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authorJustin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>2013-01-04 15:16:10 -0600
committerJustin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>2013-01-04 15:16:10 -0600
commitf82b10781df75202d8783d2d6b937920f07af972 (patch)
treebba01c6976e2368ded671cb33a9aeedebeb6ddda
parent5a4dd837795a484aab835b5503b0fb87a35189d1 (diff)
downloadkernel-f82b10781df75202d8783d2d6b937920f07af972.tar.gz
kernel-f82b10781df75202d8783d2d6b937920f07af972.tar.xz
kernel-f82b10781df75202d8783d2d6b937920f07af972.zip
Linux v3.8-rc2-116-g5f243b9
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--8139cp-set-ring-address-after-enabling-C-mode.patch100
-rw-r--r--Bluetooth-Add-support-for-BCM20702A0.patch43
-rw-r--r--Revert-8139cp-revert-set-ring-address-before-enabling.patch59
-rw-r--r--config-arm-generic1
-rw-r--r--config-generic70
-rw-r--r--config-x86-generic3
-rw-r--r--config-x86_64-generic4
-rw-r--r--efivarfs-3.7.patch1630
-rw-r--r--exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch118
-rw-r--r--exec-use-eloop-for-max-recursion-depth.patch144
-rw-r--r--handle-efi-roms.patch388
-rw-r--r--kernel.spec62
-rw-r--r--modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch78
-rw-r--r--power-x86-destdir.patch35
-rw-r--r--secure-boot-20130104.patch (renamed from secure-boot-20121212.patch)1195
-rw-r--r--sources2
16 files changed, 649 insertions, 3283 deletions
diff --git a/8139cp-set-ring-address-after-enabling-C-mode.patch b/8139cp-set-ring-address-after-enabling-C-mode.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 33bd340e9..000000000
--- a/8139cp-set-ring-address-after-enabling-C-mode.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-From a9dbe40fc10cea2efe6e1ff9e03c62dd7579c5ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
-Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2012 10:27:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] 8139cp: set ring address after enabling C+ mode
-
-This fixes (for me) a regression introduced by commit b01af457 ("8139cp:
-set ring address before enabling receiver"). That commit configured the
-descriptor ring addresses earlier in the initialisation sequence, in
-order to avoid the possibility of triggering stray DMA before the
-correct address had been set up.
-
-Unfortunately, it seems that the hardware will scribble garbage into the
-TxRingAddr registers when we enable "plus mode" Tx in the CpCmd
-register. Observed on a Traverse Geos router board.
-
-To deal with this, while not reintroducing the problem which led to the
-original commit, we augment cp_start_hw() to write to the CpCmd register
-*first*, then set the descriptor ring addresses, and then finally to
-enable Rx and Tx in the original 8139 Cmd register. The datasheet
-actually indicates that we should enable Tx/Rx in the Cmd register
-*before* configuring the descriptor addresses, but that would appear to
-re-introduce the problem that the offending commit b01af457 was trying
-to solve. And this variant appears to work fine on real hardware.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
-Cc: stable@kernel.org [3.5+]
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c
-index 1c81825..5166d94 100644
---- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c
-@@ -957,7 +957,35 @@ static void cp_reset_hw (struct cp_private *cp)
-
- static inline void cp_start_hw (struct cp_private *cp)
- {
-+ dma_addr_t ring_dma;
-+
- cpw16(CpCmd, cp->cpcmd);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * These (at least TxRingAddr) need to be configured after the
-+ * corresponding bits in CpCmd are enabled. Datasheet v1.6 §6.33
-+ * (C+ Command Register) recommends that these and more be configured
-+ * *after* the [RT]xEnable bits in CpCmd are set. And on some hardware
-+ * it's been observed that the TxRingAddr is actually reset to garbage
-+ * when C+ mode Tx is enabled in CpCmd.
-+ */
-+ cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr, 0);
-+ cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr + 4, 0);
-+
-+ ring_dma = cp->ring_dma;
-+ cpw32_f(RxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-+ cpw32_f(RxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
-+
-+ ring_dma += sizeof(struct cp_desc) * CP_RX_RING_SIZE;
-+ cpw32_f(TxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-+ cpw32_f(TxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Strictly speaking, the datasheet says this should be enabled
-+ * *before* setting the descriptor addresses. But what, then, would
-+ * prevent it from doing DMA to random unconfigured addresses?
-+ * This variant appears to work fine.
-+ */
- cpw8(Cmd, RxOn | TxOn);
- }
-
-@@ -969,7 +997,6 @@ static void cp_enable_irq(struct cp_private *cp)
- static void cp_init_hw (struct cp_private *cp)
- {
- struct net_device *dev = cp->dev;
-- dma_addr_t ring_dma;
-
- cp_reset_hw(cp);
-
-@@ -979,17 +1006,6 @@ static void cp_init_hw (struct cp_private *cp)
- cpw32_f (MAC0 + 0, le32_to_cpu (*(__le32 *) (dev->dev_addr + 0)));
- cpw32_f (MAC0 + 4, le32_to_cpu (*(__le32 *) (dev->dev_addr + 4)));
-
-- cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr, 0);
-- cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr + 4, 0);
--
-- ring_dma = cp->ring_dma;
-- cpw32_f(RxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-- cpw32_f(RxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
--
-- ring_dma += sizeof(struct cp_desc) * CP_RX_RING_SIZE;
-- cpw32_f(TxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-- cpw32_f(TxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
--
- cp_start_hw(cp);
- cpw8(TxThresh, 0x06); /* XXX convert magic num to a constant */
-
---
-1.7.6.5
-
diff --git a/Bluetooth-Add-support-for-BCM20702A0.patch b/Bluetooth-Add-support-for-BCM20702A0.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 99178d757..000000000
--- a/Bluetooth-Add-support-for-BCM20702A0.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From a5f86c3423428c8e28b6501d0e9c3929ca91f07d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeff Cook <jeff@deserettechnology.com>
-Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 16:39:48 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Bluetooth: Add support for BCM20702A0 [0b05, 17b5]
-
-Vendor-specific ID for BCM20702A0.
-Support for bluetooth over Asus Wi-Fi GO!, included with Asus P8Z77-V
-Deluxe.
-
-T: Bus=07 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=12 MxCh= 0
-D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
-P: Vendor=0b05 ProdID=17b5 Rev=01.12
-S: Manufacturer=Broadcom Corp
-S: Product=BCM20702A0
-S: SerialNumber=94DBC98AC113
-C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=0mA
-I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
-I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
-I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)
-I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=fe(app. ) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Jeff Cook <jeff@deserettechnology.com>
-Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
----
- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
-index b167944..6dc44ff 100644
---- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
-+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
-@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id btusb_table[] = {
- { USB_DEVICE(0x0c10, 0x0000) },
-
- /* Broadcom BCM20702A0 */
-+ { USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17b5) },
- { USB_DEVICE(0x04ca, 0x2003) },
- { USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe042) },
- { USB_DEVICE(0x413c, 0x8197) },
---
-1.8.0
-
diff --git a/Revert-8139cp-revert-set-ring-address-before-enabling.patch b/Revert-8139cp-revert-set-ring-address-before-enabling.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ed20c43c..000000000
--- a/Revert-8139cp-revert-set-ring-address-before-enabling.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 071e3ef4a94a021b16a2912f3885c86f4ff36b49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
-Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 15:52:09 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Revert "8139cp: revert "set ring address before enabling
- receiver""
-
-This reverts commit b26623dab7eeb1e9f5898c7a49458789dd492f20.
-
-This reverts the revert, in net-next we'll try another scheme
-to fix this bug using patches from David Woodhouse.
-
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c
-index b01f83a..1c81825 100644
---- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c
-@@ -979,6 +979,17 @@ static void cp_init_hw (struct cp_private *cp)
- cpw32_f (MAC0 + 0, le32_to_cpu (*(__le32 *) (dev->dev_addr + 0)));
- cpw32_f (MAC0 + 4, le32_to_cpu (*(__le32 *) (dev->dev_addr + 4)));
-
-+ cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr, 0);
-+ cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr + 4, 0);
-+
-+ ring_dma = cp->ring_dma;
-+ cpw32_f(RxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-+ cpw32_f(RxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
-+
-+ ring_dma += sizeof(struct cp_desc) * CP_RX_RING_SIZE;
-+ cpw32_f(TxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-+ cpw32_f(TxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
-+
- cp_start_hw(cp);
- cpw8(TxThresh, 0x06); /* XXX convert magic num to a constant */
-
-@@ -992,17 +1003,6 @@ static void cp_init_hw (struct cp_private *cp)
-
- cpw8(Config5, cpr8(Config5) & PMEStatus);
-
-- cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr, 0);
-- cpw32_f(HiTxRingAddr + 4, 0);
--
-- ring_dma = cp->ring_dma;
-- cpw32_f(RxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-- cpw32_f(RxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
--
-- ring_dma += sizeof(struct cp_desc) * CP_RX_RING_SIZE;
-- cpw32_f(TxRingAddr, ring_dma & 0xffffffff);
-- cpw32_f(TxRingAddr + 4, (ring_dma >> 16) >> 16);
--
- cpw16(MultiIntr, 0);
-
- cpw8_f(Cfg9346, Cfg9346_Lock);
---
-1.7.6.5
-
diff --git a/config-arm-generic b/config-arm-generic
index 89fc4356a..9e97725af 100644
--- a/config-arm-generic
+++ b/config-arm-generic
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ CONFIG_SCHED_SMT=y
CONFIG_RCU_FANOUT=32
CONFIG_CPU_IDLE=y
+# CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_MULTIPLE_DRIVERS is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_GOV_LADDER is not set
CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_GOV_MENU=y
diff --git a/config-generic b/config-generic
index a27aedd40..9bf766a97 100644
--- a/config-generic
+++ b/config-generic
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
CONFIG_MMU=y
CONFIG_SMP=y
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU=y
+# CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HOTPLUG_CPU0 is not set
+# CONFIG_DEBUG_HOTPLUG_CPU0 is not set
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION=""
CONFIG_CROSS_COMPILE=""
CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="(none)"
@@ -124,6 +126,7 @@ CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK_MINORS=8
CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK_BOUNCE=y
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=m
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PCI=m
+CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_ACPI=m
CONFIG_MMC_SDRICOH_CS=m
CONFIG_MMC_TIFM_SD=m
CONFIG_MMC_WBSD=m
@@ -132,6 +135,7 @@ CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=m
CONFIG_MMC_CB710=m
CONFIG_MMC_RICOH_MMC=y
CONFIG_MMC_USHC=m
+CONFIG_MMC_REALTEK_PCI=m
CONFIG_MMC_VUB300=m
CONFIG_CB710_CORE=m
@@ -340,6 +344,7 @@ CONFIG_SCSI_SRP=m
CONFIG_SCSI_SRP_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_TGT=m
CONFIG_SCSI_ISCI=m
+CONFIG_SCSI_CHELSIO_FCOE=m
CONFIG_SCSI_DH=y
CONFIG_SCSI_DH_RDAC=m
@@ -416,6 +421,9 @@ CONFIG_SCSI_MVSAS_TASKLET=y
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS_MAX_SGE=128
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SCSI_MPT3SAS=m
+CONFIG_SCSI_MPT3SAS_MAX_SGE=128
+CONFIG_SCSI_MPT3SAS_LOGGING=y
CONFIG_SCSI_UFSHCD=m
@@ -607,6 +615,7 @@ CONFIG_FIREWIRE_SBP2=m
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NET=m
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_OHCI_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NOSY=m
+CONFIG_FIREWIRE_SERIAL=m
# CONFIG_FIREWIRE_OHCI_REMOTE_DMA is not set
#
@@ -977,9 +986,11 @@ CONFIG_IP_SCTP=m
CONFIG_NET_SCTPPROBE=m
# CONFIG_SCTP_DBG_MSG is not set
# CONFIG_SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT is not set
-# CONFIG_SCTP_HMAC_NONE is not set
-CONFIG_SCTP_HMAC_SHA1=y
-# CONFIG_SCTP_HMAC_MD5 is not set
+CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_SHA1=y
+# CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_MD5 is not set
+# CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_NONE is not set
+CONFIG_SCTP_COOKIE_HMAC_MD5=y
+CONFIG_SCTP_COOKIE_HMAC_SHA1=y
CONFIG_ATM=m
CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q=m
CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q_GVRP=y
@@ -1077,6 +1088,7 @@ CONFIG_DCB=y
CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER=m
CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV=m
CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BLA=y
+CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_DAT=y
# CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_OPENVSWITCH=m
CONFIG_NETPRIO_CGROUP=m
@@ -1187,6 +1199,9 @@ CONFIG_ATL2=m
CONFIG_ATL1=m
CONFIG_ATL1C=m
CONFIG_ATL1E=m
+CONFIG_NET_CADENCE=y
+CONFIG_ARM_AT91_ETHER=m
+CONFIG_MACB=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROCADE=y
CONFIG_BNA=m
@@ -1257,6 +1272,7 @@ CONFIG_IXGBE_PTP=y
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_I825XX is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MARVELL=y
+CONFIG_MVMDIO=m
CONFIG_SKGE=m
# CONFIG_SKGE_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SKGE_GENESIS=y
@@ -1483,6 +1499,7 @@ CONFIG_WIMAX_I2400M_DEBUG_LEVEL=8
# CONFIG_ADM8211 is not set
CONFIG_ATH_COMMON=m
+CONFIG_ATH_CARDS=m
CONFIG_ATH5K=m
CONFIG_ATH5K_DEBUG=y
# CONFIG_ATH5K_TRACER is not set
@@ -1490,6 +1507,7 @@ CONFIG_ATH6KL=m
CONFIG_ATH6KL_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_ATH6KL_SDIO=m
CONFIG_ATH6KL_USB=m
+CONFIG_AR5523=m
CONFIG_ATH9K=m
CONFIG_ATH9K_PCI=y
CONFIG_ATH9K_AHB=y
@@ -1530,6 +1548,7 @@ CONFIG_BRCMFMAC=m
CONFIG_BRCMFMAC_SDIO=y
CONFIG_BRCMFMAC_SDIO_OOB=y
CONFIG_BRCMFMAC_USB=y
+# CONFIG_BRCM_TRACING is not set
# CONFIG_BRCMISCAN is not set
# CONFIG_BRCMDBG is not set
# CONFIG_HERMES is not set
@@ -1613,6 +1632,7 @@ CONFIG_RTL8192CE=m
CONFIG_RTL8192SE=m
CONFIG_RTL8192CU=m
CONFIG_RTL8192DE=m
+CONFIG_RTL8723AE=m
CONFIG_MWIFIEX=m
CONFIG_MWIFIEX_SDIO=m
@@ -1923,6 +1943,7 @@ CONFIG_SERIO_SERPORT=y
CONFIG_SERIO_RAW=m
CONFIG_SERIO_ALTERA_PS2=m
# CONFIG_SERIO_PS2MULT is not set
+CONFIG_SERIO_ARC_PS2=m
# CONFIG_SERIO_CT82C710 is not set
# CONFIG_SERIO_PARKBD is not set
@@ -2034,9 +2055,12 @@ CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_W90X900=m
CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ST1232=m
CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ATMEL_MXT=m
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MAX11801 is not set
+CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_AUO_PIXCIR=m
+CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TI_AM335X_TSC=m
CONFIG_INPUT_MISC=y
CONFIG_INPUT_PCSPKR=m
+CONFIG_INPUT_RETU_PWRBUTTON=m
CONFIG_INPUT_UINPUT=m
CONFIG_INPUT_WISTRON_BTNS=m
CONFIG_INPUT_ATLAS_BTNS=m
@@ -2160,6 +2184,8 @@ CONFIG_I2C_ALGOPCA=m
# CONFIG_I2C_NFORCE2_S4985 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_INTEL_MID is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set
+# CONFIG_I2C_CBUS_GPIO is not set
+CONFIG_I2C_VIPERBOARD=m
CONFIG_EEPROM_AT24=m
CONFIG_EEPROM_LEGACY=m
@@ -2330,6 +2356,8 @@ CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX197=m
# CONFIG_PCH_PHUB is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_PCH_UART is not set
# CONFIG_USB_SWITCH_FSA9480 is not set
+CONFIG_SERIAL_ARC=m
+CONFIG_SERIAL_ARC_NR_PORTS=1
CONFIG_W1=m
CONFIG_W1_CON=y
@@ -2442,6 +2470,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RS5C372=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_SA1100 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_TEST is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_X1205=m
+CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF8523=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_V3020=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS2404=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_STK17TA8=m
@@ -2662,6 +2691,7 @@ CONFIG_DVB_BT8XX=m
CONFIG_DVB_BUDGET_CORE=m
CONFIG_DVB_PLUTO2=m
CONFIG_SMS_SIANO_MDTV=m
+CONFIG_SMS_SIANO_RC=y
CONFIG_MEDIA_SUBDRV_AUTOSELECT=y
CONFIG_SMS_USB_DRV=m
CONFIG_SMS_SDIO_DRV=m
@@ -3035,6 +3065,7 @@ CONFIG_SND_USB_6FIRE=m
CONFIG_SND_FIREWIRE=y
CONFIG_SND_FIREWIRE_SPEAKERS=m
CONFIG_SND_ISIGHT=m
+CONFIG_SND_SCS1X=m
#
# Open Sound System
@@ -3122,6 +3153,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_HID=y
CONFIG_HID_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_HID=y
+CONFIG_I2C_HID=m
CONFIG_HID_BATTERY_STRENGTH=y
# debugging default is y upstream now
CONFIG_HIDRAW=y
@@ -3152,6 +3184,7 @@ CONFIG_HID_PS3REMOTE=m
CONFIG_HID_PRODIKEYS=m
CONFIG_HID_DRAGONRISE=m
CONFIG_HID_GYRATION=m
+CONFIG_HID_ICADE=m
CONFIG_HID_TWINHAN=m
CONFIG_HID_ORTEK=m
CONFIG_HID_PANTHERLORD=m
@@ -3283,6 +3316,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_NET_RNDIS_HOST=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_SUBSET=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_EEM=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_NCM=m
+CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_MBIM=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_ZAURUS=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_CX82310_ETH=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_INT51X1=m
@@ -3402,6 +3436,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_SEVSEG=m
CONFIG_USB_ALI_M5632=y
CONFIG_USB_APPLEDISPLAY=m
# CONFIG_OMAP_USB2 is not set
+CONFIG_USB_RCAR_PHY=m
CONFIG_USB_ATM=m
CONFIG_USB_CXACRU=m
# CONFIG_USB_C67X00_HCD is not set
@@ -3462,6 +3497,7 @@ CONFIG_SSB_PCMCIAHOST=y
# CONFIG_SSB_SILENT is not set
# CONFIG_SSB_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SSB_DRIVER_PCICORE=y
+CONFIG_SSB_DRIVER_GPIO=y
# Multifunction USB devices
# CONFIG_MFD_PCF50633 is not set
@@ -3478,6 +3514,10 @@ CONFIG_MFD_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_MFD_VX855=m
CONFIG_MFD_SM501=m
CONFIG_MFD_SM501_GPIO=y
+CONFIG_MFD_RTSX_PCI=m
+CONFIG_MFD_TI_AM335X_TSCADC=m
+CONFIG_MFD_VIPERBOARD=m
+CONFIG_MFD_RETU=m
# CONFIG_MFD_TC6393XB is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM8400 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM8350_I2C is not set
@@ -3639,6 +3679,7 @@ CONFIG_9P_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_FUSE_FS=m
# CONFIG_OMFS_FS is not set
CONFIG_CUSE=m
+# CONFIG_F2FS_FS is not set
#
# Network File Systems
@@ -3678,6 +3719,7 @@ CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX=y
CONFIG_CIFS_FSCACHE=y
CONFIG_CIFS_ACL=y
CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH=y
+# CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2 is not set
CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL=y
CONFIG_CIFS_NFSD_EXPORT=y
@@ -4060,6 +4102,11 @@ CONFIG_KEXEC=y
CONFIG_HWMON=y
# CONFIG_HWMON_DEBUG_CHIP is not set
CONFIG_THERMAL_HWMON=y
+# CONFIG_THERMAL_DEFAULT_GOV_FAIR_SHARE is not set
+# CONFIG_THERMAL_DEFAULT_GOV_USER_SPACE is not set
+CONFIG_FAIR_SHARE=y
+CONFIG_STEP_WISE=y
+# CONFIG_USER_SPACE is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_THERMAL is not set
CONFIG_INOTIFY=y
@@ -4136,6 +4183,7 @@ CONFIG_SND_INDIGOIOX=m
CONFIG_SND_INDIGODJX=m
# CONFIG_SND_SOC is not set
+CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION=y
CONFIG_COMPACTION=y
CONFIG_MIGRATION=y
CONFIG_NEW_LEDS=y
@@ -4247,6 +4295,8 @@ CONFIG_APM_POWER=m
# CONFIG_CHARGER_LP8727 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_PCF50633 is not set
+# CONFIG_CHARGER_BQ2415X is not set
+CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y
# CONFIG_PDA_POWER is not set
@@ -4256,6 +4306,7 @@ CONFIG_UIO=m
CONFIG_UIO_CIF=m
# CONFIG_UIO_PDRV is not set
# CONFIG_UIO_PDRV_GENIRQ is not set
+# CONFIG_UIO_DMEM_GENIRQ is not set
CONFIG_UIO_AEC=m
CONFIG_UIO_SERCOS3=m
CONFIG_UIO_PCI_GENERIC=m
@@ -4290,6 +4341,8 @@ CONFIG_NOZOMI=m
# CONFIG_TPS65010 is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_APANEL=m
+CONFIG_INPUT_GP2A=m
+# CONFIG_INPUT_GPIO_TILT_POLLED is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_MENLOW is not set
CONFIG_ENCLOSURE_SERVICES=m
@@ -4303,6 +4356,7 @@ CONFIG_MSPRO_BLOCK=m
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_TIFM_MS=m
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_JMICRON_38X=m
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_R592=m
+CONFIG_MEMSTICK_REALTEK_PCI=m
CONFIG_ACCESSIBILITY=y
CONFIG_A11Y_BRAILLE_CONSOLE=y
@@ -4423,6 +4477,7 @@ CONFIG_ALTERA_STAPL=m
# CONFIG_BPCTL is not set
# CONFIG_CED1401 is not set
# CONFIG_DGRP is not set
+# CONFIG_SB105X is not set
# END OF STAGING
#
@@ -4450,8 +4505,9 @@ CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y
# CONFIG_RCU_FANOUT_EXACT is not set
-# FIXME: Revisit FAST_NO_HZ after 3.5
-# CONFIG_RCU_FAST_NO_HZ is not set
+# FIXME: Revisit FAST_NO_HZ after it's fixed
+# CONFIG_RCU_FAST_NO_HZ is not setA
+# CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU is not set
CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT=60
# CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_RCU_TRACE is not set
@@ -4508,6 +4564,9 @@ CONFIG_GPIO_SYSFS=y
# CONFIG_GPIO_CS5535 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_ADP5588 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_IT8761E is not set
+# CONFIG SB105x is not set
+# CONFIG_GPIO_TS5500 is not set
+CONFIG_GPIO_VIPERBOARD=m
# CONFIG_GPIO_MAX7300 is not set
# CONFIG_UCB1400_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_TPS6105X is not set
@@ -4559,6 +4618,7 @@ CONFIG_BCMA_BLOCKIO=y
CONFIG_BCMA_HOST_PCI_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_BCMA_HOST_PCI=y
CONFIG_BCMA_DRIVER_GMAC_CMN=y
+CONFIG_BCMA_DRIVER_GPIO=y
# CONFIG_BCMA_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_GOOGLE_FIRMWARE is not set
diff --git a/config-x86-generic b/config-x86-generic
index 1716194e5..0850b1047 100644
--- a/config-x86-generic
+++ b/config-x86-generic
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP=y
CONFIG_ACPI_THERMAL=y
CONFIG_ACPI_TOSHIBA=m
CONFIG_ACPI_VIDEO=m
+CONFIG_ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE=y
# FIXME: Next two are deprecated. Remove them when they disappear upstream
# CONFIG_ACPI_PROCFS_POWER is not set
# CONFIG_ACPI_PROC_EVENT is not set
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ CONFIG_MTD_CK804XROM=m
CONFIG_NO_HZ=y
CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y
CONFIG_CPU_IDLE=y
+# CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_MULTIPLE_DRIVERS is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_GOV_LADDER is not set
CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_GOV_MENU=y
@@ -411,6 +413,7 @@ CONFIG_HYPERV_UTILS=m
CONFIG_HID_HYPERV_MOUSE=m
CONFIG_HYPERV_NET=m
CONFIG_HYPERV_STORAGE=m
+CONFIG_HYPERV_BALLOON=m
# Depends on HOTPLUG_PCI_PCIE
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX=m
diff --git a/config-x86_64-generic b/config-x86_64-generic
index 6003f11c0..e10d7858d 100644
--- a/config-x86_64-generic
+++ b/config-x86_64-generic
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ CONFIG_AMD_NUMA=y
CONFIG_X86_64_ACPI_NUMA=y
# CONFIG_NUMA_EMU is not set
# CONFIG_X86_NUMACHIP is not set
+CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y
+CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
CONFIG_NR_CPUS=128
CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START=0x1000000
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST5_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST6_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_AVX_X86_64=m
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64=m
# CONFIG_I2C_ALI1535 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_ALI1563 is not set
@@ -69,6 +72,7 @@ CONFIG_SPARSEMEM=y
CONFIG_HAVE_MEMORY_PRESENT=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP=y
+# CONFIG_MOVABLE_NODE is not set
# CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not set
# CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE is not set
diff --git a/efivarfs-3.7.patch b/efivarfs-3.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 300910716..000000000
--- a/efivarfs-3.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1630 +0,0 @@
-From cb6f23ee9601297c3c70d0cfe3d77dfde9bd119d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 13:54:56 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 01/17] efi: Add support for a UEFI variable filesystem
-
-The existing EFI variables code only supports variables of up to 1024
-bytes. This limitation existed in version 0.99 of the EFI specification,
-but was removed before any full releases. Since variables can now be
-larger than a single page, sysfs isn't the best interface for this. So,
-instead, let's add a filesystem. Variables can be read, written and
-created, with the first 4 bytes of each variable representing its UEFI
-attributes. The create() method doesn't actually commit to flash since
-zero-length variables can't exist per-spec.
