60_SYSTEM_TABLE_REVISION) {
@@ -771,10 +94,11 @@ index ba6ef71..333b159 100644
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+ if (deployedmode == 0)
-+ goto secure_boot_disabled;
++ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ }
+
- /* See if a user has put shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
* honor that.
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1979,9 +1303,9 @@ index 5b151c2..5093a76 100644
+ /* Ask the firmware to clear memory if we don't have a clean shutdown */
+ enable_reset_attack_mitigation();
+
- boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
-
- setup_graphics(boot_params);
+ /*
+ * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
+ * otherwise we ask the BIOS.
--
2.9.3