Linux v3.12-11097-ga5d6e63

- Drop all the keys-* patches because they were merged upstream.  Yay!

8 files changed, 8 insertions, 9595 deletions

diff --git a/PatchList.txt b/PatchList.txt
index b47d7201e..b9a9d6dc7 100644
--- a/PatchList.txt
+++ b/PatchList.txt
@@ -20,12 +20,6 @@ https://dev.openwrt.org/browser/trunk/package/mac80211/patches/552-ath9k_rx_dma_
   - Fedora secure boot support.
   - Dear Matthew, this is your fault.  Run sed already and get a new set out.
 
-* keys-expand-keyring.patch
-* keys-krb-support.patch
-* keys-x509-improv.patch
-* keyring-quota.patch
-  - I believe these are all now queued for 3.13 in James Morris' tree.
-
 **** Other stuff that should go upstream (in decreasing likelyhood) ************
 
 * defaults-acpi-video.patch
diff --git a/config-generic b/config-generic
index cf15d1442..cdbafb731 100644
--- a/config-generic
+++ b/config-generic
@@ -2247,6 +2247,8 @@ CONFIG_TIFM_7XX1=m
 CONFIG_TCG_TPM=m
 CONFIG_TCG_TIS=m
 # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON is not set
+# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_ATMEL is not set
+# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON is not set
 CONFIG_TCG_NSC=m
 CONFIG_TCG_ATMEL=m
 # CONFIG_TCG_INFINEON is not set
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 655134280..896dde68b 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
 # The rc snapshot level
 %define rcrev 0
 # The git snapshot level
-%define gitrev 10
+%define gitrev 11
 # Set rpm version accordingly
 %define rpmversion 3.%{upstream_sublevel}.0
 %endif
@@ -634,12 +634,6 @@ Patch800: crash-driver.patch
 
 # crypto/
 
-# keys
-Patch900: keys-expand-keyring.patch
-Patch901: keys-krb-support.patch
-Patch902: keys-x509-improv.patch
-Patch903: keyring-quota.patch
-
 # secure boot
 Patch1000: secure-modules.patch
 Patch1001: modsign-uefi.patch
@@ -1337,12 +1331,6 @@ ApplyPatch crash-driver.patch
 
 # crypto/
 
-# keys
-ApplyPatch keys-expand-keyring.patch
-ApplyPatch keys-krb-support.patch
-ApplyPatch keys-x509-improv.patch
-ApplyPatch keyring-quota.patch
-
 # secure boot
 ApplyPatch secure-modules.patch
 ApplyPatch modsign-uefi.patch
@@ -2210,6 +2198,10 @@ fi
 #                                    ||----w |
 #                                    ||     ||
 %changelog
+* Fri Nov 22 2013 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> - 3.13.0-0.rc0.git11.1
+- Linux v3.12-11097-ga5d6e63
+- Drop all the keys-* patches because they were merged upstream.  Yay!
+
 * Thu Nov 21 2013 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org>
 - Some minor ARM config updates
 
diff --git a/keyring-quota.patch b/keyring-quota.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 07952214f..000000000
--- a/keyring-quota.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-commit cb3bd4d9775d833501826832fd1562af19f8182d
-Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date:   Fri Oct 18 17:30:30 2013 +0100
-
-    KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
-    
-    If a key is displaced from a keyring by a matching one, then four more bytes
-    of quota are allocated to the keyring - despite the fact that the keyring does
-    not change in size.
-    
-    Further, when a key is unlinked from a keyring, the four bytes of quota
-    allocated the link isn't recovered and returned to the user's pool.
-    
-    The first can be tested by repeating:
-    
-    	keyctl add big_key a fred @s
-    	cat /proc/key-users
-    
-    (Don't put it in a shell loop otherwise the garbage collector won't have time
-    to clear the displaced keys, thus affecting the result).
-    
-    This was causing the kerberos keyring to run out of room fairly quickly.
-    
-    The second can be tested by:
-    
-    	cat /proc/key-users
-    	a=`keyctl add user a a @s`
-    	cat /proc/key-users
-    	keyctl unlink $a
-    	sleep 1 # Give RCU a chance to delete the key
-    	cat /proc/key-users
-    
-    assuming no system activity that otherwise adds/removes keys, the amount of
-    key data allocated should go up (say 40/20000 -> 47/20000) and then return to
-    the original value at the end.
-    
-    Reported-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
-    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index 8c05ebd..d80311e 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -1063,12 +1063,6 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
- 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- 
--	/* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */
--	ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
--				  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
--	if (ret < 0)
--		goto error_sem;
--
- 	/* Create an edit script that will insert/replace the key in the
- 	 * keyring tree.
- 	 */
-@@ -1078,17 +1072,25 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
- 				  NULL);
- 	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
- 		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
--		goto error_quota;
-+		goto error_sem;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* If we're not replacing a link in-place then we're going to need some
-+	 * extra quota.
-+	 */
-+	if (!edit->dead_leaf) {
-+		ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-+					  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-+		if (ret < 0)
-+			goto error_cancel;
- 	}
- 
- 	*_edit = edit;
- 	kleave(" = 0");
- 	return 0;
- 
--error_quota:
--	/* undo the quota changes */
--	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
--			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-+error_cancel:
-+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
- error_sem:
- 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
-@@ -1146,7 +1148,7 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
- 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- 
--	if (edit) {
-+	if (edit && !edit->dead_leaf) {
- 		key_payload_reserve(keyring,
- 				    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
- 		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
-@@ -1243,6 +1245,7 @@ int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
- 		goto error;
- 
- 	assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
-+	key_payload_reserve(keyring, keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
- 	ret = 0;
- 
- error:
diff --git a/keys-expand-keyring.patch b/keys-expand-keyring.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 75618243b..000000000
--- a/keys-expand-keyring.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6834 +0,0 @@
-From 96dcf8e91389e509021448ffd798cc68471fcf0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 01/10] KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for
- possession
-
-Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
-for possession.  Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
-keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
-possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
-them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.
-
-This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
-tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 reduced the
-initial permissions granted to a key.
-
-The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
-EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/internal.h         | 1 +
- security/keys/process_keys.c     | 8 +++++---
- security/keys/request_key.c      | 6 ++++--
- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +-
- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index d4f1468..df971fe 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 					 const void *description,
- 					 key_match_func_t match,
-+					 bool no_state_check,
- 					 const struct cred *cred);
- 
- extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
-diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-index 42defae..a3410d6 100644
---- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
-+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ found:
- key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 				  const void *description,
- 				  key_match_func_t match,
-+				  bool no_state_check,
- 				  const struct cred *cred)
- {
- 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
-@@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 	might_sleep();
- 
- 	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
--					     false, cred);
-+					     no_state_check, cred);
- 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 		goto found;
- 	err = key_ref;
-@@ -468,7 +469,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 			rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
- 
- 			key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
--							  match, rka->cred);
-+							  match, no_state_check,
-+							  rka->cred);
- 
- 			up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- 
-@@ -675,7 +677,7 @@ try_again:
- 		/* check to see if we possess the key */
- 		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
- 						   lookup_user_key_possessed,
--						   cred);
-+						   true, cred);
- 
- 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
- 			key_put(key);
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
-index c411f9b..172115b 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
-@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 	 * waited for locks */
- 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 
--	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
-+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
-+					  false, cred);
- 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 		goto key_already_present;
- 
-@@ -539,7 +540,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
- 	       dest_keyring, flags);
- 
- 	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
--	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
-+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
-+					  false, cred);
- 
- 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
- 		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-index 85730d5..92077de 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
- 		&key_type_request_key_auth,
- 		(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
- 		key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
--		cred);
-+		false, cred);
- 
- 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
- 		authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 9b1294158dd1fbca78541b5d55c057e46b1a9ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:51 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 02/10] KEYS: Use bool in make_key_ref() and is_key_possessed()
-
-Make make_key_ref() take a bool possession parameter and make
-is_key_possessed() return a bool.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/security/keys.txt | 7 +++----
- include/linux/key.h             | 4 ++--
- security/keys/keyring.c         | 5 +++--
- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
-index 7b4145d..9ede670 100644
---- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
-@@ -865,15 +865,14 @@ encountered:
-      calling processes has a searchable link to the key from one of its
-      keyrings. There are three functions for dealing with these:
- 
--	key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key,
--			       unsigned long possession);
-+	key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key, bool possession);
- 
- 	struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref);
- 
--	unsigned long is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
-+	bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
- 
-      The first function constructs a key reference from a key pointer and
--     possession information (which must be 0 or 1 and not any other value).
-+     possession information (which must be true or false).
- 
-      The second function retrieves the key pointer from a reference and the
-      third retrieves the possession flag.
-diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
-index 4dfde11..51bce29 100644
---- a/include/linux/key.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key.h
-@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct keyring_name;
- typedef struct __key_reference_with_attributes *key_ref_t;
- 
- static inline key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key,
--				     unsigned long possession)
-+				     bool possession)
- {
- 	return (key_ref_t) ((unsigned long) key | possession);
- }
-@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static inline struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref)
- 	return (struct key *) ((unsigned long) key_ref & ~1UL);
- }
- 
--static inline unsigned long is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
-+static inline bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref)
- {
- 	return (unsigned long) key_ref & 1UL;
- }
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index 6ece7f2..f784063 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -329,9 +329,10 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 
- 	struct keyring_list *keylist;
- 	struct timespec now;
--	unsigned long possessed, kflags;
-+	unsigned long kflags;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
-+	bool possessed;
- 	long err;
- 	int sp, nkeys, kix;
- 
-@@ -542,8 +543,8 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 			       key_perm_t perm)
- {
- 	struct keyring_list *klist;
--	unsigned long possessed;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key;
-+	bool possessed;
- 	int nkeys, loop;
- 
- 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 4a7e7536b9b728f1d912d0e4c047c885c95e13a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:51 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 03/10] KEYS: key_is_dead() should take a const key pointer
- argument
-
-key_is_dead() should take a const key pointer argument as it doesn't modify
-what it points to.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/internal.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index df971fe..490aef5 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
- /*
-  * Determine whether a key is dead.
-  */
--static inline bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
-+static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit)
- {
- 	return
- 		key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) |
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 9007a0a7f8c135f0085e46db277de0cf7b944403 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/10] KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key
- access
-
-Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for accessing keys.  The index key
-is the search term needed to find a key directly - basically the key type and
-the key description.  We can add to that the description length.
-
-This will be useful when turning a keyring into an associative array rather
-than just a pointer block.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/key.h         | 21 +++++++++----
- security/keys/internal.h    |  8 ++---
- security/keys/key.c         | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
- security/keys/keyring.c     | 37 +++++++++++------------
- security/keys/request_key.c | 12 +++++---
- 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
-index 51bce29..d573e82 100644
---- a/include/linux/key.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key.h
-@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ struct key_owner;
- struct keyring_list;
- struct keyring_name;
- 
-+struct keyring_index_key {
-+	struct key_type		*type;
-+	const char		*description;
-+	size_t			desc_len;
-+};
-+
- /*****************************************************************************/
- /*
-  * key reference with possession attribute handling
-@@ -129,7 +135,6 @@ struct key {
- 		struct list_head graveyard_link;
- 		struct rb_node	serial_node;
- 	};
--	struct key_type		*type;		/* type of key */
- 	struct rw_semaphore	sem;		/* change vs change sem */
- 	struct key_user		*user;		/* owner of this key */
- 	void			*security;	/* security data for this key */
-@@ -163,12 +168,18 @@ struct key {
- #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
- #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
- 
--	/* the description string
--	 * - this is used to match a key against search criteria
--	 * - this should be a printable string
-+	/* the key type and key description string
-+	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
-+	 * - it should be a printable string
- 	 * - eg: for krb5 AFS, this might be "afs@REDHAT.COM"
- 	 */
--	char			*description;
-+	union {
-+		struct keyring_index_key index_key;
-+		struct {
-+			struct key_type	*type;		/* type of key */
-+			char		*description;
-+		};
-+	};
- 
- 	/* type specific data
- 	 * - this is used by the keyring type to index the name
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index 490aef5..77441dd 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -89,19 +89,17 @@ extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
- extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
- 
- extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
--			    const struct key_type *type,
--			    const char *description,
-+			    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
- 			    unsigned long *_prealloc);
- extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
- extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
- 		       unsigned long *_prealloc);
- extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
--			   struct key_type *type,
-+			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
- 			   unsigned long prealloc);
- 
- extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--				      const struct key_type *type,
--				      const char *description,
-+				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
- 				      key_perm_t perm);
- 
- extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
-diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
-index 8fb7c7b..7e6bc39 100644
---- a/security/keys/key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/key.c
-@@ -242,8 +242,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
--	quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
-+	desclen = strlen(desc);
-+	quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
- 
- 	/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
- 	user = key_user_lookup(uid);
-@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
- 		goto no_memory_2;
- 
- 	if (desc) {
--		key->description = kmemdup(desc, desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
-+		key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
-+		key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- 		if (!key->description)
- 			goto no_memory_3;
- 	}
-@@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
- 	atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
- 	init_rwsem(&key->sem);
- 	lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
--	key->type = type;
-+	key->index_key.type = type;
- 	key->user = user;
- 	key->quotalen = quotalen;
- 	key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
-@@ -489,8 +490,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- 	}
- 
- 	if (keyring) {
--		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description,
--				       &prealloc);
-+		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto error_free_preparse;
- 	}
-@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- 					 &prealloc);
- 
- 	if (keyring)
--		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
- 
- error_free_preparse:
- 	if (key->type->preparse)
-@@ -548,8 +548,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
- 	ret = -EBUSY;
- 
- 	if (keyring)
--		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type,
--					    key->description, &prealloc);
-+		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 
-@@ -581,7 +580,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
- 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 
- 	if (keyring)
--		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
- 
- 	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
- 	if (awaken)
-@@ -780,25 +779,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 			       key_perm_t perm,
- 			       unsigned long flags)
- {
--	unsigned long prealloc;
-+	struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
-+		.description	= description,
-+	};
- 	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
- 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
--	struct key_type *ktype;
-+	unsigned long prealloc;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
- 	 * types */
--	ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
--	if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
-+	index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
-+	if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
- 		goto error;
- 	}
- 
- 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
--	if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate ||
--	    (!description && !ktype->preparse))
-+	if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate ||
-+	    (!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
- 		goto error_put_type;
- 
- 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
-@@ -812,21 +813,22 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
- 	prep.data = payload;
- 	prep.datalen = plen;
--	prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen;
--	if (ktype->preparse) {
--		ret = ktype->preparse(&prep);
-+	prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
-+	if (index_key.type->preparse) {
-+		ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
- 		if (ret < 0) {
- 			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- 			goto error_put_type;
- 		}
--		if (!description)
--			description = prep.description;
-+		if (!index_key.description)
-+			index_key.description = prep.description;
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
--		if (!description)
-+		if (!index_key.description)
- 			goto error_free_prep;
- 	}
-+	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
- 
--	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
-+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
- 	if (ret < 0) {
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- 		goto error_free_prep;
-@@ -844,9 +846,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	 * key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
- 	 * update that instead if possible
- 	 */
--	if (ktype->update) {
--		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description,
--					       0);
-+	if (index_key.type->update) {
-+		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key, 0);
- 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 			goto found_matching_key;
- 	}
-@@ -856,16 +857,17 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 		perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
- 		perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
- 
--		if (ktype->read)
-+		if (index_key.type->read)
- 			perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
- 
--		if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update)
-+		if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
-+		    index_key.type->update)
- 			perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate a new key */
--	key = key_alloc(ktype, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
--			perm, flags);
-+	key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
-+			cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags);
- 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- 		key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
- 		goto error_link_end;
-@@ -882,12 +884,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
- 
- error_link_end:
--	__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
-+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
- error_free_prep:
--	if (ktype->preparse)
--		ktype->free_preparse(&prep);
-+	if (index_key.type->preparse)
-+		index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
- error_put_type:
--	key_type_put(ktype);
-+	key_type_put(index_key.type);
- error:
- 	return key_ref;
- 
-@@ -895,7 +897,7 @@ error:
- 	/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
- 	 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
- 	 */
--	__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
-+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
- 
- 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
- 	goto error_free_prep;
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index f784063..c7f59f9 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -538,8 +538,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
-  * to the returned key reference.
-  */
- key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--			       const struct key_type *ktype,
--			       const char *description,
-+			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
- 			       key_perm_t perm)
- {
- 	struct keyring_list *klist;
-@@ -558,9 +557,9 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 		smp_rmb();
- 		for (loop = 0; loop < nkeys ; loop++) {
- 			key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
--			if (key->type == ktype &&
-+			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
- 			    (!key->type->match ||
--			     key->type->match(key, description)) &&
-+			     key->type->match(key, index_key->description)) &&
- 			    key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
- 					   perm) == 0 &&
- 			    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-@@ -747,8 +746,8 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
- /*
-  * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring.
-  */
--int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
--		     const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc)
-+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-+		     unsigned long *_prealloc)
- 	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
- 	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
- {
-@@ -759,7 +758,8 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
- 	size_t size;
- 	int loop, lru, ret;
- 
--	kenter("%d,%s,%s,", key_serial(keyring), type->name, description);
-+	kenter("%d,%s,%s,",
-+	       key_serial(keyring), index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
- 
- 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
- 		return -ENOTDIR;
-@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
- 
- 	/* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle
- 	 * when linking two keyring in opposite orders */
--	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
-+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- 
- 	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-@@ -784,8 +784,8 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
- 		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
- 			struct key *key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
- 								keyring);
--			if (key->type == type &&
--			    strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) {
-+			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
-+			    strcmp(key->description, index_key->description) == 0) {
- 				/* Found a match - we'll replace the link with
- 				 * one to the new key.  We record the slot
- 				 * position.
-@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ error_quota:
- 	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
- 			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
- error_sem:
--	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
-+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- error_krsem:
- 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-@@ -957,16 +957,17 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
-  *
-  * Must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called.
-  */
--void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
-+void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
-+		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
- 		    unsigned long prealloc)
- 	__releases(&keyring->sem)
- 	__releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
- {
--	BUG_ON(type == NULL);
--	BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
--	kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, type->name, prealloc);
-+	BUG_ON(index_key->type == NULL);
-+	BUG_ON(index_key->type->name == NULL);
-+	kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, prealloc);
- 
--	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
-+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- 
- 	if (prealloc) {
-@@ -1007,12 +1008,12 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
- 	key_check(keyring);
- 	key_check(key);
- 
--	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc);
-+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
- 	if (ret == 0) {
- 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
- 		if (ret == 0)
- 			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
--		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
- 	}
- 
- 	return ret;
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
-index 172115b..586cb79 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
-@@ -352,6 +352,11 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 			       struct key_user *user,
- 			       struct key **_key)
- {
-+	const struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
-+		.type		= type,
-+		.description	= description,
-+		.desc_len	= strlen(description),
-+	};
- 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- 	unsigned long prealloc;
- 	struct key *key;
-@@ -379,8 +384,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
- 
- 	if (dest_keyring) {
--		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, type, description,
--				       &prealloc);
-+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto link_prealloc_failed;
- 	}
-@@ -400,7 +404,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 
- 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 	if (dest_keyring)
--		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
- 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
- 	*_key = key;
- 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
-@@ -416,7 +420,7 @@ key_already_present:
- 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
- 		if (ret == 0)
- 			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
--		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto link_check_failed;
- 	}
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From eca8dad5cd291d2baf2d20372fcb0af9e75e25ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/10] KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
-
-Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied
-with each call.  Introduce a search context structure to hold these.
-
-Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search
-should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all
-keys looking for a non-description match.
-
-This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic
-routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed
-through to the iterator callback function.
-
-Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is
-separated from the description pointer in the search context.  This makes it
-clear which is being supplied.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/linux/key-type.h         |   5 ++
- security/keys/internal.h         |  40 +++++++------
- security/keys/keyring.c          |  70 +++++++++++------------
- security/keys/proc.c             |  17 ++++--
- security/keys/process_keys.c     | 117 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
- security/keys/request_key.c      |  56 +++++++++----------
- security/keys/request_key_auth.c |  14 +++--
- security/keys/user_defined.c     |  18 +++---
- 8 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
-index 518a53a..f58737b 100644
---- a/include/linux/key-type.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
-@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ struct key_type {
- 	 */
- 	size_t def_datalen;
- 
-+	/* Default key search algorithm. */
-+	unsigned def_lookup_type;
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT	0x0000	/* Direct lookup by description. */
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE	0x0001	/* Iterative search. */
-+
- 	/* vet a description */
- 	int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index 77441dd..f4bf938 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -107,23 +107,31 @@ extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
- 
- typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
- 
-+struct keyring_search_context {
-+	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
-+	const struct cred	*cred;
-+	key_match_func_t	match;
-+	const void		*match_data;
-+	unsigned		flags;
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE	0x0001	/* [as type->def_lookup_type] */
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK	0x0002	/* Skip state checks */
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK	0x0004	/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME	0x0008	/* Don't update times */
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0010	/* Don't check permissions */
-+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0020	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
-+
-+	/* Internal stuff */
-+	int			skipped_ret;
-+	bool			possessed;
-+	key_ref_t		result;
-+	struct timespec		now;
-+};
-+
- extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--				    const struct cred *cred,
--				    struct key_type *type,
--				    const void *description,
--				    key_match_func_t match,
--				    bool no_state_check);
--
--extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
--					    const void *description,
--					    key_match_func_t match,
--					    bool no_state_check,
--					    const struct cred *cred);
--extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
--					 const void *description,
--					 key_match_func_t match,
--					 bool no_state_check,
--					 const struct cred *cred);
-+				    struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
-+
-+extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
-+extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
- 
- extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index c7f59f9..b42f2d4 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -280,11 +280,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
- /**
-  * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
-  * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
-- * @cred: The credentials to use for permissions checks.
-- * @type: The type of key to search for.
-- * @description: Parameter for @match.
-- * @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required.
-- * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad
-+ * @ctx: The keyring search context.
-  *
-  * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
-  * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
-@@ -314,11 +310,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
-  * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
-  */
- key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--			     const struct cred *cred,
--			     struct key_type *type,
--			     const void *description,
--			     key_match_func_t match,
--			     bool no_state_check)
-+			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
- {
- 	struct {
- 		/* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */
-@@ -328,20 +320,18 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
- 
- 	struct keyring_list *keylist;
--	struct timespec now;
- 	unsigned long kflags;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
--	bool possessed;
- 	long err;
- 	int sp, nkeys, kix;
- 
- 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
--	possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
-+	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
- 	key_check(keyring);
- 
- 	/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
--	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
-+	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
- 	if (err < 0) {
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
- 		goto error;
-@@ -353,7 +343,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 
- 	rcu_read_lock();
- 
--	now = current_kernel_time();
-+	ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
- 	err = -EAGAIN;
- 	sp = 0;
- 
-@@ -361,16 +351,17 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	 * are looking for */
- 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
- 	kflags = keyring->flags;
--	if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) {
-+	if (keyring->type == ctx->index_key.type &&
-+	    ctx->match(keyring, ctx->match_data)) {
- 		key = keyring;
--		if (no_state_check)
-+		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
- 			goto found;
- 
- 		/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
- 		 * revoked */
- 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
- 			goto error_2;
--		if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
-+		if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
- 			goto error_2;
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
- 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
-@@ -384,7 +375,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
- 		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
- 		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
--	    (keyring->expiry && now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
-+	    (keyring->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
- 		goto error_2;
- 
- 	/* start processing a new keyring */
-@@ -406,29 +397,29 @@ descend:
- 		kflags = key->flags;
- 
- 		/* ignore keys not of this type */
--		if (key->type != type)
-+		if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type)
- 			continue;
- 
- 		/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
--		if (!no_state_check) {
-+		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)) {
- 			if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
- 				      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
- 				continue;
- 
--			if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
-+			if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
- 				continue;
- 		}
- 
- 		/* keys that don't match */
--		if (!match(key, description))
-+		if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data))
- 			continue;
- 
- 		/* key must have search permissions */
--		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
--					cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
-+		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-+					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
- 			continue;
- 
--		if (no_state_check)
-+		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
- 			goto found;
- 
- 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
-@@ -456,8 +447,8 @@ ascend:
- 		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
- 			continue;
- 
--		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
--					cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
-+		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-+					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
- 			continue;
- 
- 		/* stack the current position */
-@@ -489,12 +480,12 @@ not_this_keyring:
- 	/* we found a viable match */
- found:
- 	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
--	key->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
--	keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
-+	key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-+	keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
- 	while (sp > 0)
--		stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
-+		stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
- 	key_check(key);
--	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, possessed);
-+	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
- error_2:
- 	rcu_read_unlock();
- error:
-@@ -514,11 +505,20 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
- 			 struct key_type *type,
- 			 const char *description)
- {
--	if (!type->match)
-+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-+		.index_key.type		= type,
-+		.index_key.description	= description,
-+		.cred			= current_cred(),
-+		.match			= type->match,
-+		.match_data		= description,
-+		.flags			= (type->def_lookup_type |
-+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK),
-+	};
-+
-+	if (!ctx.match)
- 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- 
--	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
--				  type, description, type->match, false);
-+	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
-index 217b685..88e9a46 100644
---- a/security/keys/proc.c
-+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
-@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
- 
- static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
- {
--	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- 	struct rb_node *_p = v;
- 	struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
- 	struct timespec now;
-@@ -191,15 +190,23 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
- 	char xbuf[12];
- 	int rc;
- 
-+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-+		.index_key.type		= key->type,
-+		.index_key.description	= key->description,
-+		.cred			= current_cred(),
-+		.match			= lookup_user_key_possessed,
-+		.match_data		= key,
-+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
-+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
-+	};
-+
- 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
- 
- 	/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
- 	 * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
- 	 */
- 	if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
--		skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
--						      lookup_user_key_possessed,
--						      true, cred);
-+		skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
- 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
- 			key_ref_put(skey_ref);
- 			key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
-@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
- 	 * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
- 	 *   access to __current_cred() safe
- 	 */
--	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW);
-+	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
- 	if (rc < 0)
- 		return 0;
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-index a3410d6..e68a3e0 100644
---- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
-+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-@@ -319,11 +319,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
-  * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
-  * returned key reference.
