Forgot to remove dropped patches

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 246 deletions

diff --git a/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch b/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08195ff4e..000000000
--- a/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-From 90dc66270b02981b19a085c6a9184e3452b7b3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
-
-Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
-This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring.  This
-allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
-with signed modules.  By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
-variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
-load.  The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
-in the 'MokListRT' variable.  We import those as well.
-
-Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
-variable.  We load those certificates into the newly introduced system
-blacklist keyring and forbid any module signed with those from loading and
-forbid the use within the kernel of any key with a matching hash.
-
-This facility is enabled by setting CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- certs/Kconfig     |  16 ++++++
- certs/Makefile    |   4 ++
- certs/load_uefi.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 188 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 certs/load_uefi.c
-
-diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
-index 630ae09..edf9f75 100644
---- a/certs/Kconfig
-+++ b/certs/Kconfig
-@@ -90,4 +90,20 @@ config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
- 	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
- 	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
-
-+config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
-+	bool "Load certs and blacklist from UEFI db for module checking"
-+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-+	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-+	depends on EFI
-+	depends on EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+	help
-+	  If the kernel is booted in secure boot mode, this option will cause
-+	  the kernel to load the certificates from the UEFI db and MokListRT
-+	  into the secondary trusted keyring.  It will also load any X.509
-+	  SHA256 hashes in the dbx list into the blacklist.
-+
-+	  The effect of this is that, if the kernel is booted in secure boot
-+	  mode, modules signed with UEFI-stored keys will be permitted to be
-+	  loaded and keys that match the blacklist will be rejected.
-+
- endmenu
-diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
-index 738151a..a5e057a 100644
---- a/certs/Makefile
-+++ b/certs/Makefile
-@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
- endif
- obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
-
-+obj-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += load_uefi.o
-+$(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-+
-+
- ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
-
- $(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
-diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b44e464
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
-+#include <linux/kernel.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-+#include "internal.h"
-+
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
-+ */
-+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
-+				  unsigned long *size)
-+{
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+	unsigned long lsize = 4;
-+	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
-+	void *db;
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
-+	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!db) {
-+		pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-+		kfree(db);
-+		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	*size = lsize;
-+	return db;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
-+ */
-+static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
-+					   const void *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+	char *hash, *p;
-+
-+	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!hash)
-+		return;
-+	p = memcpy(hash, "tbs:", 4);
-+	p += 4;
-+	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-+	p += len * 2;
-+	*p = 0;
-+
-+	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-+	kfree(hash);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
-+ */
-+static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
-+					 const void *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+	char *hash, *p;
-+
-+	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!hash)
-+		return;
-+	p = memcpy(hash, "bin:", 4);
-+	p += 4;
-+	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-+	p += len * 2;
-+	*p = 0;
-+
-+	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-+	kfree(hash);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
-+ * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
-+ */
-+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
-+{
-+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
-+		return add_trusted_secondary_key;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
-+ * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
-+ */
-+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
-+{
-+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
-+		return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
-+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
-+		return uefi_blacklist_binary;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
-+ */
-+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
-+{
-+	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
-+	efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
-+	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
-+	int rc = 0;
-+
-+	if (!efi.get_variable)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
-+	 * an error if we can't get them.
-+	 */
-+	db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
-+	if (!db) {
-+		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
-+					      db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(db);
-+	}
-+
-+	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
-+	if (!mok) {
-+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
-+					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(mok);
-+	}
-+
-+	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
-+	if (!dbx) {
-+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
-+					      dbx, dbxsize,
-+					      get_handler_for_dbx);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(dbx);
-+	}
-+
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--- 
-2.9.3
-