kernel.git - Linux vanilla kernels for Fedora – https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Kernel_Vanilla

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author	Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>	2017-12-13 16:14:15 -0500
committer	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>	2018-01-05 14:40:14 -0800
commit	4d6d8cc5c16bc5edff4ee564b8e9d4ace9c28469 (patch)
tree	c6e08195c28b1041a4bd51c692811dfc7950fa9b /configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_USERFAULTFD
parent	32813e5abf211a0420e5486553f0e9a159ce123a (diff)
download	kernel-4d6d8cc5c16bc5edff4ee564b8e9d4ace9c28469.tar.gz kernel-4d6d8cc5c16bc5edff4ee564b8e9d4ace9c28469.tar.xz kernel-4d6d8cc5c16bc5edff4ee564b8e9d4ace9c28469.zip

configs: Move base-debug and base-generic to configs/fedora

It was suggested that base-debug and base-generic were not good names to use. Further discussion led to using configs/fedora for the base config files and configs/rhel for any overrides. This patch does a plain mkdir configs/fedora git mv configs/base-{generic,debug} configs/fedora No code changes.

Diffstat (limited to 'configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_USERFAULTFD')

-rw-r--r--

configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_USERFAULTFD

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions

/* * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as * published by the Free Software Foundation. */ #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/ieee80211.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <net/mac80211.h> #include "ieee80211_i.h" #include "michael.h" #include "tkip.h" #include "aes_ccm.h" #include "wpa.h" ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { u8 *data, *key, *mic, key_offset; size_t data_len; unsigned int hdrlen; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; int authenticator; int wpa_test = 0; int tail; hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) return TX_CONTINUE; hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); if (skb->len < hdrlen) return TX_DROP; data = skb->data + hdrlen; data_len = skb->len - hdrlen; if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) && !wpa_test) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC */ return TX_CONTINUE; } tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; if (!(tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN; if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN)) return TX_DROP; #if 0 authenticator = fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FROMDS; /* FIX */ #else authenticator = 1; #endif /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */ key_offset = authenticator ? NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY : NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY; key = &tx->key->conf.key[key_offset]; mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); return TX_CONTINUE; } ieee80211_rx_result ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { u8 *data, *key = NULL, key_offset; size_t data_len; unsigned int hdrlen; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN]; struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0; DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac); /* * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */ if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED) return RX_CONTINUE; hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || !ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control) || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) return RX_CONTINUE; hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; data = skb->data + hdrlen; data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; #if 0 authenticator = fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_TODS; /* FIX */ #else authenticator = 1; #endif /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */ key_offset = authenticator ? NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY : NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY; key = &rx->key->conf.key[key_offset]; michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0 || wpa_test) { if (!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata, rx->key->conf.keyidx, (void *) skb->data); return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32; rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16; return RX_CONTINUE; } static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); unsigned int hdrlen; int len, tail; u8 *pos; if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for IV/ICV */ info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; return 0; } hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); len = skb->len - hdrlen; if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) tail = 0; else tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN; if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN)) return -1; pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN); memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen); pos += hdrlen; /* Increase IV for the frame */ key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++; if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0) key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++; if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { /* hwaccel - with preallocated room for IV */ ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key, key->u.tkip.tx.iv16); info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; return 0; } /* Add room for ICV */ skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm, key, pos, len, hdr->addr2); return 0; } ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) return TX_DROP; if (tx->extra_frag) { int i; for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) return TX_DROP; } } return TX_CONTINUE; } ieee80211_rx_result ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0, wpa_test = 0; struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac); hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) return RX_CONTINUE; if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) { /* * Hardware took care of all processing, including * replay protection, and stripped the ICV/IV so * we cannot do any checks here. */ return RX_CONTINUE; } /* let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption */ hwaccel = 1; } res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm, key, skb->data + hdrlen, skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue, &rx->tkip_iv32, &rx->tkip_iv16); if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK || wpa_test) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Trim ICV */ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN); /* Remove IV */ memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN); return RX_CONTINUE; } static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch, int encrypted) { __le16 mask_fc; int a4_included; u8 qos_tid; u8 *b_0, *aad; u16 data_len, len_a; unsigned int hdrlen; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN; aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN; /* * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected */ mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070 | IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); len_a = hdrlen - 2; a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK; else qos_tid = 0; data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN; if (encrypted) data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN; /* First block, b_0 */ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */ /* Nonce: QoS Priority | A2 | PN */ b_0[1] = qos_tid; memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); /* l(m) */ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]); /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]); put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; aad[23] = 0; if (a4_included) { memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); aad[30] = qos_tid; aad[31] = 0; } else { memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); aad[24] = qos_tid; } } static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) { hdr[0] = pn[5]; hdr[1] = pn[4]; hdr[2] = 0; hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); hdr[4] = pn[3]; hdr[5] = pn[2]; hdr[6] = pn[1]; hdr[7] = pn[0]; } static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) { pn[0] = hdr[7]; pn[1] = hdr[6]; pn[2] = hdr[5]; pn[3] = hdr[4]; pn[4] = hdr[1]; pn[5] = hdr[0]; return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03; } static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); int hdrlen, len, tail; u8 *pos, *pn; int i; if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP " * header or MIC fields */ info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; return 0; } hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); len = skb->len - hdrlen; if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) tail = 0; else tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN; if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN)) return -1; pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN); memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos; pos += hdrlen; /* PN = PN + 1 */ pn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn; for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) { pn[i]++; if (pn[i]) break; } ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { /* hwaccel - with preallocated room for CCMP header */ info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; return 0; } pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN; ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, 0); ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, pos, len, pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN)); return 0; } ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) return TX_DROP; if (tx->extra_frag) { int i; for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) return TX_DROP; } } return TX_CONTINUE; } ieee80211_rx_result ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; int hdrlen; struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN]; int data_len; DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac); hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) return RX_CONTINUE; data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN; if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; if ((rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) return RX_CONTINUE; (void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { key->u.ccmp.replays++; return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } if (!(rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, 1); if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len, skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN, skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) { return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } } memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN); memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN); return RX_CONTINUE; }


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