-  */
--key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
--				     const void *description,
--				     key_match_func_t match,
--				     bool no_state_check,
--				     const struct cred *cred)
-+key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
- {
- 	key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
- 
-@@ -339,10 +335,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 	err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
- 
- 	/* search the thread keyring first */
--	if (cred->thread_keyring) {
-+	if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {
- 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
--			make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
--			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
-+			make_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);
- 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 			goto found;
- 
-@@ -358,10 +353,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 	}
- 
- 	/* search the process keyring second */
--	if (cred->process_keyring) {
-+	if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {
- 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
--			make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1),
--			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
-+			make_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);
- 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 			goto found;
- 
-@@ -379,11 +373,11 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 	}
- 
- 	/* search the session keyring */
--	if (cred->session_keyring) {
-+	if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {
- 		rcu_read_lock();
- 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
--			make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1),
--			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
-+			make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),
-+			ctx);
- 		rcu_read_unlock();
- 
- 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
-@@ -402,10 +396,10 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 		}
- 	}
- 	/* or search the user-session keyring */
--	else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
-+	else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {
- 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
--			make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
--			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
-+			make_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
-+			ctx);
- 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 			goto found;
- 
-@@ -437,19 +431,14 @@ found:
-  *
-  * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().
-  */
--key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
--				  const void *description,
--				  key_match_func_t match,
--				  bool no_state_check,
--				  const struct cred *cred)
-+key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
- {
- 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
- 
- 	might_sleep();
- 
--	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
--					     no_state_check, cred);
-+	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);
- 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 		goto found;
- 	err = key_ref;
-@@ -458,19 +447,21 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
- 	 * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
- 	 * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
- 	 */
--	if (cred->request_key_auth &&
--	    cred == current_cred() &&
--	    type != &key_type_request_key_auth
-+	if (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&
-+	    ctx->cred == current_cred() &&
-+	    ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth
- 	    ) {
-+		const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
-+
- 		/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
- 		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- 
--		if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
--			rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
-+		if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
-+			rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
- 
--			key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
--							  match, no_state_check,
--							  rka->cred);
-+			ctx->cred = rka->cred;
-+			key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
-+			ctx->cred = cred;
- 
- 			up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- 
-@@ -524,19 +515,23 @@ int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
- key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
- 			  key_perm_t perm)
- {
-+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-+		.match	= lookup_user_key_possessed,
-+		.flags	= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
-+			   KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
-+	};
- 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
--	const struct cred *cred;
- 	struct key *key;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
- 	int ret;
- 
- try_again:
--	cred = get_current_cred();
-+	ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
- 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- 
- 	switch (id) {
- 	case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
--		if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
-+		if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
- 			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
- 				goto error;
- 
-@@ -548,13 +543,13 @@ try_again:
- 			goto reget_creds;
- 		}
- 
--		key = cred->thread_keyring;
-+		key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
- 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
- 	case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
--		if (!cred->process_keyring) {
-+		if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
- 			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
- 				goto error;
- 
-@@ -566,13 +561,13 @@ try_again:
- 			goto reget_creds;
- 		}
- 
--		key = cred->process_keyring;
-+		key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
- 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
- 	case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
--		if (!cred->session_keyring) {
-+		if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
- 			/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
- 			 * doesn't exist yet */
- 			ret = install_user_keyrings();
-@@ -582,13 +577,13 @@ try_again:
- 				ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
- 			else
- 				ret = install_session_keyring(
--					cred->user->session_keyring);
-+					ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
- 
- 			if (ret < 0)
- 				goto error;
- 			goto reget_creds;
--		} else if (cred->session_keyring ==
--			   cred->user->session_keyring &&
-+		} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
-+			   ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
- 			   lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
- 			ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
- 			if (ret < 0)
-@@ -597,32 +592,32 @@ try_again:
- 		}
- 
- 		rcu_read_lock();
--		key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
-+		key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
- 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 		rcu_read_unlock();
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
- 	case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
--		if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
-+		if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
- 			ret = install_user_keyrings();
- 			if (ret < 0)
- 				goto error;
- 		}
- 
--		key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
-+		key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
- 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
- 	case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
--		if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
-+		if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
- 			ret = install_user_keyrings();
- 			if (ret < 0)
- 				goto error;
- 		}
- 
--		key = cred->user->session_keyring;
-+		key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
- 		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
-@@ -633,7 +628,7 @@ try_again:
- 		goto error;
- 
- 	case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
--		key = cred->request_key_auth;
-+		key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
- 		if (!key)
- 			goto error;
- 
-@@ -642,20 +637,20 @@ try_again:
- 		break;
- 
- 	case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
--		if (!cred->request_key_auth)
-+		if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
- 			goto error;
- 
--		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
-+		down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- 		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
--			     &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
-+			     &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
- 			key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
- 			key = NULL;
- 		} else {
--			rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
-+			rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
- 			key = rka->dest_keyring;
- 			atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 		}
--		up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
-+		up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- 		if (!key)
- 			goto error;
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
-@@ -675,9 +670,13 @@ try_again:
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
- 
- 		/* check to see if we possess the key */
--		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
--						   lookup_user_key_possessed,
--						   true, cred);
-+		ctx.index_key.type		= key->type;
-+		ctx.index_key.description	= key->description;
-+		ctx.index_key.desc_len		= strlen(key->description);
-+		ctx.match_data			= key;
-+		kdebug("check possessed");
-+		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
-+		kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
- 
- 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
- 			key_put(key);
-@@ -717,14 +716,14 @@ try_again:
- 		goto invalid_key;
- 
- 	/* check the permissions */
--	ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
-+	ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
- 	if (ret < 0)
- 		goto invalid_key;
- 
- 	key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
- 
- error:
--	put_cred(cred);
-+	put_cred(ctx.cred);
- 	return key_ref;
- 
- invalid_key:
-@@ -735,7 +734,7 @@ invalid_key:
- 	/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
- 	 * creds to be installed */
- reget_creds:
--	put_cred(cred);
-+	put_cred(ctx.cred);
- 	goto try_again;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
-index 586cb79..ab75df4 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
-@@ -345,38 +345,34 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
-  * May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a
-  * race between two thread calling request_key().
-  */
--static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
--			       const char *description,
-+static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
- 			       struct key *dest_keyring,
- 			       unsigned long flags,
- 			       struct key_user *user,
- 			       struct key **_key)
- {
--	const struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
--		.type		= type,
--		.description	= description,
--		.desc_len	= strlen(description),
--	};
--	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- 	unsigned long prealloc;
- 	struct key *key;
- 	key_perm_t perm;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	kenter("%s,%s,,,", type->name, description);
-+	kenter("%s,%s,,,",
-+	       ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);
- 
- 	*_key = NULL;
- 	mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
- 
- 	perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
- 	perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
--	if (type->read)
-+	if (ctx->index_key.type->read)
- 		perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
--	if (type == &key_type_keyring || type->update)
-+	if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
-+	    ctx->index_key.type->update)
- 		perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
- 
--	key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
-+	key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
-+			ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
- 			perm, flags);
- 	if (IS_ERR(key))
- 		goto alloc_failed;
-@@ -384,7 +380,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
- 
- 	if (dest_keyring) {
--		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
-+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &prealloc);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto link_prealloc_failed;
- 	}
-@@ -394,8 +390,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 	 * waited for locks */
- 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 
--	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
--					  false, cred);
-+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
- 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 		goto key_already_present;
- 
-@@ -404,7 +399,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
- 
- 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 	if (dest_keyring)
--		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
- 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
- 	*_key = key;
- 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
-@@ -420,7 +415,7 @@ key_already_present:
- 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
- 		if (ret == 0)
- 			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
--		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto link_check_failed;
- 	}
-@@ -449,8 +444,7 @@ alloc_failed:
- /*
-  * Commence key construction.
-  */
--static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
--					  const char *description,
-+static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
- 					  const char *callout_info,
- 					  size_t callout_len,
- 					  void *aux,
-@@ -469,8 +463,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
- 
- 	construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
- 
--	ret = construct_alloc_key(type, description, dest_keyring, flags, user,
--				  &key);
-+	ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
- 	key_user_put(user);
- 
- 	if (ret == 0) {
-@@ -534,18 +527,24 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
- 				 struct key *dest_keyring,
- 				 unsigned long flags)
- {
--	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-+		.index_key.type		= type,
-+		.index_key.description	= description,
-+		.cred			= current_cred(),
-+		.match			= type->match,
-+		.match_data		= description,
-+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-+	};
- 	struct key *key;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
--	       type->name, description, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
--	       dest_keyring, flags);
-+	       ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
-+	       callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
- 
- 	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
--	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
--					  false, cred);
-+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
- 
- 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
- 		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
-@@ -568,9 +567,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
- 		if (!callout_info)
- 			goto error;
- 
--		key = construct_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,
--					     callout_len, aux, dest_keyring,
--					     flags);
-+		key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
-+					     aux, dest_keyring, flags);
- 	}
- 
- error:
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-index 92077de..8d09852 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-@@ -239,15 +239,17 @@ static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
-  */
- struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
- {
--	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-+		.index_key.type		= &key_type_request_key_auth,
-+		.cred			= current_cred(),
-+		.match			= key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
-+		.match_data		= (void *)(unsigned long)target_id,
-+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-+	};
- 	struct key *authkey;
- 	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
- 
--	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(
--		&key_type_request_key_auth,
--		(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
--		key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
--		false, cred);
-+	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
- 
- 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
- 		authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
-diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
-index 55dc889..faa2cae 100644
---- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
-+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
-@@ -25,14 +25,15 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
-  * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
-  */
- struct key_type key_type_user = {
--	.name		= "user",
--	.instantiate	= user_instantiate,
--	.update		= user_update,
--	.match		= user_match,
--	.revoke		= user_revoke,
--	.destroy	= user_destroy,
--	.describe	= user_describe,
--	.read		= user_read,
-+	.name			= "user",
-+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-+	.instantiate		= user_instantiate,
-+	.update			= user_update,
-+	.match			= user_match,
-+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
-+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
-+	.describe		= user_describe,
-+	.read			= user_read,
- };
- 
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
-@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
-  */
- struct key_type key_type_logon = {
- 	.name			= "logon",
-+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- 	.instantiate		= user_instantiate,
- 	.update			= user_update,
- 	.match			= user_match,
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 4dffed72b92a305bcdbb73b719570d8f4ec53f46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/10] KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target
- key ID
-
-Search for auth-key by name rather than by target key ID as, in a future
-patch, we'll by searching directly by index key in preference to iteration
-over all keys.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 21 +++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-index 8d09852..7495a93 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
- #include <linux/slab.h>
- #include <asm/uaccess.h>
- #include "internal.h"
-+#include <keys/user-type.h>
- 
- static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
- 					struct key_preparsed_payload *);
-@@ -222,33 +223,25 @@ error_alloc:
- }
- 
- /*
-- * See if an authorisation key is associated with a particular key.
-- */
--static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
--					       const void *_id)
--{
--	struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
--	key_serial_t id = (key_serial_t)(unsigned long) _id;
--
--	return rka->target_key->serial == id;
--}
--
--/*
-  * Search the current process's keyrings for the authorisation key for
-  * instantiation of a key.
-  */
- struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
- {
-+	char description[16];
- 	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
- 		.index_key.type		= &key_type_request_key_auth,
-+		.index_key.description	= description,
- 		.cred			= current_cred(),
--		.match			= key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
--		.match_data		= (void *)(unsigned long)target_id,
-+		.match			= user_match,
-+		.match_data		= description,
- 		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- 	};
- 	struct key *authkey;
- 	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
- 
-+	sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
-+
- 	authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
- 
- 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 5f3c76b0923620ddd5294270ac478819f06f21d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:53 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 07/10] KEYS: Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than
- atomic_inc()
-
-Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
-count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/security/keys.txt | 13 ++++++++-----
- include/linux/key.h             | 10 +++++++---
- security/keys/key.c             |  2 +-
- security/keys/keyring.c         |  6 +++---
- security/keys/process_keys.c    | 16 ++++++++--------
- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
-index 9ede670..a4c33f1 100644
---- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
-+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
-@@ -960,14 +960,17 @@ payload contents" for more information.
-     the argument will not be parsed.
- 
- 
--(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling the following function:
-+(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following
-+    functions:
- 
-+	struct key *__key_get(struct key *key);
- 	struct key *key_get(struct key *key);
- 
--    These need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when they've been
--    finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned. If the pointer
--    is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set then the key will not be dereferenced and
--    no increment will take place.
-+    Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when
-+    they've been finished with.  The key pointer passed in will be returned.
-+
-+    In the case of key_get(), if the pointer is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set
-+    then the key will not be dereferenced and no increment will take place.
- 
- 
- (*) A key's serial number can be obtained by calling:
-diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
-index d573e82..ef596c7 100644
---- a/include/linux/key.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key.h
-@@ -219,13 +219,17 @@ extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
- extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
- extern void key_put(struct key *key);
- 
--static inline struct key *key_get(struct key *key)
-+static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key)
- {
--	if (key)
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- 	return key;
- }
- 
-+static inline struct key *key_get(struct key *key)
-+{
-+	return key ? __key_get(key) : key;
-+}
-+
- static inline void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref)
- {
- 	key_put(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
-diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
-index 7e6bc39..1e23cc2 100644
---- a/security/keys/key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/key.c
-@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ found:
- 	/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
- 	 * doesn't actually change the key
- 	 */
--	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+	__key_get(key);
- 
- error:
- 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index b42f2d4..87eff32 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ not_this_keyring:
- 
- 	/* we found a viable match */
- found:
--	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+	__key_get(key);
- 	key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
- 	keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
- 	while (sp > 0)
-@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- 
- found:
--	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+	__key_get(key);
- 	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
- 		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
- 	rcu_read_unlock();
-@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
- 
- 	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
- 
--	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+	__key_get(key);
- 	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
- 		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-index e68a3e0..68548ea 100644
---- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
-+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
- 		if (IS_ERR(keyring))
- 			return PTR_ERR(keyring);
- 	} else {
--		atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
-+		__key_get(keyring);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* install the keyring */
-@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ try_again:
- 		}
- 
- 		key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+		__key_get(key);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
-@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ try_again:
- 		}
- 
- 		key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+		__key_get(key);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
-@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ try_again:
- 
- 		rcu_read_lock();
- 		key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+		__key_get(key);
- 		rcu_read_unlock();
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
-@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ try_again:
- 		}
- 
- 		key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+		__key_get(key);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
-@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ try_again:
- 		}
- 
- 		key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+		__key_get(key);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
-@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ try_again:
- 		if (!key)
- 			goto error;
- 
--		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+		__key_get(key);
- 		key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
- 		break;
- 
-@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ try_again:
- 		} else {
- 			rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
- 			key = rka->dest_keyring;
--			atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-+			__key_get(key);
- 		}
- 		up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- 		if (!key)
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 99b0f3185570bb92a61952673b9933d9c1999508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:53 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/10] KEYS: Drop the permissions argument from
- __keyring_search_one()
-
-Drop the permissions argument from __keyring_search_one() as the only caller
-passes 0 here - which causes all checks to be skipped.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/internal.h | 3 +--
- security/keys/key.c      | 2 +-
- security/keys/keyring.c  | 9 +++------
- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index f4bf938..73950bf 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -99,8 +99,7 @@ extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
- 			   unsigned long prealloc);
- 
- extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
--				      key_perm_t perm);
-+				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
- 
- extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
- 					  key_serial_t target_id);
-diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
-index 1e23cc2..7d716b8 100644
---- a/security/keys/key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/key.c
-@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	 * update that instead if possible
- 	 */
- 	if (index_key.type->update) {
--		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key, 0);
-+		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key);
- 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
- 			goto found_matching_key;
- 	}
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index 87eff32..eeef1a0 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -531,15 +531,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
-  * RCU is used to make it unnecessary to lock the keyring key list here.
-  *
-  * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if
-- * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found.  Revoked keys and keys not
-- * providing the requested permission are skipped over.
-+ * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys
-+ * are skipped over.
-  *
-  * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref
-  * to the returned key reference.
-  */
- key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
--			       key_perm_t perm)
-+			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
- {
- 	struct keyring_list *klist;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key;
-@@ -560,8 +559,6 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
- 			    (!key->type->match ||
- 			     key->type->match(key, index_key->description)) &&
--			    key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
--					   perm) == 0 &&
- 			    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
- 					    (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
- 			    )
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From cb720b39e41e62d55bf1e5f8243d78643d31154d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:53 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Add a generic associative array implementation.
-
-Add a generic associative array implementation that can be used as the
-container for keyrings, thereby massively increasing the capacity available
-whilst also speeding up searching in keyrings that contain a lot of keys.
-
-This may also be useful in FS-Cache for tracking cookies.
-
-Documentation is added into Documentation/associative_array.txt
-
-Some of the properties of the implementation are:
-
- (1) Objects are opaque pointers.  The implementation does not care where they
-     point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything).
-
-     [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the two least significant
-     	       bits.
-
- (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array.  This
-     permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously.
-     Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects.
-
- (3) Objects are labelled as being one of two types (the type is a bool value).
-     This information is stored in the array, but has no consequence to the
-     array itself or its algorithms.
-
- (4) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array.
-
- (5) Index keys must be unique.  Inserting an object with the same key as one
-     already in the array will replace the old object.
-
- (6) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths.
-
- (7) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to
-     length is seen.
-
- (8) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array.
-
- (9) The array can iterated over.  The objects will not necessarily come out in
-     key order.
-
-(10) The array can be iterated whilst it is being modified, provided the RCU
-     readlock is being held by the iterator.  Note, however, under these
-     circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once.  If this is a
-     problem, the iterator should lock against modification.  Objects will not
-     be missed, however, unless deleted.
-
-(11) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key.
-
-(12) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the
-     RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up.
-
-The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed
-on each level by nibbles from the index key.  To improve memory efficiency,
-shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over what would otherwise be a series of
-single-occupancy nodes.  Further, nodes pack leaf object pointers into spare
-space in the node rather than making an extra branch until as such time an
-object needs to be added to a full node.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- Documentation/assoc_array.txt    |  574 +++++++++++++
- include/linux/assoc_array.h      |   92 ++
- include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h |  182 ++++
- lib/Kconfig                      |   14 +
- lib/Makefile                     |    1 +
- lib/assoc_array.c                | 1745 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 6 files changed, 2608 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Documentation/assoc_array.txt
- create mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array.h
- create mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h
- create mode 100644 lib/assoc_array.c
-
-diff --git a/Documentation/assoc_array.txt b/Documentation/assoc_array.txt
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f4faec0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Documentation/assoc_array.txt
-@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
-+		   ========================================
-+		   GENERIC ASSOCIATIVE ARRAY IMPLEMENTATION
-+		   ========================================
-+
-+Contents:
-+
-+ - Overview.
-+
-+ - The public API.
-+   - Edit script.
-+   - Operations table.
-+   - Manipulation functions.
-+   - Access functions.
-+   - Index key form.
-+
-+ - Internal workings.
-+   - Basic internal tree layout.
-+   - Shortcuts.
-+   - Splitting and collapsing nodes.
-+   - Non-recursive iteration.
-+   - Simultaneous alteration and iteration.
-+
-+
-+========
-+OVERVIEW
-+========
-+
-+This associative array implementation is an object container with the following
-+properties:
-+
-+ (1) Objects are opaque pointers.  The implementation does not care where they
-+     point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything).
-+
-+     [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the least significant bit.
-+
-+ (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array.  This
-+     permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously.
-+     Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects.
-+
-+ (3) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array.
-+
-+ (4) Index keys must be unique.  Inserting an object with the same key as one
-+     already in the array will replace the old object.
-+
-+ (5) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths.
-+
-+ (6) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to
-+     length is seen.
-+
-+ (7) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array.
-+
-+ (8) The array can iterated over.  The objects will not necessarily come out in
-+     key order.
-+
-+ (9) The array can be iterated over whilst it is being modified, provided the
-+     RCU readlock is being held by the iterator.  Note, however, under these
-+     circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once.  If this is a
-+     problem, the iterator should lock against modification.  Objects will not
-+     be missed, however, unless deleted.
-+
-+(10) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key.
-+
-+(11) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the
-+     RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up.
-+
-+The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed
-+on each level by nibbles from the index key in the same manner as in a radix
-+tree.  To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over
-+what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes.  Further, nodes
-+pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an
-+extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node.
-+
-+
-+==============
-+THE PUBLIC API
-+==============
-+
-+The public API can be found in <linux/assoc_array.h>.  The associative array is
-+rooted on the following structure:
-+
-+	struct assoc_array {
-+		...
-+	};
-+
-+The code is selected by enabling CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY.
-+
-+
-+EDIT SCRIPT
-+-----------
-+
-+The insertion and deletion functions produce an 'edit script' that can later be
-+applied to effect the changes without risking ENOMEM.  This retains the
-+preallocated metadata blocks that will be installed in the internal tree and
-+keeps track of the metadata blocks that will be removed from the tree when the
-+script is applied.
-+
-+This is also used to keep track of dead blocks and dead objects after the
-+script has been applied so that they can be freed later.  The freeing is done
-+after an RCU grace period has passed - thus allowing access functions to
-+proceed under the RCU read lock.
-+
-+The script appears as outside of the API as a pointer of the type:
-+
-+	struct assoc_array_edit;
-+
-+There are two functions for dealing with the script:
-+
-+ (1) Apply an edit script.
-+
-+	void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
-+
-+     This will perform the edit functions, interpolating various write barriers
-+     to permit accesses under the RCU read lock to continue.  The edit script
-+     will then be passed to call_rcu() to free it and any dead stuff it points
-+     to.
-+
-+ (2) Cancel an edit script.
-+
-+	void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
-+
-+     This frees the edit script and all preallocated memory immediately.  If
-+     this was for insertion, the new object is _not_ released by this function,
-+     but must rather be released by the caller.
-+
-+These functions are guaranteed not to fail.
-+
-+
-+OPERATIONS TABLE
-+----------------
-+
-+Various functions take a table of operations:
-+
-+	struct assoc_array_ops {
-+		...
-+	};
-+
-+This points to a number of methods, all of which need to be provided:
-+
-+ (1) Get a chunk of index key from caller data:
-+
-+	unsigned long (*get_key_chunk)(const void *index_key, int level);
-+
-+     This should return a chunk of caller-supplied index key starting at the
-+     *bit* position given by the level argument.  The level argument will be a
-+     multiple of ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE and the function should return
-+     ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE bits.  No error is possible.
-+
-+
-+ (2) Get a chunk of an object's index key.
-+
-+	unsigned long (*get_object_key_chunk)(const void *object, int level);
-+
-+     As the previous function, but gets its data from an object in the array
-+     rather than from a caller-supplied index key.
-+
-+
-+ (3) See if this is the object we're looking for.
-+
-+	bool (*compare_object)(const void *object, const void *index_key);
-+
-+     Compare the object against an index key and return true if it matches and
-+     false if it doesn't.
-+
-+
-+ (4) Diff the index keys of two objects.
-+
-+	int (*diff_objects)(const void *a, const void *b);
-+
-+     Return the bit position at which the index keys of two objects differ or
-+     -1 if they are the same.
-+
-+
-+ (5) Free an object.
-+
-+	void (*free_object)(void *object);
-+
-+     Free the specified object.  Note that this may be called an RCU grace
-+     period after assoc_array_apply_edit() was called, so synchronize_rcu() may
-+     be necessary on module unloading.
-+
-+
-+MANIPULATION FUNCTIONS
-+----------------------
-+
-+There are a number of functions for manipulating an associative array:
-+
-+ (1) Initialise an associative array.
-+
-+	void assoc_array_init(struct assoc_array *array);
-+
-+     This initialises the base structure for an associative array.  It can't
-+     fail.
-+
-+
-+ (2) Insert/replace an object in an associative array.
-+
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *
-+	assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array,
-+			   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+			   const void *index_key,
-+			   void *object);
-+
-+     This inserts the given object into the array.  Note that the least
-+     significant bit of the pointer must be zero as it's used to type-mark
-+     pointers internally.
-+
-+     If an object already exists for that key then it will be replaced with the
-+     new object and the old one will be freed automatically.
-+
-+     The index_key argument should hold index key information and is
-+     passed to the methods in the ops table when they are called.
-+
-+     This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns
-+     an edit script that must be applied.  -ENOMEM is returned in the case of
-+     an out-of-memory error.
-+
-+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
-+
-+
-+ (3) Delete an object from an associative array.
-+
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *
-+	assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
-+			   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+			   const void *index_key);
-+
-+     This deletes an object that matches the specified data from the array.
-+
-+     The index_key argument should hold index key information and is
-+     passed to the methods in the ops table when they are called.
