summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>2013-10-05 10:08:07 -0400
committerJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>2013-10-05 10:08:07 -0400
commit989a44de862ae9a0c958321ab96dc33e9d3f46ce (patch)
tree6eb6c824fbde377cb8426c522c68a86af19da4ca
parentdce629e00c29027fdcfe319c5002453d2ae44c3d (diff)
downloadkernel-989a44de862ae9a0c958321ab96dc33e9d3f46ce.tar.gz
kernel-989a44de862ae9a0c958321ab96dc33e9d3f46ce.tar.xz
kernel-989a44de862ae9a0c958321ab96dc33e9d3f46ce.zip
Drop long carried selinux ptraceme patch
Nobody is working on this in Fedora at the moment, and it really needs to come from upstream.
-rw-r--r--kernel.spec6
-rw-r--r--selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch162
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 168 deletions
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 304171e2c..37117e084 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -724,9 +724,6 @@ Patch21247: ath9k_rx_dma_stop_check.patch
Patch22000: weird-root-dentry-name-debug.patch
-#selinux ptrace child permissions
-Patch22001: selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch
-
Patch25047: drm-radeon-Disable-writeback-by-default-on-ppc.patch
#CVE-2013-4345 rhbz 1007690 1009136
@@ -1421,9 +1418,6 @@ ApplyPatch scsi-sd_revalidate_disk-prevent-NULL-ptr-deref.patch
#pplyPatch weird-root-dentry-name-debug.patch
-#selinux ptrace child permissions
-ApplyPatch selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch
-
# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/Checkpoint_Restore
ApplyPatch criu-no-expert.patch
diff --git a/selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch b/selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 90baad840..000000000
--- a/selinux-apply-different-permission-to-ptrace-child.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-Some applications, like gdb, are able to ptrace both children or other
-completely unrelated tasks. We would like to be able to discern these two
-things and to be able to allow gdb to ptrace it's children, but not to be
-able to ptrace unrelated tasks for security reasons.
-
-Upstream is a bit weary of this patch as it may be incomplete. They are
-not fundamentally opposed to the patch, I was just ask to see if I could
-flush out any needed refinement in Fedora where we already had the
-problem. We may find that we need to emulate the YAMA non-child
-registration module in order to completely deal with 'normal' ptrace on
-a system. At the moment however, this patch will at least let us get
-gdb working for many users in Fedora (See fedora-devel-list for a
-discussion of the current issues people are complaining about in F17
-without this)
-
----
-
- security/selinux/hooks.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
- security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 ++
- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 ++-
- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +++
- 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-index 1a4acf4..b226f26 100644
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -1805,6 +1805,39 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
-
- /* Hook functions begin here. */
-
-+/**
-+ * task_is_descendant - walk up a process family tree looking for a match
-+ * @parent: the process to compare against while walking up from child
-+ * @child: the process to start from while looking upwards for parent
-+ *
-+ * Returns 1 if child is a descendant of parent, 0 if not.
-+ */
-+static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
-+ struct task_struct *child)
-+{
-+ int rc = 0;
-+ struct task_struct *walker = child;
-+
-+ if (!parent || !child)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ rcu_read_lock();
-+ if (!thread_group_leader(parent))
-+ parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader);
-+ while (walker->pid > 0) {
-+ if (!thread_group_leader(walker))
-+ walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader);
-+ if (walker == parent) {
-+ rc = 1;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
-+ }
-+ rcu_read_unlock();
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
- static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
- unsigned int mode)
- {
-@@ -1820,6 +1853,9 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
- return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
- }
-
-+
-+ if (selinux_policycap_ptrace_child && task_is_descendant(current, child))
-+ return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE_CHILD);
- return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
- }
-
-@@ -1831,6 +1867,8 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
-+ if (selinux_policycap_ptrace_child && task_is_descendant(parent, current))
-+ return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE_CHILD);
- return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
- }
-
-diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-index 39e678c..72c08b9 100644
---- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
-@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
- "getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh",
- "setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent",
- "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
-- "setsockcreate", NULL } },
-+ "setsockcreate", "ptrace_child", NULL } },
- { "system",
- { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
- "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } },
-diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
-index dde2005..ac14b0a 100644
---- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
-+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
-@@ -68,12 +68,14 @@ extern int selinux_enabled;
- enum {
- POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
- POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
-+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_PTRACE_CHILD,
- __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
- };
- #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
-
- extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
- extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-+extern int selinux_policycap_ptrace_child;
-
- /*
- * type_datum properties
-diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
-index 4e93f9e..3379765 100644
---- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
-@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@
- /* Policy capability filenames */
- static char *policycap_names[] = {
- "network_peer_controls",
-- "open_perms"
-+ "open_perms",
-+ "ptrace_child",
- };
-
- unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
-index 9b7e7ed..4d12a6e 100644
---- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
-
- int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
- int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-+int selinux_policycap_ptrace_child;
-
- static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-
-@@ -1812,6 +1813,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
- POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
- selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
- POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
-+ selinux_policycap_ptrace_child = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_PTRACE_CHILD);
- }
-
- static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
-
-
-
-
-_______________________________________________
-kernel mailing list
-kernel@lists.fedoraproject.org
-https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/kernel