-
-Updates from Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 384 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- include/linux/efi.h | 5 +
- 2 files changed, 383 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index d10c987..b605c48 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@
- #include <linux/slab.h>
- #include <linux/pstore.h>
-
-+#include <linux/fs.h>
-+#include <linux/ramfs.h>
-+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
-+
- #include <asm/uaccess.h>
-
- #define EFIVARS_VERSION "0.08"
-@@ -91,6 +95,7 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
- MODULE_VERSION(EFIVARS_VERSION);
-
- #define DUMP_NAME_LEN 52
-+#define GUID_LEN 37
-
- /*
- * The maximum size of VariableName + Data = 1024
-@@ -108,7 +113,6 @@ struct efi_variable {
- __u32 Attributes;
- } __attribute__((packed));
-
--
- struct efivar_entry {
- struct efivars *efivars;
- struct efi_variable var;
-@@ -122,6 +126,9 @@ struct efivar_attribute {
- ssize_t (*store)(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count);
- };
-
-+static struct efivars __efivars;
-+static struct efivar_operations ops;
-+
- #define PSTORE_EFI_ATTRIBUTES \
- (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | \
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | \
-@@ -629,14 +636,380 @@ static struct kobj_type efivar_ktype = {
- .default_attrs = def_attrs,
- };
-
--static struct pstore_info efi_pstore_info;
--
- static inline void
- efivar_unregister(struct efivar_entry *var)
- {
- kobject_put(&var->kobj);
- }
-
-+static int efivarfs_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+ file->private_data = inode->i_private;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
-+ const char __user *userbuf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-+{
-+ struct efivar_entry *var = file->private_data;
-+ struct efivars *efivars;
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+ void *data;
-+ u32 attributes;
-+ struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
-+ int datasize = count - sizeof(attributes);
-+
-+ if (count < sizeof(attributes))
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ data = kmalloc(datasize, GFP_KERNEL);
-+
-+ if (!data)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ efivars = var->efivars;
-+
-+ if (copy_from_user(&attributes, userbuf, sizeof(attributes))) {
-+ count = -EFAULT;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (attributes & ~(EFI_VARIABLE_MASK)) {
-+ count = -EINVAL;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (copy_from_user(data, userbuf + sizeof(attributes), datasize)) {
-+ count = -EFAULT;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (validate_var(&var->var, data, datasize) == false) {
-+ count = -EINVAL;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ status = efivars->ops->set_variable(var->var.VariableName,
-+ &var->var.VendorGuid,
-+ attributes, datasize,
-+ data);
-+
-+ switch (status) {
-+ case EFI_SUCCESS:
-+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-+ i_size_write(inode, count);
-+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
-+ count = -EINVAL;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
-+ count = -ENOSPC;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-+ count = -EIO;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
-+ count = -EROFS;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-+ count = -EACCES;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-+ count = -ENOENT;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ count = -EINVAL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+out:
-+ kfree(data);
-+
-+ return count;
-+}
-+
-+static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
-+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-+{
-+ struct efivar_entry *var = file->private_data;
-+ struct efivars *efivars = var->efivars;
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+ unsigned long datasize = 0;
-+ u32 attributes;
-+ void *data;
-+ ssize_t size;
-+
-+ status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
-+ &var->var.VendorGuid,
-+ &attributes, &datasize, NULL);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ data = kmalloc(datasize + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
-+
-+ if (!data)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
-+ &var->var.VendorGuid,
-+ &attributes, &datasize,
-+ (data + 4));
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ memcpy(data, &attributes, 4);
-+ size = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos,
-+ data, datasize + 4);
-+ kfree(data);
-+
-+ return size;
-+}
-+
-+static void efivarfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
-+{
-+ clear_inode(inode);
-+}
-+
-+static const struct super_operations efivarfs_ops = {
-+ .statfs = simple_statfs,
-+ .drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
-+ .evict_inode = efivarfs_evict_inode,
-+ .show_options = generic_show_options,
-+};
-+
-+static struct super_block *efivarfs_sb;
-+
-+static const struct inode_operations efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
-+
-+static const struct file_operations efivarfs_file_operations = {
-+ .open = efivarfs_file_open,
-+ .read = efivarfs_file_read,
-+ .write = efivarfs_file_write,
-+ .llseek = no_llseek,
-+};
-+
-+static struct inode *efivarfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
-+ const struct inode *dir, int mode, dev_t dev)
-+{
-+ struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
-+
-+ if (inode) {
-+ inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
-+ inode->i_uid = inode->i_gid = 0;
-+ inode->i_mode = mode;
-+ inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
-+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
-+ case S_IFREG:
-+ inode->i_fop = &efivarfs_file_operations;
-+ break;
-+ case S_IFDIR:
-+ inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
-+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
-+ inc_nlink(inode);
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ return inode;
-+}
-+
-+static void efivarfs_hex_to_guid(const char *str, efi_guid_t *guid)
-+{
-+ guid->b[0] = hex_to_bin(str[6]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[7]);
-+ guid->b[1] = hex_to_bin(str[4]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[5]);
-+ guid->b[2] = hex_to_bin(str[2]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[3]);
-+ guid->b[3] = hex_to_bin(str[0]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[1]);
-+ guid->b[4] = hex_to_bin(str[11]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[12]);
-+ guid->b[5] = hex_to_bin(str[9]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[10]);
-+ guid->b[6] = hex_to_bin(str[16]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[17]);
-+ guid->b[7] = hex_to_bin(str[14]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[15]);
-+ guid->b[8] = hex_to_bin(str[19]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[20]);
-+ guid->b[9] = hex_to_bin(str[21]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[22]);
-+ guid->b[10] = hex_to_bin(str[24]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[25]);
-+ guid->b[11] = hex_to_bin(str[26]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[27]);
-+ guid->b[12] = hex_to_bin(str[28]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[29]);
-+ guid->b[13] = hex_to_bin(str[30]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[31]);
-+ guid->b[14] = hex_to_bin(str[32]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[33]);
-+ guid->b[15] = hex_to_bin(str[34]) << 4 | hex_to_bin(str[35]);
-+}
-+
-+static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+ umode_t mode, bool excl)
-+{
-+ struct inode *inode = efivarfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, 0);
-+ struct efivars *efivars = &__efivars;
-+ struct efivar_entry *var;
-+ int namelen, i = 0, err = 0;
-+
-+ if (dentry->d_name.len < 38)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if (!inode)
-+ return -ENOSPC;
-+
-+ var = kzalloc(sizeof(struct efivar_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-+
-+ if (!var)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ namelen = dentry->d_name.len - GUID_LEN;
-+
-+ efivarfs_hex_to_guid(dentry->d_name.name + namelen + 1,
-+ &var->var.VendorGuid);
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
-+ var->var.VariableName[i] = dentry->d_name.name[i];
-+
-+ var->var.VariableName[i] = '\0';
-+
-+ inode->i_private = var;
-+ var->efivars = efivars;
-+ var->kobj.kset = efivars->kset;
-+
-+ err = kobject_init_and_add(&var->kobj, &efivar_ktype, NULL, "%s",
-+ dentry->d_name.name);
-+ if (err)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ kobject_uevent(&var->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
-+ list_add(&var->list, &efivars->list);
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-+ d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
-+ dget(dentry);
-+out:
-+ if (err)
-+ kfree(var);
-+ return err;
-+}
-+
-+static int efivarfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+{
-+ struct efivar_entry *var = dentry->d_inode->i_private;
-+ struct efivars *efivars = var->efivars;
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
-+
-+ status = efivars->ops->set_variable(var->var.VariableName,
-+ &var->var.VendorGuid,
-+ 0, 0, NULL);
-+
-+ if (status == EFI_SUCCESS || status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
-+ list_del(&var->list);
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-+ efivar_unregister(var);
-+ drop_nlink(dir);
-+ dput(dentry);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+};
-+
-+int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
-+{
-+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
-+ struct dentry *root;
-+ struct efivar_entry *entry, *n;
-+ struct efivars *efivars = &__efivars;
-+ int err;
-+
-+ efivarfs_sb = sb;
-+
-+ sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
-+ sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
-+ sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
-+ sb->s_magic = PSTOREFS_MAGIC;
-+ sb->s_op = &efivarfs_ops;
-+ sb->s_time_gran = 1;
-+
-+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0);
-+ if (!inode) {
-+ err = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
-+
-+ root = d_make_root(inode);
-+ sb->s_root = root;
-+ if (!root) {
-+ err = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+
-+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &efivars->list, list) {
-+ struct inode *inode;
-+ struct dentry *dentry, *root = efivarfs_sb->s_root;
-+ char *name;
-+ unsigned long size = 0;
-+ int len, i;
-+
-+ len = utf16_strlen(entry->var.VariableName);
-+
-+ /* GUID plus trailing NULL */
-+ name = kmalloc(len + 38, GFP_ATOMIC);
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-+ name[i] = entry->var.VariableName[i] & 0xFF;
-+
-+ name[len] = '-';
-+
-+ efi_guid_unparse(&entry->var.VendorGuid, name + len + 1);
-+
-+ name[len+GUID_LEN] = '\0';
-+
-+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(efivarfs_sb, root->d_inode,
-+ S_IFREG | 0644, 0);
-+ dentry = d_alloc_name(root, name);
-+
-+ efivars->ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
-+ &entry->var.VendorGuid,
-+ &entry->var.Attributes,
-+ &size,
-+ NULL);
-+
-+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-+ inode->i_private = entry;
-+ i_size_write(inode, size+4);
-+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-+ d_add(dentry, inode);
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+fail:
-+ iput(inode);
-+ return err;
-+}
-+
-+static struct dentry *efivarfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
-+ int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
-+{
-+ return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, efivarfs_fill_super);
-+}
-+
-+static void efivarfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
-+{
-+ kill_litter_super(sb);
-+ efivarfs_sb = NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static struct file_system_type efivarfs_type = {
-+ .name = "efivarfs",
-+ .mount = efivarfs_mount,
-+ .kill_sb = efivarfs_kill_sb,
-+};
-+
-+static const struct inode_operations efivarfs_dir_inode_operations = {
-+ .lookup = simple_lookup,
-+ .unlink = efivarfs_unlink,
-+ .create = efivarfs_create,
-+};
-+
-+static struct pstore_info efi_pstore_info;
-+
- #ifdef CONFIG_PSTORE
-
- static int efi_pstore_open(struct pstore_info *psi)
-@@ -1198,6 +1571,8 @@ int register_efivars(struct efivars *efivars,
- pstore_register(&efivars->efi_pstore_info);
- }
-
-+ register_filesystem(&efivarfs_type);
-+
- out:
- kfree(variable_name);
-
-@@ -1205,9 +1580,6 @@ out:
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_efivars);
-
--static struct efivars __efivars;
--static struct efivar_operations ops;
--
- /*
- * For now we register the efi subsystem with the firmware subsystem
- * and the vars subsystem with the efi subsystem. In the future, it
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 8670eb1..b2af157 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -29,7 +29,12 @@
- #define EFI_UNSUPPORTED ( 3 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
- #define EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE ( 4 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
- #define EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ( 5 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
-+#define EFI_NOT_READY ( 6 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
-+#define EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ( 7 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
-+#define EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED ( 8 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
-+#define EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ( 9 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
- #define EFI_NOT_FOUND (14 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
-+#define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION (26 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
-
- typedef unsigned long efi_status_t;
- typedef u8 efi_bool_t;
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 2fc1dc88e97665c70f203f0132232ea55e8dd7eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 13:54:56 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 02/17] efi: Handle deletions and size changes in
- efivarfs_write_file
-
-A write to an efivarfs file will not always result in a variable of
-'count' size after the EFI SetVariable() call. We may have appended to
-the existing data (ie, with the EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute), or
-even have deleted the variable (with an authenticated variable update,
-with a zero datasize).
-
-This change re-reads the updated variable from firmware, to check for
-size changes and deletions. In the latter case, we need to drop the
-dentry.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index b605c48..d7658b4 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -658,6 +658,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- u32 attributes;
- struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
- int datasize = count - sizeof(attributes);
-+ unsigned long newdatasize;
-
- if (count < sizeof(attributes))
- return -EINVAL;
-@@ -696,32 +697,60 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
-
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_SUCCESS:
-- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-- i_size_write(inode, count);
-- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- break;
- case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
- count = -EINVAL;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
- count = -ENOSPC;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- count = -EIO;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
- count = -EROFS;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- count = -EACCES;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- count = -ENOENT;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- default:
- count = -EINVAL;
-- break;
-+ goto out;
- }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Writing to the variable may have caused a change in size (which
-+ * could either be an append or an overwrite), or the variable to be
-+ * deleted. Perform a GetVariable() so we can tell what actually
-+ * happened.
-+ */
-+ newdatasize = 0;
-+ status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
-+ &var->var.VendorGuid,
-+ NULL, &newdatasize,
-+ NULL);
-+
-+ if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-+ i_size_write(inode, newdatasize + sizeof(attributes));
-+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-+
-+ } else if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
-+ list_del(&var->list);
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-+ efivar_unregister(var);
-+ drop_nlink(inode);
-+ dput(file->f_dentry);
-+
-+ } else {
-+ pr_warn("efivarfs: inconsistent EFI variable implementation? "
-+ "status = %lx\n", status);
-+ }
-+
- out:
- kfree(data);
-
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From c98611fc95672862950c9bc4d6a3a4c4453a3c3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 13:54:56 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 03/17] efi: add efivars kobject to efi sysfs folder
-
-UEFI variable filesystem need a new mount point, so this patch add
-efivars kobject to efi_kobj for create a /sys/firmware/efi/efivars
-folder.
-
-Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
-Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 9 +++++++++
- include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index d7658b4..6793965 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -1527,6 +1527,7 @@ void unregister_efivars(struct efivars *efivars)
- sysfs_remove_bin_file(&efivars->kset->kobj, efivars->del_var);
- kfree(efivars->new_var);
- kfree(efivars->del_var);
-+ kobject_put(efivars->kobject);
- kset_unregister(efivars->kset);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_efivars);
-@@ -1558,6 +1559,14 @@ int register_efivars(struct efivars *efivars,
- goto out;
- }
-
-+ efivars->kobject = kobject_create_and_add("efivars", parent_kobj);
-+ if (!efivars->kobject) {
-+ pr_err("efivars: Subsystem registration failed.\n");
-+ error = -ENOMEM;
-+ kset_unregister(efivars->kset);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
- /*
- * Per EFI spec, the maximum storage allocated for both
- * the variable name and variable data is 1024 bytes.