-+
-+     This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns
-+     an edit script that must be applied.  -ENOMEM is returned in the case of
-+     an out-of-memory error.  NULL will be returned if the specified object is
-+     not found within the array.
-+
-+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
-+
-+
-+ (4) Delete all objects from an associative array.
-+
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *
-+	assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array,
-+			  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
-+
-+     This deletes all the objects from an associative array and leaves it
-+     completely empty.
-+
-+     This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns
-+     an edit script that must be applied.  -ENOMEM is returned in the case of
-+     an out-of-memory error.
-+
-+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
-+
-+
-+ (5) Destroy an associative array, deleting all objects.
-+
-+	void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array,
-+				 const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
-+
-+     This destroys the contents of the associative array and leaves it
-+     completely empty.  It is not permitted for another thread to be traversing
-+     the array under the RCU read lock at the same time as this function is
-+     destroying it as no RCU deferral is performed on memory release -
-+     something that would require memory to be allocated.
-+
-+     The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers and accessors
-+     of the array.
-+
-+
-+ (6) Garbage collect an associative array.
-+
-+	int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
-+			   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+			   bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data),
-+			   void *iterator_data);
-+
-+     This iterates over the objects in an associative array and passes each one
-+     to iterator().  If iterator() returns true, the object is kept.  If it
-+     returns false, the object will be freed.  If the iterator() function
-+     returns true, it must perform any appropriate refcount incrementing on the
-+     object before returning.
-+
-+     The internal tree will be packed down if possible as part of the iteration
-+     to reduce the number of nodes in it.
-+
-+     The iterator_data is passed directly to iterator() and is otherwise
-+     ignored by the function.
-+
-+     The function will return 0 if successful and -ENOMEM if there wasn't
-+     enough memory.
-+
-+     It is possible for other threads to iterate over or search the array under
-+     the RCU read lock whilst this function is in progress.  The caller should
-+     lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array.
-+
-+
-+ACCESS FUNCTIONS
-+----------------
-+
-+There are two functions for accessing an associative array:
-+
-+ (1) Iterate over all the objects in an associative array.
-+
-+	int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+				int (*iterator)(const void *object,
-+						void *iterator_data),
-+				void *iterator_data);
-+
-+     This passes each object in the array to the iterator callback function.
-+     iterator_data is private data for that function.
-+
-+     This may be used on an array at the same time as the array is being
-+     modified, provided the RCU read lock is held.  Under such circumstances,
-+     it is possible for the iteration function to see some objects twice.  If
-+     this is a problem, then modification should be locked against.  The
-+     iteration algorithm should not, however, miss any objects.
-+
-+     The function will return 0 if no objects were in the array or else it will
-+     return the result of the last iterator function called.  Iteration stops
-+     immediately if any call to the iteration function results in a non-zero
-+     return.
-+
-+
-+ (2) Find an object in an associative array.
-+
-+	void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+			       const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+			       const void *index_key);
-+
-+     This walks through the array's internal tree directly to the object
-+     specified by the index key..
-+
-+     This may be used on an array at the same time as the array is being
-+     modified, provided the RCU read lock is held.
-+
-+     The function will return the object if found (and set *_type to the object
-+     type) or will return NULL if the object was not found.
-+
-+
-+INDEX KEY FORM
-+--------------
-+
-+The index key can be of any form, but since the algorithms aren't told how long
-+the key is, it is strongly recommended that the index key includes its length
-+very early on before any variation due to the length would have an effect on
-+comparisons.
-+
-+This will cause leaves with different length keys to scatter away from each
-+other - and those with the same length keys to cluster together.
-+
-+It is also recommended that the index key begin with a hash of the rest of the
-+key to maximise scattering throughout keyspace.
-+
-+The better the scattering, the wider and lower the internal tree will be.
-+
-+Poor scattering isn't too much of a problem as there are shortcuts and nodes
-+can contain mixtures of leaves and metadata pointers.
-+
-+The index key is read in chunks of machine word.  Each chunk is subdivided into
-+one nibble (4 bits) per level, so on a 32-bit CPU this is good for 8 levels and
-+on a 64-bit CPU, 16 levels.  Unless the scattering is really poor, it is
-+unlikely that more than one word of any particular index key will have to be
-+used.
-+
-+
-+=================
-+INTERNAL WORKINGS
-+=================
-+
-+The associative array data structure has an internal tree.  This tree is
-+constructed of two types of metadata blocks: nodes and shortcuts.
-+
-+A node is an array of slots.  Each slot can contain one of four things:
-+
-+ (*) A NULL pointer, indicating that the slot is empty.
-+
-+ (*) A pointer to an object (a leaf).
-+
-+ (*) A pointer to a node at the next level.
-+
-+ (*) A pointer to a shortcut.
-+
-+
-+BASIC INTERNAL TREE LAYOUT
-+--------------------------
-+
-+Ignoring shortcuts for the moment, the nodes form a multilevel tree.  The index
-+key space is strictly subdivided by the nodes in the tree and nodes occur on
-+fixed levels.  For example:
-+
-+ Level:	0		1		2		3
-+	===============	===============	===============	===============
-+							NODE D
-+			NODE B		NODE C	+------>+---+
-+		+------>+---+	+------>+---+	|	| 0 |
-+	NODE A	|	| 0 |	|	| 0 |	|	+---+
-+	+---+	|	+---+	|	+---+	|	:   :
-+	| 0 |	|	:   :	|	:   :	|	+---+
-+	+---+	|	+---+	|	+---+	|	| f |
-+	| 1 |---+	| 3 |---+	| 7 |---+	+---+
-+	+---+		+---+		+---+
-+	:   :		:   :		| 8 |---+
-+	+---+		+---+		+---+	|	NODE E
-+	| e |---+	| f |		:   :   +------>+---+
-+	+---+	|	+---+		+---+		| 0 |
-+	| f |	|			| f |		+---+
-+	+---+	|			+---+		:   :
-+		|	NODE F				+---+
-+		+------>+---+				| f |
-+			| 0 |		NODE G		+---+
-+			+---+	+------>+---+
-+			:   :	|	| 0 |
-+			+---+	|	+---+
-+			| 6 |---+	:   :
-+			+---+		+---+
-+			:   :		| f |
-+			+---+		+---+
-+			| f |
-+			+---+
-+
-+In the above example, there are 7 nodes (A-G), each with 16 slots (0-f).
-+Assuming no other meta data nodes in the tree, the key space is divided thusly:
-+
-+	KEY PREFIX	NODE
-+	==========	====
-+	137*		D
-+	138*		E
-+	13[0-69-f]*	C
-+	1[0-24-f]*	B
-+	e6*		G
-+	e[0-57-f]*	F
-+	[02-df]*	A
-+
-+So, for instance, keys with the following example index keys will be found in
-+the appropriate nodes:
-+
-+	INDEX KEY	PREFIX	NODE
-+	===============	=======	====
-+	13694892892489	13	C
-+	13795289025897	137	D
-+	13889dde88793	138	E
-+	138bbb89003093	138	E
-+	1394879524789	12	C
-+	1458952489	1	B
-+	9431809de993ba	-	A
-+	b4542910809cd	-	A
-+	e5284310def98	e	F
-+	e68428974237	e6	G
-+	e7fffcbd443	e	F
-+	f3842239082	-	A
-+
-+To save memory, if a node can hold all the leaves in its portion of keyspace,
-+then the node will have all those leaves in it and will not have any metadata
-+pointers - even if some of those leaves would like to be in the same slot.
-+
-+A node can contain a heterogeneous mix of leaves and metadata pointers.
-+Metadata pointers must be in the slots that match their subdivisions of key
-+space.  The leaves can be in any slot not occupied by a metadata pointer.  It
-+is guaranteed that none of the leaves in a node will match a slot occupied by a
-+metadata pointer.  If the metadata pointer is there, any leaf whose key matches
-+the metadata key prefix must be in the subtree that the metadata pointer points
-+to.
-+
-+In the above example list of index keys, node A will contain:
-+
-+	SLOT	CONTENT		INDEX KEY (PREFIX)
-+	====	===============	==================
-+	1	PTR TO NODE B	1*
-+	any	LEAF		9431809de993ba
-+	any	LEAF		b4542910809cd
-+	e	PTR TO NODE F	e*
-+	any	LEAF		f3842239082
-+
-+and node B:
-+
-+	3	PTR TO NODE C	13*
-+	any	LEAF		1458952489
-+
-+
-+SHORTCUTS
-+---------
-+
-+Shortcuts are metadata records that jump over a piece of keyspace.  A shortcut
-+is a replacement for a series of single-occupancy nodes ascending through the
-+levels.  Shortcuts exist to save memory and to speed up traversal.
-+
-+It is possible for the root of the tree to be a shortcut - say, for example,
-+the tree contains at least 17 nodes all with key prefix '1111'.  The insertion
-+algorithm will insert a shortcut to skip over the '1111' keyspace in a single
-+bound and get to the fourth level where these actually become different.
-+
-+
-+SPLITTING AND COLLAPSING NODES
-+------------------------------
-+
-+Each node has a maximum capacity of 16 leaves and metadata pointers.  If the
-+insertion algorithm finds that it is trying to insert a 17th object into a
-+node, that node will be split such that at least two leaves that have a common
-+key segment at that level end up in a separate node rooted on that slot for
-+that common key segment.
-+
-+If the leaves in a full node and the leaf that is being inserted are
-+sufficiently similar, then a shortcut will be inserted into the tree.
-+
-+When the number of objects in the subtree rooted at a node falls to 16 or
-+fewer, then the subtree will be collapsed down to a single node - and this will
-+ripple towards the root if possible.
-+
-+
-+NON-RECURSIVE ITERATION
-+-----------------------
-+
-+Each node and shortcut contains a back pointer to its parent and the number of
-+slot in that parent that points to it.  None-recursive iteration uses these to
-+proceed rootwards through the tree, going to the parent node, slot N + 1 to
-+make sure progress is made without the need for a stack.
-+
-+The backpointers, however, make simultaneous alteration and iteration tricky.
-+
-+
-+SIMULTANEOUS ALTERATION AND ITERATION
-+-------------------------------------
-+
-+There are a number of cases to consider:
-+
-+ (1) Simple insert/replace.  This involves simply replacing a NULL or old
-+     matching leaf pointer with the pointer to the new leaf after a barrier.
-+     The metadata blocks don't change otherwise.  An old leaf won't be freed
-+     until after the RCU grace period.
-+
-+ (2) Simple delete.  This involves just clearing an old matching leaf.  The
-+     metadata blocks don't change otherwise.  The old leaf won't be freed until
-+     after the RCU grace period.
-+
-+ (3) Insertion replacing part of a subtree that we haven't yet entered.  This
-+     may involve replacement of part of that subtree - but that won't affect
-+     the iteration as we won't have reached the pointer to it yet and the
-+     ancestry blocks are not replaced (the layout of those does not change).
-+
-+ (4) Insertion replacing nodes that we're actively processing.  This isn't a
-+     problem as we've passed the anchoring pointer and won't switch onto the
-+     new layout until we follow the back pointers - at which point we've
-+     already examined the leaves in the replaced node (we iterate over all the
-+     leaves in a node before following any of its metadata pointers).
-+
-+     We might, however, re-see some leaves that have been split out into a new
-+     branch that's in a slot further along than we were at.
-+
-+ (5) Insertion replacing nodes that we're processing a dependent branch of.
-+     This won't affect us until we follow the back pointers.  Similar to (4).
-+
-+ (6) Deletion collapsing a branch under us.  This doesn't affect us because the
-+     back pointers will get us back to the parent of the new node before we
-+     could see the new node.  The entire collapsed subtree is thrown away
-+     unchanged - and will still be rooted on the same slot, so we shouldn't
-+     process it a second time as we'll go back to slot + 1.
-+
-+Note:
-+
-+ (*) Under some circumstances, we need to simultaneously change the parent
-+     pointer and the parent slot pointer on a node (say, for example, we
-+     inserted another node before it and moved it up a level).  We cannot do
-+     this without locking against a read - so we have to replace that node too.
-+
-+     However, when we're changing a shortcut into a node this isn't a problem
-+     as shortcuts only have one slot and so the parent slot number isn't used
-+     when traversing backwards over one.  This means that it's okay to change
-+     the slot number first - provided suitable barriers are used to make sure
-+     the parent slot number is read after the back pointer.
-+
-+Obsolete blocks and leaves are freed up after an RCU grace period has passed,
-+so as long as anyone doing walking or iteration holds the RCU read lock, the
-+old superstructure should not go away on them.
-diff --git a/include/linux/assoc_array.h b/include/linux/assoc_array.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9a193b8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/linux/assoc_array.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
-+/* Generic associative array implementation.
-+ *
-+ * See Documentation/assoc_array.txt for information.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_H
-+#define _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_H
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
-+
-+#include <linux/types.h>
-+
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG /* Key data retrieved in chunks of this size */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Generic associative array.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array {
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*root;		/* The node at the root of the tree */
-+	unsigned long		nr_leaves_on_tree;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Operations on objects and index keys for use by array manipulation routines.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_ops {
-+	/* Method to get a chunk of an index key from caller-supplied data */
-+	unsigned long (*get_key_chunk)(const void *index_key, int level);
-+
-+	/* Method to get a piece of an object's index key */
-+	unsigned long (*get_object_key_chunk)(const void *object, int level);
-+
-+	/* Is this the object we're looking for? */
-+	bool (*compare_object)(const void *object, const void *index_key);
-+
-+	/* How different are two objects, to a bit position in their keys? (or
-+	 * -1 if they're the same)
-+	 */
-+	int (*diff_objects)(const void *a, const void *b);
-+
-+	/* Method to free an object. */
-+	void (*free_object)(void *object);
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Access and manipulation functions.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_edit;
-+
-+static inline void assoc_array_init(struct assoc_array *array)
-+{
-+	array->root = NULL;
-+	array->nr_leaves_on_tree = 0;
-+}
-+
-+extern int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+			       int (*iterator)(const void *object,
-+					       void *iterator_data),
-+			       void *iterator_data);
-+extern void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+			      const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+			      const void *index_key);
-+extern void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array,
-+				const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
-+extern struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array,
-+						   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+						   const void *index_key,
-+						   void *object);
-+extern void assoc_array_insert_set_object(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
-+					  void *object);
-+extern struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
-+						   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+						   const void *index_key);
-+extern struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array,
-+						  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops);
-+extern void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
-+extern void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
-+extern int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
-+			  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+			  bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data),
-+			  void *iterator_data);
-+
-+#endif /* CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY */
-+#endif /* _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_H */
-diff --git a/include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h b/include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..711275e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
-+/* Private definitions for the generic associative array implementation.
-+ *
-+ * See Documentation/assoc_array.txt for information.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_PRIV_H
-+#define _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_PRIV_H
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
-+
-+#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
-+
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT		16	/* Number of slots per node */
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK		(ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT - 1)
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP		(ilog2(ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT))
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK	(ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP - 1)
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK	(ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 1)
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT	(ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG))
-+
-+/*
-+ * Undefined type representing a pointer with type information in the bottom
-+ * two bits.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_ptr;
-+
-+/*
-+ * An N-way node in the tree.
-+ *
-+ * Each slot contains one of four things:
-+ *
-+ *	(1) Nothing (NULL).
-+ *
-+ *	(2) A leaf object (pointer types 0).
-+ *
-+ *	(3) A next-level node (pointer type 1, subtype 0).
-+ *
-+ *	(4) A shortcut (pointer type 1, subtype 1).
-+ *
-+ * The tree is optimised for search-by-ID, but permits reasonable iteration
-+ * also.
-+ *
-+ * The tree is navigated by constructing an index key consisting of an array of
-+ * segments, where each segment is ilog2(ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) bits in size.
-+ *
-+ * The segments correspond to levels of the tree (the first segment is used at
-+ * level 0, the second at level 1, etc.).
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_node {
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*back_pointer;
-+	u8			parent_slot;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*slots[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT];
-+	unsigned long		nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * A shortcut through the index space out to where a collection of nodes/leaves
-+ * with the same IDs live.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_shortcut {
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*back_pointer;
-+	int			parent_slot;
-+	int			skip_to_level;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr	*next_node;
-+	unsigned long		index_key[];
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Preallocation cache.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_edit {
-+	struct rcu_head			rcu;
-+	struct assoc_array		*array;
-+	const struct assoc_array_ops	*ops;
-+	const struct assoc_array_ops	*ops_for_excised_subtree;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*leaf;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		**leaf_p;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*dead_leaf;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*new_meta[3];
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*excised_meta[1];
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*excised_subtree;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		**set_backpointers[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT];
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr		*set_backpointers_to;
-+	struct assoc_array_node		*adjust_count_on;
-+	long				adjust_count_by;
-+	struct {
-+		struct assoc_array_ptr	**ptr;
-+		struct assoc_array_ptr	*to;
-+	} set[2];
-+	struct {
-+		u8			*p;
-+		u8			to;
-+	} set_parent_slot[1];
-+	u8				segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1];
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Internal tree member pointers are marked in the bottom one or two bits to
-+ * indicate what type they are so that we don't have to look behind every
-+ * pointer to see what it points to.
-+ *
-+ * We provide functions to test type annotations and to create and translate
-+ * the annotated pointers.
-+ */
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_LEAF_TYPE 0x0UL	/* Points to leaf (or nowhere) */
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE 0x1UL	/* Points to node or shortcut */
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK	0x2UL
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_NODE_SUBTYPE	0x0UL
-+#define ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SHORTCUT_SUBTYPE 0x2UL
-+
-+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (unsigned long)x & ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK;
-+}
-+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return !assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(x);
-+}
-+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (unsigned long)x & ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK;
-+}
-+static inline bool assoc_array_ptr_is_node(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return !assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(x);
-+}
-+
-+static inline void *assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (void *)((unsigned long)x & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK);
-+}
-+
-+static inline
-+unsigned long __assoc_array_ptr_to_meta(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (unsigned long)x &
-+		~(ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK | ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_TYPE_MASK);
-+}
-+static inline
-+struct assoc_array_node *assoc_array_ptr_to_node(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (struct assoc_array_node *)__assoc_array_ptr_to_meta(x);
-+}
-+static inline
-+struct assoc_array_shortcut *assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (struct assoc_array_shortcut *)__assoc_array_ptr_to_meta(x);
-+}
-+
-+static inline
-+struct assoc_array_ptr *__assoc_array_x_to_ptr(const void *p, unsigned long t)
-+{
-+	return (struct assoc_array_ptr *)((unsigned long)p | t);
-+}
-+static inline
-+struct assoc_array_ptr *assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(const void *p)
-+{
-+	return __assoc_array_x_to_ptr(p, ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_LEAF_TYPE);
-+}
-+static inline
-+struct assoc_array_ptr *assoc_array_node_to_ptr(const struct assoc_array_node *p)
-+{
-+	return __assoc_array_x_to_ptr(
-+		p, ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE | ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_NODE_SUBTYPE);
-+}
-+static inline
-+struct assoc_array_ptr *assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(const struct assoc_array_shortcut *p)
-+{
-+	return __assoc_array_x_to_ptr(
-+		p, ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE | ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SHORTCUT_SUBTYPE);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY */
-+#endif /* _LINUX_ASSOC_ARRAY_PRIV_H */
-diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
-index 35da513..b7d3234 100644
---- a/lib/Kconfig
-+++ b/lib/Kconfig
-@@ -312,6 +312,20 @@ config TEXTSEARCH_FSM
- config BTREE
- 	boolean
- 
-+config ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
-+	bool
-+	help
-+	  Generic associative array.  Can be searched and iterated over whilst
-+	  it is being modified.  It is also reasonably quick to search and
-+	  modify.  The algorithms are non-recursive, and the trees are highly
-+	  capacious.
-+
-+	  See:
-+
-+		Documentation/assoc_array.txt
-+
-+	  for more information.
-+
- config HAS_IOMEM
- 	boolean
- 	depends on !NO_IOMEM
-diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
-index 7baccfd..2c59891 100644
---- a/lib/Makefile
-+++ b/lib/Makefile
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ CFLAGS_hweight.o = $(subst $(quote),,$(CONFIG_ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS))
- obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o
- 
- obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
-diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a095281
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,1745 @@
-+/* Generic associative array implementation.
-+ *
-+ * See Documentation/assoc_array.txt for information.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+//#define DEBUG
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * Iterate over an associative array.  The caller must hold the RCU read lock
-+ * or better.
-+ */
-+static int assoc_array_subtree_iterate(const struct assoc_array_ptr *root,
-+				       const struct assoc_array_ptr *stop,
-+				       int (*iterator)(const void *leaf,
-+						       void *iterator_data),
-+				       void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	const struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
-+	const struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+	const struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr, *parent;
-+	unsigned long has_meta;
-+	int slot, ret;
-+
-+	cursor = root;
-+
-+begin_node:
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor)) {
-+		/* Descend through a shortcut */
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
-+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+		cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
-+	}
-+
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+	slot = 0;
-+
-+	/* We perform two passes of each node.
-+	 *
-+	 * The first pass does all the leaves in this node.  This means we
-+	 * don't miss any leaves if the node is split up by insertion whilst
-+	 * we're iterating over the branches rooted here (we may, however, see
-+	 * some leaves twice).
-+	 */
-+	has_meta = 0;
-+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
-+		has_meta |= (unsigned long)ptr;
-+		if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr)) {
-+			/* We need a barrier between the read of the pointer
-+			 * and dereferencing the pointer - but only if we are
-+			 * actually going to dereference it.
-+			 */
-+			smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+
-+			/* Invoke the callback */
-+			ret = iterator(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
-+				       iterator_data);
-+			if (ret)
-+				return ret;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* The second pass attends to all the metadata pointers.  If we follow
-+	 * one of these we may find that we don't come back here, but rather go
-+	 * back to a replacement node with the leaves in a different layout.
-+	 *
-+	 * We are guaranteed to make progress, however, as the slot number for
-+	 * a particular portion of the key space cannot change - and we
-+	 * continue at the back pointer + 1.
-+	 */
-+	if (!(has_meta & ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_META_TYPE))
-+		goto finished_node;
-+	slot = 0;
-+
-+continue_node:
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+
-+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
-+			cursor = ptr;
-+			goto begin_node;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+finished_node:
-+	/* Move up to the parent (may need to skip back over a shortcut) */
-+	parent = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
-+	slot = node->parent_slot;
-+	if (parent == stop)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(parent)) {
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(parent);
-+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+		cursor = parent;
-+		parent = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
-+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+		if (parent == stop)
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Ascend to next slot in parent node */
-+	cursor = parent;
-+	slot++;
-+	goto continue_node;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_iterate - Pass all objects in the array to a callback
-+ * @array: The array to iterate over.
-+ * @iterator: The callback function.
-+ * @iterator_data: Private data for the callback function.
-+ *
-+ * Iterate over all the objects in an associative array.  Each one will be
-+ * presented to the iterator function.
-+ *
-+ * If the array is being modified concurrently with the iteration then it is
-+ * possible that some objects in the array will be passed to the iterator
-+ * callback more than once - though every object should be passed at least
-+ * once.  If this is undesirable then the caller must lock against modification
-+ * for the duration of this function.
-+ *
-+ * The function will return 0 if no objects were in the array or else it will
-+ * return the result of the last iterator function called.  Iteration stops
-+ * immediately if any call to the iteration function results in a non-zero
-+ * return.
-+ *
-+ * The caller should hold the RCU read lock or better if concurrent
-+ * modification is possible.
-+ */
-+int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+			int (*iterator)(const void *object,
-+					void *iterator_data),
-+			void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *root = ACCESS_ONCE(array->root);
-+
-+	if (!root)
-+		return 0;
-+	return assoc_array_subtree_iterate(root, NULL, iterator, iterator_data);
-+}
-+
-+enum assoc_array_walk_status {
-+	assoc_array_walk_tree_empty,
-+	assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node,
-+	assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut,
-+} status;
-+
-+struct assoc_array_walk_result {
-+	struct {
-+		struct assoc_array_node	*node;	/* Node in which leaf might be found */
-+		int		level;
-+		int		slot;
-+	} terminal_node;
-+	struct {
-+		struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
-+		int		level;
-+		int		sc_level;
-+		unsigned long	sc_segments;
-+		unsigned long	dissimilarity;
-+	} wrong_shortcut;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Navigate through the internal tree looking for the closest node to the key.
-+ */
-+static enum assoc_array_walk_status
-+assoc_array_walk(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+		 const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+		 const void *index_key,
-+		 struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
-+	unsigned long sc_segments, dissimilarity;
-+	unsigned long segments;
-+	int level, sc_level, next_sc_level;
-+	int slot;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(array->root);
-+	if (!cursor)
-+		return assoc_array_walk_tree_empty;
-+
-+	level = 0;
-+
-+	/* Use segments from the key for the new leaf to navigate through the
-+	 * internal tree, skipping through nodes and shortcuts that are on
-+	 * route to the destination.  Eventually we'll come to a slot that is
-+	 * either empty or contains a leaf at which point we've found a node in
-+	 * which the leaf we're looking for might be found or into which it
-+	 * should be inserted.
-+	 */
-+jumped:
-+	segments = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
-+	pr_devel("segments[%d]: %lx\n", level, segments);
-+
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor))
-+		goto follow_shortcut;
-+
-+consider_node:
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+
-+	slot = segments >> (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
-+	slot &= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
-+	ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
-+
-+	pr_devel("consider slot %x [ix=%d type=%lu]\n",
-+		 slot, level, (unsigned long)ptr & 3);
-+
-+	if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
-+		/* The node doesn't have a node/shortcut pointer in the slot
-+		 * corresponding to the index key that we have to follow.
