Linux v4.12.3

1 files changed, 129 insertions, 124 deletions

diff --git a/efi-lockdown.patch b/efi-lockdown.patch
index 7803d6dff..e04878458 100644
--- a/efi-lockdown.patch
+++ b/efi-lockdown.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 85255f3885abdd1d2e5dc9f6e51f2fc9db075843 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From df7d76ae50f18d4465e59fdf7f19d3df44906cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 07/32] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 4bf0c89..396285b 100644
+index 69780ed..447905e 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+@@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
  			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
  			break;
  		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ index 94d34e0..6049600 100644
  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
  /*
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 341507e80b888b5b587bdb60f0d95275dbbcad89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f05a90c19a9613d8d50597319ed91f691e25b689 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:36:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 09/32] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel
- image
+Subject: [PATCH 09/32] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
+ kernel image
 
 Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
 should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
 
 diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
-index 4c26dc3..b820a80 100644
+index cb09238..3cd3be9 100644
 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h
 +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
-@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
+@@ -273,6 +273,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
  void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
  void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
  
@@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ index 4c26dc3..b820a80 100644
  int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
  int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
 diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
-index 96899fa..5808570 100644
+index d3868f2..187b74b 100644
 --- a/include/linux/security.h
 +++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -1678,5 +1678,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
+@@ -1679,5 +1679,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
  { }
  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
  
@@ -191,9 +191,9 @@ index 0000000..5788c60
 +}
 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_is_locked_down);
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From dfabd5c5acc95a2de69d44f794e6f1ce894fd3ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fb6feb38e297260d050fc477c72683ac51d07ae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:55 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 10/32] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
@@ -211,10 +211,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index cc98d5a..21f3985 100644
+index 874c123..a315974 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
 +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
+@@ -1816,6 +1816,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
  
  	   If unsure, say N.
  
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ index cc98d5a..21f3985 100644
  	def_bool y
  	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 396285b..85dfa74 100644
+index 447905e..d44e60e 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
@@ -243,9 +243,9 @@ index 396285b..85dfa74 100644
  #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 +#include <linux/security.h>
  
+ #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
  #include <video/edid.h>
- 
-@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+@@ -1183,7 +1184,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
  			break;
  		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
  			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
@@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ index 396285b..85dfa74 100644
  		default:
  			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 0329e34894da0599619b03fa6cb16d575bfc68d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7182f2f5b254d6dc6d3105d2f99219a76adf9de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:22:22 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 11/32] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
@@ -289,13 +289,13 @@ index 7eba6de..3331f2e 100644
  
  	return err;
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 236e7dcbf5eb7b27416a819d6cb69d3006481cef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7e97c58bcd0b4c082b889fb093a2779147532b9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 12/32] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked
- down
+Subject: [PATCH 12/32] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is
+ locked down
 
 Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
 be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions.  Prevent this when the
@@ -308,10 +308,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index 6e0cbe0..a97b22f 100644
+index 6d9cc2d..f814404 100644
 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c
 +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  	if (p != *ppos)
  		return -EFBIG;
  
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ index 6e0cbe0..a97b22f 100644
  	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
  		return -EFAULT;
  
-@@ -540,6 +543,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+@@ -513,6 +516,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
  	int err = 0;
  
@@ -332,9 +332,9 @@ index 6e0cbe0..a97b22f 100644
  		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
  					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 58a5ca7a67b9091800f61c1c411b3f411fcd857b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b83b68a9a13120664eaabf21a7b3ff0b065bd5b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 23:55:56 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 13/32] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
@@ -354,10 +354,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  7 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index 21f3985..457c049 100644
+index a315974..6931e68 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
 +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -1829,6 +1829,16 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+@@ -1828,6 +1828,16 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
  	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
  	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
  
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ index 21f3985..457c049 100644
  	def_bool y
  	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 85dfa74..a415a48 100644
+index d44e60e..f7635d0 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
 @@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
@@ -387,10 +387,10 @@ index 85dfa74..a415a48 100644
 +#include <linux/sysrq.h>
 +#include <linux/init_task.h>
 +
+ #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
  #include <video/edid.h>
  