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index b2af157..337aefb 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ struct efivars {
- spinlock_t lock;
- struct list_head list;
- struct kset *kset;
-+ struct kobject *kobject;
- struct bin_attribute *new_var, *del_var;
- const struct efivar_operations *ops;
- struct efivar_entry *walk_entry;
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 8ef5f49da57087022f2031820ceb3b1c6101d76c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2012 09:57:31 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/17] efivarfs: Add documentation for the EFI variable
- filesystem
-
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- Documentation/filesystems/00-INDEX | 2 ++
- Documentation/filesystems/efivarfs.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/efivarfs.txt
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/00-INDEX b/Documentation/filesystems/00-INDEX
-index 8c624a1..7b52ba7 100644
---- a/Documentation/filesystems/00-INDEX
-+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/00-INDEX
-@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ dnotify_test.c
- - example program for dnotify
- ecryptfs.txt
- - docs on eCryptfs: stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux.
-+efivarfs.txt
-+ - info for the efivarfs filesystem.
- exofs.txt
- - info, usage, mount options, design about EXOFS.
- ext2.txt
-diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/efivarfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/efivarfs.txt
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c477af0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/efivarfs.txt
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+
-+efivarfs - a (U)EFI variable filesystem
-+
-+The efivarfs filesystem was created to address the shortcomings of
-+using entries in sysfs to maintain EFI variables. The old sysfs EFI
-+variables code only supported variables of up to 1024 bytes. This
-+limitation existed in version 0.99 of the EFI specification, but was
-+removed before any full releases. Since variables can now be larger
-+than a single page, sysfs isn't the best interface for this.
-+
-+Variables can be created, deleted and modified with the efivarfs
-+filesystem.
-+
-+efivarfs is typically mounted like this,
-+
-+ mount -t efivarfs none /sys/firmware/efi/efivars
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From f69c39248e2f1eebf24f5ee55139602c56d15aec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:32:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/17] efivarfs: efivarfs_file_read ensure we free data in
- error paths
-
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 6793965..b7c9a32 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- unsigned long datasize = 0;
- u32 attributes;
- void *data;
-- ssize_t size;
-+ ssize_t size = 0;
-
- status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
- &var->var.VendorGuid,
-@@ -784,13 +784,13 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- &var->var.VendorGuid,
- &attributes, &datasize,
- (data + 4));
--
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-- return 0;
-+ goto out_free;
-
- memcpy(data, &attributes, 4);
- size = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos,
- data, datasize + 4);
-+out_free:
- kfree(data);
-
- return size;
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 429136e16c7c43bbebb8b8030203161a2d3fc3ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:32:18 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/17] efivarfs: efivarfs_create() ensure we drop our
- reference on inode on error
-
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index b7c9a32..6e5f367 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static void efivarfs_hex_to_guid(const char *str, efi_guid_t *guid)
- static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- umode_t mode, bool excl)
- {
-- struct inode *inode = efivarfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, 0);
-+ struct inode *inode;
- struct efivars *efivars = &__efivars;
- struct efivar_entry *var;
- int namelen, i = 0, err = 0;
-@@ -874,13 +874,15 @@ static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- if (dentry->d_name.len < 38)
- return -EINVAL;
-
-+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, 0);
- if (!inode)
- return -ENOSPC;
-
- var = kzalloc(sizeof(struct efivar_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
--
-- if (!var)
-- return -ENOMEM;
-+ if (!var) {
-+ err = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-
- namelen = dentry->d_name.len - GUID_LEN;
-
-@@ -908,8 +910,10 @@ static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
- dget(dentry);
- out:
-- if (err)
-+ if (err) {
- kfree(var);
-+ iput(inode);
-+ }
- return err;
- }
-
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 1a19268e8a4bae43c1feb3f71ee468c6bc70aca6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:32:19 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 07/17] efivarfs: efivarfs_fill_super() fix inode reference
- counts
-
-When d_make_root() fails it will automatically drop the reference
-on the root inode. We should not be doing so as well.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 16 ++++------------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 6e5f367..adfc486 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -948,7 +948,6 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- struct dentry *root;
- struct efivar_entry *entry, *n;
- struct efivars *efivars = &__efivars;
-- int err;
-
- efivarfs_sb = sb;
-
-@@ -960,18 +959,14 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- sb->s_time_gran = 1;
-
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0);
-- if (!inode) {
-- err = -ENOMEM;
-- goto fail;
-- }
-+ if (!inode)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
- inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
-
- root = d_make_root(inode);
- sb->s_root = root;
-- if (!root) {
-- err = -ENOMEM;
-- goto fail;
-- }
-+ if (!root)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &efivars->list, list) {
- struct inode *inode;
-@@ -1012,9 +1007,6 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- }
-
- return 0;
--fail:
-- iput(inode);
-- return err;
- }
-
- static struct dentry *efivarfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From f0d90a4024493aed6fc77ce5cd3b93f278fed9c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:32:20 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/17] efivarfs: efivarfs_fill_super() ensure we free our
- temporary name
-
-d_alloc_name() copies the passed name to new storage, once complete we
-no longer need our name.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index adfc486..36b3dd6 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -992,6 +992,8 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(efivarfs_sb, root->d_inode,
- S_IFREG | 0644, 0);
- dentry = d_alloc_name(root, name);
-+ /* copied by the above to local storage in the dentry. */
-+ kfree(name);
-
- efivars->ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
- &entry->var.VendorGuid,
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From c4cf244c318218153200d0011d8ef0ebcf3146ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:32:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/17] efivarfs: efivarfs_fill_super() ensure we clean up
- correctly on error
-
-Ensure we free both the name and inode on error when building the
-individual variables.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 36b3dd6..216086d 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -948,6 +948,7 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- struct dentry *root;
- struct efivar_entry *entry, *n;
- struct efivars *efivars = &__efivars;
-+ char *name;
-
- efivarfs_sb = sb;
-
-@@ -969,16 +970,18 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &efivars->list, list) {
-- struct inode *inode;
- struct dentry *dentry, *root = efivarfs_sb->s_root;
-- char *name;
- unsigned long size = 0;
- int len, i;
-
-+ inode = NULL;
-+
- len = utf16_strlen(entry->var.VariableName);
-
- /* GUID plus trailing NULL */
- name = kmalloc(len + 38, GFP_ATOMIC);
-+ if (!name)
-+ goto fail;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- name[i] = entry->var.VariableName[i] & 0xFF;
-@@ -991,7 +994,13 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
-
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(efivarfs_sb, root->d_inode,
- S_IFREG | 0644, 0);
-+ if (!inode)
-+ goto fail_name;
-+
- dentry = d_alloc_name(root, name);
-+ if (!dentry)
-+ goto fail_inode;
-+
- /* copied by the above to local storage in the dentry. */
- kfree(name);
-
-@@ -1009,6 +1018,13 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- }
-
- return 0;
-+
-+fail_inode:
-+ iput(inode);
-+fail_name:
-+ kfree(name);
-+fail:
-+ return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- static struct dentry *efivarfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From d3b7165568bcb50e4526c3dadda59e43f6681bc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 21:19:11 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 10/17] efivarfs: Implement exclusive access for
- {get,set}_variable
-
-Currently, efivarfs does not enforce exclusion over the get_variable and
-set_variable operations. Section 7.1 of UEFI requires us to only allow a
-single processor to enter {get,set}_variable services at once.
-
-This change acquires the efivars->lock over calls to these operations
-from the efivarfs paths.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 216086d..d478c56 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -690,35 +690,45 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- goto out;
- }
-
-+ /*
-+ * The lock here protects the get_variable call, the conditional
-+ * set_variable call, and removal of the variable from the efivars
-+ * list (in the case of an authenticated delete).
-+ */
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
-+
- status = efivars->ops->set_variable(var->var.VariableName,
- &var->var.VendorGuid,
- attributes, datasize,
- data);
-
-- switch (status) {
-- case EFI_SUCCESS:
-- break;
-- case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
-- count = -EINVAL;
-- goto out;
-- case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
-- count = -ENOSPC;
-- goto out;
-- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-- count = -EIO;
-- goto out;
-- case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
-- count = -EROFS;
-- goto out;
-- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-- count = -EACCES;
-- goto out;
-- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-- count = -ENOENT;
-- goto out;
-- default:
-- count = -EINVAL;
-- goto out;
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-+ kfree(data);
-+
-+ switch (status) {
-+ case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
-+ count = -EINVAL;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
-+ count = -ENOSPC;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-+ count = -EIO;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
-+ count = -EROFS;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-+ count = -EACCES;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-+ count = -ENOENT;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ count = -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+ return count;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -734,12 +744,12 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- NULL);
-
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- i_size_write(inode, newdatasize + sizeof(attributes));
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-
- } else if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
-- spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
- list_del(&var->list);
- spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
- efivar_unregister(var);
-@@ -747,6 +757,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- dput(file->f_dentry);
-
- } else {
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
- pr_warn("efivarfs: inconsistent EFI variable implementation? "
- "status = %lx\n", status);
- }
-@@ -768,9 +779,11 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- void *data;
- ssize_t size = 0;
-
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
- status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
- &var->var.VendorGuid,
- &attributes, &datasize, NULL);
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
- return 0;
-@@ -780,10 +793,13 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- if (!data)
- return 0;
-
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
- status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
- &var->var.VendorGuid,
- &attributes, &datasize,
- (data + 4));
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-+
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_free;
-
-@@ -1004,11 +1020,13 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- /* copied by the above to local storage in the dentry. */
- kfree(name);
-
-+ spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
- efivars->ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
- &entry->var.VendorGuid,
- &entry->var.Attributes,
- &size,
- NULL);
-+ spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- inode->i_private = entry;
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 90a462e9cf439a1987e0f9434d1f615addcc1970 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2012 15:16:45 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 11/17] efi: Clarify GUID length calculations
-
-At present, the handling of GUIDs in efivar file names isn't consistent.
-We use GUID_LEN in some places, and 38 in others (GUID_LEN plus
-separator), and implicitly use the presence of the trailing NUL.
-
-This change removes the trailing NUL from GUID_LEN, so that we're
-explicitly adding it when required. We also replace magic numbers
-with GUID_LEN, and clarify the comments where appropriate.
-
-We also fix the allocation size in efivar_create_sysfs_entry, where
-we're allocating one byte too much, due to counting the trailing NUL
-twice - once when calculating short_name_size, and once in the kzalloc.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index d478c56..a93e401 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -95,7 +95,12 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
- MODULE_VERSION(EFIVARS_VERSION);
-
- #define DUMP_NAME_LEN 52
--#define GUID_LEN 37
-+
-+/*
-+ * Length of a GUID string (strlen("aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee"))
-+ * not including trailing NUL
-+ */
-+#define GUID_LEN 36
-
- /*
- * The maximum size of VariableName + Data = 1024
-@@ -887,7 +892,11 @@ static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- struct efivar_entry *var;
- int namelen, i = 0, err = 0;
-
-- if (dentry->d_name.len < 38)
-+ /*
-+ * We need a GUID, plus at least one letter for the variable name,
-+ * plus the '-' separator
-+ */
-+ if (dentry->d_name.len < GUID_LEN + 2)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, 0);
-@@ -900,7 +909,8 @@ static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- goto out;
- }
-
-- namelen = dentry->d_name.len - GUID_LEN;
-+ /* length of the variable name itself: remove GUID and separator */
-+ namelen = dentry->d_name.len - GUID_LEN - 1;
-
- efivarfs_hex_to_guid(dentry->d_name.name + namelen + 1,
- &var->var.VendorGuid);
-@@ -994,8 +1004,8 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
-
- len = utf16_strlen(entry->var.VariableName);
-
-- /* GUID plus trailing NULL */
-- name = kmalloc(len + 38, GFP_ATOMIC);
-+ /* name, plus '-', plus GUID, plus NUL*/
-+ name = kmalloc(len + 1 + GUID_LEN + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!name)
- goto fail;
-
-@@ -1006,7 +1016,7 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
-
- efi_guid_unparse(&entry->var.VendorGuid, name + len + 1);
-
-- name[len+GUID_LEN] = '\0';
-+ name[len+GUID_LEN+1] = '\0';
-
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(efivarfs_sb, root->d_inode,
- S_IFREG | 0644, 0);
-@@ -1435,11 +1445,18 @@ efivar_create_sysfs_entry(struct efivars *efivars,
- efi_char16_t *variable_name,
- efi_guid_t *vendor_guid)
- {
-- int i, short_name_size = variable_name_size / sizeof(efi_char16_t) + 38;
-+ int i, short_name_size;
- char *short_name;
- struct efivar_entry *new_efivar;
-
-- short_name = kzalloc(short_name_size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ /*
-+ * Length of the variable bytes in ASCII, plus the '-' separator,
-+ * plus the GUID, plus trailing NUL
-+ */
-+ short_name_size = variable_name_size / sizeof(efi_char16_t)
-+ + 1 + GUID_LEN + 1;
-+
-+ short_name = kzalloc(short_name_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- new_efivar = kzalloc(sizeof(struct efivar_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!short_name || !new_efivar) {
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From ecbf90823d85ebb41e68e6be01f476862d184825 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 15:58:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 12/17] efivarfs: Return an error if we fail to read a
- variable
-
-Instead of always returning 0 in efivarfs_file_read(), even when we
-fail to successfully read the variable, convert the EFI status to
-something meaningful and return that to the caller. This way the user
-will have some hint as to why the read failed.