-+		 */
-+		result->terminal_node.node = node;
-+		result->terminal_node.level = level;
-+		result->terminal_node.slot = slot;
-+		pr_devel("<--%s() = terminal_node\n", __func__);
-+		return assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
-+		/* There is a pointer to a node in the slot corresponding to
-+		 * this index key segment, so we need to follow it.
-+		 */
-+		cursor = ptr;
-+		level += ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
-+		if ((level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) != 0)
-+			goto consider_node;
-+		goto jumped;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* There is a shortcut in the slot corresponding to the index key
-+	 * segment.  We follow the shortcut if its partial index key matches
-+	 * this leaf's.  Otherwise we need to split the shortcut.
-+	 */
-+	cursor = ptr;
-+follow_shortcut:
-+	shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+	pr_devel("shortcut to %d\n", shortcut->skip_to_level);
-+	sc_level = level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
-+	BUG_ON(sc_level > shortcut->skip_to_level);
-+
-+	do {
-+		/* Check the leaf against the shortcut's index key a word at a
-+		 * time, trimming the final word (the shortcut stores the index
-+		 * key completely from the root to the shortcut's target).
-+		 */
-+		if ((sc_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) == 0)
-+			segments = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, sc_level);
-+
-+		sc_segments = shortcut->index_key[sc_level >> ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT];
-+		dissimilarity = segments ^ sc_segments;
-+
-+		if (round_up(sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE) > shortcut->skip_to_level) {
-+			/* Trim segments that are beyond the shortcut */
-+			int shift = shortcut->skip_to_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
-+			dissimilarity &= ~(ULONG_MAX << shift);
-+			next_sc_level = shortcut->skip_to_level;
-+		} else {
-+			next_sc_level = sc_level + ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
-+			next_sc_level = round_down(next_sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
-+		}
-+
-+		if (dissimilarity != 0) {
-+			/* This shortcut points elsewhere */
-+			result->wrong_shortcut.shortcut = shortcut;
-+			result->wrong_shortcut.level = level;
-+			result->wrong_shortcut.sc_level = sc_level;
-+			result->wrong_shortcut.sc_segments = sc_segments;
-+			result->wrong_shortcut.dissimilarity = dissimilarity;
-+			return assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut;
-+		}
-+
-+		sc_level = next_sc_level;
-+	} while (sc_level < shortcut->skip_to_level);
-+
-+	/* The shortcut matches the leaf's index to this point. */
-+	cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
-+	if (((level ^ sc_level) & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) != 0) {
-+		level = sc_level;
-+		goto jumped;
-+	} else {
-+		level = sc_level;
-+		goto consider_node;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_find - Find an object by index key
-+ * @array: The associative array to search.
-+ * @ops: The operations to use.
-+ * @index_key: The key to the object.
-+ *
-+ * Find an object in an associative array by walking through the internal tree
-+ * to the node that should contain the object and then searching the leaves
-+ * there.  NULL is returned if the requested object was not found in the array.
-+ *
-+ * The caller must hold the RCU read lock or better.
-+ */
-+void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array,
-+		       const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+		       const void *index_key)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
-+	const struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+	const struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+	const void *leaf;
-+	int slot;
-+
-+	if (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result) !=
-+	    assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	node = result.terminal_node.node;
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+
-+	/* If the target key is available to us, it's has to be pointed to by
-+	 * the terminal node.
-+	 */
-+	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
-+		if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr)) {
-+			/* We need a barrier between the read of the pointer
-+			 * and dereferencing the pointer - but only if we are
-+			 * actually going to dereference it.
-+			 */
-+			leaf = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr);
-+			smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+			if (ops->compare_object(leaf, index_key))
-+				return (void *)leaf;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destructively iterate over an associative array.  The caller must prevent
-+ * other simultaneous accesses.
-+ */
-+static void assoc_array_destroy_subtree(struct assoc_array_ptr *root,
-+					const struct assoc_array_ops *ops)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *parent = NULL;
-+	int slot = -1;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	cursor = root;
-+	if (!cursor) {
-+		pr_devel("empty\n");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+move_to_meta:
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor)) {
-+		/* Descend through a shortcut */
-+		pr_devel("[%d] shortcut\n", slot);
-+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor));
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
-+		BUG_ON(shortcut->back_pointer != parent);
-+		BUG_ON(slot != -1 && shortcut->parent_slot != slot);
-+		parent = cursor;
-+		cursor = shortcut->next_node;
-+		slot = -1;
-+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(cursor));
-+	}
-+
-+	pr_devel("[%d] node\n", slot);
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	BUG_ON(node->back_pointer != parent);
-+	BUG_ON(slot != -1 && node->parent_slot != slot);
-+	slot = 0;
-+
-+continue_node:
-+	pr_devel("Node %p [back=%p]\n", node, node->back_pointer);
-+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr = node->slots[slot];
-+		if (!ptr)
-+			continue;
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
-+			parent = cursor;
-+			cursor = ptr;
-+			goto move_to_meta;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (ops) {
-+			pr_devel("[%d] free leaf\n", slot);
-+			ops->free_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr));
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	parent = node->back_pointer;
-+	slot = node->parent_slot;
-+	pr_devel("free node\n");
-+	kfree(node);
-+	if (!parent)
-+		return; /* Done */
-+
-+	/* Move back up to the parent (may need to free a shortcut on
-+	 * the way up) */
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(parent)) {
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(parent);
-+		BUG_ON(shortcut->next_node != cursor);
-+		cursor = parent;
-+		parent = shortcut->back_pointer;
-+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+		pr_devel("free shortcut\n");
-+		kfree(shortcut);
-+		if (!parent)
-+			return;
-+
-+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(parent));
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Ascend to next slot in parent node */
-+	pr_devel("ascend to %p[%d]\n", parent, slot);
-+	cursor = parent;
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	slot++;
-+	goto continue_node;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_destroy - Destroy an associative array
-+ * @array: The array to destroy.
-+ * @ops: The operations to use.
-+ *
-+ * Discard all metadata and free all objects in an associative array.  The
-+ * array will be empty and ready to use again upon completion.  This function
-+ * cannot fail.
-+ *
-+ * The caller must prevent all other accesses whilst this takes place as no
-+ * attempt is made to adjust pointers gracefully to permit RCU readlock-holding
-+ * accesses to continue.  On the other hand, no memory allocation is required.
-+ */
-+void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array,
-+			 const struct assoc_array_ops *ops)
-+{
-+	assoc_array_destroy_subtree(array->root, ops);
-+	array->root = NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Handle insertion into an empty tree.
-+ */
-+static bool assoc_array_insert_in_empty_tree(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_node *new_n0;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!new_n0)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[0];
-+	edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
-+	edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
-+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+
-+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [no root]\n", __func__);
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Handle insertion into a terminal node.
-+ */
-+static bool assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
-+						  const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+						  const void *index_key,
-+						  struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s0;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0, *new_n1, *side;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+	unsigned long dissimilarity, base_seg, blank;
-+	size_t keylen;
-+	bool have_meta;
-+	int level, diff;
-+	int slot, next_slot, free_slot, i, j;
-+
-+	node	= result->terminal_node.node;
-+	level	= result->terminal_node.level;
-+	edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = result->terminal_node.slot;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	/* We arrived at a node which doesn't have an onward node or shortcut
-+	 * pointer that we have to follow.  This means that (a) the leaf we
-+	 * want must go here (either by insertion or replacement) or (b) we
-+	 * need to split this node and insert in one of the fragments.
-+	 */
-+	free_slot = -1;
-+
-+	/* Firstly, we have to check the leaves in this node to see if there's
-+	 * a matching one we should replace in place.
-+	 */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		ptr = node->slots[i];
-+		if (!ptr) {
-+			free_slot = i;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		if (ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr), index_key)) {
-+			pr_devel("replace in slot %d\n", i);
-+			edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[i];
-+			edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[i];
-+			pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [replace]\n", __func__);
-+			return true;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* If there is a free slot in this node then we can just insert the
-+	 * leaf here.
-+	 */
-+	if (free_slot >= 0) {
-+		pr_devel("insert in free slot %d\n", free_slot);
-+		edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[free_slot];
-+		edit->adjust_count_on = node;
-+		pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert]\n", __func__);
-+		return true;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* The node has no spare slots - so we're either going to have to split
-+	 * it or insert another node before it.
-+	 *
-+	 * Whatever, we're going to need at least two new nodes - so allocate
-+	 * those now.  We may also need a new shortcut, but we deal with that
-+	 * when we need it.
-+	 */
-+	new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!new_n0)
-+		return false;
-+	edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	new_n1 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!new_n1)
-+		return false;
-+	edit->new_meta[1] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
-+
-+	/* We need to find out how similar the leaves are. */
-+	pr_devel("no spare slots\n");
-+	have_meta = false;
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		ptr = node->slots[i];
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
-+			edit->segment_cache[i] = 0xff;
-+			have_meta = true;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(
-+			assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr), level);
-+		base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
-+		edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (have_meta) {
-+		pr_devel("have meta\n");
-+		goto split_node;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* The node contains only leaves */
-+	dissimilarity = 0;
-+	base_seg = edit->segment_cache[0];
-+	for (i = 1; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
-+		dissimilarity |= edit->segment_cache[i] ^ base_seg;
-+
-+	pr_devel("only leaves; dissimilarity=%lx\n", dissimilarity);
-+
-+	if ((dissimilarity & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) == 0) {
-+		/* The old leaves all cluster in the same slot.  We will need
-+		 * to insert a shortcut if the new node wants to cluster with them.
-+		 */
-+		if ((edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] ^ base_seg) == 0)
-+			goto all_leaves_cluster_together;
-+
-+		/* Otherwise we can just insert a new node ahead of the old
-+		 * one.
-+		 */
-+		goto present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf;
-+	}
-+
-+split_node:
-+	pr_devel("split node\n");
-+
-+	/* We need to split the current node; we know that the node doesn't
-+	 * simply contain a full set of leaves that cluster together (it
-+	 * contains meta pointers and/or non-clustering leaves).
-+	 *
-+	 * We need to expel at least two leaves out of a set consisting of the
-+	 * leaves in the node and the new leaf.
-+	 *
-+	 * We need a new node (n0) to replace the current one and a new node to
-+	 * take the expelled nodes (n1).
-+	 */
-+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
-+	new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
-+	new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
-+
-+do_split_node:
-+	pr_devel("do_split_node\n");
-+
-+	new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+	new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = 0;
-+
-+	/* Begin by finding two matching leaves.  There have to be at least two
-+	 * that match - even if there are meta pointers - because any leaf that
-+	 * would match a slot with a meta pointer in it must be somewhere
-+	 * behind that meta pointer and cannot be here.  Further, given N
-+	 * remaining leaf slots, we now have N+1 leaves to go in them.
-+	 */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		slot = edit->segment_cache[i];
-+		if (slot != 0xff)
-+			for (j = i + 1; j < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1; j++)
-+				if (edit->segment_cache[j] == slot)
-+					goto found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy;
-+	}
-+found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy:
-+	pr_devel("same slot: %x %x [%02x]\n", i, j, slot);
-+	BUG_ON(i >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
-+	BUG_ON(j >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1);
-+	BUG_ON(slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
-+
-+	new_n1->parent_slot = slot;
-+
-+	/* Metadata pointers cannot change slot */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
-+			new_n0->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
-+		else
-+			new_n0->slots[i] = NULL;
-+	BUG_ON(new_n0->slots[slot] != NULL);
-+	new_n0->slots[slot] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
-+
-+	/* Filter the leaf pointers between the new nodes */
-+	free_slot = -1;
-+	next_slot = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
-+			continue;
-+		if (edit->segment_cache[i] == slot) {
-+			new_n1->slots[next_slot++] = node->slots[i];
-+			new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch++;
-+		} else {
-+			do {
-+				free_slot++;
-+			} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
-+			new_n0->slots[free_slot] = node->slots[i];
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	pr_devel("filtered: f=%x n=%x\n", free_slot, next_slot);
-+
-+	if (edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] != slot) {
-+		do {
-+			free_slot++;
-+		} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
-+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[free_slot];
-+		edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
-+	} else {
-+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n1->slots[next_slot++];
-+		edit->adjust_count_on = new_n1;
-+	}
-+
-+	BUG_ON(next_slot <= 1);
-+
-+	edit->set_backpointers_to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		if (edit->segment_cache[i] == 0xff) {
-+			ptr = node->slots[i];
-+			BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr));
-+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
-+				side = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+				edit->set_backpointers[i] = &side->back_pointer;
-+			} else {
-+				shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+				edit->set_backpointers[i] = &shortcut->back_pointer;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ptr = node->back_pointer;
-+	if (!ptr)
-+		edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
-+	else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr))
-+		edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr)->slots[node->parent_slot];
-+	else
-+		edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr)->next_node;
-+	edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
-+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [split node]\n", __func__);
-+	return true;
-+
-+present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf:
-+	/* All the old leaves cluster in the same slot, but the new leaf wants
-+	 * to go into a different slot, so we create a new node to hold the new
-+	 * leaf and a pointer to a new node holding all the old leaves.
-+	 */
-+	pr_devel("present leaves cluster but not new leaf\n");
-+
-+	new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
-+	new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
-+	new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+	new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	new_n1->parent_slot = edit->segment_cache[0];
-+	new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+	edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
-+		new_n1->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
-+
-+	new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[0]] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT]];
-+
-+	edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer)->slots[node->parent_slot];
-+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
-+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert node before]\n", __func__);
-+	return true;
-+
-+all_leaves_cluster_together:
-+	/* All the leaves, new and old, want to cluster together in this node
-+	 * in the same slot, so we have to replace this node with a shortcut to
-+	 * skip over the identical parts of the key and then place a pair of
-+	 * nodes, one inside the other, at the end of the shortcut and
-+	 * distribute the keys between them.
-+	 *
-+	 * Firstly we need to work out where the leaves start diverging as a
-+	 * bit position into their keys so that we know how big the shortcut
-+	 * needs to be.
-+	 *
-+	 * We only need to make a single pass of N of the N+1 leaves because if
-+	 * any keys differ between themselves at bit X then at least one of
-+	 * them must also differ with the base key at bit X or before.
-+	 */
-+	pr_devel("all leaves cluster together\n");
-+	diff = INT_MAX;
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		int x = ops->diff_objects(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->leaf),
-+					  assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(node->slots[i]));
-+		if (x < diff) {
-+			BUG_ON(x < 0);
-+			diff = x;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	BUG_ON(diff == INT_MAX);
-+	BUG_ON(diff < level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP);
-+
-+	keylen = round_up(diff, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
-+	keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
-+
-+	new_s0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
-+			 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!new_s0)
-+		return false;
-+	edit->new_meta[2] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
-+
-+	edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
-+	new_s0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
-+	new_s0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
-+	new_s0->next_node = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	new_n0->back_pointer = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
-+	new_n0->parent_slot = 0;
-+	new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
-+
-+	new_s0->skip_to_level = level = diff & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
-+	pr_devel("skip_to_level = %d [diff %d]\n", level, diff);
-+	BUG_ON(level <= 0);
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++)
-+		new_s0->index_key[i] =
-+			ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, i * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
-+
-+	blank = ULONG_MAX << (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
-+	pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, level, blank);
-+	new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
-+
-+	/* This now reduces to a node splitting exercise for which we'll need
-+	 * to regenerate the disparity table.
-+	 */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+		ptr = node->slots[i];
-+		base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
-+						     level);
-+		base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
-+		edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
-+	}
-+
-+	base_seg = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
-+	base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
-+	edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
-+	goto do_split_node;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Handle insertion into the middle of a shortcut.
-+ */
-+static bool assoc_array_insert_mid_shortcut(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
-+					    const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+					    struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s0, *new_s1;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0, *side;
-+	unsigned long sc_segments, dissimilarity, blank;
-+	size_t keylen;
-+	int level, sc_level, diff;
-+	int sc_slot;
-+
-+	shortcut	= result->wrong_shortcut.shortcut;
-+	level		= result->wrong_shortcut.level;
-+	sc_level	= result->wrong_shortcut.sc_level;
-+	sc_segments	= result->wrong_shortcut.sc_segments;
-+	dissimilarity	= result->wrong_shortcut.dissimilarity;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s(ix=%d dis=%lx scix=%d)\n",
-+		 __func__, level, dissimilarity, sc_level);
-+
-+	/* We need to split a shortcut and insert a node between the two
-+	 * pieces.  Zero-length pieces will be dispensed with entirely.
-+	 *
-+	 * First of all, we need to find out in which level the first
-+	 * difference was.
-+	 */
-+	diff = __ffs(dissimilarity);
-+	diff &= ~ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
-+	diff += sc_level & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
-+	pr_devel("diff=%d\n", diff);
-+
-+	if (!shortcut->back_pointer) {
-+		edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
-+	} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(shortcut->back_pointer)) {
-+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(shortcut->back_pointer);
-+		edit->set[0].ptr = &node->slots[shortcut->parent_slot];
-+	} else {
-+		BUG();
-+	}
-+
-+	edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(shortcut);
-+
-+	/* Create a new node now since we're going to need it anyway */
-+	new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!new_n0)
-+		return false;
-+	edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
-+
-+	/* Insert a new shortcut before the new node if this segment isn't of
-+	 * zero length - otherwise we just connect the new node directly to the
-+	 * parent.
-+	 */
-+	level += ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
-+	if (diff > level) {
-+		pr_devel("pre-shortcut %d...%d\n", level, diff);
-+		keylen = round_up(diff, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
-+		keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
-+
-+		new_s0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
-+				 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!new_s0)
-+			return false;
-+		edit->new_meta[1] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
-+		edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
-+		new_s0->back_pointer = shortcut->back_pointer;
-+		new_s0->parent_slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+		new_s0->next_node = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+		new_s0->skip_to_level = diff;
-+
-+		new_n0->back_pointer = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
-+		new_n0->parent_slot = 0;
-+
-+		memcpy(new_s0->index_key, shortcut->index_key,
-+		       keylen * sizeof(unsigned long));
-+
-+		blank = ULONG_MAX << (diff & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
-+		pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, diff, blank);
-+		new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
-+	} else {
-+		pr_devel("no pre-shortcut\n");
-+		edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+		new_n0->back_pointer = shortcut->back_pointer;
-+		new_n0->parent_slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+	}
-+
-+	side = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(shortcut->next_node);
-+	new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = side->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+
-+	/* We need to know which slot in the new node is going to take a
-+	 * metadata pointer.
-+	 */
-+	sc_slot = sc_segments >> (diff & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
-+	sc_slot &= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
-+
-+	pr_devel("new slot %lx >> %d -> %d\n",
-+		 sc_segments, diff & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK, sc_slot);
-+
-+	/* Determine whether we need to follow the new node with a replacement
-+	 * for the current shortcut.  We could in theory reuse the current
-+	 * shortcut if its parent slot number doesn't change - but that's a
-+	 * 1-in-16 chance so not worth expending the code upon.
-+	 */
-+	level = diff + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
-+	if (level < shortcut->skip_to_level) {
-+		pr_devel("post-shortcut %d...%d\n", level, shortcut->skip_to_level);
-+		keylen = round_up(shortcut->skip_to_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
-+		keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
-+
-+		new_s1 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
-+				 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!new_s1)
-+			return false;
-+		edit->new_meta[2] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s1);
-+
-+		new_s1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+		new_s1->parent_slot = sc_slot;
-+		new_s1->next_node = shortcut->next_node;
-+		new_s1->skip_to_level = shortcut->skip_to_level;
-+
-+		new_n0->slots[sc_slot] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s1);
-+
-+		memcpy(new_s1->index_key, shortcut->index_key,
-+		       keylen * sizeof(unsigned long));
-+
-+		edit->set[1].ptr = &side->back_pointer;
-+		edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s1);
-+	} else {
-+		pr_devel("no post-shortcut\n");
-+
-+		/* We don't have to replace the pointed-to node as long as we
-+		 * use memory barriers to make sure the parent slot number is
-+		 * changed before the back pointer (the parent slot number is
-+		 * irrelevant to the old parent shortcut).
-+		 */
-+		new_n0->slots[sc_slot] = shortcut->next_node;
-+		edit->set_parent_slot[0].p = &side->parent_slot;
-+		edit->set_parent_slot[0].to = sc_slot;
-+		edit->set[1].ptr = &side->back_pointer;
-+		edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Install the new leaf in a spare slot in the new node. */
-+	if (sc_slot == 0)
-+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[1];
-+	else
-+		edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[0];
-+
-+	pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [split shortcut]\n", __func__);
-+	return edit;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_insert - Script insertion of an object into an associative array
-+ * @array: The array to insert into.
-+ * @ops: The operations to use.
-+ * @index_key: The key to insert at.
-+ * @object: The object to insert.
-+ *
-+ * Precalculate and preallocate a script for the insertion or replacement of an
-+ * object in an associative array.  This results in an edit script that can
-+ * either be applied or cancelled.
-+ *
-+ * The function returns a pointer to an edit script or -ENOMEM.
-+ *
-+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
-+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
-+ *
-+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
-+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array,
-+					    const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+					    const void *index_key,
-+					    void *object)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	/* The leaf pointer we're given must not have the bottom bit set as we
-+	 * use those for type-marking the pointer.  NULL pointers are also not
-+	 * allowed as they indicate an empty slot but we have to allow them
-+	 * here as they can be updated later.
-+	 */
-+	BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(object));
-+
-+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!edit)
-+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+	edit->array = array;
-+	edit->ops = ops;
-+	edit->leaf = assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(object);
-+	edit->adjust_count_by = 1;
-+
-+	switch (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result)) {
-+	case assoc_array_walk_tree_empty:
-+		/* Allocate a root node if there isn't one yet */
-+		if (!assoc_array_insert_in_empty_tree(edit))
-+			goto enomem;
-+		return edit;
-+
-+	case assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node:
-+		/* We found a node that doesn't have a node/shortcut pointer in
-+		 * the slot corresponding to the index key that we have to
-+		 * follow.
-+		 */
-+		if (!assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(edit, ops, index_key,
-+							   &result))
-+			goto enomem;
-+		return edit;
-+
-+	case assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut:
-+		/* We found a shortcut that didn't match our key in a slot we
-+		 * needed to follow.
-+		 */
-+		if (!assoc_array_insert_mid_shortcut(edit, ops, &result))
-+			goto enomem;
-+		return edit;
-+	}
-+
-+enomem:
-+	/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
-+	pr_devel("enomem\n");
-+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
-+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_insert_set_object - Set the new object pointer in an edit script
-+ * @edit: The edit script to modify.
-+ * @object: The object pointer to set.
-+ *
-+ * Change the object to be inserted in an edit script.  The object pointed to
-+ * by the old object is not freed.  This must be done prior to applying the
-+ * script.
-+ */
-+void assoc_array_insert_set_object(struct assoc_array_edit *edit, void *object)
-+{
-+	BUG_ON(!object);
-+	edit->leaf = assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(object);
-+}
-+
-+struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context {
-+	struct assoc_array_node	*node;
-+	const void		*skip_leaf;
-+	int			slot;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Subtree collapse to node iterator.
-+ */
-+static int assoc_array_delete_collapse_iterator(const void *leaf,
-+						void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context *collapse = iterator_data;
-+
-+	if (leaf == collapse->skip_leaf)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	BUG_ON(collapse->slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
-+
-+	collapse->node->slots[collapse->slot++] = assoc_array_leaf_to_ptr(leaf);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_delete - Script deletion of an object from an associative array
-+ * @array: The array to search.
-+ * @ops: The operations to use.
-+ * @index_key: The key to the object.
-+ *
-+ * Precalculate and preallocate a script for the deletion of an object from an
-+ * associative array.  This results in an edit script that can either be
-+ * applied or cancelled.
-+ *
-+ * The function returns a pointer to an edit script if the object was found,
-+ * NULL if the object was not found or -ENOMEM.
-+ *
-+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
-+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
-+ *
-+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
-+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array,
-+					    const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+					    const void *index_key)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_delete_collapse_context collapse;
-+	struct assoc_array_walk_result result;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+	bool has_meta;
-+	int slot, i;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!edit)
-+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+	edit->array = array;
-+	edit->ops = ops;
-+	edit->adjust_count_by = -1;
-+
-+	switch (assoc_array_walk(array, ops, index_key, &result)) {
-+	case assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node:
-+		/* We found a node that should contain the leaf we've been
-+		 * asked to remove - *if* it's in the tree.
-+		 */
-+		pr_devel("terminal_node\n");
-+		node = result.terminal_node.node;
-+
-+		for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+			ptr = node->slots[slot];
-+			if (ptr &&
-+			    assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr) &&
-+			    ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
-+						index_key))
-+				goto found_leaf;
-+		}
-+	case assoc_array_walk_tree_empty:
-+	case assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut:
-+	default:
-+		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
-+		pr_devel("not found\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+found_leaf:
-+	BUG_ON(array->nr_leaves_on_tree <= 0);
-+
-+	/* In the simplest form of deletion we just clear the slot and release
-+	 * the leaf after a suitable interval.
-+	 */
-+	edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[slot];
-+	edit->set[0].ptr = &node->slots[slot];
-+	edit->set[0].to = NULL;
-+	edit->adjust_count_on = node;
-+
-+	/* If that concludes erasure of the last leaf, then delete the entire
-+	 * internal array.