- #include <asm/mtrr.h>
-@@ -1330,6 +1335,32 @@ void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
+@@ -1328,6 +1333,32 @@ void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
  
@@ -436,10 +436,10 @@ index 022be0e..4a054a5 100644
  	input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev);
  
 diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
-index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
+index 7113674..e1addc3 100644
 --- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
 +++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
-@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
+@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
  	/* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */
  	/* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */
  	/* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
  	NULL,				/* x */
  	/* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */
  	NULL,				/* y */
-@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
+@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
                  sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p;
  }
  
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
  {
  	struct sysrq_key_op *op_p;
  	int orig_log_level;
-@@ -544,11 +545,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+@@ -542,11 +543,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
  
          op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key);
          if (op_p) {
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
  			pr_cont("%s\n", op_p->action_msg);
  			console_loglevel = orig_log_level;
  			op_p->handler(key);
-@@ -580,7 +585,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+@@ -578,7 +583,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
  void handle_sysrq(int key)
  {
  	if (sysrq_on())
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq);
  
-@@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(unsigned long _state)
+@@ -659,7 +664,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(unsigned long _state)
  static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state)
  {
  	if (state->reset_requested)
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
  
  	if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms)
  		mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer,
-@@ -812,8 +817,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
+@@ -810,8 +815,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
  
  	default:
  		if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) {
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ index c6fc714..0c96cf6 100644
  		}
  		break;
  	}
-@@ -1097,7 +1104,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+@@ -1095,7 +1102,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  
  		if (get_user(c, buf))
  			return -EFAULT;
@@ -570,10 +570,10 @@ index 387fa7d..f7c52a9 100644
  int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
  struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key);
 diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
-index c8146d5..b480cad 100644
+index ca18391..c4524b8 100644
 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
 +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
-@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
+@@ -1967,7 +1967,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
  		return KDB_ARGCOUNT;
  
  	kdb_trap_printk++;
@@ -583,9 +583,9 @@ index c8146d5..b480cad 100644
  
  	return 0;
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 1b5f90719268c27616172f00cde6e1078eb413c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 8884bd44932e595323fcddfb09c2a2a586134cdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 14/32] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
@@ -622,12 +622,13 @@ index 980936a..46de8e6 100644
  	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.
  	 */
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 85eaf32ad6cb1ce6ab88601daac8e601386929bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From cace563d1743c3d2faf1e46bd4df8e63e2310207 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
+Subject: [PATCH 15/32] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
+ reboot
 
 Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
 boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
@@ -659,12 +660,13 @@ index d0a814a..3551bca 100644
  	ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
  	ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 421f4933387c7663b99d63624bdc23d4037e9c26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 08a3467acbc28bb469d1eebd0f5fd40b944d984a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:49:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 16/32] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
+Subject: [PATCH 16/32] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been
+ set
 
 When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image
 through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set.
@@ -680,7 +682,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
-index b118735..f6937ee 100644
+index b56a558..003cade 100644
 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
 +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
 @@ -268,6 +268,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
@@ -697,9 +699,9 @@ index b118735..f6937ee 100644
  	if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS))
  		return -EINVAL;
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 0376070dd24c4226e047cf5ab8d68c8341b8d521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 925fd10d7a99a6f999dde76daf2b1ef1238b251a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 17/32] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
@@ -716,10 +718,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-index a8b978c..50cca5d 100644
+index 86385af..1629798 100644
 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
 +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
  
  bool hibernation_available(void)
  {
@@ -729,12 +731,12 @@ index a8b978c..50cca5d 100644
  