-
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index a93e401..277e426 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -653,6 +653,36 @@ static int efivarfs_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
- return 0;
- }
-
-+static int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status)
-+{
-+ int err;
-+
-+ switch (status) {
-+ case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
-+ err = -EINVAL;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
-+ err = -ENOSPC;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-+ err = -EIO;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
-+ err = -EROFS;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-+ err = -EACCES;
-+ break;
-+ case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-+ err = -ENOENT;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ err = -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return err;
-+}
-+
- static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- const char __user *userbuf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
- {
-@@ -711,29 +741,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
- kfree(data);
-
-- switch (status) {
-- case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
-- count = -EINVAL;
-- break;
-- case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
-- count = -ENOSPC;
-- break;
-- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-- count = -EIO;
-- break;
-- case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
-- count = -EROFS;
-- break;
-- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-- count = -EACCES;
-- break;
-- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-- count = -ENOENT;
-- break;
-- default:
-- count = -EINVAL;
-- }
-- return count;
-+ return efi_status_to_err(status);
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -791,12 +799,12 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
-- return 0;
-+ return efi_status_to_err(status);
-
- data = kmalloc(datasize + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!data)
-- return 0;
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-
- spin_lock(&efivars->lock);
- status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
-@@ -805,8 +813,10 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- (data + 4));
- spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-
-- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-+ size = efi_status_to_err(status);
- goto out_free;
-+ }
-
- memcpy(data, &attributes, 4);
- size = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos,
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 39210330739b943856ff21b29b4a0804f4e8349f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 15:23:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 13/17] efivarfs: Replace magic number with sizeof(attributes)
-
-Seeing "+ 4" littered throughout the functions gets a bit
-confusing. Use "sizeof(attributes)" which clearly explains what
-quantity we're adding.
-
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 277e426..2c04434 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
- return efi_status_to_err(status);
-
-- data = kmalloc(datasize + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ data = kmalloc(datasize + sizeof(attributes), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- status = efivars->ops->get_variable(var->var.VariableName,
- &var->var.VendorGuid,
- &attributes, &datasize,
-- (data + 4));
-+ (data + sizeof(attributes)));
- spin_unlock(&efivars->lock);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-@@ -818,9 +818,9 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
- goto out_free;
- }
-
-- memcpy(data, &attributes, 4);
-+ memcpy(data, &attributes, sizeof(attributes));
- size = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos,
-- data, datasize + 4);
-+ data, datasize + sizeof(attributes));
- out_free:
- kfree(data);
-
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 5555f0af6294b3675a95a06da23101150644936d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 15:51:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 14/17] efivarfs: Add unique magic number
-
-Using pstore's superblock magic number is no doubt going to cause
-problems in the future. Give efivarfs its own magic number.
-
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 2 +-
- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 2c04434..3b0cf9a 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
- sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
- sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
- sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
-- sb->s_magic = PSTOREFS_MAGIC;
-+ sb->s_magic = EFIVARFS_MAGIC;
- sb->s_op = &efivarfs_ops;
- sb->s_time_gran = 1;
-
-diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
-index e15192c..12f68c7 100644
---- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
-+++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
- #define ISOFS_SUPER_MAGIC 0x9660
- #define JFFS2_SUPER_MAGIC 0x72b6
- #define PSTOREFS_MAGIC 0x6165676C
-+#define EFIVARFS_MAGIC 0xde5e81e4
-
- #define MINIX_SUPER_MAGIC 0x137F /* minix v1 fs, 14 char names */
- #define MINIX_SUPER_MAGIC2 0x138F /* minix v1 fs, 30 char names */
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From a42845c67f2386b164d0c5d8220838d7faf5a409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 12:35:43 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 15/17] efivarfs: Make 'datasize' unsigned long
-
-There's no reason to declare 'datasize' as an int, since the majority
-of the functions it's passed to expect an unsigned long anyway. Plus,
-this way we avoid any sign problems during arithmetic.
-
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 3b0cf9a..6a858d1 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- void *data;
- u32 attributes;
- struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
-- int datasize = count - sizeof(attributes);
-+ unsigned long datasize = count - sizeof(attributes);
- unsigned long newdatasize;
-
- if (count < sizeof(attributes))
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From a268bdf6d7ce623ea4bdfcf39aa52ed3fbfdfd65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 12:41:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 16/17] efivarfs: Return a consistent error when
- efivarfs_get_inode() fails
-
-Instead of returning -ENOSPC if efivarfs_get_inode() fails we should
-be returning -ENOMEM, since running out of memory is the only reason
-it can fail. Furthermore, that's the error value used everywhere else
-in this file. It's also less likely to confuse users that hit this
-error case.
-
-Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 6a858d1..58cec62 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static int efivarfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, 0);
- if (!inode)
-- return -ENOSPC;
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-
- var = kzalloc(sizeof(struct efivar_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!var) {
---
-1.7.12.1
-
-
-From 9c3136c987175b179c0aa725d76cda156894f918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:18:53 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 17/17] efivarfs: Fix return value of efivarfs_file_write()
-
-We're stuffing a variable of type size_t (unsigned) into a ssize_t
-(signed) which, even though both types should be the same number of
-bits, it's just asking for sign issues to be introduced.
-
-Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jeremy.kerr@canonical.com>
-Reported-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
-Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
----
- drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 13 ++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-index 58cec62..9ac9340 100644
---- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-+++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c
-@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
- unsigned long datasize = count - sizeof(attributes);
- unsigned long newdatasize;
-+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
-
- if (count < sizeof(attributes))
- return -EINVAL;
-@@ -706,22 +707,22 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- efivars = var->efivars;
-
- if (copy_from_user(&attributes, userbuf, sizeof(attributes))) {
-- count = -EFAULT;
-+ bytes = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (attributes & ~(EFI_VARIABLE_MASK)) {
-- count = -EINVAL;
-+ bytes = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (copy_from_user(data, userbuf + sizeof(attributes), datasize)) {
-- count = -EFAULT;
-+ bytes = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (validate_var(&var->var, data, datasize) == false) {
-- count = -EINVAL;
-+ bytes = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
-@@ -744,6 +745,8 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- return efi_status_to_err(status);
- }
-
-+ bytes = count;
-+
- /*
- * Writing to the variable may have caused a change in size (which
- * could either be an append or an overwrite), or the variable to be
-@@ -778,7 +781,7 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,
- out:
- kfree(data);
-
-- return count;
-+ return bytes;
- }
-
- static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
---
-1.7.12.1
-
diff --git a/exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch b/exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5198824ed..000000000
--- a/exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-From 6752ab4cb863fc63ed85f1ca78a42235c09fad83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 09:07:50 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
-
-If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
-unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
-into the command line.
-
-Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
-However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
-bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching binfmt
-modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc does
-not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp pointing to their
-local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is left pointing into
-unused stack memory which can then be copied into the userspace argv
-areas.
-
-After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
-the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
-such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
-
-This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
-bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
-value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
-binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
-
-For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
-http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
-
-Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
-Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
----
- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 5 ++++-
- fs/binfmt_script.c | 4 +++-
- fs/exec.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- include/linux/binfmts.h | 1 +
- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
-index 790b3cd..772428d 100644
---- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c
-+++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
-@@ -176,7 +176,10 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
- goto _error;
- bprm->argc ++;
-
-- bprm->interp = iname; /* for binfmt_script */
-+ /* Update interp in case binfmt_script needs it. */
-+ retval = bprm_change_interp(iname, bprm);
-+ if (retval < 0)
-+ goto _error;
-
- interp_file = open_exec (iname);
- retval = PTR_ERR (interp_file);
-diff --git a/fs/binfmt_script.c b/fs/binfmt_script.c
-index d3b8c1f..df49d48 100644
---- a/fs/binfmt_script.c
-+++ b/fs/binfmt_script.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,9 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
- retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &i_name, bprm);
- if (retval) return retval;
- bprm->argc++;
-- bprm->interp = interp;
-+ retval = bprm_change_interp(interp, bprm);
-+ if (retval < 0)
-+ return retval;
-
- /*
- * OK, now restart the process with the interpreter's dentry.
-diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
-index 0039055..c6e6de4 100644
---- a/fs/exec.c
-+++ b/fs/exec.c
-@@ -1175,9 +1175,24 @@ void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
- mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
- abort_creds(bprm->cred);
- }
-+ /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */
-+ if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
-+ kfree(bprm->interp);
- kfree(bprm);
- }
-
-+int bprm_change_interp(char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-+{
-+ /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it first. */
-+ if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
-+ kfree(bprm->interp);
-+ bprm->interp = kstrdup(interp, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!bprm->interp)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
-+
- /*
- * install the new credentials for this executable
- */
-diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
-index cfcc6bf..de0628e 100644
---- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
-+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
-@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ extern int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm * bprm,
- unsigned long stack_top,
- int executable_stack);
- extern int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-+extern int bprm_change_interp(char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- extern int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *argv,
- struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- extern int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
---
-1.8.0
-
diff --git a/exec-use-eloop-for-max-recursion-depth.patch b/exec-use-eloop-for-max-recursion-depth.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a3c48884f..000000000
--- a/exec-use-eloop-for-max-recursion-depth.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-From ba1b23d05259e31d30a78017cdfbc010dcb08aa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 09:02:11 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] exec: use -ELOOP for max recursion depth
-
-To avoid an explosion of request_module calls on a chain of abusive
-scripts, fail maximum recursion with -ELOOP instead of -ENOEXEC. As soon
-as maximum recursion depth is hit, the error will fail all the way back
-up the chain, aborting immediately.
-
-This also has the side-effect of stopping the user's shell from attempting
-to reexecute the top-level file as a shell script. As seen in the
-dash source:
-
- if (cmd != path_bshell && errno == ENOEXEC) {
- *argv-- = cmd;
- *argv = cmd = path_bshell;
- goto repeat;
- }
-
-The above logic was designed for running scripts automatically that lacked
-the "#!" header, not to re-try failed recursion. On a legitimate -ENOEXEC,
-things continue to behave as the shell expects.
-
-Additionally, when tracking recursion, the binfmt handlers should not be
-involved. The recursion being tracked is the depth of calls through
-search_binary_handler(), so that function should be exclusively responsible
-for tracking the depth.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
-Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
----
- fs/binfmt_em86.c | 1 -
- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 6 ------
- fs/binfmt_script.c | 4 +---
- fs/exec.c | 10 +++++-----
- include/linux/binfmts.h | 2 --
- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/binfmt_em86.c b/fs/binfmt_em86.c
-index 2790c7e..575796a 100644
---- a/fs/binfmt_em86.c
-+++ b/fs/binfmt_em86.c
-@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ static int load_em86(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
- return -ENOEXEC;
- }
-
-- bprm->recursion_depth++; /* Well, the bang-shell is implicit... */
- allow_write_access(bprm->file);
- fput(bprm->file);
- bprm->file = NULL;
-diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
-index 772428d..f0f1a06 100644
---- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c
-+++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
-@@ -117,10 +117,6 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
- if (!enabled)
- goto _ret;
-
-- retval = -ENOEXEC;
-- if (bprm->recursion_depth > BINPRM_MAX_RECURSION)
-- goto _ret;
--
- /* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */
- read_lock(&entries_lock);
- fmt = check_file(bprm);
-@@ -200,8 +196,6 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
- if (retval < 0)
- goto _error;
-
-- bprm->recursion_depth++;
--
- retval = search_binary_handler (bprm, regs);
- if (retval < 0)
- goto _error;
-diff --git a/fs/binfmt_script.c b/fs/binfmt_script.c
-index df49d48..8ae4be1 100644
---- a/fs/binfmt_script.c
-+++ b/fs/binfmt_script.c
-@@ -22,15 +22,13 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
- char interp[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE];
- int retval;
-
-- if ((bprm->buf[0] != '#') || (bprm->buf[1] != '!') ||
-- (bprm->recursion_depth > BINPRM_MAX_RECURSION))
-+ if ((bprm->buf[0] != '#') || (bprm->buf[1] != '!'))
- return -ENOEXEC;
- /*
- * This section does the #! interpretation.
- * Sorta complicated, but hopefully it will work. -TYT
- */
-
-- bprm->recursion_depth++;
- allow_write_access(bprm->file);
- fput(bprm->file);
- bprm->file = NULL;
-diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
-index c6e6de4..85c1f9e 100644
---- a/fs/exec.c
-+++ b/fs/exec.c
-@@ -1371,6 +1371,10 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
- struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
- pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
-
-+ /* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
-+ if (depth > 5)
-+ return -ELOOP;
-+
- retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
- if (retval)
- return retval;
-@@ -1395,12 +1399,8 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
- if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
- continue;
- read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
-+ bprm->recursion_depth = depth + 1;
- retval = fn(bprm, regs);
-- /*
-- * Restore the depth counter to its starting value
-- * in this call, so we don't have to rely on every
-- * load_binary function to restore it on return.