-+	 */
-+	if (array->nr_leaves_on_tree == 1) {
-+		edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
-+		edit->set[1].to = NULL;
-+		edit->adjust_count_on = NULL;
-+		edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
-+		pr_devel("all gone\n");
-+		return edit;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* However, we'd also like to clear up some metadata blocks if we
-+	 * possibly can.
-+	 *
-+	 * We go for a simple algorithm of: if this node has FAN_OUT or fewer
-+	 * leaves in it, then attempt to collapse it - and attempt to
-+	 * recursively collapse up the tree.
-+	 *
-+	 * We could also try and collapse in partially filled subtrees to take
-+	 * up space in this node.
-+	 */
-+	if (node->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1) {
-+		struct assoc_array_node *parent, *grandparent;
-+		struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+
-+		/* First of all, we need to know if this node has metadata so
-+		 * that we don't try collapsing if all the leaves are already
-+		 * here.
-+		 */
-+		has_meta = false;
-+		for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+			ptr = node->slots[i];
-+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
-+				has_meta = true;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+		pr_devel("leaves: %ld [m=%d]\n",
-+			 node->nr_leaves_on_branch - 1, has_meta);
-+
-+		/* Look further up the tree to see if we can collapse this node
-+		 * into a more proximal node too.
-+		 */
-+		parent = node;
-+	collapse_up:
-+		pr_devel("collapse subtree: %ld\n", parent->nr_leaves_on_branch);
-+
-+		ptr = parent->back_pointer;
-+		if (!ptr)
-+			goto do_collapse;
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+			struct assoc_array_shortcut *s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+			ptr = s->back_pointer;
-+			if (!ptr)
-+				goto do_collapse;
-+		}
-+
-+		grandparent = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+		if (grandparent->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1) {
-+			parent = grandparent;
-+			goto collapse_up;
-+		}
-+
-+	do_collapse:
-+		/* There's no point collapsing if the original node has no meta
-+		 * pointers to discard and if we didn't merge into one of that
-+		 * node's ancestry.
-+		 */
-+		if (has_meta || parent != node) {
-+			node = parent;
-+
-+			/* Create a new node to collapse into */
-+			new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
-+			if (!new_n0)
-+				goto enomem;
-+			edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+
-+			new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
-+			new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
-+			new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+			edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
-+
-+			collapse.node = new_n0;
-+			collapse.skip_leaf = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->dead_leaf);
-+			collapse.slot = 0;
-+			assoc_array_subtree_iterate(assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node),
-+						    node->back_pointer,
-+						    assoc_array_delete_collapse_iterator,
-+						    &collapse);
-+			pr_devel("collapsed %d,%lu\n", collapse.slot, new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch);
-+			BUG_ON(collapse.slot != new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch - 1);
-+
-+			if (!node->back_pointer) {
-+				edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
-+			} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(node->back_pointer)) {
-+				BUG();
-+			} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(node->back_pointer)) {
-+				struct assoc_array_node *p =
-+					assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer);
-+				edit->set[1].ptr = &p->slots[node->parent_slot];
-+			} else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(node->back_pointer)) {
-+				struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
-+					assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(node->back_pointer);
-+				edit->set[1].ptr = &s->next_node;
-+			}
-+			edit->set[1].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
-+			edit->excised_subtree = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return edit;
-+
-+enomem:
-+	/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
-+	pr_devel("enomem\n");
-+	assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
-+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_clear - Script deletion of all objects from an associative array
-+ * @array: The array to clear.
-+ * @ops: The operations to use.
-+ *
-+ * Precalculate and preallocate a script for the deletion of all the objects
-+ * from an associative array.  This results in an edit script that can either
-+ * be applied or cancelled.
-+ *
-+ * The function returns a pointer to an edit script if there are objects to be
-+ * deleted, NULL if there are no objects in the array or -ENOMEM.
-+ *
-+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
-+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
-+ *
-+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
-+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
-+ */
-+struct assoc_array_edit *assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array,
-+					   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	if (!array->root)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!edit)
-+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+	edit->array = array;
-+	edit->ops = ops;
-+	edit->set[1].ptr = &array->root;
-+	edit->set[1].to = NULL;
-+	edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
-+	edit->ops_for_excised_subtree = ops;
-+	pr_devel("all gone\n");
-+	return edit;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Handle the deferred destruction after an applied edit.
-+ */
-+static void assoc_array_rcu_cleanup(struct rcu_head *head)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit =
-+		container_of(head, struct assoc_array_edit, rcu);
-+	int i;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	if (edit->dead_leaf)
-+		edit->ops->free_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(edit->dead_leaf));
-+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->excised_meta); i++)
-+		if (edit->excised_meta[i])
-+			kfree(assoc_array_ptr_to_node(edit->excised_meta[i]));
-+
-+	if (edit->excised_subtree) {
-+		BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(edit->excised_subtree));
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(edit->excised_subtree)) {
-+			struct assoc_array_node *n =
-+				assoc_array_ptr_to_node(edit->excised_subtree);
-+			n->back_pointer = NULL;
-+		} else {
-+			struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
-+				assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(edit->excised_subtree);
-+			s->back_pointer = NULL;
-+		}
-+		assoc_array_destroy_subtree(edit->excised_subtree,
-+					    edit->ops_for_excised_subtree);
-+	}
-+
-+	kfree(edit);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_apply_edit - Apply an edit script to an associative array
-+ * @edit: The script to apply.
-+ *
-+ * Apply an edit script to an associative array to effect an insertion,
-+ * deletion or clearance.  As the edit script includes preallocated memory,
-+ * this is guaranteed not to fail.
-+ *
-+ * The edit script, dead objects and dead metadata will be scheduled for
-+ * destruction after an RCU grace period to permit those doing read-only
-+ * accesses on the array to continue to do so under the RCU read lock whilst
-+ * the edit is taking place.
-+ */
-+void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	smp_wmb();
-+	if (edit->leaf_p)
-+		*edit->leaf_p = edit->leaf;
-+
-+	smp_wmb();
-+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->set_parent_slot); i++)
-+		if (edit->set_parent_slot[i].p)
-+			*edit->set_parent_slot[i].p = edit->set_parent_slot[i].to;
-+
-+	smp_wmb();
-+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->set_backpointers); i++)
-+		if (edit->set_backpointers[i])
-+			*edit->set_backpointers[i] = edit->set_backpointers_to;
-+
-+	smp_wmb();
-+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->set); i++)
-+		if (edit->set[i].ptr)
-+			*edit->set[i].ptr = edit->set[i].to;
-+
-+	if (edit->array->root == NULL) {
-+		edit->array->nr_leaves_on_tree = 0;
-+	} else if (edit->adjust_count_on) {
-+		node = edit->adjust_count_on;
-+		for (;;) {
-+			node->nr_leaves_on_branch += edit->adjust_count_by;
-+
-+			ptr = node->back_pointer;
-+			if (!ptr)
-+				break;
-+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+				shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+				ptr = shortcut->back_pointer;
-+				if (!ptr)
-+					break;
-+			}
-+			BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
-+			node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+		}
-+
-+		edit->array->nr_leaves_on_tree += edit->adjust_count_by;
-+	}
-+
-+	call_rcu(&edit->rcu, assoc_array_rcu_cleanup);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_cancel_edit - Discard an edit script.
-+ * @edit: The script to discard.
-+ *
-+ * Free an edit script and all the preallocated data it holds without making
-+ * any changes to the associative array it was intended for.
-+ *
-+ * NOTE!  In the case of an insertion script, this does _not_ release the leaf
-+ * that was to be inserted.  That is left to the caller.
-+ */
-+void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	/* Clean up after an out of memory error */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(edit->new_meta); i++) {
-+		ptr = edit->new_meta[i];
-+		if (ptr) {
-+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr))
-+				kfree(assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr));
-+			else
-+				kfree(assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr));
-+		}
-+	}
-+	kfree(edit);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * assoc_array_gc - Garbage collect an associative array.
-+ * @array: The array to clean.
-+ * @ops: The operations to use.
-+ * @iterator: A callback function to pass judgement on each object.
-+ * @iterator_data: Private data for the callback function.
-+ *
-+ * Collect garbage from an associative array and pack down the internal tree to
-+ * save memory.
-+ *
-+ * The iterator function is asked to pass judgement upon each object in the
-+ * array.  If it returns false, the object is discard and if it returns true,
-+ * the object is kept.  If it returns true, it must increment the object's
-+ * usage count (or whatever it needs to do to retain it) before returning.
-+ *
-+ * This function returns 0 if successful or -ENOMEM if out of memory.  In the
-+ * latter case, the array is not changed.
-+ *
-+ * The caller should lock against other modifications and must continue to hold
-+ * the lock until assoc_array_apply_edit() has been called.
-+ *
-+ * Accesses to the tree may take place concurrently with this function,
-+ * provided they hold the RCU read lock.
-+ */
-+int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array,
-+		   const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
-+		   bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data),
-+		   void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *new_root, *new_parent, **new_ptr_pp;
-+	unsigned long nr_leaves_on_tree;
-+	int keylen, slot, nr_free, next_slot, i;
-+
-+	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
-+
-+	if (!array->root)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	edit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_edit), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!edit)
-+		return -ENOMEM;
-+	edit->array = array;
-+	edit->ops = ops;
-+	edit->ops_for_excised_subtree = ops;
-+	edit->set[0].ptr = &array->root;
-+	edit->excised_subtree = array->root;
-+
-+	new_root = new_parent = NULL;
-+	new_ptr_pp = &new_root;
-+	cursor = array->root;
-+
-+descend:
-+	/* If this point is a shortcut, then we need to duplicate it and
-+	 * advance the target cursor.
-+	 */
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor)) {
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
-+		keylen = round_up(shortcut->skip_to_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
-+		keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
-+		new_s = kmalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
-+				keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!new_s)
-+			goto enomem;
-+		pr_devel("dup shortcut %p -> %p\n", shortcut, new_s);
-+		memcpy(new_s, shortcut, (sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
-+					 keylen * sizeof(unsigned long)));
-+		new_s->back_pointer = new_parent;
-+		new_s->parent_slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+		*new_ptr_pp = new_parent = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s);
-+		new_ptr_pp = &new_s->next_node;
-+		cursor = shortcut->next_node;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Duplicate the node at this position */
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	new_n = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!new_n)
-+		goto enomem;
-+	pr_devel("dup node %p -> %p\n", node, new_n);
-+	new_n->back_pointer = new_parent;
-+	new_n->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
-+	*new_ptr_pp = new_parent = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n);
-+	new_ptr_pp = NULL;
-+	slot = 0;
-+
-+continue_node:
-+	/* Filter across any leaves and gc any subtrees */
-+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		ptr = node->slots[slot];
-+		if (!ptr)
-+			continue;
-+
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr)) {
-+			if (iterator(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
-+				     iterator_data))
-+				/* The iterator will have done any reference
-+				 * counting on the object for us.
-+				 */
-+				new_n->slots[slot] = ptr;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		new_ptr_pp = &new_n->slots[slot];
-+		cursor = ptr;
-+		goto descend;
-+	}
-+
-+	pr_devel("-- compress node %p --\n", new_n);
-+
-+	/* Count up the number of empty slots in this node and work out the
-+	 * subtree leaf count.
-+	 */
-+	new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch = 0;
-+	nr_free = 0;
-+	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		ptr = new_n->slots[slot];
-+		if (!ptr)
-+			nr_free++;
-+		else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr))
-+			new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch++;
-+	}
-+	pr_devel("free=%d, leaves=%lu\n", nr_free, new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
-+
-+	/* See what we can fold in */
-+	next_slot = 0;
-+	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		struct assoc_array_shortcut *s;
-+		struct assoc_array_node *child;
-+
-+		ptr = new_n->slots[slot];
-+		if (!ptr || assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr))
-+			continue;
-+
-+		s = NULL;
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+			s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+			ptr = s->next_node;
-+		}
-+
-+		child = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+		new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch += child->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+
-+		if (child->nr_leaves_on_branch <= nr_free + 1) {
-+			/* Fold the child node into this one */
-+			pr_devel("[%d] fold node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n",
-+				 slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1,
-+				 next_slot);
-+
-+			/* We would already have reaped an intervening shortcut
-+			 * on the way back up the tree.
-+			 */
-+			BUG_ON(s);
-+
-+			new_n->slots[slot] = NULL;
-+			nr_free++;
-+			if (slot < next_slot)
-+				next_slot = slot;
-+			for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
-+				struct assoc_array_ptr *p = child->slots[i];
-+				if (!p)
-+					continue;
-+				BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));
-+				while (new_n->slots[next_slot])
-+					next_slot++;
-+				BUG_ON(next_slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
-+				new_n->slots[next_slot++] = p;
-+				nr_free--;
-+			}
-+			kfree(child);
-+		} else {
-+			pr_devel("[%d] retain node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n",
-+				 slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1,
-+				 next_slot);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	pr_devel("after: %lu\n", new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
-+
-+	nr_leaves_on_tree = new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch;
-+
-+	/* Excise this node if it is singly occupied by a shortcut */
-+	if (nr_free == ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT - 1) {
-+		for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++)
-+			if ((ptr = new_n->slots[slot]))
-+				break;
-+
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) &&
-+		    assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+			pr_devel("excise node %p with 1 shortcut\n", new_n);
-+			new_s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+			new_parent = new_n->back_pointer;
-+			slot = new_n->parent_slot;
-+			kfree(new_n);
-+			if (!new_parent) {
-+				new_s->back_pointer = NULL;
-+				new_s->parent_slot = 0;
-+				new_root = ptr;
-+				goto gc_complete;
-+			}
-+
-+			if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(new_parent)) {
-+				/* We can discard any preceding shortcut also */
-+				struct assoc_array_shortcut *s =
-+					assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(new_parent);
-+
-+				pr_devel("excise preceding shortcut\n");
-+
-+				new_parent = new_s->back_pointer = s->back_pointer;
-+				slot = new_s->parent_slot = s->parent_slot;
-+				kfree(s);
-+				if (!new_parent) {
-+					new_s->back_pointer = NULL;
-+					new_s->parent_slot = 0;
-+					new_root = ptr;
-+					goto gc_complete;
-+				}
-+			}
-+
-+			new_s->back_pointer = new_parent;
-+			new_s->parent_slot = slot;
-+			new_n = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(new_parent);
-+			new_n->slots[slot] = ptr;
-+			goto ascend_old_tree;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Excise any shortcuts we might encounter that point to nodes that
-+	 * only contain leaves.
-+	 */
-+	ptr = new_n->back_pointer;
-+	if (!ptr)
-+		goto gc_complete;
-+
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+		new_s = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+		new_parent = new_s->back_pointer;
-+		slot = new_s->parent_slot;
-+
-+		if (new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) {
-+			struct assoc_array_node *n;
-+
-+			pr_devel("excise shortcut\n");
-+			new_n->back_pointer = new_parent;
-+			new_n->parent_slot = slot;
-+			kfree(new_s);
-+			if (!new_parent) {
-+				new_root = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n);
-+				goto gc_complete;
-+			}
-+
-+			n = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(new_parent);
-+			n->slots[slot] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n);
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+		new_parent = ptr;
-+	}
-+	new_n = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(new_parent);
-+
-+ascend_old_tree:
-+	ptr = node->back_pointer;
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+		cursor = shortcut->back_pointer;
-+	} else {
-+		slot = node->parent_slot;
-+		cursor = ptr;
-+	}
-+	BUG_ON(!ptr);
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
-+	slot++;
-+	goto continue_node;
-+
-+gc_complete:
-+	edit->set[0].to = new_root;
-+	assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
-+	edit->array->nr_leaves_on_tree = nr_leaves_on_tree;
-+	return 0;
-+
-+enomem:
-+	pr_devel("enomem\n");
-+	assoc_array_destroy_subtree(new_root, edit->ops);
-+	kfree(edit);
-+	return -ENOMEM;
-+}
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 03ac60b84587fa8e57e7ec5cd3d59b7fa8d97c79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:54 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 10/10] KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring
-
-Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using
-the previously added associative array implementation.  Currently the maximum
-capacity is:
-
-	(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *)
-
-which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500.  However, since this is being
-used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that.  The new implementation
-gives us effectively unlimited capacity.
-
-With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion
-after this patch is applied.  The alterations are because (a) keyrings that
-are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have
-changed a bit.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/keys/keyring-type.h |   17 +-
- include/linux/key.h         |   13 +-
- lib/assoc_array.c           |    1 +
- security/keys/Kconfig       |    1 +
- security/keys/gc.c          |   33 +-
- security/keys/internal.h    |   17 +-
- security/keys/key.c         |   35 +-
- security/keys/keyring.c     | 1436 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- security/keys/request_key.c |   12 +-
- 9 files changed, 803 insertions(+), 762 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/keys/keyring-type.h b/include/keys/keyring-type.h
-index cf49159..fca5c62 100644
---- a/include/keys/keyring-type.h
-+++ b/include/keys/keyring-type.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* Keyring key type
-  *
-- * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-  *
-  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-@@ -13,19 +13,6 @@
- #define _KEYS_KEYRING_TYPE_H
- 
- #include <linux/key.h>
--#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
--
--/*
-- * the keyring payload contains a list of the keys to which the keyring is
-- * subscribed
-- */
--struct keyring_list {
--	struct rcu_head	rcu;		/* RCU deletion hook */
--	unsigned short	maxkeys;	/* max keys this list can hold */
--	unsigned short	nkeys;		/* number of keys currently held */
--	unsigned short	delkey;		/* key to be unlinked by RCU */
--	struct key __rcu *keys[0];
--};
--
-+#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
- 
- #endif /* _KEYS_KEYRING_TYPE_H */
-diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
-index ef596c7..2417f78 100644
---- a/include/linux/key.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key.h
-@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
- #include <linux/sysctl.h>
- #include <linux/rwsem.h>
- #include <linux/atomic.h>
-+#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
- 
- #ifdef __KERNEL__
- #include <linux/uidgid.h>
-@@ -196,11 +197,13 @@ struct key {
- 	 *   whatever
- 	 */
- 	union {
--		unsigned long		value;
--		void __rcu		*rcudata;
--		void			*data;
--		struct keyring_list __rcu *subscriptions;
--	} payload;
-+		union {
-+			unsigned long		value;
-+			void __rcu		*rcudata;
-+			void			*data;
-+		} payload;
-+		struct assoc_array keys;
-+	};
- };
- 
- extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
-diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c
-index a095281..17edeaf 100644
---- a/lib/assoc_array.c
-+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
-@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
-  */
- //#define DEBUG
- #include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
- #include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
-index a90d6d3..15e0dfe 100644
---- a/security/keys/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
-@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
- 
- config KEYS
- 	bool "Enable access key retention support"
-+	select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
- 	help
- 	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
- 	  access keys in the kernel.
-diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
-index d67c97b..cce621c 100644
---- a/security/keys/gc.c
-+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
-@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
- 	kleave("");
- }
- 
-+static int key_gc_keyring_func(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	const struct key *key = object;
-+	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
-+	return key_is_dead(key, *limit);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring.
-  *
-@@ -138,10 +145,9 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
-  */
- static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
--	int loop;
-+	int result;
- 
--	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
-+	kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
- 
- 	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
- 			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
-@@ -149,27 +155,17 @@ static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
- 
- 	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
- 	rcu_read_lock();
--	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
--	if (!klist)
--		goto unlock_dont_gc;
--
--	loop = klist->nkeys;
--	smp_rmb();
--	for (loop--; loop >= 0; loop--) {
--		struct key *key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
--		if (key_is_dead(key, limit))
--			goto do_gc;
--	}
--
--unlock_dont_gc:
-+	result = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys,
-+				     key_gc_keyring_func, &limit);
- 	rcu_read_unlock();
-+	if (result == true)
-+		goto do_gc;
-+
- dont_gc:
- 	kleave(" [no gc]");
- 	return;
- 
- do_gc:
--	rcu_read_unlock();
--
- 	keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
- 	kleave(" [gc]");
- }
-@@ -392,7 +388,6 @@ found_unreferenced_key:
- 	 */
- found_keyring:
- 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
--	kdebug("scan keyring %d", key->serial);
- 	key_gc_keyring(key, limit);
- 	goto maybe_resched;
- 
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index 73950bf..581c6f6 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -90,20 +90,23 @@ extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
- 
- extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
- 			    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
--			    unsigned long *_prealloc);
-+			    struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
- extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
--extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
--		       unsigned long *_prealloc);
-+extern void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit);
- extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
- 			   const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
--			   unsigned long prealloc);
-+			   struct assoc_array_edit *edit);
- 
--extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--				      const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
-+extern key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-+				    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
- 
- extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
- 					  key_serial_t target_id);
- 
-+extern int iterate_over_keyring(const struct key *keyring,
-+				int (*func)(const struct key *key, void *data),
-+				void *data);
-+
- typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
- 
- struct keyring_search_context {
-@@ -119,6 +122,8 @@ struct keyring_search_context {
- #define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0010	/* Don't check permissions */
- #define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0020	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
- 
-+	int (*iterator)(const void *object, void *iterator_data);
-+
- 	/* Internal stuff */
- 	int			skipped_ret;
- 	bool			possessed;
-diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
-index 7d716b8..a819b5c 100644
---- a/security/keys/key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/key.c
-@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- 				      struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
- 				      struct key *keyring,
- 				      struct key *authkey,
--				      unsigned long *_prealloc)
-+				      struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
- {
- 	int ret, awaken;
- 
-@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- 
- 			/* and link it into the destination keyring */
- 			if (keyring)
--				__key_link(keyring, key, _prealloc);
-+				__key_link(key, _edit);
- 
- 			/* disable the authorisation key */
- 			if (authkey)
-@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- 			     struct key *authkey)
- {
- 	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
--	unsigned long prealloc;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
-@@ -490,16 +490,15 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
- 	}
- 
- 	if (keyring) {
--		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
-+		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto error_free_preparse;
- 	}
- 
--	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey,
--					 &prealloc);
-+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
- 
- 	if (keyring)
--		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
- 
- error_free_preparse:
- 	if (key->type->preparse)
-@@ -537,7 +536,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
- 			struct key *keyring,
- 			struct key *authkey)
- {
--	unsigned long prealloc;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 	struct timespec now;
- 	int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
- 
-@@ -548,7 +547,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
- 	ret = -EBUSY;
- 
- 	if (keyring)
--		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
-+		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 
-@@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
- 
- 		/* and link it into the destination keyring */
- 		if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
--			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
-+			__key_link(key, &edit);
- 
- 		/* disable the authorisation key */
- 		if (authkey)
-@@ -580,7 +579,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
- 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 
- 	if (keyring)
--		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
- 
- 	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
- 	if (awaken)
-@@ -783,8 +782,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 		.description	= description,
- 	};
- 	struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
--	unsigned long prealloc;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -828,7 +827,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	}
- 	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
- 
--	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
-+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
- 	if (ret < 0) {
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- 		goto error_free_prep;
-@@ -847,8 +846,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	 * update that instead if possible
- 	 */
- 	if (index_key.type->update) {
--		key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, &index_key);
--		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
-+		key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
-+		if (key_ref)
- 			goto found_matching_key;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -874,7 +873,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	}
- 
- 	/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
--	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc);
-+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit);
- 	if (ret < 0) {
- 		key_put(key);
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
-@@ -884,7 +883,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
- 
- error_link_end:
--	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
-+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
- error_free_prep:
- 	if (index_key.type->preparse)
- 		index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
-@@ -897,7 +896,7 @@ error:
- 	/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
- 	 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
- 	 */
--	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
-+	__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
- 
- 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
- 	goto error_free_prep;
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index eeef1a0..f7cdea2 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* Keyring handling
-  *
-- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008, 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-  *
-  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-@@ -17,25 +17,11 @@
- #include <linux/seq_file.h>
- #include <linux/err.h>
- #include <keys/keyring-type.h>
-+#include <keys/user-type.h>
-+#include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
- #include <linux/uaccess.h>
- #include "internal.h"
- 
--#define rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring)				\
--	(rcu_dereference_protected(					\
--		(keyring)->payload.subscriptions,			\
--		rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem)))
--
--#define rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, index, keyring)			\
--	(rcu_dereference_protected(					\
--		(klist)->keys[index],					\
--		rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem)))
--
--#define MAX_KEYRING_LINKS						\
--	min_t(size_t, USHRT_MAX - 1,					\
--	      ((PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct keyring_list)) / sizeof(struct key *)))
--
--#define KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA 1UL
--
- /*
-  * When plumbing the depths of the key tree, this sets a hard limit
-  * set on how deep we're willing to go.
-@@ -47,6 +33,28 @@
-  */
- #define KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE	(1 << 5)
- 
-+/*
-+ * We mark pointers we pass to the associative array with bit 1 set if
-+ * they're keyrings and clear otherwise.