  /**
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From fff7953fd653f695d0a43872726086637cad224b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b14fb5fcd60c84a09a15bd7ec974b6fbce68335c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:28:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 18/32] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
 
 uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
 makes it possible to modify the running kernel.  Disable this if the kernel
@@ -761,12 +763,13 @@ index 22df9f7..e4b926d 100644
  
  	if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From a4cb6a7d28d27aa8166b7e0d5f75fe16f2f18ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From d8167273e7562e5aa866d2b65e25bb1962de972c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 19/32] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 19/32] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
+ down
 
 Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
 order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
@@ -783,10 +786,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-index 7ac258f..7d29b03 100644
+index 0666287..b10992c 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+@@ -718,6 +718,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
  	loff_t init_off = off;
  	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
  
@@ -796,17 +799,17 @@ index 7ac258f..7d29b03 100644
  	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
  		return 0;
  	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
-@@ -1022,6 +1025,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
- 	resource_size_t start, end;
- 	int i;
+@@ -1009,6 +1012,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ 	enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
+ 	struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
  
 +	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
 +		return -EPERM;
 +
- 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
- 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
- 			break;
-@@ -1121,6 +1127,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ 	if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -1108,6 +1114,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
  				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
  				     loff_t off, size_t count)
  {
@@ -817,7 +820,7 @@ index 7ac258f..7d29b03 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-index dc8912e..e2c5eff 100644
+index f82710a..139d6f0 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
 @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@@ -842,13 +845,13 @@ index dc8912e..e2c5eff 100644
  		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
 @@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
  	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
- 	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit;
+ 	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
  
 -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
 +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
  		return -EPERM;
  
- 	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io)
+ 	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
 index 9bf993e..c095247 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -863,12 +866,13 @@ index 9bf993e..c095247 100644
  
  	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 4f9b39483a30ae4bd6e9c90caaf3a0466161d024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 169d13e0c5240ac6aad13aace5ecbdb3de2cfada Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 20/32] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 20/32] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
+ down
 
 IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
 registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
@@ -886,10 +890,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-index 9c3cf09..4a613fe 100644
+index b01bc8517..4ccaace 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
 +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
  
  	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
  		return -EINVAL;
@@ -898,7 +902,7 @@ index 9c3cf09..4a613fe 100644
  		return -EPERM;
  
  	/*
-@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
+@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
  		return -EINVAL;
  	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
  	if (level > old) {
@@ -908,10 +912,10 @@ index 9c3cf09..4a613fe 100644
  	}
  	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |
 diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index a97b22f..8705f8f 100644
+index f814404..9afebb6 100644
 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c
 +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
+@@ -741,6 +741,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
  
  static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
  {
@@ -921,9 +925,9 @@ index a97b22f..8705f8f 100644
  }
  
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From b746ba587c937240794cd7006c15a0fb3b2f8128 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From efd24f7e9af624b62f39efce4f60b31f0ca643d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:17 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 21/32] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
@@ -965,9 +969,9 @@ index ef68880..fbcce02 100644
  			err = -EFAULT;
  			break;
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 5aff4c16ee0a6441b1abbf6e80a5da9cf2007469 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 62ebdffbcb0726b98562e9f1173a6d5967755764 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 22/32] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is
@@ -986,10 +990,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
+index 43cb680..9be3e08 100644
 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
 +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-@@ -1900,6 +1900,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+@@ -1898,6 +1898,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
  	int err;
  	u32 retval = -1;
  
@@ -999,7 +1003,7 @@ index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
  	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
  
  	if (err < 0)
-@@ -1916,6 +1919,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+@@ -1914,6 +1917,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
  	int err;
  	u32 retval = -1;
  
@@ -1009,7 +1013,7 @@ index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
  	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
  				    &retval);
  
-@@ -1940,6 +1946,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+@@ -1938,6 +1944,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
  	union acpi_object *obj;
  	acpi_status status;
  
