Patch file cleanup

Do a couple things here:

- Split the mega-patches into individual patches.  Should help with rebasing.
- Make all patches 'git am' acceptable.

There should be no functional or actual code differences from before

1 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch b/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c0186088
--- /dev/null
+++ b/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 3d2fbfb0264c8286432026e152d7561975506ffc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
+
+A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
+images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
+MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set.  Given that the
+user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
+secure boot mode if that variable is set.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+index 88edd48f03e9..3b18ef2b534c 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+@@ -806,8 +806,9 @@ out:
+ 
+ static int get_secure_boot(void)
+ {
+-	u8 sb, setup;
++	u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
+ 	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
++	u32 attr;
+ 	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+ 	efi_status_t status;
+ 
+@@ -831,6 +832,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void)
+ 	if (setup == 1)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	/* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode.  If so, and the variable
++	 * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
++	 */
++	var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
++	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
++				L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
++				&moksbstate);
++
++	/* If it fails, we don't care why.  Default to secure */
++	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
++		if (moksbstate == 1)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+1.9.3
+