-+ */
-+#define KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE	0x2UL
-+
-+static inline bool keyring_ptr_is_keyring(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	return (unsigned long)x & KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE;
-+}
-+static inline struct key *keyring_ptr_to_key(const struct assoc_array_ptr *x)
-+{
-+	void *object = assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(x);
-+	return (struct key *)((unsigned long)object & ~KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
-+}
-+static inline void *keyring_key_to_ptr(struct key *key)
-+{
-+	if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
-+		return (void *)((unsigned long)key | KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
-+	return key;
-+}
-+
- static struct list_head	keyring_name_hash[KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE];
- static DEFINE_RWLOCK(keyring_name_lock);
- 
-@@ -67,7 +75,6 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
-  */
- static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
- 			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
--static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion);
- static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
- static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
- static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m);
-@@ -76,9 +83,9 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
- 
- struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
- 	.name		= "keyring",
--	.def_datalen	= sizeof(struct keyring_list),
-+	.def_datalen	= 0,
- 	.instantiate	= keyring_instantiate,
--	.match		= keyring_match,
-+	.match		= user_match,
- 	.revoke		= keyring_revoke,
- 	.destroy	= keyring_destroy,
- 	.describe	= keyring_describe,
-@@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
- 
- 	ret = -EINVAL;
- 	if (prep->datalen == 0) {
-+		assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
- 		/* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
- 		keyring_publish_name(keyring);
- 		ret = 0;
-@@ -136,15 +144,226 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
- }
- 
- /*
-- * Match keyrings on their name
-+ * Multiply 64-bits by 32-bits to 96-bits and fold back to 64-bit.  Ideally we'd
-+ * fold the carry back too, but that requires inline asm.
-+ */
-+static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y)
-+{
-+	u64 hi = (u64)(u32)(x >> 32) * y;
-+	u64 lo = (u64)(u32)(x) * y;
-+	return lo + ((u64)(u32)hi << 32) + (u32)(hi >> 32);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Hash a key type and description.
-+ */
-+static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
-+{
-+	const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
-+	const unsigned long level_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
-+	const char *description = index_key->description;
-+	unsigned long hash, type;
-+	u32 piece;
-+	u64 acc;
-+	int n, desc_len = index_key->desc_len;
-+
-+	type = (unsigned long)index_key->type;
-+
-+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(type, desc_len + 13);
-+	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
-+	for (;;) {
-+		n = desc_len;
-+		if (n <= 0)
-+			break;
-+		if (n > 4)
-+			n = 4;
-+		piece = 0;
-+		memcpy(&piece, description, n);
-+		description += n;
-+		desc_len -= n;
-+		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
-+		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Fold the hash down to 32 bits if need be. */
-+	hash = acc;
-+	if (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE == 32)
-+		hash ^= acc >> 32;
-+
-+	/* Squidge all the keyrings into a separate part of the tree to
-+	 * ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is
-+	 * zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise.
-+	 */
-+	if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) == 0)
-+		return hash | (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1;
-+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) != 0)
-+		return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~level_mask;
-+	return hash;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Build the next index key chunk.
-+ *
-+ * On 32-bit systems the index key is laid out as:
-+ *
-+ *	0	4	5	9...
-+ *	hash	desclen	typeptr	desc[]
-+ *
-+ * On 64-bit systems:
-+ *
-+ *	0	8	9	17...
-+ *	hash	desclen	typeptr	desc[]
-+ *
-+ * We return it one word-sized chunk at a time.
-  */
--static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description)
-+static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
-+{
-+	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
-+	unsigned long chunk = 0;
-+	long offset = 0;
-+	int desc_len = index_key->desc_len, n = sizeof(chunk);
-+
-+	level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
-+	switch (level) {
-+	case 0:
-+		return hash_key_type_and_desc(index_key);
-+	case 1:
-+		return ((unsigned long)index_key->type << 8) | desc_len;
-+	case 2:
-+		if (desc_len == 0)
-+			return (u8)((unsigned long)index_key->type >>
-+				    (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 8));
-+		n--;
-+		offset = 1;
-+	default:
-+		offset += sizeof(chunk) - 1;
-+		offset += (level - 3) * sizeof(chunk);
-+		if (offset >= desc_len)
-+			return 0;
-+		desc_len -= offset;
-+		if (desc_len > n)
-+			desc_len = n;
-+		offset += desc_len;
-+		do {
-+			chunk <<= 8;
-+			chunk |= ((u8*)index_key->description)[--offset];
-+		} while (--desc_len > 0);
-+
-+		if (level == 2) {
-+			chunk <<= 8;
-+			chunk |= (u8)((unsigned long)index_key->type >>
-+				      (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - 8));
-+		}
-+		return chunk;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static unsigned long keyring_get_object_key_chunk(const void *object, int level)
-+{
-+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+	return keyring_get_key_chunk(&key->index_key, level);
-+}
-+
-+static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data)
- {
--	return keyring->description &&
--		strcmp(keyring->description, description) == 0;
-+	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
-+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+
-+	return key->index_key.type == index_key->type &&
-+		key->index_key.desc_len == index_key->desc_len &&
-+		memcmp(key->index_key.description, index_key->description,
-+		       index_key->desc_len) == 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position
-+ * at which they differ - if they differ.
-+ */
-+static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *_a, const void *_b)
-+{
-+	const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(_a);
-+	const struct key *key_b = keyring_ptr_to_key(_b);
-+	const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key;
-+	const struct keyring_index_key *b = &key_b->index_key;
-+	unsigned long seg_a, seg_b;
-+	int level, i;
-+
-+	level = 0;
-+	seg_a = hash_key_type_and_desc(a);
-+	seg_b = hash_key_type_and_desc(b);
-+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-+		goto differ;
-+
-+	/* The number of bits contributed by the hash is controlled by a
-+	 * constant in the assoc_array headers.  Everything else thereafter we
-+	 * can deal with as being machine word-size dependent.
-+	 */
-+	level += ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE / 8;
-+	seg_a = a->desc_len;
-+	seg_b = b->desc_len;
-+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-+		goto differ;
-+
-+	/* The next bit may not work on big endian */
-+	level++;
-+	seg_a = (unsigned long)a->type;
-+	seg_b = (unsigned long)b->type;
-+	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-+		goto differ;
-+
-+	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
-+	if (a->desc_len == 0)
-+		goto same;
-+
-+	i = 0;
-+	if (((unsigned long)a->description | (unsigned long)b->description) &
-+	    (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)) {
-+		do {
-+			seg_a = *(unsigned long *)(a->description + i);
-+			seg_b = *(unsigned long *)(b->description + i);
-+			if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-+				goto differ_plus_i;
-+			i += sizeof(unsigned long);
-+		} while (i < (a->desc_len & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)));
-+	}
-+
-+	for (; i < a->desc_len; i++) {
-+		seg_a = *(unsigned char *)(a->description + i);
-+		seg_b = *(unsigned char *)(b->description + i);
-+		if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-+			goto differ_plus_i;
-+	}
-+
-+same:
-+	return -1;
-+
-+differ_plus_i:
-+	level += i;
-+differ:
-+	i = level * 8 + __ffs(seg_a ^ seg_b);
-+	return i;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Free an object after stripping the keyring flag off of the pointer.
-+ */
-+static void keyring_free_object(void *object)
-+{
-+	key_put(keyring_ptr_to_key(object));
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Operations for keyring management by the index-tree routines.
-+ */
-+static const struct assoc_array_ops keyring_assoc_array_ops = {
-+	.get_key_chunk		= keyring_get_key_chunk,
-+	.get_object_key_chunk	= keyring_get_object_key_chunk,
-+	.compare_object		= keyring_compare_object,
-+	.diff_objects		= keyring_diff_objects,
-+	.free_object		= keyring_free_object,
-+};
-+
-+/*
-  * Clean up a keyring when it is destroyed.  Unpublish its name if it had one
-  * and dispose of its data.
-  *
-@@ -155,9 +374,6 @@ static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description)
-  */
- static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
--	int loop;
--
- 	if (keyring->description) {
- 		write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
- 
-@@ -168,12 +384,7 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
- 		write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
- 	}
- 
--	klist = rcu_access_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
--	if (klist) {
--		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
--			key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]));
--		kfree(klist);
--	}
-+	assoc_array_destroy(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -181,76 +392,88 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
-  */
- static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
--
- 	if (keyring->description)
- 		seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
- 	else
- 		seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
- 
- 	if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
--		rcu_read_lock();
--		klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
--		if (klist)
--			seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
-+		if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
-+			seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
- 		else
- 			seq_puts(m, ": empty");
--		rcu_read_unlock();
- 	}
- }
- 
-+struct keyring_read_iterator_context {
-+	size_t			qty;
-+	size_t			count;
-+	key_serial_t __user	*buffer;
-+};
-+
-+static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
-+{
-+	struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data;
-+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}",
-+	       key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->qty);
-+
-+	if (ctx->count >= ctx->qty)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer);
-+	if (ret < 0)
-+		return ret;
-+	ctx->buffer++;
-+	ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Read a list of key IDs from the keyring's contents in binary form
-  *
-- * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller.
-+ * The keyring's semaphore is read-locked by the caller.  This prevents someone
-+ * from modifying it under us - which could cause us to read key IDs multiple
-+ * times.
-  */
- static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
- 			 char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
--	struct key *key;
--	size_t qty, tmp;
--	int loop, ret;
-+	struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx;
-+	unsigned long nr_keys;
-+	int ret;
- 
--	ret = 0;
--	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
--	if (klist) {
--		/* calculate how much data we could return */
--		qty = klist->nkeys * sizeof(key_serial_t);
--
--		if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
--			if (buflen > qty)
--				buflen = qty;
--
--			/* copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the
--			 * buffer */
--			ret = -EFAULT;
--
--			for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) {
--				key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
--							    keyring);
--
--				tmp = sizeof(key_serial_t);
--				if (tmp > buflen)
--					tmp = buflen;
--
--				if (copy_to_user(buffer,
--						 &key->serial,
--						 tmp) != 0)
--					goto error;
--
--				buflen -= tmp;
--				if (buflen == 0)
--					break;
--				buffer += tmp;
--			}
--		}
-+	kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen);
-+
-+	if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	nr_keys = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree;
-+	if (nr_keys == 0)
-+		return 0;
- 
--		ret = qty;
-+	/* Calculate how much data we could return */
-+	ctx.qty = nr_keys * sizeof(key_serial_t);
-+
-+	if (!buffer || !buflen)
-+		return ctx.qty;
-+
-+	if (buflen > ctx.qty)
-+		ctx.qty = buflen;
-+
-+	/* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */
-+	ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer;
-+	ctx.count = 0;
-+	ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
-+		kleave(" = %d [iterate]", ret);
-+		return ret;
- 	}
- 
--error:
--	return ret;
-+	kleave(" = %zu [ok]", ctx.count);
-+	return ctx.count;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -277,219 +500,360 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
- 
--/**
-- * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
-- * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
-- * @ctx: The keyring search context.
-- *
-- * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
-- * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
-- * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search
-- * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use
-- * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree.  In
-- * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches.
-- *
-- * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed
-- * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH).
-- *
-- * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match
-- * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit.  The
-- * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to
-- * determine the match.  Normally the match function from the key type would be
-- * used.
-- *
-- * RCU is used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without the
-- * need to take lots of locks.
-- *
-- * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if
-- * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked
-- * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the
-- * specified keyring wasn't a keyring.
-- *
-- * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from
-- * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
-+/*
-+ * Iteration function to consider each key found.
-  */
--key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
-+static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
- {
--	struct {
--		/* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */
--		struct key *keyring;
--		struct keyring_list *keylist;
--		int kix;
--	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
--
--	struct keyring_list *keylist;
--	unsigned long kflags;
--	struct key *keyring, *key;
--	key_ref_t key_ref;
--	long err;
--	int sp, nkeys, kix;
-+	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
-+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+	unsigned long kflags = key->flags;
- 
--	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
--	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
--	key_check(keyring);
-+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
- 
--	/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
--	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
--	if (err < 0) {
--		key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
--		goto error;
-+	/* ignore keys not of this type */
-+	if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type) {
-+		kleave(" = 0 [!type]");
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
--	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
--	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
--		goto error;
-+	/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
-+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
-+		if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
-+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
-+			kleave(" = %d [invrev]", ctx->skipped_ret);
-+			goto skipped;
-+		}
- 
--	rcu_read_lock();
-+		if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
-+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED);
-+			kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret);
-+			goto skipped;
-+		}
-+	}
- 
--	ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
--	err = -EAGAIN;
--	sp = 0;
--
--	/* firstly we should check to see if this top-level keyring is what we
--	 * are looking for */
--	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
--	kflags = keyring->flags;
--	if (keyring->type == ctx->index_key.type &&
--	    ctx->match(keyring, ctx->match_data)) {
--		key = keyring;
--		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
--			goto found;
-+	/* keys that don't match */
-+	if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data)) {
-+		kleave(" = 0 [!match]");
-+		return 0;
-+	}
- 
--		/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
--		 * revoked */
--		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
--			goto error_2;
--		if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
--			goto error_2;
--		key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
--		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
--			goto error_2;
--		goto found;
-+	/* key must have search permissions */
-+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
-+	    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-+				ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
-+		ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
-+		kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
-+		goto skipped;
- 	}
- 
--	/* otherwise, the top keyring must not be revoked, expired, or
--	 * negatively instantiated if we are to search it */
--	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
--	if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
--		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
--		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
--	    (keyring->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
--		goto error_2;
--
--	/* start processing a new keyring */
--descend:
--	kflags = keyring->flags;
--	if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
--		      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
--		goto not_this_keyring;
-+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
-+		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
-+		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
-+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
-+			kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
-+			goto skipped;
-+		}
-+	}
- 
--	keylist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
--	if (!keylist)
--		goto not_this_keyring;
-+	/* Found */
-+	ctx->result = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
-+	kleave(" = 1 [found]");
-+	return 1;
- 
--	/* iterate through the keys in this keyring first */
--	nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
--	smp_rmb();
--	for (kix = 0; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
--		key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
--		kflags = key->flags;
-+skipped:
-+	return ctx->skipped_ret;
-+}
- 
--		/* ignore keys not of this type */
--		if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type)
--			continue;
-+/*
-+ * Search inside a keyring for a key.  We can search by walking to it
-+ * directly based on its index-key or we can iterate over the entire
-+ * tree looking for it, based on the match function.
-+ */
-+static int search_keyring(struct key *keyring, struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
-+{
-+	if ((ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE) ==
-+	    KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) {
-+		const void *object;
-+
-+		object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys,
-+					  &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
-+					  &ctx->index_key);
-+		return object ? ctx->iterator(object, ctx) : 0;
-+	}
-+	return assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, ctx->iterator, ctx);
-+}
- 
--		/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
--		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)) {
--			if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
--				      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
--				continue;
-+/*
-+ * Search a tree of keyrings that point to other keyrings up to the maximum
-+ * depth.
-+ */
-+static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring,
-+				   struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct {
-+		struct key *keyring;
-+		struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+		int slot;
-+	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
- 
--			if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
--				continue;
--		}
-+	struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
-+	struct assoc_array_node *node;
-+	struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
-+	struct key *key;
-+	int sp = 0, slot;
- 
--		/* keys that don't match */
--		if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data))
--			continue;
-+	kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}",
-+	       keyring->serial,
-+	       ctx->index_key.type->name,
-+	       ctx->index_key.description);
- 
--		/* key must have search permissions */
--		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
--					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
--			continue;
-+	if (ctx->index_key.description)
-+		ctx->index_key.desc_len = strlen(ctx->index_key.description);
- 
--		if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
-+	/* Check to see if this top-level keyring is what we are looking for
-+	 * and whether it is valid or not.
-+	 */
-+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ||
-+	    keyring_compare_object(keyring, &ctx->index_key)) {
-+		ctx->skipped_ret = 2;
-+		ctx->flags |= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK;
-+		switch (ctx->iterator(keyring_key_to_ptr(keyring), ctx)) {
-+		case 1:
- 			goto found;
--
--		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
--		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
--			err = key->type_data.reject_error;
--			continue;
-+		case 2:
-+			return false;
-+		default:
-+			break;
- 		}
-+	}
- 
-+	ctx->skipped_ret = 0;
-+	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
-+		ctx->flags &= ~KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK;
-+
-+	/* Start processing a new keyring */
-+descend_to_keyring:
-+	kdebug("descend to %d", keyring->serial);
-+	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
-+		goto not_this_keyring;
-+
-+	/* Search through the keys in this keyring before its searching its
-+	 * subtrees.
-+	 */
-+	if (search_keyring(keyring, ctx))
- 		goto found;
--	}
- 
--	/* search through the keyrings nested in this one */
--	kix = 0;
--ascend:
--	nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
--	smp_rmb();
--	for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
--		key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
--		if (key->type != &key_type_keyring)
--			continue;
-+	/* Then manually iterate through the keyrings nested in this one.
-+	 *
-+	 * Start from the root node of the index tree.  Because of the way the
-+	 * hash function has been set up, keyrings cluster on the leftmost
-+	 * branch of the root node (root slot 0) or in the root node itself.
-+	 * Non-keyrings avoid the leftmost branch of the root entirely (root
-+	 * slots 1-15).
-+	 */
-+	ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(keyring->keys.root);
-+	if (!ptr)
-+		goto not_this_keyring;
- 
--		/* recursively search nested keyrings
--		 * - only search keyrings for which we have search permission
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+		/* If the root is a shortcut, either the keyring only contains
-+		 * keyring pointers (everything clusters behind root slot 0) or
-+		 * doesn't contain any keyring pointers.
- 		 */
--		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+		if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
-+			goto not_this_keyring;
-+
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
-+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+		goto begin_node;
-+	}
-+
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+
-+	ptr = node->slots[0];
-+	if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr))
-+		goto begin_node;
-+
-+descend_to_node:
-+	/* Descend to a more distal node in this keyring's content tree and go
-+	 * through that.
-+	 */
-+	kdebug("descend");
-+	if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
-+		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
-+		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+	}
-+
-+begin_node:
-+	kdebug("begin_node");
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+	slot = 0;
-+ascend_to_node:
-+	/* Go through the slots in a node */
-+	for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
-+
-+		if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer)
-+			goto descend_to_node;
-+
-+		if (!keyring_ptr_is_keyring(ptr))
- 			continue;
- 
--		if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-+		key = keyring_ptr_to_key(ptr);
-+
-+		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH) {
-+			if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP) {
-+				ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
-+				return false;
-+			}
-+			goto not_this_keyring;
-+		}
-+
-+		/* Search a nested keyring */
-+		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
-+		    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- 					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
- 			continue;
- 
- 		/* stack the current position */
- 		stack[sp].keyring = keyring;
--		stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
--		stack[sp].kix = kix;
-+		stack[sp].node = node;
-+		stack[sp].slot = slot;
- 		sp++;
- 
- 		/* begin again with the new keyring */
- 		keyring = key;
--		goto descend;
-+		goto descend_to_keyring;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* We've dealt with all the slots in the current node, so now we need
-+	 * to ascend to the parent and continue processing there.
-+	 */
-+	ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->back_pointer);
-+	slot = node->parent_slot;
-+
-+	if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
-+		shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
-+		smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
-+		slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
-+	}
-+	if (!ptr)
-+		goto not_this_keyring;
-+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
-+	smp_read_barrier_depends();
-+	slot++;
-+
-+	/* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just
-+	 * finished processing the leftmost branch rather than the root slots -
-+	 * so there can't be any more keyrings for us to find.
-+	 */
-+	if (node->back_pointer) {
-+		kdebug("ascend %d", slot);
-+		goto ascend_to_node;
- 	}
- 
--	/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
--	 * matching key */
-+	/* The keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
-+	 * matching key.
-+	 */
- not_this_keyring:
--	if (sp > 0) {
--		/* resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
--		sp--;
--		keyring = stack[sp].keyring;
--		keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
--		kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
--		goto ascend;
-+	kdebug("not_this_keyring %d", sp);
-+	if (sp <= 0) {
-+		kleave(" = false");
-+		return false;
- 	}
- 
--	key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
--	goto error_2;
-+	/* Resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
-+	sp--;
-+	keyring = stack[sp].keyring;
-+	node = stack[sp].node;
-+	slot = stack[sp].slot + 1;
-+	kdebug("ascend to %d [%d]", keyring->serial, slot);
-+	goto ascend_to_node;
- 
--	/* we found a viable match */
-+	/* We found a viable match */
- found:
--	__key_get(key);
--	key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
--	keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
--	while (sp > 0)
--		stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result);
- 	key_check(key);
--	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
--error_2:
-+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) {
-+		key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-+		keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-+		while (sp > 0)
-+			stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
-+	}
-+	kleave(" = true");
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
-+ * @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
-+ * @ctx: The keyring search context.
-+ *
-+ * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
-+ * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
-+ * caller to be searchable and keys can only be found if they too grant Search
-+ * to the caller. The possession flag on the root keyring pointer controls use
-+ * of the possessor bits in permissions checking of the entire tree.  In
-+ * addition, the LSM gets to forbid keyring searches and key matches.
-+ *
-+ * The search is performed as a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed
-+ * limit (KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH).
-+ *
-+ * Keys are matched to the type provided and are then filtered by the match
-+ * function, which is given the description to use in any way it sees fit.  The
-+ * match function may use any attributes of a key that it wishes to to
-+ * determine the match.  Normally the match function from the key type would be
-+ * used.
-+ *
-+ * RCU can be used to prevent the keyring key lists from disappearing without
-+ * the need to take lots of locks.
-+ *
-+ * Returns a pointer to the found key and increments the key usage count if
-+ * successful; -EAGAIN if no matching keys were found, or if expired or revoked
-+ * keys were found; -ENOKEY if only negative keys were found; -ENOTDIR if the
-+ * specified keyring wasn't a keyring.
-+ *
-+ * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute from
-+ * @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
-+ */
-+key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-+			     struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct key *keyring;
-+	long err;
-+
-+	ctx->iterator = keyring_search_iterator;
-+	ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
-+	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
-+
-+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
-+	key_check(keyring);
-+
-+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
-+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
-+
-+	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
-+		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
-+		if (err < 0)
-+			return ERR_PTR(err);
-+	}
-+
-+	rcu_read_lock();
-+	ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
-+	if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx))
-+		__key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result));
- 	rcu_read_unlock();
--error:
--	return key_ref;
-+	return ctx->result;
- }
- 
- /**
-@@ -499,7 +863,7 @@ error:
-  * @description: The name of the keyring we want to find.
-  *
-  * As keyring_search_aux() above, but using the current task's credentials and
-- * type's default matching function.
-+ * type's default matching function and preferred search method.
-  */
- key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
- 			 struct key_type *type,
-@@ -523,58 +887,49 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
- 
- /*
-- * Search the given keyring only (no recursion).
-+ * Search the given keyring for a key that might be updated.
-  *
-  * The caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring and that the
-- * permission is granted to search the keyring as no check is made here.
-- *
-- * RCU is used to make it unnecessary to lock the keyring key list here.
-+ * permission is granted to modify the keyring as no check is made here.  The
-+ * caller must also hold a lock on the keyring semaphore.
-  *
-  * Returns a pointer to the found key with usage count incremented if
-- * successful and returns -ENOKEY if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys
-- * are skipped over.
-+ * successful and returns NULL if not found.  Revoked and invalidated keys are
-+ * skipped over.
-  *
-  * If successful, the possession indicator is propagated from the keyring ref
-  * to the returned key reference.
-  */
--key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
--			       const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
-+key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
-+			     const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
- 	struct key *keyring, *key;
--	bool possessed;
--	int nkeys, loop;
-+	const void *object;
- 
- 	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
--	possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
- 
--	rcu_read_lock();
-+	kenter("{%d},{%s,%s}",
-+	       keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
- 
--	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
--	if (klist) {
--		nkeys = klist->nkeys;
--		smp_rmb();
--		for (loop = 0; loop < nkeys ; loop++) {
--			key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
--			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
--			    (!key->type->match ||
--			     key->type->match(key, index_key->description)) &&
--			    !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
--					    (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
--			    )
--				goto found;
--		}
--	}
-+	object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
-+				  index_key);
- 
--	rcu_read_unlock();
--	return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-+	if (object)
-+		goto found;
-+
-+	kleave(" = NULL");
-+	return NULL;
- 
- found:
-+	key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+	if (key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
-+			  (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
-+		kleave(" = NULL [x]");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
- 	__key_get(key);
--	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
--		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
--	rcu_read_unlock();
--	return make_key_ref(key, possessed);
-+	kleave(" = {%d}", key->serial);
-+	return make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -637,6 +992,19 @@ out:
- 	return keyring;
- }
- 
-+static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
-+					 void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
-+	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+
-+	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
-+
-+	BUG_ON(key != ctx->match_data);
-+	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * See if a cycle will will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic
-  * tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A).
-@@ -646,117 +1014,39 @@ out:
-  */
- static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
- {
--	struct {
--		struct keyring_list *keylist;
--		int kix;
--	} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
--
--	struct keyring_list *keylist;
--	struct key *subtree, *key;
--	int sp, nkeys, kix, ret;
-+	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-+		.index_key	= A->index_key,
-+		.match_data	= A,
-+		.iterator	= keyring_detect_cycle_iterator,
-+		.flags		= (KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT |
-+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
-+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME |
-+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM |
-+				   KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP),
-+	};
- 
- 	rcu_read_lock();
--
--	ret = -EDEADLK;
--	if (A == B)
--		goto cycle_detected;
--
--	subtree = B;
--	sp = 0;
--
--	/* start processing a new keyring */
--descend:
--	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &subtree->flags))
--		goto not_this_keyring;
--
--	keylist = rcu_dereference(subtree->payload.subscriptions);
--	if (!keylist)
--		goto not_this_keyring;
--	kix = 0;
--
--ascend:
--	/* iterate through the remaining keys in this keyring */
--	nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
--	smp_rmb();
--	for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
--		key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
--
--		if (key == A)
--			goto cycle_detected;
--
--		/* recursively check nested keyrings */
--		if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
--			if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
--				goto too_deep;
--
--			/* stack the current position */
--			stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
--			stack[sp].kix = kix;
--			sp++;
--
--			/* begin again with the new keyring */
--			subtree = key;
--			goto descend;
--		}
--	}
--
--	/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
--	 * matching key */
--not_this_keyring:
--	if (sp > 0) {
--		/* resume the checking of a keyring higher up in the tree */
--		sp--;
--		keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
--		kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
--		goto ascend;
--	}
--
--	ret = 0; /* no cycles detected */
--
--error:
-+	search_nested_keyrings(B, &ctx);
- 	rcu_read_unlock();
--	return ret;
--
--too_deep:
--	ret = -ELOOP;
--	goto error;
--
--cycle_detected:
--	ret = -EDEADLK;
--	goto error;
--}
--
--/*
-- * Dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, freeing the unlinked
-- * key
-- */
--static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
--{
--	struct keyring_list *klist =
--		container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
--
--	if (klist->delkey != USHRT_MAX)
--		key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey]));
--	kfree(klist);
-+	return PTR_ERR(ctx.result) == -EAGAIN ? 0 : PTR_ERR(ctx.result);
- }
- 
- /*
-  * Preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring.