-- */
- bprm->recursion_depth = depth;
- if (retval >= 0) {
- if (depth == 0) {
-diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
-index de0628e..54135f6 100644
---- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
-+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
-@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ struct linux_binprm {
- #define BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD_BIT 1
- #define BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD_BIT)
-
--#define BINPRM_MAX_RECURSION 4
--
- /* Function parameter for binfmt->coredump */
- struct coredump_params {
- siginfo_t *siginfo;
---
-1.8.0
-
diff --git a/handle-efi-roms.patch b/handle-efi-roms.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bc080542b..000000000
--- a/handle-efi-roms.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c 2012-08-22 15:26:32.485522068 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c 2012-08-22 15:25:40.529244868 -0400
-@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
- #include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <linux/pci.h>
- #include <asm/efi.h>
- #include <asm/setup.h>
- #include <asm/desc.h>
-@@ -243,6 +244,121 @@
- *size = len;
- }
-
-+static efi_status_t setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params)
-+{
-+ efi_pci_io_protocol *pci;
-+ efi_status_t status;
-+ void **pci_handle;
-+ efi_guid_t pci_proto = EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL_GUID;
-+ unsigned long nr_pci, size = 0;
-+ int i;
-+ struct setup_data *data;
-+
-+ data = (struct setup_data *)params->hdr.setup_data;
-+
-+ while (data && data->next)
-+ data = (struct setup_data *)data->next;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->boottime->locate_handle,
-+ EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL, &pci_proto,
-+ NULL, &size, pci_handle);
-+
-+ if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+ status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool,
-+ EFI_LOADER_DATA, size, &pci_handle);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ return status;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->boottime->locate_handle,
-+ EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL, &pci_proto,
-+ NULL, &size, pci_handle);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto free_handle;
-+
-+ nr_pci = size / sizeof(void *);
-+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pci; i++) {
-+ void *h = pci_handle[i];
-+ uint64_t attributes;
-+ struct pci_setup_rom *rom;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->handle_protocol,
-+ h, &pci_proto, &pci);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ if (!pci)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys4(pci->attributes, pci,
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationGet, 0,
-+ &attributes);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ if (!attributes & EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_EMBEDDED_ROM)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ if (!pci->romimage || !pci->romsize)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ size = pci->romsize + sizeof(*rom);
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool,
-+ EFI_LOADER_DATA, size, &rom);
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ rom->data.type = SETUP_PCI;
-+ rom->data.len = size - sizeof(struct setup_data);
-+ rom->data.next = NULL;
-+ rom->pcilen = pci->romsize;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(pci->pci.read, pci,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthUint16, PCI_VENDOR_ID,
-+ 1, &(rom->vendor));
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto free_struct;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(pci->pci.read, pci,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthUint16, PCI_DEVICE_ID,
-+ 1, &(rom->devid));
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto free_struct;
-+
-+ status = efi_call_phys5(pci->get_location, pci,
-+ &(rom->segment), &(rom->bus),
-+ &(rom->device), &(rom->function));
-+
-+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-+ goto free_struct;
-+
-+ memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
-+
-+ if (data)
-+ data->next = (uint64_t)rom;
-+ else
-+ params->hdr.setup_data = (uint64_t)rom;
-+
-+ data = (struct setup_data *)rom;
-+
-+ continue;
-+ free_struct:
-+ efi_call_phys1(sys_table->boottime->free_pool, rom);
-+ }
-+
-+free_handle:
-+ efi_call_phys1(sys_table->boottime->free_pool, pci_handle);
-+ return status;
-+}
-+
- /*
- * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol
- */
-@@ -1052,6 +1171,8 @@
-
- setup_graphics(boot_params);
-
-+ setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
-+
- status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool,
- EFI_LOADER_DATA, sizeof(*gdt),
- (void **)&gdt);
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h 2012-08-22 15:26:32.485522068 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h 2012-08-22 15:25:40.530244882 -0400
-@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- #define SETUP_NONE 0
- #define SETUP_E820_EXT 1
- #define SETUP_DTB 2
-+#define SETUP_PCI 3
-
- /* extensible setup data list node */
- struct setup_data {
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/pci.h ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/pci.h
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/pci.h 2012-07-21 16:58:29.000000000 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/include/asm/pci.h 2012-08-22 15:25:40.530244882 -0400
-@@ -171,4 +171,16 @@
- }
- #endif
-
-+struct pci_setup_rom {
-+ struct setup_data data;
-+ uint16_t vendor;
-+ uint16_t devid;
-+ uint64_t pcilen;
-+ unsigned long segment;
-+ unsigned long bus;
-+ unsigned long device;
-+ unsigned long function;
-+ uint8_t romdata[0];
-+};
-+
- #endif /* _ASM_X86_PCI_H */
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/pci/common.c ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/pci/common.c
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/pci/common.c 2012-08-22 15:24:45.477951182 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/arch/x86/pci/common.c 2012-08-22 15:25:40.530244882 -0400
-@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
- #include <asm/io.h>
- #include <asm/smp.h>
- #include <asm/pci_x86.h>
-+#include <asm/setup.h>
-
- unsigned int pci_probe = PCI_PROBE_BIOS | PCI_PROBE_CONF1 | PCI_PROBE_CONF2 |
- PCI_PROBE_MMCONF;
-@@ -608,6 +609,38 @@
- return (pci_probe & PCI_ASSIGN_ALL_BUSSES) ? 1 : 0;
- }
-
-+int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
-+{
-+ struct setup_data *data;
-+ struct pci_setup_rom *rom;
-+ u64 pa_data;
-+
-+ if (boot_params.hdr.version < 0x0209)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
-+ while (pa_data) {
-+ data = phys_to_virt(pa_data);
-+
-+ if (data->type == SETUP_PCI) {
-+ rom = (struct pci_setup_rom *)data;
-+
-+ if ((pci_domain_nr(dev->bus) == rom->segment) &&
-+ (dev->bus->number == rom->bus) &&
-+ (PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn) == rom->device) &&
-+ (PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn) == rom->function) &&
-+ (dev->vendor == rom->vendor) &&
-+ (dev->device == rom->devid)) {
-+ dev->rom = (void *)(pa_data +
-+ offsetof(struct pci_setup_rom, romdata));
-+ dev->romlen = rom->pcilen;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ pa_data = data->next;
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- int pcibios_enable_device(struct pci_dev *dev, int mask)
- {
- int err;
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/bus.c ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/bus.c
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/bus.c 2012-08-22 15:24:47.425961575 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/bus.c 2012-08-22 15:26:20.147456241 -0400
-@@ -166,6 +166,11 @@
- int retval;
-
- pci_fixup_device(pci_fixup_final, dev);
-+
-+ retval = pcibios_add_device(dev);
-+ if (retval)
-+ return retval;
-+
- retval = device_add(&dev->dev);
- if (retval)
- return retval;
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/pci.c ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/pci.c
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/pci.c 2012-08-22 15:24:47.432961612 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/pci.c 2012-08-22 15:25:40.531244893 -0400
-@@ -1385,6 +1385,19 @@
- dr->pinned = 1;
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * pcibios_add_device - provide arch specific hooks when adding device dev
-+ * @dev: the PCI device being added
-+ *
-+ * Permits the platform to provide architecture specific functionality when
-+ * devices are added. This is the default implementation. Architecture
-+ * implementations can override this.
-+ */
-+int __attribute__ ((weak)) pcibios_add_device (struct pci_dev *dev)
-+{
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- /**
- * pcibios_disable_device - disable arch specific PCI resources for device dev
- * @dev: the PCI device to disable
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/rom.c ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/rom.c
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/rom.c 2012-07-21 16:58:29.000000000 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/drivers/pci/rom.c 2012-08-22 15:25:40.531244893 -0400
-@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@
- /* primary video rom always starts here */
- start = (loff_t)0xC0000;
- *size = 0x20000; /* cover C000:0 through E000:0 */
-+ /*
-+ * Some devices may provide ROMs via a source other than the BAR
-+ */
-+ } else if (pdev->rom && pdev->romlen) {
-+ *size = pdev->romlen;
-+ return phys_to_virt(pdev->rom);
- } else {
- if (res->flags &
- (IORESOURCE_ROM_COPY | IORESOURCE_ROM_BIOS_COPY)) {
-@@ -219,7 +225,8 @@
- if (res->flags & (IORESOURCE_ROM_COPY | IORESOURCE_ROM_BIOS_COPY))
- return;
-
-- iounmap(rom);
-+ if (!pdev->rom || !pdev->romlen)
-+ iounmap(rom);
-
- /* Disable again before continuing, leave enabled if pci=rom */
- if (!(res->flags & (IORESOURCE_ROM_ENABLE | IORESOURCE_ROM_SHADOW)))
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/efi.h ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/efi.h
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/efi.h 2012-08-22 15:24:49.550972911 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/efi.h 2012-08-22 15:25:40.533244906 -0400
-@@ -196,6 +196,77 @@
- void *create_event_ex;
- } efi_boot_services_t;
-
-+typedef enum {
-+ EfiPciIoWidthUint8,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthUint16,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthUint32,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthUint64,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFifoUint8,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFifoUint16,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFifoUint32,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFifoUint64,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFillUint8,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFillUint16,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFillUint32,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthFillUint64,
-+ EfiPciIoWidthMaximum
-+} EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL_WIDTH;
-+
-+typedef enum {
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationGet,
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationSet,
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationEnable,
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationDisable,
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationSupported,
-+ EfiPciIoAttributeOperationMaximum
-+} EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL_ATTRIBUTE_OPERATION;
-+
-+
-+typedef struct {
-+ void *read;
-+ void *write;
-+} efi_pci_io_protocol_access_t;
-+
-+typedef struct {
-+ void *poll_mem;
-+ void *poll_io;
-+ efi_pci_io_protocol_access_t mem;
-+ efi_pci_io_protocol_access_t io;
-+ efi_pci_io_protocol_access_t pci;
-+ void *copy_mem;
-+ void *map;
-+ void *unmap;
-+ void *allocate_buffer;
-+ void *free_buffer;
-+ void *flush;
-+ void *get_location;
-+ void *attributes;
-+ void *get_bar_attributes;
-+ void *set_bar_attributes;
-+ uint64_t romsize;
-+ void *romimage;
-+} efi_pci_io_protocol;
-+
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_ISA_MOTHERBOARD_IO 0x0001
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_ISA_IO 0x0002
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_PALETTE_IO 0x0004
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_MEMORY 0x0008
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_IO 0x0010
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_IDE_PRIMARY_IO 0x0020
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_IDE_SECONDARY_IO 0x0040
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_MEMORY_WRITE_COMBINE 0x0080
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_IO 0x0100
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_MEMORY 0x0200
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_BUS_MASTER 0x0400
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_MEMORY_CACHED 0x0800
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_MEMORY_DISABLE 0x1000
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_EMBEDDED_DEVICE 0x2000
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_EMBEDDED_ROM 0x4000
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_DUAL_ADDRESS_CYCLE 0x8000
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_ISA_IO_16 0x10000
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_PALETTE_IO_16 0x20000
-+#define EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_VGA_IO_16 0x40000
-+
- /*
- * Types and defines for EFI ResetSystem
- */
-diff -ur linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/pci.h ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/pci.h
---- linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/pci.h 2012-08-22 15:24:48.703968392 -0400
-+++ ../kernel-3.5.fc18.bak/linux-3.6.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc18.x86_64/include/linux/pci.h 2012-08-22 15:25:40.534244910 -0400
-@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@
- };
- struct pci_ats *ats; /* Address Translation Service */
- #endif
-+ void *rom; /* Physical pointer to ROM if it's not from the BAR */
-+ size_t romlen; /* Length of ROM if it's not from the BAR */
- };
-
- static inline struct pci_dev *pci_physfn(struct pci_dev *dev)
-@@ -1582,6 +1584,7 @@
- void pcibios_set_master(struct pci_dev *dev);
- int pcibios_set_pcie_reset_state(struct pci_dev *dev,
- enum pcie_reset_state state);
-+int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev);
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG
- extern void __init pci_mmcfg_early_init(void);
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 140c977a5..92f286b6e 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# For a stable, released kernel, released_kernel should be 1. For rawhide
