Revert debuginfo changes for stable rebases

1 files changed, 149 insertions, 116 deletions

diff --git a/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch b/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
index 76084d472..08195ff4e 100644
--- a/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
+++ b/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 8a4535bcfe24d317be675e53cdc8c61d22fdc7f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 90dc66270b02981b19a085c6a9184e3452b7b3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 18/20] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
+Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
 
 Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
 This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring.  This
@@ -11,104 +11,68 @@ variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
 load.  The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
 in the 'MokListRT' variable.  We import those as well.
 
-In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed
-certificates in the 'dbx' variable.  We load those certificates into
-the newly introduced system blacklist keyring and forbid any module
-signed with those from loading.
+Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
+variable.  We load those certificates into the newly introduced system
+blacklist keyring and forbid any module signed with those from loading and
+forbid the use within the kernel of any key with a matching hash.
+
+This facility is enabled by setting CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS.
 
 Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 ---
- certs/system_keyring.c        | 13 ++++++
- include/keys/system_keyring.h |  1 +
- init/Kconfig                  |  9 ++++
- kernel/Makefile               |  3 ++
- kernel/modsign_uefi.c         | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
+ certs/Kconfig     |  16 ++++++
+ certs/Makefile    |   4 ++
+ certs/load_uefi.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 188 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 certs/load_uefi.c
 
-diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
-index 787eeead2f57..4d9123ed5c07 100644
---- a/certs/system_keyring.c
-+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
-@@ -30,6 +30,19 @@ extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
- extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
- 
- /**
-+ * get_system_keyring - Return a pointer to the system keyring
-+ *
-+ */
-+struct key *get_system_keyring(void)
-+{
-+	struct key *system_keyring = NULL;
-+
-+	system_keyring = builtin_trusted_keys;
-+	return system_keyring;
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_system_keyring);
-+
-+/**
-  * restrict_link_to_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by built in CA
-  *
-  * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
-diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
-index 5bc291a3d261..56ff5715ab67 100644
---- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
-+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
- extern struct key *system_blacklist_keyring;
- #endif
-+extern struct key *get_system_keyring(void);
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
- extern struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 461ad575a608..93646fd7b1c8 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -2009,6 +2009,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_ALL
- comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file"
- 	depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL
- 
-+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI
-+	bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI"
-+	depends on MODULE_SIG && SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING && EFI
-+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
+index 630ae09..edf9f75 100644
+--- a/certs/Kconfig
++++ b/certs/Kconfig
+@@ -90,4 +90,20 @@ config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+ 	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
+ 	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
+
++config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
++	bool "Load certs and blacklist from UEFI db for module checking"
++	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
++	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
++	depends on EFI
++	depends on EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
 +	help
-+	  This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules
-+	  signed with those to be loaded.  It will also disallow loading
-+	  of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable.
-+
- choice
- 	prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
- 	depends on MODULE_SIG
-diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index eb26e12c6c2a..e0c2268cb97e 100644
---- a/kernel/Makefile
-+++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ endif
- obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) += kexec_core.o
-@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMBARRIER) += membarrier.o
- 
- obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += memremap.o
- 
-+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-+
- $(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
- 
- targets += config_data.gz
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
++	  If the kernel is booted in secure boot mode, this option will cause
++	  the kernel to load the certificates from the UEFI db and MokListRT
++	  into the secondary trusted keyring.  It will also load any X.509
++	  SHA256 hashes in the dbx list into the blacklist.
++
++	  The effect of this is that, if the kernel is booted in secure boot
++	  mode, modules signed with UEFI-stored keys will be permitted to be
++	  loaded and keys that match the blacklist will be rejected.
++
+ endmenu
+diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
+index 738151a..a5e057a 100644
+--- a/certs/Makefile
++++ b/certs/Makefile
+@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
+ endif
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
+
++obj-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += load_uefi.o
++$(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
++
++
+ ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
+
+ $(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
+index 0000000..b44e464
 --- /dev/null
-+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
++++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
 +#include <linux/sched.h>
 +#include <linux/cred.h>
@@ -117,14 +81,22 @@ index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
 +#include <linux/slab.h>
 +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 +#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-+#include "module-internal.h"
++#include "internal.h"
 +
-+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size)
++static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
++static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
++static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
++
++/*
++ * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
++ */
++static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
++				  unsigned long *size)
 +{
 +	efi_status_t status;
 +	unsigned long lsize = 4;
 +	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
-+	void *db = NULL;
++	void *db;
 +
 +	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
 +	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
@@ -135,23 +107,89 @@ index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
 +	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
 +	if (!db) {
 +		pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
-+		goto out;
++		return NULL;
 +	}
 +
 +	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
 +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
 +		kfree(db);
-+		db = NULL;
 +		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
++		return NULL;
 +	}
-+out:
++
 +	*size = lsize;
 +	return db;
 +}
 +
 +/*
-+ *  * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
-+ *   */
++ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
++ */
++static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
++					   const void *data, size_t len)
++{
++	char *hash, *p;
++
++	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!hash)
++		return;
++	p = memcpy(hash, "tbs:", 4);
++	p += 4;
++	bin2hex(p, data, len);
++	p += len * 2;
++	*p = 0;
++
++	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
++	kfree(hash);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
++ */
++static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
++					 const void *data, size_t len)
++{
++	char *hash, *p;
++
++	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!hash)
++		return;
++	p = memcpy(hash, "bin:", 4);
++	p += 4;
++	bin2hex(p, data, len);
++	p += len * 2;
++	*p = 0;
++
++	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
++	kfree(hash);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
++ * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
++ */
++static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
++{
++	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
++		return add_trusted_secondary_key;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
++ * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
++ */
++static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
++{
++	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
++		return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
++	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
++		return uefi_blacklist_binary;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
++ */
 +static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
 +{
 +	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
@@ -159,17 +197,9 @@ index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
 +	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
 +	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
 +	int rc = 0;
-+	struct key *keyring = NULL;
 +
-+	/* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
-+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	keyring = get_system_keyring();
-+	if (!keyring) {
-+		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get system keyring\n");
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+	}
++	if (!efi.get_variable)
++		return false;
 +
 +	/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
 +	 * an error if we can't get them.
@@ -178,7 +208,8 @@ index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
 +	if (!db) {
 +		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
 +	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, keyring);
++		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
++					      db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
 +		if (rc)
 +			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
 +		kfree(db);
@@ -188,7 +219,8 @@ index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
 +	if (!mok) {
 +		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
 +	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, keyring);
++		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
++					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
 +		if (rc)
 +			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
 +		kfree(mok);
@@ -198,8 +230,9 @@ index 000000000000..fe4a6f2bf10a
 +	if (!dbx) {
 +		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
 +	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
-+			system_blacklist_keyring);
++		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
++					      dbx, dbxsize,
++					      get_handler_for_dbx);
 +		if (rc)
 +			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
 +		kfree(dbx);