-  */
--int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
--		     unsigned long *_prealloc)
-+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
-+		     const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
-+		     struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
- 	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
- 	__acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
--	unsigned long prealloc;
--	unsigned max;
--	time_t lowest_lru;
--	size_t size;
--	int loop, lru, ret;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
-+	int ret;
- 
- 	kenter("%d,%s,%s,",
--	       key_serial(keyring), index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
-+	       keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, index_key->description);
-+
-+	BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);
- 
- 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
- 		return -ENOTDIR;
-@@ -772,88 +1062,25 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_
- 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- 
--	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
--
--	/* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
--	lru = -1;
--	if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
--		lowest_lru = TIME_T_MAX;
--		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
--			struct key *key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
--								keyring);
--			if (key->type == index_key->type &&
--			    strcmp(key->description, index_key->description) == 0) {
--				/* Found a match - we'll replace the link with
--				 * one to the new key.  We record the slot
--				 * position.
--				 */
--				klist->delkey = loop;
--				prealloc = 0;
--				goto done;
--			}
--			if (key->last_used_at < lowest_lru) {
--				lowest_lru = key->last_used_at;
--				lru = loop;
--			}
--		}
--	}
--
--	/* If the keyring is full then do an LRU discard */
--	if (klist &&
--	    klist->nkeys == klist->maxkeys &&
--	    klist->maxkeys >= MAX_KEYRING_LINKS) {
--		kdebug("LRU discard %d\n", lru);
--		klist->delkey = lru;
--		prealloc = 0;
--		goto done;
--	}
--
- 	/* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */
- 	ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
- 				  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
- 	if (ret < 0)
- 		goto error_sem;
- 
--	if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) {
--		/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
--		klist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
--		prealloc = KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
--	} else {
--		/* grow the key list */
--		max = 4;
--		if (klist) {
--			max += klist->maxkeys;
--			if (max > MAX_KEYRING_LINKS)
--				max = MAX_KEYRING_LINKS;
--			BUG_ON(max <= klist->maxkeys);
--		}
--
--		size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max;
--
--		ret = -ENOMEM;
--		nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
--		if (!nklist)
--			goto error_quota;
--
--		nklist->maxkeys = max;
--		if (klist) {
--			memcpy(nklist->keys, klist->keys,
--			       sizeof(struct key *) * klist->nkeys);
--			nklist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
--			nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys + 1;
--			klist->delkey = USHRT_MAX;
--		} else {
--			nklist->nkeys = 1;
--			nklist->delkey = 0;
--		}
--
--		/* add the key into the new space */
--		RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], NULL);
--		prealloc = (unsigned long)nklist | KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
-+	/* Create an edit script that will insert/replace the key in the
-+	 * keyring tree.
-+	 */
-+	edit = assoc_array_insert(&keyring->keys,
-+				  &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
-+				  index_key,
-+				  NULL);
-+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
-+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
-+		goto error_quota;
- 	}
- 
--done:
--	*_prealloc = prealloc;
-+	*_edit = edit;
- 	kleave(" = 0");
- 	return 0;
- 
-@@ -893,60 +1120,12 @@ int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
-  * holds at most one link to any given key of a particular type+description
-  * combination.
-  */
--void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
--		unsigned long *_prealloc)
-+void __key_link(struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
--	struct key *discard;
--
--	nklist = (struct keyring_list *)(*_prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA);
--	*_prealloc = 0;
--
--	kenter("%d,%d,%p", keyring->serial, key->serial, nklist);
--
--	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
--
- 	__key_get(key);
--	keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
--		current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
--
--	/* there's a matching key we can displace or an empty slot in a newly
--	 * allocated list we can fill */
--	if (nklist) {
--		kdebug("reissue %hu/%hu/%hu",
--		       nklist->delkey, nklist->nkeys, nklist->maxkeys);
--
--		RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], key);
--
--		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
--
--		/* dispose of the old keyring list and, if there was one, the
--		 * displaced key */
--		if (klist) {
--			kdebug("dispose %hu/%hu/%hu",
--			       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
--			call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
--		}
--	} else if (klist->delkey < klist->nkeys) {
--		kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu",
--		       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
--
--		discard = rcu_dereference_protected(
--			klist->keys[klist->delkey],
--			rwsem_is_locked(&keyring->sem));
--		rcu_assign_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key);
--		/* The garbage collector will take care of RCU
--		 * synchronisation */
--		key_put(discard);
--	} else {
--		/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
--		kdebug("append %hu/%hu/%hu",
--		       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
--
--		RCU_INIT_POINTER(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key);
--		smp_wmb();
--		klist->nkeys++;
--	}
-+	assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key));
-+	assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit);
-+	*_edit = NULL;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -956,23 +1135,20 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
-  */
- void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
- 		    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key,
--		    unsigned long prealloc)
-+		    struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
- 	__releases(&keyring->sem)
- 	__releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem)
- {
- 	BUG_ON(index_key->type == NULL);
--	BUG_ON(index_key->type->name == NULL);
--	kenter("%d,%s,%lx", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name, prealloc);
-+	kenter("%d,%s,", keyring->serial, index_key->type->name);
- 
- 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
- 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- 
--	if (prealloc) {
--		if (prealloc & KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA)
--			key_payload_reserve(keyring,
--					    keyring->datalen -
--					    KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
--		kfree((struct keyring_list *)(prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA));
-+	if (edit) {
-+		key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-+				    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-+		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
- 	}
- 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
- }
-@@ -999,20 +1175,24 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
-  */
- int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
- {
--	unsigned long prealloc;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 	int ret;
- 
-+	kenter("{%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
-+
- 	key_check(keyring);
- 	key_check(key);
- 
--	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &prealloc);
-+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
- 	if (ret == 0) {
-+		kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
- 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
- 		if (ret == 0)
--			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
--		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, prealloc);
-+			__key_link(key, &edit);
-+		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
- 	}
- 
-+	kleave(" = %d {%d,%d}", ret, keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
- 	return ret;
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
-@@ -1036,90 +1216,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
-  */
- int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
--	int loop, ret;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
-+	int ret;
- 
- 	key_check(keyring);
- 	key_check(key);
- 
--	ret = -ENOTDIR;
- 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
--		goto error;
-+		return -ENOTDIR;
- 
- 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
- 
--	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
--	if (klist) {
--		/* search the keyring for the key */
--		for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++)
--			if (rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]) == key)
--				goto key_is_present;
-+	edit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
-+				  &key->index_key);
-+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
-+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
-+		goto error;
- 	}
--
--	up_write(&keyring->sem);
- 	ret = -ENOENT;
--	goto error;
--
--key_is_present:
--	/* we need to copy the key list for RCU purposes */
--	nklist = kmalloc(sizeof(*klist) +
--			 sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys,
--			 GFP_KERNEL);
--	if (!nklist)
--		goto nomem;
--	nklist->maxkeys = klist->maxkeys;
--	nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys - 1;
--
--	if (loop > 0)
--		memcpy(&nklist->keys[0],
--		       &klist->keys[0],
--		       loop * sizeof(struct key *));
--
--	if (loop < nklist->nkeys)
--		memcpy(&nklist->keys[loop],
--		       &klist->keys[loop + 1],
--		       (nklist->nkeys - loop) * sizeof(struct key *));
--
--	/* adjust the user's quota */
--	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
--			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
--
--	rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
--
--	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--
--	/* schedule for later cleanup */
--	klist->delkey = loop;
--	call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
-+	if (edit == NULL)
-+		goto error;
- 
-+	assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
- 	ret = 0;
- 
- error:
--	return ret;
--nomem:
--	ret = -ENOMEM;
- 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--	goto error;
-+	return ret;
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink);
- 
--/*
-- * Dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, releasing the keys it
-- * links to.
-- */
--static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
--{
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
--	int loop;
--
--	klist = container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
--
--	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
--		key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]));
--
--	kfree(klist);
--}
--
- /**
-  * keyring_clear - Clear a keyring
-  * @keyring: The keyring to clear.
-@@ -1130,33 +1256,25 @@ static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-  */
- int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	ret = -ENOTDIR;
--	if (keyring->type == &key_type_keyring) {
--		/* detach the pointer block with the locks held */
--		down_write(&keyring->sem);
--
--		klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
--		if (klist) {
--			/* adjust the quota */
--			key_payload_reserve(keyring,
--					    sizeof(struct keyring_list));
--
--			rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
--					   NULL);
--		}
--
--		up_write(&keyring->sem);
-+	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
-+		return -ENOTDIR;
- 
--		/* free the keys after the locks have been dropped */
--		if (klist)
--			call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
-+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
- 
-+	edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
-+	if (IS_ERR(edit)) {
-+		ret = PTR_ERR(edit);
-+	} else {
-+		if (edit)
-+			assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
-+		key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
- 		ret = 0;
- 	}
- 
-+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
- 	return ret;
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);
-@@ -1168,17 +1286,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);
-  */
- static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 
--	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-+	edit = assoc_array_clear(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops);
-+	if (!IS_ERR(edit)) {
-+		if (edit)
-+			assoc_array_apply_edit(edit);
-+		key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
-+	}
-+}
- 
--	/* adjust the quota */
--	key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
-+static bool gc_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
-+{
-+	struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-+	time_t *limit = iterator_data;
- 
--	if (klist) {
--		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
--		call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
--	}
-+	if (key_is_dead(key, *limit))
-+		return false;
-+	key_get(key);
-+	return true;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1191,88 +1317,12 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
-  */
- void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
- {
--	struct keyring_list *klist, *new;
--	struct key *key;
--	int loop, keep, max;
--
- 	kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description);
- 
- 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
--
--	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
--	if (!klist)
--		goto no_klist;
--
--	/* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
--	keep = 0;
--	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
--		if (!key_is_dead(rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring),
--				 limit))
--			keep++;
--
--	if (keep == klist->nkeys)
--		goto just_return;
--
--	/* allocate a new keyring payload */
--	max = roundup(keep, 4);
--	new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
--		      GFP_KERNEL);
--	if (!new)
--		goto nomem;
--	new->maxkeys = max;
--	new->nkeys = 0;
--	new->delkey = 0;
--
--	/* install the live keys
--	 * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life
--	 */
--	keep = 0;
--	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
--		key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring);
--		if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
--			if (keep >= max)
--				goto discard_new;
--			RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->keys[keep++], key_get(key));
--		}
--	}
--	new->nkeys = keep;
--
--	/* adjust the quota */
--	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
--			    sizeof(struct keyring_list) +
--			    KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep);
--
--	if (keep == 0) {
--		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
--		kfree(new);
--	} else {
--		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new);
--	}
--
--	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--
--	call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
--	kleave(" [yes]");
--	return;
--
--discard_new:
--	new->nkeys = keep;
--	keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
-+	assoc_array_gc(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
-+		       gc_iterator, &limit);
- 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--	kleave(" [discard]");
--	return;
- 
--just_return:
--	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--	kleave(" [no dead]");
--	return;
--
--no_klist:
--	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--	kleave(" [no_klist]");
--	return;
--
--nomem:
--	up_write(&keyring->sem);
--	kleave(" [oom]");
-+	kleave("");
- }
-diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
-index ab75df4..df94827 100644
---- a/security/keys/request_key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
-@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
- 			       struct key_user *user,
- 			       struct key **_key)
- {
--	unsigned long prealloc;
-+	struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- 	struct key *key;
- 	key_perm_t perm;
- 	key_ref_t key_ref;
-@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
- 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
- 
- 	if (dest_keyring) {
--		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &prealloc);
-+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &edit);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto link_prealloc_failed;
- 	}
-@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
- 		goto key_already_present;
- 
- 	if (dest_keyring)
--		__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
-+		__key_link(key, &edit);
- 
- 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- 	if (dest_keyring)
--		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
-+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
- 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
- 	*_key = key;
- 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
-@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ key_already_present:
- 	if (dest_keyring) {
- 		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
- 		if (ret == 0)
--			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
--		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
-+			__key_link(key, &edit);
-+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, edit);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto link_check_failed;
- 	}
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/keys-krb-support.patch b/keys-krb-support.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aa4752c78..000000000
--- a/keys-krb-support.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,748 +0,0 @@
-From d7ccdaa17aab12a49f5e9e327b55167c4af26bf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:54 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
-
-Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus
-swapspace when memory is tight.  This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
----
- include/keys/big_key-type.h |  25 ++++++
- include/linux/key.h         |   1 +
- security/keys/Kconfig       |  11 +++
- security/keys/Makefile      |   1 +
- security/keys/big_key.c     | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 242 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 include/keys/big_key-type.h
- create mode 100644 security/keys/big_key.c
-
-diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..d69bc8a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
-+/* Big capacity key type.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H
-+#define _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H
-+
-+#include <linux/key-type.h>
-+
-+extern struct key_type key_type_big_key;
-+
-+extern int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
-+extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key);
-+extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key);
-+extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m);
-+extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
-+
-+#endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */
-diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
-index 2417f78..010dbb6 100644
---- a/include/linux/key.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key.h
-@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ struct key {
- 			unsigned long		value;
- 			void __rcu		*rcudata;
- 			void			*data;
-+			void			*data2[2];
- 		} payload;
- 		struct assoc_array keys;
- 	};
-diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
-index 15e0dfe..b563622 100644
---- a/security/keys/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
-@@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ config KEYS
- 
- 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
- 
-+config BIG_KEYS
-+	tristate "Large payload keys"
-+	depends on KEYS
-+	depends on TMPFS
-+	help
-+	  This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
-+	  (for example Kerberos ticket caches).  The data may be stored out to
-+	  swapspace by tmpfs.
-+
-+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-+
- config TRUSTED_KEYS
- 	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
- 	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
-diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
-index 504aaa0..c487c77 100644
---- a/security/keys/Makefile
-+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
-@@ -22,5 +22,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
- #
- # Key types
- #
-+obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
-diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5f9defc
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
-+/* Large capacity key type
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/init.h>
-+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-+#include <linux/file.h>
-+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <keys/user-type.h>
-+#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
-+
-+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-+
-+/*
-+ * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
-+ * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
-+ * least as large as the data.
-+ */
-+#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
-+
-+/*
-+ * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
-+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
-+ */
-+struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
-+	.name			= "big_key",
-+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-+	.instantiate		= big_key_instantiate,
-+	.match			= user_match,
-+	.revoke			= big_key_revoke,
-+	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
-+	.describe		= big_key_describe,
-+	.read			= big_key_read,
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Instantiate a big key
-+ */
-+int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-+{
-+	struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
-+	struct file *file;
-+	ssize_t written;
-+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	ret = -EINVAL;
-+	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+	/* Set an arbitrary quota */
-+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16);
-+	if (ret < 0)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+	key->type_data.x[1] = datalen;
-+
-+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-+		/* Create a shmem file to store the data in.  This will permit the data
-+		 * to be swapped out if needed.
-+		 *
-+		 * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
-+		 */
-+		file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
-+		if (IS_ERR(file))
-+			goto err_quota;
-+
-+		written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
-+		if (written != datalen) {
-+			if (written >= 0)
-+				ret = -ENOMEM;
-+			goto err_fput;
-+		}
-+
-+		/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
-+		 * later
-+		 */
-+		*path = file->f_path;
-+		path_get(path);
-+		fput(file);
-+	} else {
-+		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
-+		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!data) {
-+			ret = -ENOMEM;
-+			goto err_quota;
-+		}
-+
-+		key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+
-+err_fput:
-+	fput(file);
-+err_quota:
-+	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
-+error:
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
-+ * - called with the key sem write-locked
-+ */
-+void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
-+{
-+	struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
-+
-+	/* clear the quota */
-+	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
-+	if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
-+		vfs_truncate(path, 0);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key
-+ */
-+void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
-+{
-+	if (key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-+		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
-+		path_put(path);
-+		path->mnt = NULL;
-+		path->dentry = NULL;
-+	} else {
-+		kfree(key->payload.data);
-+		key->payload.data = NULL;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * describe the big_key key
-+ */
-+void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
-+{
-+	unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1];
-+
-+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-+
-+	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
-+		seq_printf(m, ": %lu [%s]",
-+			   datalen,
-+			   datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * read the key data
-+ * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
-+ */
-+long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
-+{
-+	unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1];
-+	long ret;
-+
-+	if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
-+		return datalen;
-+
-+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-+		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
-+		struct file *file;
-+		loff_t pos;
-+
-+		file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
-+		if (IS_ERR(file))
-+			return PTR_ERR(file);
-+
-+		pos = 0;
-+		ret = vfs_read(file, buffer, datalen, &pos);
-+		fput(file);
-+		if (ret >= 0 && ret != datalen)
-+			ret = -EIO;
-+	} else {
-+		ret = datalen;
-+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data, datalen) != 0)
-+			ret = -EFAULT;
-+	}
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Module stuff
-+ */
-+static int __init big_key_init(void)
-+{
-+	return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
-+}
-+
-+static void __exit big_key_cleanup(void)
-+{
-+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
-+}
-+
-+module_init(big_key_init);
-+module_exit(big_key_cleanup);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 862e98313b10123fa4352117b0b0c0f5a530cefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:37:54 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent
- per-UID kerberos caches
-
-Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos
-caches held within the kernel.
-
-This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's
-processes so that the user's cron jobs can work.
-
-The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like:
-
-	struct user_namespace
-	  \___ .krb_cache keyring		- The register
-		\___ _krb.0 keyring		- Root's Kerberos cache
-		\___ _krb.5000 keyring		- User 5000's Kerberos cache
-		\___ _krb.5001 keyring		- User 5001's Kerberos cache
-			\___ tkt785 big_key	- A ccache blob
-			\___ tkt12345 big_key	- Another ccache blob
-
-Or possibly:
-
-	struct user_namespace
-	  \___ .krb_cache keyring		- The register
-		\___ _krb.0 keyring		- Root's Kerberos cache
-		\___ _krb.5000 keyring		- User 5000's Kerberos cache
-		\___ _krb.5001 keyring		- User 5001's Kerberos cache
-			\___ tkt785 keyring	- A ccache
-				\___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key
-				\___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
-				\___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
-				\___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
-				\___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
-				\___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
-
-What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace.  Kernel
-support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want.
-
-The user asks for their Kerberos cache by:
-
-	krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring);
-
-The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some
-other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID).  This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to
-mess with the cache.
-
-The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read,
-search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to.  Active LSMs get a
-chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link.
-
-Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a
-timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring
-goes away after a while.  The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to
-three days.
-
-Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the
-register.  The cache keyrings are added to it.  This means that standard key
-search and garbage collection facilities are available.
-
-The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left
-in it is then automatically gc'd.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
-cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
-cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
----
- include/linux/user_namespace.h |   7 ++
- include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h    |   1 +
- kernel/user.c                  |   4 +
- kernel/user_namespace.c        |   6 ++
- security/keys/Kconfig          |  17 +++++
- security/keys/Makefile         |   1 +
- security/keys/compat.c         |   3 +
- security/keys/internal.h       |   9 +++
- security/keys/keyctl.c         |   3 +
- security/keys/persistent.c     | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/keys/sysctl.c         |  11 +++
- 11 files changed, 231 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 security/keys/persistent.c
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
-index 4db2985..bb0639d 100644
---- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
-+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
-@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ struct user_namespace {
- 	kuid_t			owner;
- 	kgid_t			group;
- 	unsigned int		proc_inum;
-+
-+	/* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
-+	struct key		*persistent_keyring_register;
-+	struct rw_semaphore	persistent_keyring_register_sem;
-+#endif
-+
- };
- 
- extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
-diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
-index c9b7f4fa..840cb99 100644
---- a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
-+++ b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
-@@ -56,5 +56,6 @@
- #define KEYCTL_REJECT			19	/* reject a partially constructed key */
- #define KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV		20	/* instantiate a partially constructed key */
- #define KEYCTL_INVALIDATE		21	/* invalidate a key */
-+#define KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT		22	/* get a user's persistent keyring */
- 
- #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
-diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
-index 5bbb919..a3a0dbf 100644
---- a/kernel/user.c
-+++ b/kernel/user.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
- 	.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
- 	.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
- 	.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
-+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_KERBEROS_CACHE
-+	.krb_cache_register_sem =
-+	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.krb_cache_register_sem),
-+#endif
- };
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
- 
-diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-index 13fb113..2dbc299 100644
---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
-+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
-@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
- 
- 	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
-+	init_rwsem(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
-+#endif
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -130,6 +133,9 @@ void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
- 
- 	do {
- 		parent = ns->parent;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
-+		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
-+#endif
- 		proc_free_inum(ns->proc_inum);
- 		kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
- 		ns = parent;
-diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
-index b563622..53d8748 100644
---- a/security/keys/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
-@@ -20,6 +20,23 @@ config KEYS
- 
- 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
- 
-+config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
-+	bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings"
-+	depends on KEYS
-+	help
-+	  This option provides a register of persistent per-UID keyrings,
-+	  primarily aimed at Kerberos key storage.  The keyrings are persistent
-+	  in the sense that they stay around after all processes of that UID
-+	  have exited, not that they survive the machine being rebooted.
-+
-+	  A particular keyring may be accessed by either the user whose keyring
-+	  it is or by a process with administrative privileges.  The active
-+	  LSMs gets to rule on which admin-level processes get to access the
-+	  cache.
-+
-+	  Keyrings are created and added into the register upon demand and get
-+	  removed if they expire (a default timeout is set upon creation).
-+
- config BIG_KEYS
- 	tristate "Large payload keys"
- 	depends on KEYS
-diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
-index c487c77..dfb3a7b 100644
---- a/security/keys/Makefile
-+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ obj-y := \
- obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
- 
- #
- # Key types
-diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
-index d65fa7f..bbd32c7 100644
---- a/security/keys/compat.c
-+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
-@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
- 	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
- 		return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
- 
-+	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
-+		return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
-+
- 	default:
- 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- 	}
-diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
-index 581c6f6..80b2aac 100644
---- a/security/keys/internal.h
-+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
-@@ -255,6 +255,15 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
- extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
- 					  const struct iovec *,
- 					  unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
-+extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t, key_serial_t);
-+extern unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry;
-+#else
-+static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
-+{
-+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-+}
-+#endif
- 
- /*
-  * Debugging key validation
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
-index 33cfd27..cee72ce 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
-@@ -1667,6 +1667,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
- 	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
- 		return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
- 
-+	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
-+		return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
-+
- 	default:
- 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- 	}
-diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..631a022
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
-+/* General persistent per-UID keyrings register
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
-+#include "internal.h"
-+
-+unsigned persistent_keyring_expiry = 3 * 24 * 3600; /* Expire after 3 days of non-use */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create the persistent keyring register for the current user namespace.
-+ *
-+ * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
-+ */
-+static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+	struct key *reg = keyring_alloc(".persistent_register",
-+					KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
-+					current_cred(),
-+					((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+					 KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
-+					KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
-+	if (IS_ERR(reg))
-+		return PTR_ERR(reg);
-+
-+	ns->persistent_keyring_register = reg;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create the persistent keyring for the specified user.
-+ *
-+ * Called with the namespace's sem locked for writing.
-+ */
-+static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
-+				       struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
-+{
-+	struct key *persistent;
-+	key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
-+
-+	if (!ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
-+		long err = key_create_persistent_register(ns);
-+		if (err < 0)
-+			return ERR_PTR(err);
-+	} else {
-+		reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
-+		persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, index_key);
-+		if (persistent_ref)
-+			return persistent_ref;
-+	}
-+
-+	persistent = keyring_alloc(index_key->description,
-+				   uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(),
-+				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
-+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
-+				   ns->persistent_keyring_register);
-+	if (IS_ERR(persistent))
-+		return ERR_CAST(persistent);
-+
-+	return make_key_ref(persistent, true);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
-+ * keyring.
-+ */
-+static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
-+			       key_ref_t dest_ref)
-+{
-+	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
-+	struct key *persistent;
-+	key_ref_t reg_ref, persistent_ref;
-+	char buf[32];
-+	long ret;
-+
-+	/* Look in the register if it exists */
-+	index_key.type = &key_type_keyring;
-+	index_key.description = buf;
-+	index_key.desc_len = sprintf(buf, "_persistent.%u", from_kuid(ns, uid));
-+
-+	if (ns->persistent_keyring_register) {
-+		reg_ref = make_key_ref(ns->persistent_keyring_register, true);
-+		down_read(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
-+		persistent_ref = find_key_to_update(reg_ref, &index_key);
-+		up_read(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
-+
-+		if (persistent_ref)
-+			goto found;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* It wasn't in the register, so we'll need to create it.  We might
-+	 * also need to create the register.
