Forgot to remove dropped patches

3 files changed, 0 insertions, 510 deletions

diff --git a/Add-an-EFI-signature-blob-parser-and-key-loader.patch b/Add-an-EFI-signature-blob-parser-and-key-loader.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 276eb708d..000000000
--- a/Add-an-EFI-signature-blob-parser-and-key-loader.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-From 73e105771858bf39aeabcbcd2f7b002c24ac4bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
-
-Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of
-interest.  A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the
-elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of
-different types.
-
-For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the
-get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and
-returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or
-NULL if the type is not of interest.
-
-If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
-function in turn.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- certs/Kconfig      |   8 ++++
- certs/Makefile     |   1 +
- certs/efi_parser.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 121 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 certs/efi_parser.c
-
-diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
-index c94e93d8bccf..650ffcb8db79 100644
---- a/certs/Kconfig
-+++ b/certs/Kconfig
-@@ -83,4 +83,12 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
- 	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> should
- 	  be a string of hex digits.
- 
-+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+	bool "EFI signature list parser"
-+	depends on EFI
-+	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
-+	help
-+	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
-+	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
-+
- endmenu
-diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
-index 5d0999b9e21b..7e5e179ac685 100644
---- a/certs/Makefile
-+++ b/certs/Makefile
-@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o
- else
- obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
- endif
-+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
- 
- ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
- 
-diff --git a/certs/efi_parser.c b/certs/efi_parser.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..4e396f98f5c7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/certs/efi_parser.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
-+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/printk.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+
-+/**
-+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
-+ * @source: The source of the key
-+ * @data: The data blob to parse
-+ * @size: The size of the data blob
-+ * @get_handler_for_guid: Get the handler func for the sig type (or NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Parse an EFI signature list looking for elements of interest.  A list is
-+ * made up of a series of sublists, where all the elements in a sublist are of
-+ * the same type, but sublists can be of different types.
-+ *
-+ * For each sublist encountered, the @get_handler_for_guid function is called
-+ * with the type specifier GUID and returns either a pointer to a function to
-+ * handle elements of that type or NULL if the type is not of interest.
-+ *
-+ * If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
-+ * function in turn.
-+ *
-+ * Error EBADMSG is returned if the list doesn't parse correctly and 0 is
-+ * returned if the list was parsed correctly.  No error can be returned from
-+ * the @get_handler_for_guid function or the element handler function it
-+ * returns.
-+ */
-+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(
-+	const char *source,
-+	const void *data, size_t size,
-+	efi_element_handler_t (*get_handler_for_guid)(const efi_guid_t *))
-+{
-+	efi_element_handler_t handler;
-+	unsigned offs = 0;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
-+
-+	while (size > 0) {
-+		const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
-+		efi_signature_list_t list;
-+		size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
-+
-+		if (size < sizeof(list))
-+			return -EBADMSG;
-+
-+		memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
-+		pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
-+			 offs,
-+			 list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size,
-+			 list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
-+
-+		lsize = list.signature_list_size;
-+		hsize = list.signature_header_size;
-+		esize = list.signature_size;
-+		elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
-+
-+		if (lsize > size) {
-+			pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
-+				 __func__, offs);
-+			return -EBADMSG;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
-+		    lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
-+		    esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
-+		    elsize < esize ||
-+		    elsize % esize != 0) {
-+			pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
-+			return -EBADMSG;
-+		}
-+
-+		handler = get_handler_for_guid(&list.signature_type);
-+		if (!handler) {
-+			data += lsize;
-+			size -= lsize;
-+			offs += lsize;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+		size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+		offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
-+
-+		for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
-+			elem = data;
-+
-+			pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
-+			handler(source,
-+				&elem->signature_data,
-+				esize - sizeof(*elem));
-+
-+			data += esize;
-+			size -= esize;
-+			offs += esize;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
--- 
-2.20.1
-
diff --git a/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch b/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08195ff4e..000000000
--- a/MODSIGN-Import-certificates-from-UEFI-Secure-Boot.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-From 90dc66270b02981b19a085c6a9184e3452b7b3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
-
-Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
-This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring.  This
-allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
-with signed modules.  By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
-variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
-load.  The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
-in the 'MokListRT' variable.  We import those as well.
-
-Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
-variable.  We load those certificates into the newly introduced system
-blacklist keyring and forbid any module signed with those from loading and
-forbid the use within the kernel of any key with a matching hash.