# and/or a kernel built from an rc or git snapshot, released_kernel should
# be 0.
-%global released_kernel 1
+%global released_kernel 0
# Sign modules on x86. Make sure the config files match this setting if more
# architectures are added.
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
# gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
#
-%global baserelease 7
+%global baserelease 1
%global fedora_build %{baserelease}
# base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# The next upstream release sublevel (base_sublevel+1)
%define upstream_sublevel %(echo $((%{base_sublevel} + 1)))
# The rc snapshot level
-%define rcrev 8
+%define rcrev 2
# The git snapshot level
-%define gitrev 0
+%define gitrev 1
# Set rpm version accordingly
%define rpmversion 3.%{upstream_sublevel}.0
%endif
@@ -654,8 +654,6 @@ Patch04: linux-2.6-compile-fixes.patch
# build tweak for build ID magic, even for -vanilla
Patch05: linux-2.6-makefile-after_link.patch
-Patch06: power-x86-destdir.patch
-
%if !%{nopatches}
@@ -690,14 +688,9 @@ Patch700: linux-2.6-e1000-ich9-montevina.patch
Patch800: linux-2.6-crash-driver.patch
# crypto/
-Patch900: modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
# secure boot
-Patch1000: secure-boot-20121212.patch
-Patch1001: efivarfs-3.7.patch
-
-# Improve PCI support on UEFI
-Patch1100: handle-efi-roms.patch
+Patch1000: secure-boot-20130104.patch
# virt + ksm patches
@@ -763,21 +756,9 @@ Patch22001: selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch
# Build patch, should go away
Patch22070: irqnr-build.patch
-#rhbz 874791
-Patch22125: Bluetooth-Add-support-for-BCM20702A0.patch
-
#rhbz 859485
Patch21226: vt-Drop-K_OFF-for-VC_MUTE.patch
-#rhbz CVE-2012-4530 868285 880147
-Patch21228: exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch
-Patch21229: exec-use-eloop-for-max-recursion-depth.patch
-
-#rhbz 851278
-Patch21234: Revert-8139cp-revert-set-ring-address-before-enabling.patch
-Patch21232: 8139cp-set-ring-address-after-enabling-C-mode.patch
-Patch21233: 8139cp-re-enable-interrupts-after-tx-timeout.patch
-
#rhbz 883414
Patch21236: mac80211-fix-ibss-scanning.patch
@@ -1333,8 +1314,6 @@ ApplyPatch linux-2.6-makefile-after_link.patch
#
ApplyOptionalPatch linux-2.6-compile-fixes.patch
-ApplyPatch power-x86-destdir.patch
-
%if !%{nopatches}
# revert patches from upstream that conflict or that we get via other means
@@ -1352,11 +1331,11 @@ ApplyPatch vmbugon-warnon.patch
#
ApplyPatch arm-export-read_current_timer.patch
ApplyPatch arm-allnoconfig-error-__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__-undeclared.patch
-ApplyPatch arm-omapdrm-fixinc.patch
+# ApplyPatch arm-omapdrm-fixinc.patch
ApplyPatch arm-imx-fixdrm.patch
-ApplyPatch arm-tegra-nvec-kconfig.patch
+# ApplyPatch arm-tegra-nvec-kconfig.patch
ApplyPatch arm-tegra-usb-no-reset-linux33.patch
-ApplyPatch arm-tegra-sdhci-module-fix.patch
+# ApplyPatch arm-tegra-sdhci-module-fix.patch
#
# bugfixes to drivers and filesystems
@@ -1424,14 +1403,9 @@ ApplyPatch linux-2.6-crash-driver.patch
ApplyPatch linux-2.6-e1000-ich9-montevina.patch
# crypto/
-ApplyPatch modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
# secure boot
-ApplyPatch efivarfs-3.7.patch
-ApplyPatch secure-boot-20121212.patch
-
-# Improved PCI support for UEFI
-ApplyPatch handle-efi-roms.patch
+ApplyPatch secure-boot-20130104.patch
# Assorted Virt Fixes
@@ -1481,21 +1455,9 @@ ApplyPatch selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch
#Build patch, should go away
ApplyPatch irqnr-build.patch
-#rhbz 874791
-ApplyPatch Bluetooth-Add-support-for-BCM20702A0.patch
-
#rhbz 859485
ApplyPatch vt-Drop-K_OFF-for-VC_MUTE.patch
-#rhbz CVE-2012-4530 868285 880147
-ApplyPatch exec-do-not-leave-bprm-interp-on-stack.patch
-ApplyPatch exec-use-eloop-for-max-recursion-depth.patch
-
-#rhbz 851278
-ApplyPatch Revert-8139cp-revert-set-ring-address-before-enabling.patch
-ApplyPatch 8139cp-set-ring-address-after-enabling-C-mode.patch
-ApplyPatch 8139cp-re-enable-interrupts-after-tx-timeout.patch
-
#rhbz 883414
ApplyPatch mac80211-fix-ibss-scanning.patch
@@ -2368,6 +2330,12 @@ fi
# ||----w |
# || ||
%changelog
+* Fri Jan 04 2013 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com> - 3.8.0-0.rc2.git1.1
+- Linux v3.8-rc2-116-g5f243b9
+
+* Thu Jan 03 2013 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>
+- Initial 3.8-rc2 rebase
+
* Wed Jan 02 2013 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
- BR the hostname package (rhbz 886113)
diff --git a/modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch b/modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1bafd22f5..000000000
--- a/modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-From 56713a28675b966e027a824a0130b80dffab209f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 09:09:24 +1030
-Subject: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Add modules_sign make target
-
-If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, and 'make modules_sign' is called then this
-patch will cause the modules to get a signature appended. The make target
-is intended to be run after 'make modules_install', and will modify the
-modules in-place in the installed location. It can be used to produce
-signed modules after they have been processed by distribution build
-scripts.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (minor typo fix)
----
- Makefile | 6 ++++++
- scripts/Makefile.modsign | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.modsign
-
-diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 42d0e56..253aa1b 100644
---- a/Makefile
-+++ b/Makefile
-@@ -981,6 +981,12 @@ _modinst_post: _modinst_
- $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/scripts/Makefile.fwinst obj=firmware __fw_modinst
- $(call cmd,depmod)
-
-+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG), y)
-+PHONY += modules_sign
-+modules_sign:
-+ $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/scripts/Makefile.modsign
-+endif
-+
- else # CONFIG_MODULES
-
- # Modules not configured
-diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modsign b/scripts/Makefile.modsign
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..abfda62
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/scripts/Makefile.modsign
-@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
-+# ==========================================================================
-+# Signing modules
-+# ==========================================================================
-+
-+PHONY := __modsign
-+__modsign:
-+
-+include scripts/Kbuild.include
-+
-+__modules := $(sort $(shell grep -h '\.ko' /dev/null $(wildcard $(MODVERDIR)/*.mod)))
-+modules := $(patsubst %.o,%.ko,$(wildcard $(__modules:.ko=.o)))
-+
-+PHONY += $(modules)
-+__modsign: $(modules)
-+ @:
-+
-+quiet_cmd_sign_ko = SIGN [M] $(2)/$(notdir $@)
-+ cmd_sign_ko = $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@)
-+
-+# Modules built outside the kernel source tree go into extra by default
-+INSTALL_MOD_DIR ?= extra
-+ext-mod-dir = $(INSTALL_MOD_DIR)$(subst $(patsubst %/,%,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)),,$(@D))
-+
-+modinst_dir = $(if $(KBUILD_EXTMOD),$(ext-mod-dir),kernel/$(@D))
-+
-+$(modules):
-+ $(call cmd,sign_ko,$(MODLIB)/$(modinst_dir))
-+
-+# Declare the contents of the .PHONY variable as phony. We keep that
-+# information in a variable se we can use it in if_changed and friends.
-+
-+.PHONY: $(PHONY)
---
-1.7.7.6
-
diff --git a/power-x86-destdir.patch b/power-x86-destdir.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 97665314f..000000000
--- a/power-x86-destdir.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
-index f856495..984cc00 100644
---- a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
-@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-+DESTDIR ?=
-+
- turbostat : turbostat.c
- CFLAGS += -Wall
-
-@@ -5,5 +7,5 @@ clean :
- rm -f turbostat
-
- install :
-- install turbostat /usr/bin/turbostat
-- install turbostat.8 /usr/share/man/man8
-+ install turbostat ${DESTDIR}/usr/bin/turbostat
-+ install turbostat.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8
-diff --git a/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile b/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
-index f458237..f9824f0 100644
---- a/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
-@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
-+DESTDIR ?=
-+
- x86_energy_perf_policy : x86_energy_perf_policy.c
-
- clean :
- rm -f x86_energy_perf_policy
-
- install :
-- install x86_energy_perf_policy /usr/bin/
-- install x86_energy_perf_policy.8 /usr/share/man/man8/
-+ install x86_energy_perf_policy ${DESTDIR}/usr/bin/
-+ install x86_energy_perf_policy.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
diff --git a/secure-boot-20121212.patch b/secure-boot-20130104.patch
index 387302b90..a20851a3a 100644
--- a/secure-boot-20121212.patch
+++ b/secure-boot-20130104.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From d510ea864f470d96aafb75d0de7f09450407095e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 627d53fc0ed9c59fe79788e9101db814d096fdfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 01/20] Secure boot: Add new capability
+Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Secure boot: Add new capability
Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
@@ -35,294 +35,43 @@ index ba478fa..7109e65 100644
1.8.0.1
-From a07ae01ac4b304ac7f0e2b5d4193519f1a9eee8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 02/20] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
-
-Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
-userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
-arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can
-potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
- drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++-
- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-index f39378d..1db1e74 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
-@@ -546,6 +546,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
- loff_t init_off = off;
- u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (off > dev->cfg_size)
- return 0;
- if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
-@@ -852,6 +855,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
- resource_size_t start, end;
- int i;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
- if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
- break;
-@@ -959,6 +965,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
- struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
- loff_t off, size_t count)
- {
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
- }
-
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
-@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
- int size = dp->size;
- int cnt;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (pos >= size)
- return 0;
- if (nbytes >= size)
-@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
- #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
- int ret = 0;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- switch (cmd) {
- case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
- ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
-@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
- struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
- int i, ret;
-
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
-
- /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
-diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
---- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
-@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
- u32 dword;
- int err = 0;
-
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
-
- dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From 1b5a1b53577992b32a3f51b18aa07cb9b300a3b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 03/20] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
- environments
-
-IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
-registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
-space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
-it down by default.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
- drivers/char/mem.c | 3 +++
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
-
- if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
- return -EINVAL;
-- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
- return -EPERM;
-
- /*
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs)
- return -EINVAL;
- /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
- if (level > old) {
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
- }
- regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
-diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index 0537903..47501fc 100644
---- a/drivers/char/mem.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- unsigned long i = *ppos;
- const char __user * tmp = buf;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
- return -EFAULT;
- while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From 09c266136915eb1f4a9b36423b7ba65e3d024de4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 04/20] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
-
-It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
-under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
-access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644
---- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
- struct acpi_table_header table;
- acpi_status status;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (!(*ppos)) {
- /* parse the table header to get the table length */
- if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From f3e9cb16e5ab3e680ec3ef464682c52371bbbbe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 05/20] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
-
-We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
-given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
-be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
-kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-index c0e9ff4..3c10167 100644
---- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
-@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- int err;
- u32 retval = -1;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
-
- if (err < 0)
-@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- int err;
- u32 retval = -1;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
- &retval);
-
-@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
- union acpi_object *obj;
- acpi_status status;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
- 1, asus->debug.method_id,
- &input, &output);
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From 23372d2a40135aca7a6d73511bd88790b598b489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 06/20] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
+From 959fc919f8b9a94c1db9b9ba73901a23b1a81db5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 02/18] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
-Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
-to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
+Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux
+policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
+capability class.
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
- drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
-index 47501fc..8817cdc 100644
---- a/drivers/char/mem.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
-@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- unsigned long copied;
- void *ptr;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
- return -EFAULT;
-
-@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
- int err = 0;
-
-+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
- if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
- unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
- (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
+diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+index df2de54..70e2834 100644
+--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
++++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
+ { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
+ { "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
+ { "capability2",
+- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
+- NULL } },
++ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
++ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } },
+ { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
+ { "tun_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
--
1.8.0.1
-From a0c80b01e80a1f6484a2a2811b4a212322494614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From fc74142ccd8b8fd53fc92032c3cbfaa78e398133 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 07/20] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
+Subject: [PATCH 03/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
switch on Secure Boot mode
This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
@@ -336,10 +85,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-index 9776f06..0d6c28d 100644
+index 363e348..832b39b 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-@@ -2599,6 +2599,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
+@@ -2654,6 +2654,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
@@ -354,10 +103,10 @@ index 9776f06..0d6c28d 100644
If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
security module asking for security registration will be
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
-index 48cea3d..3f5be65 100644
+index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
-@@ -623,6 +623,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
+@@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
@@ -385,10 +134,10 @@ index 48cea3d..3f5be65 100644
1.8.0.1
-From 640f088c49da87a344417f58d3faa72d63a4f6ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5118ce1d16d6b3b00ad9f54ec1a5847fefe0e059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 08/20] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
+Subject: [PATCH 04/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
enabled in firmware
The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
@@ -397,11 +146,11 @@ down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++
- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++-
- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 +++
- include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++
+ Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++
+ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++-
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 +++
+ include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++
5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -418,10 +167,10 @@ index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
(array of struct e820entry)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-index e87b0ca..260cace 100644
+index b1942e2..1201907 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
-@@ -732,6 +732,36 @@ fail:
+@@ -848,6 +848,36 @@ fail:
return status;
}
@@ -458,7 +207,7 @@ index e87b0ca..260cace 100644
/*
* Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
* need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
-@@ -1026,6 +1056,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
+@@ -1142,6 +1172,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
goto fail;
@@ -466,12 +215,12 @@ index e87b0ca..260cace 100644
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
- status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool,
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
-index 2ad874c..c7338e0 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
-@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ struct boot_params {
+ setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+index 92862cd..422e056 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
@@ -482,7 +231,7 @@ index 2ad874c..c7338e0 100644
__u8 _pad7[0x290-0x1f1-sizeof(struct setup_header)];
__u32 edd_mbr_sig_buffer[EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX]; /* 0x290 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index ca45696..800673d 100644
+index 23ddd55..94203e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -962,6 +962,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@@ -496,10 +245,10 @@ index ca45696..800673d 100644
* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
-index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644
+index abb2cd5..4f9dea1 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
-@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
+@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern void __init cred_init(void);
@@ -512,211 +261,85 @@ index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644
1.8.0.1
-From 994d895b5b684fc53c3b43dda9aee460c1f526f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From adfec2043a2fb091f9f7da6dffdf1cf5aa1bdc3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 09/20] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
- boot environment
+Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:29:49 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 05/18] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot
+ is enabled
-This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This
-could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
-We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.
+There are a few cases where in-kernel functions may need to know if
+Secure Boot is enabled. The added capability check cannot be used as the
+kernel can't drop it's own capabilites, so we add a global variable
+similar to efi_enabled so they can determine if Secure Boot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 +++++-
+ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++
+ include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-index 9eaf708..f94341b 100644
---- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
- acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
- {
- #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
-- if (acpi_rsdp)
-+ if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return acpi_rsdp;
- #endif
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+index 94203e5..2b89b38 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -962,8 +962,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From c80aaf3eee3cb6b0d1a051e418ee99cd238c868c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 10/20] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
-
-Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux
-policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
-capability class.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-index df2de54..70e2834 100644
---- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
- { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
- { "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
- { "capability2",
-- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
-- NULL } },
-+ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
-+ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } },
- { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
- { "tun_socket",
- { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From 26352bcb92468233dd960b5d02ba1db344df72b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 11/20] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
-
-kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
-to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
-support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
-loading entirely in that situation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
-index 5e4bd78..dd464e0 100644
---- a/kernel/kexec.c
-+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
-@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
- int result;
+ io_delay_init();
- /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
-- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
-+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
- return -EPERM;
+- if (boot_params.secure_boot)
++ if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+ secureboot_enable();
++#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
++ secure_boot_enabled = 1;
++#endif
++ }
/*
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From c03c68adceaec9656c55c47190fb4243bf903b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:29:46 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 12/20] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove
- capability.disable
-
-Remove the documentation for capability.disable. The code supporting this
-parameter was removed with:
-
- commit 5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27
- Author: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
- Date: Thu Jul 3 20:56:05 2008 +0200
-
- security: remove dummy module
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ------
- 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-index 0d6c28d..d9af501 100644
---- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-@@ -446,12 +446,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
- possible to determine what the correct size should be.