@@ -1020,13 +1024,13 @@ index 8fe5890..feef250 100644
  				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
  				     &input, &output);
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From f0b27fdb42b57c2044ea3cf49371f786acc7b58e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 31f493d03dde1854fa9e540f87a751fbeeb41cb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 23/32] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked
- down
+Subject: [PATCH 23/32] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
+ locked down
 
 custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
 it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
@@ -1053,13 +1057,13 @@ index c68e724..e4d721c 100644
  		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
  		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From d67f882220ae3d969b496ad93fcbbcd3b09288cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1dec5dc62c78f78b9efe44aac3d6119d97b67017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:46:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 24/32] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been
- locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 24/32] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
+ been locked down
 
 This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
 makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on
@@ -1085,13 +1089,13 @@ index db78d35..d4d4ba3 100644
  #endif
  
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 15b10045321ac2af988918726a461178237d2d24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 96eaf04100d7365d93f898013175351c7d2702a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:32:27 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 25/32] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked
- down
+Subject: [PATCH 25/32] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
+ locked down
 
 From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
 
@@ -1126,13 +1130,13 @@ index 2604189..601096d 100644
  		memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS,
  				       all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From dec3a108f63021d82b132847a02e8496f613ac6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 521979b819b853f7578ba8edef8b33bc2077026d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:39:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 26/32] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked
- down
+Subject: [PATCH 26/32] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
+ locked down
 
 ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
 the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features.  If
@@ -1170,9 +1174,9 @@ index ec50c32..e082718 100644
  	if (flags && (flags &
  		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From dcc51d5b69c23c3f955b332d959f13cb61b4500c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fe597dad1cba83345d62c4079c0d8861c426698c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:41:23 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 27/32] Enable cold boot attack mitigation
@@ -1228,13 +1232,13 @@ index 801c7a1..ef9409b 100644
  	 * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
  	 * otherwise we ask the BIOS.
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 6cff44c809671affbf65ac2e0d0c2b0a0f705756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 04fac895731801bc6cb26a6061f1c353c80a866c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
 Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:52:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 28/32] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel
- is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 28/32] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
+ kernel is locked down
 
 There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
 bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk.  These allow
@@ -1285,9 +1289,9 @@ index cee9802..7fde851 100644
  	for (i = 0; i < fmt_size; i++) {
  		if ((!isprint(fmt[i]) && !isspace(fmt[i])) || !isascii(fmt[i]))
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 9c7dd48309e4d8e18a9979f6c0cbf9c7b8bf4ea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 707d0e14c2c0d6c3139ff4bcb16ee22c462b4304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:10:34 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 29/32] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
@@ -1313,7 +1317,7 @@ cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/eata.c b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
-index 227dd2c..5c036d1 100644
+index 227dd2c..5c036d10 100644
 --- a/drivers/scsi/eata.c
 +++ b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
 @@ -1552,8 +1552,13 @@ static int eata2x_detect(struct scsi_host_template *tpnt)
@@ -1332,12 +1336,13 @@ index 227dd2c..5c036d1 100644
  #if defined(MODULE)
  	/* io_port could have been modified when loading as a module */
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 5e2b99e099ba52131c7a87695b294961a0bf54f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 07e05e0b7d806a05eba55092630bb75a92311344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 14:37:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 30/32] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
+Subject: [PATCH 30/32] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
+ down
 
 Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
 kernel is locked down.
@@ -1364,9 +1369,9 @@ index 55ef7d1..193e4f7 100644
  
  	if (off)
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4
 
-From 6d6e052a6c2df0a7a492439efe1ac6d62498e0d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From cf1e877adbe35c5f72a9d85570b494aa3f35be6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:28:39 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 31/32] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
@@ -1383,10 +1388,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
-index 3fe5689..4181b00 100644
+index 9939c3d..7c040e2 100644
 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
 +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
-@@ -821,6 +821,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
+@@ -820,6 +820,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
  	new_flags = new_info->flags;
  	old_custom_divisor = uport->custom_divisor;
  
@@ -1400,5 +1405,5 @@ index 3fe5689..4181b00 100644
  		retval = -EPERM;
  		if (change_irq || change_port ||
 -- 
-2.7.5
+2.7.4