-
-This facility is enabled by setting CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- certs/Kconfig     |  16 ++++++
- certs/Makefile    |   4 ++
- certs/load_uefi.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 188 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 certs/load_uefi.c
-
-diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
-index 630ae09..edf9f75 100644
---- a/certs/Kconfig
-+++ b/certs/Kconfig
-@@ -90,4 +90,20 @@ config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
- 	  This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
- 	  X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
-
-+config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
-+	bool "Load certs and blacklist from UEFI db for module checking"
-+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-+	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-+	depends on EFI
-+	depends on EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
-+	help
-+	  If the kernel is booted in secure boot mode, this option will cause
-+	  the kernel to load the certificates from the UEFI db and MokListRT
-+	  into the secondary trusted keyring.  It will also load any X.509
-+	  SHA256 hashes in the dbx list into the blacklist.
-+
-+	  The effect of this is that, if the kernel is booted in secure boot
-+	  mode, modules signed with UEFI-stored keys will be permitted to be
-+	  loaded and keys that match the blacklist will be rejected.
-+
- endmenu
-diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
-index 738151a..a5e057a 100644
---- a/certs/Makefile
-+++ b/certs/Makefile
-@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
- endif
- obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
-
-+obj-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += load_uefi.o
-+$(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-+
-+
- ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
-
- $(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
-diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..b44e464
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
-+#include <linux/kernel.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <linux/efi.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-+#include "internal.h"
-+
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
-+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
-+ */
-+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
-+				  unsigned long *size)
-+{
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+	unsigned long lsize = 4;
-+	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
-+	void *db;
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
-+	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-+		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!db) {
-+		pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
-+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-+		kfree(db);
-+		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	*size = lsize;
-+	return db;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
-+ */
-+static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
-+					   const void *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+	char *hash, *p;
-+
-+	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!hash)
-+		return;
-+	p = memcpy(hash, "tbs:", 4);
-+	p += 4;
-+	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-+	p += len * 2;
-+	*p = 0;
-+
-+	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-+	kfree(hash);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
-+ */
-+static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
-+					 const void *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+	char *hash, *p;
-+
-+	hash = kmalloc(4 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!hash)
-+		return;
-+	p = memcpy(hash, "bin:", 4);
-+	p += 4;
-+	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-+	p += len * 2;
-+	*p = 0;
-+
-+	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-+	kfree(hash);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
-+ * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
-+ */
-+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
-+{
-+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
-+		return add_trusted_secondary_key;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
-+ * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
-+ */
-+static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
-+{
-+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
-+		return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
-+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
-+		return uefi_blacklist_binary;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
-+ */
-+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
-+{
-+	efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
-+	efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
-+	unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
-+	int rc = 0;
-+
-+	if (!efi.get_variable)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
-+	 * an error if we can't get them.
-+	 */
-+	db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
-+	if (!db) {
-+		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
-+					      db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(db);
-+	}
-+
-+	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
-+	if (!mok) {
-+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
-+					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(mok);
-+	}
-+
-+	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
-+	if (!dbx) {
-+		pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
-+	} else {
-+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
-+					      dbx, dbxsize,
-+					      get_handler_for_dbx);
-+		if (rc)
-+			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+		kfree(dbx);
-+	}
-+
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--- 
-2.9.3
-
diff --git a/MODSIGN-Support-not-importing-certs-from-db.patch b/MODSIGN-Support-not-importing-certs-from-db.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 13fecd2f2..000000000
--- a/MODSIGN-Support-not-importing-certs-from-db.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From 9f1958a0cc911e1f79b2733ee5029dbd819ff328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
-
-If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
-for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
-MokIgnoreDB.  Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
-variable if it is found.
-
-Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- certs/load_uefi.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
-index b44e464..3d88459 100644
---- a/certs/load_uefi.c
-+++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
-@@ -13,6 +13,26 @@ static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GU
- static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
-
- /*
-+ * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
-+ * it does.
-+ *
-+ * This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use
-+ * the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes.  If it
-+ * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
-+ * this.
-+ */
-+static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
-+{
-+	efi_status_t status;
-+	unsigned int db = 0;
-+	unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
-+	efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-+
-+	status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
-+	return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
-  */
- static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
-@@ -113,7 +133,9 @@ static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_ty
- }
-
- /*
-- * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
-+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the secondary trusted
-+ * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
-+ * keyring.
-  */
- static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
- {
-@@ -129,15 +151,17 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
- 	/* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
- 	 * an error if we can't get them.
- 	 */
--	db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
--	if (!db) {
--		pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
--	} else {
--		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
--					      db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
--		if (rc)
--			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
--		kfree(db);
-+	if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
-+		db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
-+		if (!db) {
-+			pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
-+		} else {
-+			rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
-+						      db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
-+			if (rc)
-+				pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
-+			kfree(db);
-+		}
- 	}
-
- 	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
--- 
-2.9.3
-