- This option provides an override for these situations.
-
-- capability.disable=
-- [SECURITY] Disable capabilities. This would normally
-- be used only if an alternative security model is to be
-- configured. Potentially dangerous and should only be
-- used if you are entirely sure of the consequences.
--
- ccw_timeout_log [S390]
- See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
-
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From 3f1bda64d2c7b369e2833bd32cd1f3ba6c90348f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 13/20] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
- environment
-
-If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
-protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed
-with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for
-this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make
-this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++
- kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
-index 3f5be65..a381e27 100644
---- a/kernel/cred.c
-+++ b/kernel/cred.c
-@@ -623,11 +623,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
- 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- }
+ * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
+diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+index ad44391..d22bfeb 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
++++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
+ int efi_enabled;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_enabled);
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+extern bool sig_enforce;
-+#endif
++int secure_boot_enabled;
+
- void __init secureboot_enable()
- {
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
- cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
-+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-+ /* Enable module signature enforcing */
-+ sig_enforce = true;
-+#endif
- }
-
- /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
-diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
-index 6e48c3a..6d5d2aa 100644
---- a/kernel/module.c
-+++ b/kernel/module.c
-@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
- #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
--static bool sig_enforce = true;
-+bool sig_enforce = true;
+ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
+ .mps = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
+ .acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
+diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
+index 8b84916..7a1a53c 100644
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -625,11 +625,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
+ # ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ extern int efi_enabled;
+ extern bool efi_64bit;
++ extern int secure_boot_enabled;
+ # else
+ # define efi_enabled 1
++# define secure_boot_enabled 0
+ # endif
#else
--static bool sig_enforce = false;
-+bool sig_enforce = false;
+ # define efi_enabled 0
++# define secure_boot_enabled 0
+ #endif
- static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
- const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ /*
--
1.8.0.1
-From e6e3ec77b2fa037b32829e7f5ee468ad8a62dd05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 32c1c8077fe00d38db0e01b2200d17ab6c9b7263 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 14/20] Add EFI signature data types, such as are used for
- containing hashes, keys and certificates for cryptographic verification.
+Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Add EFI signature data types
+
+Add the data types that are used for containing hashes, keys and certificates
+for cryptographic verification.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
@@ -724,10 +347,10 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 337aefb..a01f8a7 100644
+index 7a1a53c..887b9f3 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -317,6 +317,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
+@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
@@ -740,7 +363,7 @@ index 337aefb..a01f8a7 100644
typedef struct {
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
-@@ -452,6 +458,20 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -523,6 +529,20 @@ typedef struct {
#define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR (~0UL)
@@ -765,11 +388,13 @@ index 337aefb..a01f8a7 100644
1.8.0.1
-From c2542256f632a22232cf02d5fd64568a5afa4516 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a270b377f37b16022625fe499f47b51ec29edce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 15/20] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader. X.509
- certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type keys.
+Subject: [PATCH 07/18] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.
+
+X.509 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type
+keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
@@ -810,7 +435,7 @@ index 0727204..cd8388e 100644
# X.509 Certificate handling
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..59b859a
+index 0000000..a0b8a3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
@@ -877,7 +502,7 @@ index 0000000..59b859a
+ elsize < esize ||
+ elsize % esize != 0) {
+ pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
-+ continue;
++ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
@@ -922,10 +547,10 @@ index 0000000..59b859a
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index a01f8a7..44a7faa 100644
+index 887b9f3..6b78779 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -541,6 +541,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
+@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
@@ -940,82 +565,10 @@ index a01f8a7..44a7faa 100644
1.8.0.1
-From a418e6fdd2aa946a30cf1bee5c9540d03d626981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:29:49 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 16/20] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot
- is enabled
-
-There are a few cases where in-kernel functions may need to know if
-Secure Boot is enabled. The added capability check cannot be used as the
-kernel can't drop it's own capabilites, so we add a global variable
-similar to efi_enabled so they can determine if Secure Boot is enabled.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 +++++-
- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++
- include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-index 800673d..cf8823b 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
-@@ -962,8 +962,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
-
- io_delay_init();
-
-- if (boot_params.secure_boot)
-+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
- secureboot_enable();
-+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
-+ secure_boot_enabled = 1;
-+#endif
-+ }
-
- /*
- * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
-diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
-index ad44391..d22bfeb 100644
---- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
- int efi_enabled;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_enabled);
-
-+int secure_boot_enabled;
-+
- struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
- .mps = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
- .acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index 44a7faa..b5403ae 100644
---- a/include/linux/efi.h
-+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -578,11 +578,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
- # ifdef CONFIG_X86
- extern int efi_enabled;
- extern bool efi_64bit;
-+ extern int secure_boot_enabled;
- # else
- # define efi_enabled 1
-+# define secure_boot_enabled 0
- # endif
- #else
- # define efi_enabled 0
-+# define secure_boot_enabled 0
- #endif
-
- /*
---
-1.8.0.1
-
-
-From f6d05f0974f6a7667ebbbf91624678bcf32169ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From cd19cf4fd5f2f8f1d423a48af845cad163170bc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 17/20] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
+Subject: [PATCH 08/18] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
@@ -1025,16 +578,16 @@ useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
- kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
kernel/module-internal.h | 3 +++
kernel/module_signing.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 6fdd6e3..7a9bf00 100644
+index 7d30240..4a0705e 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1602,6 +1602,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
+@@ -1665,6 +1665,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
@@ -1050,7 +603,7 @@ index 6fdd6e3..7a9bf00 100644
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-index 767e559..3bfb7ed 100644
+index 2b6e699..4cd408d 100644
--- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
+++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
@@ -1063,22 +616,19 @@ index 767e559..3bfb7ed 100644
extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
-@@ -52,6 +55,20 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void)
- if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
- panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n");
+@@ -43,6 +46,17 @@ static __init int module_verify_init(void)
+ if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
-+ modsign_blacklist = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".modsign_blacklist",
++ modsign_blacklist = keyring_alloc(".modsign_blacklist",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+ current_cred(),
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
-+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
++ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(modsign_blacklist))
+ panic("Can't allocate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
-+
-+ if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_blacklist, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-+ panic("Can't instantiate module signing blacklist keyring\n");
+#endif
+
return 0;
@@ -1098,7 +648,7 @@ index 24f9247..51a8380 100644
extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
-index f2970bd..8ab83a6 100644
+index f2970bd..4654e94 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
@@ -1125,7 +675,7 @@ index f2970bd..8ab83a6 100644
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+ }
+#endif
-+
++
key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
@@ -1133,10 +683,10 @@ index f2970bd..8ab83a6 100644
1.8.0.1
-From ff0ed221fe8d5a46a9bc36323ca8fb6f75c22a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a407acb4318d02658ba2447e653561ab9b1c3a99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 18/20] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
+Subject: [PATCH 09/18] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring. This
@@ -1161,10 +711,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
-index b5403ae..bba53e3 100644
+index 6b78779..a395dff 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
-@@ -323,6 +323,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
+@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
@@ -1178,10 +728,10 @@ index b5403ae..bba53e3 100644
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 7a9bf00..51aa170 100644
+index 4a0705e..984b316 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1610,6 +1610,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
+@@ -1673,6 +1673,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
should not pass module signature verification. If a module is
signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
@@ -1198,18 +748,18 @@ index 7a9bf00..51aa170 100644
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index 86e3285..12e17ab 100644
+index 6c072b6..8848829 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
-@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
+@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
$(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
@@ -1318,10 +868,420 @@ index 0000000..76a5a34
1.8.0.1
-From 7d5629a2000d9dc92da91d2f1258af748e89cfd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 289a4c7fae985fbb476f4b0d3b008fab5a6f71a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 10/18] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
+
+Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
+userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
+arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can
+potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
+ drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++-
+ drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644
+--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ loff_t init_off = off;
+ u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (off > dev->cfg_size)
+ return 0;
+ if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
+@@ -928,6 +931,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
+ resource_size_t start, end;
+ int i;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
+ if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
+ break;
+@@ -1035,6 +1041,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
+ loff_t off, size_t count)
+ {
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
+index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644
+--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
+@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
+ int size = dp->size;
+ int cnt;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (pos >= size)
+ return 0;
+ if (nbytes >= size)
+@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
+ int ret = 0;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
+ ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
+@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+ struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ int i, ret;
+
+- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
+diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
+--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
+ u32 dword;
+ int err = 0;
+
+- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From 2ba88cf9227f38b0681a59a93ba809a624d5ca57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 11/18] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
+ environments
+
+IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
+registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
+space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
+it down by default.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
+ drivers/char/mem.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
+
+ if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
+ return -EINVAL;
+- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
+@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
+ if (level > old) {
+- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
+diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
+index c6fa3bc..fc28099 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
+@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ unsigned long i = *ppos;
+ const char __user * tmp = buf;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From 49b64dbdd09cdea74b42e488766f4bb6dad098d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 12/18] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
+
+It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
+under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
+access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
+ struct acpi_table_header table;
+ acpi_status status;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (!(*ppos)) {
+ /* parse the table header to get the table length */
+ if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From 7317c00a377490a270267b7311dead7c2fb4fc4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 13/18] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
+
+We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
+given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
+be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
+kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+index f80ae4d..059195f 100644
+--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
++++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+ int err;
+ u32 retval = -1;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
+
+ if (err < 0)
+@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+ int err;
+ u32 retval = -1;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
+ &retval);
+
+@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+ union acpi_object *obj;
+ acpi_status status;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
+ 1, asus->debug.method_id,
+ &input, &output);
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From dc5b32fcb170a0ef921bc83979a6fc5b23ccddb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 14/18] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
+
+Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
+to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
+index fc28099..b5df7a8 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
+@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ unsigned long copied;
+ void *ptr;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
+ int err = 0;
+
++ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
+ unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
+ (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From 780002e8d091621db933d4daf29ee471a44a5a4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 15/18] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
+ boot environment
+
+This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This
+could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
+We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+index 3ff2678..794d78b 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
+ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
+- if (acpi_rsdp)
++ if (acpi_rsdp && capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return acpi_rsdp;
+ #endif
+
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From 56c6202ad8bc40114bf2bf9b8067e5d6b3be33e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 16/18] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
+
+kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
+to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
+support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
+loading entirely in that situation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
+---
+ kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
+index 5e4bd78..dd464e0 100644
+--- a/kernel/kexec.c
++++ b/kernel/kexec.c
+@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
+ int result;
+
+ /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
+- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From d0cf848b67ae89fed7e5ddb417cf57c83b2e187c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 17/18] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
+ environment
+
+If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
+protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed
+with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for
+this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make
+this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
+---
+ kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++
+ kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
+index c3f4e3e..c5554e0 100644
+--- a/kernel/cred.c
++++ b/kernel/cred.c
+@@ -565,11 +565,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
+ 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
++extern bool sig_enforce;
++#endif
++
+ void __init secureboot_enable()
+ {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
++ /* Enable module signature enforcing */
++ sig_enforce = true;
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
+diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
+index a50172e..11a08cf 100644
+--- a/kernel/module.c
++++ b/kernel/module.c
+@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
+-static bool sig_enforce = true;
++bool sig_enforce = true;
+ #else
+-static bool sig_enforce = false;
++bool sig_enforce = false;
+
+ static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
+ const struct kernel_param *kp)
+--
+1.8.0.1
+
+
+From eaa24912bea0dc76a5522da7a2bc2ae9c6b2359f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 19/20] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
+Subject: [PATCH 18/18] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
@@ -1382,7 +1342,7 @@ index b26f5f1..f04343b 100644
len = p ? p - buf : n;
diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c
-index f458238..72580c1 100644
+index 1c16f91..82eed15 100644
--- a/kernel/power/main.c
+++ b/kernel/power/main.c
@@ -301,7 +301,9 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
@@ -1413,40 +1373,3 @@ index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644
--
1.8.0.1
-
-From 81adc779dba0f45f10b5ff307bd55832305f1112 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 11:48:49 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH 20/20] Don't soft lockup on bad EFI signature lists
-
-If a signature list is read from an UEFI variable and that contains bogus
-data, we can go into an infinite loop in efi_parse_signature_list. Notably,
-if one of the entries in the list has a signature_size that is larger than
-the actual signature size, it will fail the elsize < esize test. Simply
-continuing in the loop without modifying the data or size variables just
-leads to the same list entry being parsed repeatedly.
-
-Since the data is bogus, but we can't tell which value is actually
-incorrect, we need to stop parsing the list. Just return -EBADMSG instead.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-index 59b859a..a0b8a3a 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *k
- elsize < esize ||
- elsize % esize != 0) {
- pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
-- continue;
-+ return -EBADMSG;
- }
-
- if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
---
-1.8.0.1
-
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 580ae0bbf..7b1c33c77 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
21223369d682bcf44bcdfe1521095983 linux-3.7.tar.xz
+bf527ba474ebb9a8a0cd2432ac0ac2b8 patch-3.8-rc2.xz
+3ae68b09402b6b775b5174508138b0b7 patch-3.8-rc2-git1.xz
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-11-07 06:27:49 +0000