-+	 */
-+	down_write(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
-+	persistent_ref = key_create_persistent(ns, uid, &index_key);
-+	up_write(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
-+	if (!IS_ERR(persistent_ref))
-+		goto found;
-+
-+	return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
-+
-+found:
-+	ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK);
-+	if (ret == 0) {
-+		persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
-+		ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
-+		if (ret == 0) {
-+			key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry);
-+			ret = persistent->serial;		
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	key_ref_put(persistent_ref);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated
-+ * keyring.
-+ */
-+long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
-+{
-+	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
-+	key_ref_t dest_ref;
-+	kuid_t uid;
-+	long ret;
-+
-+	/* -1 indicates the current user */
-+	if (_uid == (uid_t)-1) {
-+		uid = current_uid();
-+	} else {
-+		uid = make_kuid(ns, _uid);
-+		if (!uid_valid(uid))
-+			return -EINVAL;
-+
-+		/* You can only see your own persistent cache if you're not
-+		 * sufficiently privileged.
-+		 */
-+		if (!uid_eq(uid, current_uid()) &&
-+		  /*  uid_eq(uid, current_suid()) && */
-+		    !uid_eq(uid, current_euid()) &&
-+		  /*  uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid()) && */
-+		    !ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
-+			return -EPERM;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* There must be a destination keyring */
-+	dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
-+	if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
-+		return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
-+	if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
-+		ret = -ENOTDIR;
-+		goto out_put_dest;
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = key_get_persistent(ns, uid, dest_ref);
-+
-+out_put_dest:
-+	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
-index ee32d18..8c0af08 100644
---- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
-+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
-@@ -61,5 +61,16 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
- 		.extra1 = (void *) &zero,
- 		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
- 	},
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
-+	{
-+		.procname = "persistent_keyring_expiry",
-+		.data = &persistent_keyring_expiry,
-+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
-+		.mode = 0644,
-+		.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
-+		.extra1 = (void *) &zero,
-+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
-+	},
-+#endif
- 	{ }
- };
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/keys-x509-improv.patch b/keys-x509-improv.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 161675819..000000000
--- a/keys-x509-improv.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1889 +0,0 @@
-From db25f1d9f45079db5860c0fd1938032248ad2f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:10 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 01/18] KEYS: Rename public key parameter name arrays
-
-Rename the arrays of public key parameters (public key algorithm names, hash
-algorithm names and ID type names) so that the array name ends in "_name".
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 14 +++++++-------
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  8 ++++----
- include/crypto/public_key.h              |  6 +++---
- kernel/module_signing.c                  |  4 ++--
- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-index cb2e291..b313df1 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@
- 
- MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
- 
--const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
-+const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
- 	[PKEY_ALGO_DSA]		= "DSA",
- 	[PKEY_ALGO_RSA]		= "RSA",
- };
--EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name);
- 
--const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
-+const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
- 	[PKEY_HASH_MD4]		= "md4",
- 	[PKEY_HASH_MD5]		= "md5",
- 	[PKEY_HASH_SHA1]	= "sha1",
-@@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
- 	[PKEY_HASH_SHA512]	= "sha512",
- 	[PKEY_HASH_SHA224]	= "sha224",
- };
--EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo);
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo_name);
- 
--const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
-+const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
- 	[PKEY_ID_PGP]		= "PGP",
- 	[PKEY_ID_X509]		= "X509",
- };
--EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type);
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
- 
- /*
-  * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
- 
- 	if (key)
- 		seq_printf(m, "%s.%s",
--			   pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
-+			   pkey_id_type_name[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
- }
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index 06007f0..afbbc36 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
- 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
- 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
- 	 */
--	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
-+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
- 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
- 
-@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 
- 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
--	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]);
-+	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- 		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
- 		 cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
-@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 		 cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
- 		 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
--		 pkey_algo[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
--		 pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
-+		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
-+		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
- 
- 	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
- 		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
-diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-index f5b0224..619d570 100644
---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ enum pkey_algo {
- 	PKEY_ALGO__LAST
- };
- 
--extern const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
-+extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
- 
- enum pkey_hash_algo {
- 	PKEY_HASH_MD4,
-@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ enum pkey_hash_algo {
- 	PKEY_HASH__LAST
- };
- 
--extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
-+extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
- 
- enum pkey_id_type {
- 	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
-@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ enum pkey_id_type {
- 	PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST
- };
- 
--extern const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
-+extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
- 
- /*
-  * Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
-diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
-index f2970bd..ee47640 100644
---- a/kernel/module_signing.c
-+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
- 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
- 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
- 	 */
--	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0);
-+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
- 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
- 
-@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
- 		return -ENOPKG;
- 
- 	if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
--	    !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash])
-+	    !pkey_hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
- 		return -ENOPKG;
- 
- 	key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 1881703e6a0943f5d45278d19ffc5268495f57a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:18 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 02/18] KEYS: Move the algorithm pointer array from x509 to
- public_key.c
-
-Move the public-key algorithm pointer array from x509_public_key.c to
-public_key.c as it isn't X.509 specific.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      |  8 ++++++++
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +----------
- include/crypto/public_key.h              |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-index b313df1..796ce08 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
- };
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name);
- 
-+const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
-+#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
-+	defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
-+	[PKEY_ALGO_RSA]		= &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
-+#endif
-+};
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
-+
- const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
- 	[PKEY_HASH_MD4]		= "md4",
- 	[PKEY_HASH_MD5]		= "md5",
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index afbbc36..fe38628 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@
- #include "public_key.h"
- #include "x509_parser.h"
- 
--static const
--struct public_key_algorithm *x509_public_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
--	[PKEY_ALGO_DSA]		= NULL,
--#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
--	defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
--	[PKEY_ALGO_RSA]		= &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
--#endif
--};
--
- /*
-  * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
-  */
-@@ -174,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 		goto error_free_cert;
- 	}
- 
--	cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo];
-+	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo];
- 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
- 
- 	/* Check the signature on the key */
-diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-index 619d570..46bde25 100644
---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum pkey_algo {
- };
- 
- extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
-+extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
- 
- enum pkey_hash_algo {
- 	PKEY_HASH_MD4,
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 564f7dc3b31d53d195d046e6a717e9a2277296bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:24 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 03/18] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key struct
-
-Store public key algo ID in public_key struct for reference purposes.  This
-allows it to be removed from the x509_certificate struct and used to find a
-default in public_key_verify_signature().
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 5 +++--
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 1 -
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  | 4 ++--
- include/crypto/public_key.h               | 1 +
- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
-index facbf26..8cc253d 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
-@@ -343,8 +343,9 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
- 	if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
- 		return -ENOPKG;
- 
--	/* There seems to be an extraneous 0 byte on the front of the data */
--	ctx->cert->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+	ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+
-+	/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
- 	ctx->key = value + 1;
- 	ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
- 	return 0;
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-index f86dc5f..e583ad0 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ struct x509_certificate {
- 	char		*authority;		/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
- 	struct tm	valid_from;
- 	struct tm	valid_to;
--	enum pkey_algo	pkey_algo : 8;		/* Public key algorithm */
- 	enum pkey_algo	sig_pkey_algo : 8;	/* Signature public key algorithm */
- 	enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8;	/* Signature hash algorithm */
- 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index fe38628..fac574c 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 
- 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
--	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]);
-+	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- 		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
- 		 cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 		goto error_free_cert;
- 	}
- 
--	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo];
-+	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
- 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
- 
- 	/* Check the signature on the key */
-diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-index 46bde25..05778df 100644
---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct public_key {
- #define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT	0x02
- #define PKEY_CAN_SIGN		0x04
- #define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY		0x08
-+	enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
- 	enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8;
- 	union {
- 		MPI	mpi[5];
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 2666dd8e330d6792cc32e8739e89f9ad0acd04c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:30 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/18] KEYS: Split public_key_verify_signature() and make
- available
-
-Modify public_key_verify_signature() so that it now takes a public_key struct
-rather than a key struct and supply a wrapper that takes a key struct.  The
-wrapper is then used by the asymmetric key subtype and the modified function is
-used by X.509 self-signature checking and can be used by other things also.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h      |  6 +++++
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  2 +-
- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-index 796ce08..49ac8d8 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
-@@ -86,21 +86,45 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
- /*
-  * Verify a signature using a public key.
-  */
--static int public_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
--				       const struct public_key_signature *sig)
-+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
-+				const struct public_key_signature *sig)
- {
--	const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
-+	const struct public_key_algorithm *algo;
-+
-+	BUG_ON(!pk);
-+	BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[0]);
-+	BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[1]);
-+	BUG_ON(!sig);
-+	BUG_ON(!sig->digest);
-+	BUG_ON(!sig->mpi[0]);
-+
-+	algo = pk->algo;
-+	if (!algo) {
-+		if (pk->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST)
-+			return -ENOPKG;
-+		algo = pkey_algo[pk->pkey_algo];
-+		if (!algo)
-+			return -ENOPKG;
-+	}
- 
--	if (!pk->algo->verify_signature)
-+	if (!algo->verify_signature)
- 		return -ENOTSUPP;
- 
--	if (sig->nr_mpi != pk->algo->n_sig_mpi) {
-+	if (sig->nr_mpi != algo->n_sig_mpi) {
- 		pr_debug("Signature has %u MPI not %u\n",
--			 sig->nr_mpi, pk->algo->n_sig_mpi);
-+			 sig->nr_mpi, algo->n_sig_mpi);
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 	}
- 
--	return pk->algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
-+	return algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
-+
-+static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
-+					 const struct public_key_signature *sig)
-+{
-+	const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
-+	return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -111,6 +135,6 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
- 	.name			= "public_key",
- 	.describe		= public_key_describe,
- 	.destroy		= public_key_destroy,
--	.verify_signature	= public_key_verify_signature,
-+	.verify_signature	= public_key_verify_signature_2,
- };
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
-index 5e5e356..5c37a22 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
-@@ -28,3 +28,9 @@ struct public_key_algorithm {
- };
- 
- extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm;
-+
-+/*
-+ * public_key.c
-+ */
-+extern int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
-+				       const struct public_key_signature *sig);
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index fac574c..8cb2f70 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
- 	if (ret < 0)
- 		goto error_mpi;
- 
--	ret = pub->algo->verify_signature(pub, sig);
-+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig);
- 
- 	pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 9c814dcdc6d5836d82dc194f8f11ca9769251439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:15:37 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/18] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key_signature
- struct
-
-Store public key algorithm ID in public_key_signature struct for reference
-purposes.  This allows a public_key_signature struct to be embedded in
-struct x509_certificate and other places more easily.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-index 05778df..b34fda4 100644
---- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
-@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
- 	u8 *digest;
- 	u8 digest_size;			/* Number of bytes in digest */
- 	u8 nr_mpi;			/* Occupancy of mpi[] */
-+	enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
- 	enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8;
- 	union {
- 		MPI mpi[2];
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From b467a1c6be1c64c6abf4efd357a348f39c4b7daa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:16:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/18] X.509: struct x509_certificate needs struct tm
- declaring
-
-struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring by #inclusion of linux/time.h
-prior to its definition.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-index e583ad0..2d01182 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
-  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-  */
- 
-+#include <linux/time.h>
- #include <crypto/public_key.h>
- 
- struct x509_certificate {
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 37137e9377322a4fe92f679d78f8181feefe4d21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:18:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 07/18] X.509: Embed public_key_signature struct and create
- filler function
-
-Embed a public_key_signature struct in struct x509_certificate, eliminating
-now unnecessary fields, and split x509_check_signature() to create a filler
-function for it that attaches a digest of the signed data and an MPI that
-represents the signature data.  x509_free_certificate() is then modified to
-deal with these.
-
-Whilst we're at it, export both x509_check_signature() and the new
-x509_get_sig_params().
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 30 +++++------
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      | 16 ++++--
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  | 83 +++++++++++++++++--------------
- 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
-index 8cc253d..144201c 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
-@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
- 		kfree(cert->subject);
- 		kfree(cert->fingerprint);
- 		kfree(cert->authority);
-+		kfree(cert->sig.digest);
-+		mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
- 		kfree(cert);
- 	}
- }
-@@ -152,33 +154,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
- 		return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
- 
- 	case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
--		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
--		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
--		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
--		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
--		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
--		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
--		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
--		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
--		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
--		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
--		ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
--		ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
-+		ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
- 		break;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -203,8 +205,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 	}
- 
--	ctx->cert->sig = value;
--	ctx->cert->sig_size = vlen;
-+	ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
-+	ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-index 2d01182..87d9cc2 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
-@@ -21,12 +21,11 @@ struct x509_certificate {
- 	char		*authority;		/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
- 	struct tm	valid_from;
- 	struct tm	valid_to;
--	enum pkey_algo	sig_pkey_algo : 8;	/* Signature public key algorithm */
--	enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8;	/* Signature hash algorithm */
- 	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
--	size_t		tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
--	const void	*sig;			/* Signature data */
--	size_t		sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
-+	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
-+	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
-+	const void	*raw_sig;		/* Signature data */
-+	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
- };
- 
- /*
-@@ -34,3 +33,10 @@ struct x509_certificate {
-  */
- extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
- extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
-+
-+/*
-+ * x509_public_key.c
-+ */
-+extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
-+extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
-+				struct x509_certificate *cert);
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index 8cb2f70..b7c81d8 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -24,72 +24,83 @@
- #include "x509_parser.h"
- 
- /*
-- * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
-+ * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
-+ * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
-  */
--static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
--				const struct x509_certificate *cert)
-+int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
- {
--	struct public_key_signature *sig;
- 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- 	struct shash_desc *desc;
- 	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
-+	void *digest;
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
--	
-+
-+	if (cert->sig.rsa.s)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	cert->sig.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size);
-+	if (!cert->sig.rsa.s)
-+		return -ENOMEM;
-+	cert->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
-+
- 	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
- 	 * big the hash operational data will be.
- 	 */
--	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
-+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
- 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- 		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
- 
- 	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- 	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
- 
--	/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
--	 * context data.
-+	/* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the
-+	 * digest storage space.
- 	 */
- 	ret = -ENOMEM;
--	sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
--	if (!sig)
--		goto error_no_sig;
-+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!digest)
-+		goto error;
- 
--	sig->pkey_hash_algo	= cert->sig_hash_algo;
--	sig->digest		= (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size;
--	sig->digest_size	= digest_size;
-+	cert->sig.digest = digest;
-+	cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size;
- 
--	desc = (void *)sig + sizeof(*sig);
--	desc->tfm	= tfm;
--	desc->flags	= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-+	desc = digest + digest_size;
-+	desc->tfm = tfm;
-+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
- 
- 	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- 	if (ret < 0)
- 		goto error;
-+	might_sleep();
-+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest);
-+error:
-+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_sig_params);
- 
--	ret = -ENOMEM;
--	sig->rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->sig, cert->sig_size);
--	if (!sig->rsa.s)
--		goto error;
-+/*
-+ * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
-+ */
-+int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
-+			 struct x509_certificate *cert)
-+{
-+	int ret;
- 
--	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
--	if (ret < 0)
--		goto error_mpi;
-+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- 
--	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig);
-+	ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
-+	if (ret < 0)
-+		return ret;
- 
-+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig);
- 	pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
--
--error_mpi:
--	mpi_free(sig->rsa.s);
--error:
--	kfree(sig);
--error_no_sig:
--	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
--
--	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- 	return ret;
- }
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
- 
- /*
-  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
-@@ -118,8 +129,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 		 cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
- 		 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
--		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
--		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
-+		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
-+		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
- 
- 	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
- 		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 51432bf93bf4ff11cccf91c5ca22e9e92c05f4b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:18:15 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/18] X.509: Check the algorithm IDs obtained from parsing an
- X.509 certificate
-
-Check that the algorithm IDs obtained from the ASN.1 parse by OID lookup
-corresponds to algorithms that are available to us.
-
-Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index b7c81d8..eb368d4 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 
- 	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
-+
-+	if (cert->pub->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST ||
-+	    cert->sig.pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST ||
-+	    cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
-+	    !pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo] ||
-+	    !pkey_algo[cert->sig.pkey_algo] ||
-+	    !pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
-+		ret = -ENOPKG;
-+		goto error_free_cert;
-+	}
-+
- 	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
- 	pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- 		 cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 8f943dd14f8a4d8aa2126f8544e140d019ceb36d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:18:31 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/18] X.509: Handle certificates that lack an
- authorityKeyIdentifier field
-
-Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field by assuming
-they're self-signed and checking their signatures against themselves.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 9 +++++----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index eb368d4..0f55e3b 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 		 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
- 		 pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
- 
--	if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
--		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
-+	if (!cert->fingerprint) {
-+		pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
- 			cert->subject);
- 		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
- 		goto error_free_cert;
-@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
- 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
- 
--	/* Check the signature on the key */
--	if (strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
-+	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
-+	if (!cert->authority ||
-+	    strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
- 		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto error_free_cert;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 89c63be02d8eea6403d6b7d7a045e8f115787a81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2013 17:40:44 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 10/18] X.509: Remove certificate date checks
-
-Remove the certificate date checks that are performed when a certificate is
-parsed.  There are two checks: a valid from and a valid to.  The first check is
-causing a lot of problems with system clocks that don't keep good time and the
-second places an implicit expiry date upon the kernel when used for module
-signing, so do we really need them?
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
-cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
-cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
-cc: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>
-cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 38 --------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 38 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index 0f55e3b..c1540e8 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
- static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- {
- 	struct x509_certificate *cert;
--	struct tm now;
- 	size_t srlen, sulen;
- 	char *desc = NULL;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -150,43 +149,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 		goto error_free_cert;
- 	}
- 
--	time_to_tm(CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec, 0, &now);
--	pr_devel("Now: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
--		 now.tm_year + 1900, now.tm_mon + 1, now.tm_mday,
--		 now.tm_hour, now.tm_min,  now.tm_sec);
--	if (now.tm_year < cert->valid_from.tm_year ||
--	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_from.tm_year &&
--	     (now.tm_mon < cert->valid_from.tm_mon ||
--	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_from.tm_mon &&
--	       (now.tm_mday < cert->valid_from.tm_mday ||
--		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_from.tm_mday &&
--		 (now.tm_hour < cert->valid_from.tm_hour ||
--		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_from.tm_hour &&
--		   (now.tm_min < cert->valid_from.tm_min ||
--		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_from.tm_min &&
--		     (now.tm_sec < cert->valid_from.tm_sec
--		      ))))))))))) {
--		pr_warn("Cert %s is not yet valid\n", cert->fingerprint);
--		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
--		goto error_free_cert;
--	}
--	if (now.tm_year > cert->valid_to.tm_year ||
--	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_to.tm_year &&
--	     (now.tm_mon > cert->valid_to.tm_mon ||
--	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_to.tm_mon &&
--	       (now.tm_mday > cert->valid_to.tm_mday ||
--		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_to.tm_mday &&
--		 (now.tm_hour > cert->valid_to.tm_hour ||
--		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_to.tm_hour &&
--		   (now.tm_min > cert->valid_to.tm_min ||
--		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_to.tm_min &&
--		     (now.tm_sec > cert->valid_to.tm_sec
--		      ))))))))))) {
--		pr_warn("Cert %s has expired\n", cert->fingerprint);
--		ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
--		goto error_free_cert;
--	}
--
- 	cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
- 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From cdbd1f60c92814fa44ca968dd3fdc78c8b65400c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:07:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 11/18] KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
-
-Load all the files matching the pattern "*.x509" that are to be found in kernel
-base source dir and base build dir into the module signing keyring.
-
-The "extra_certificates" file is then redundant.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/Makefile              | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- kernel/modsign_certificate.S |  3 +--
- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index 09a9c94..0246125 100644
---- a/kernel/Makefile
-+++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -123,17 +123,40 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
- 	$(call if_changed,bc)
- 
- ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
-+###############################################################################
- #
--# Pull the signing certificate and any extra certificates into the kernel
-+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull
-+# them into the kernel.
- #
-+###############################################################################
-+X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
-+X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
-+X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
-+
-+ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
-+$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
-+endif
-+
-+ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),)
-+ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES))
-+$(info X.509 certificate list changed)
-+$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
-+endif
-+endif
-+
-+kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
- 
--quiet_cmd_touch = TOUCH   $@
--      cmd_touch = touch   $@
-+quiet_cmd_x509certs  = CERTS   $@
-+      cmd_x509certs  = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@
-+targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
-+	$(call if_changed,x509certs)
- 
--extra_certificates:
--	$(call cmd,touch)
-+targets += $(obj)/.x509.list
-+$(obj)/.x509.list:
-+	@echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
- 
--kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates
-+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
- 
- ###############################################################################
- #
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
-index 4a9a86d..6fe03c7 100644
---- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
-+++ b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
-@@ -7,6 +7,5 @@
- 	.section ".init.data","aw"
- 
- GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list)
--	.incbin "signing_key.x509"
--	.incbin "extra_certificates"
-+	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
- GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From d38add998f9fb35e901e022c14b0f771823b35e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 17:13:15 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 12/18] KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509
- certs better to deduplicate
-
-Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certificates before we sort them
-as this allows $(sort) to better remove duplicates.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/Makefile | 12 +++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index 0246125..c71d596 100644
---- a/kernel/Makefile
-+++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -125,13 +125,19 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
- ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
- ###############################################################################
- #
--# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull
--# them into the kernel.
-+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
-+# the kernel.
-+#
-+# We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
-+# in ".x509".  Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
-+# have make canonicalise the pathnames and then sort them to discard the
-+# duplicates.
- #
- ###############################################################################
- X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
- X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
--X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
-+X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
-+				$(or $(realpath $(CERT)),$(CERT))))
- 
- ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
- $(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 1e326161658f6c4bd5dba53bc2076d915400124a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:07:30 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 13/18] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring
- from module signing
-
-Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
-can be used by code other than the module-signing code.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- include/keys/system_keyring.h |  23 ++++++++++
- init/Kconfig                  |  13 ++++++
- kernel/Makefile               |  15 ++++--
- kernel/modsign_certificate.S  |  11 -----
- kernel/modsign_pubkey.c       | 104 ------------------------------------------
- kernel/module-internal.h      |   2 -
- kernel/module_signing.c       |   3 +-
- kernel/system_certificates.S  |  11 +++++
- kernel/system_keyring.c       | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 9 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 include/keys/system_keyring.h
- delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_certificate.S
- delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
- create mode 100644 kernel/system_certificates.S
- create mode 100644 kernel/system_keyring.c
-
-diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8dabc39
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
-+/* System keyring containing trusted public keys.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
-+#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-+
-+#include <linux/key.h>
-+
-+extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
-diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
-index 5496f30..b5c524c 100644
---- a/init/Kconfig
-+++ b/init/Kconfig
-@@ -1675,6 +1675,18 @@ config BASE_SMALL
- 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
- 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
- 
-+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-+	bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
-+	depends on KEYS
-+	help
-+	  Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added.  Keys in
-+	  the keyring are considered to be trusted.  Keys may be added at will
-+	  by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
-+	  userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
-+	  keys already in the keyring.
-+
-+	  Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
-+
- menuconfig MODULES
- 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
- 	option modules
-@@ -1748,6 +1760,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
- config MODULE_SIG
- 	bool "Module signature verification"
- 	depends on MODULES
-+	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- 	select KEYS
- 	select CRYPTO
- 	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
-diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
-index c71d596..bbaf7d5 100644
---- a/kernel/Makefile
-+++ b/kernel/Makefile
-@@ -41,8 +41,9 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_SMP),y)
- obj-y += up.o
- endif
- obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
--obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
-@@ -122,11 +123,11 @@ targets += timeconst.h
- $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(obj)/hz.bc $(src)/timeconst.bc FORCE
- 	$(call if_changed,bc)
- 
--ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
- ###############################################################################
- #
- # Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
--# the kernel.
-+# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during
-+# boot.
- #
- # We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
- # in ".x509".  Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
-@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
- # duplicates.
- #
- ###############################################################################
-+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
- X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
- X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
- X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
-@@ -150,10 +152,11 @@ $(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
- endif
- endif
- 
--kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-+kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
- 
- quiet_cmd_x509certs  = CERTS   $@
--      cmd_x509certs  = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@
-+      cmd_x509certs  = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; echo "  - Including cert $(X509)")
-+
- targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
- $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
- 	$(call if_changed,x509certs)
-@@ -163,7 +166,9 @@ $(obj)/.x509.list:
- 	@echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
- 
- clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
-+endif
- 
-+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
- ###############################################################################
- #
- # If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 6fe03c7..0000000
---- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
--#include <linux/export.h>
--
--#define GLOBAL(name)	\
--	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name);	\
--	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name):
--
--	.section ".init.data","aw"
--
--GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list)
--	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
--GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
-diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 7cbd450..0000000
---- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
--/* Public keys for module signature verification
-- *
-- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-- * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-- *
-- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-- */
--
--#include <linux/kernel.h>
--#include <linux/sched.h>
--#include <linux/cred.h>
--#include <linux/err.h>
--#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
--#include "module-internal.h"
--
--struct key *modsign_keyring;
--
--extern __initconst const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
--extern __initconst const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
--
--/*
-- * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice
-- * if modsign.pub changes.
-- */
--static __initconst const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo";
--
--/*
-- * Load the compiled-in keys
-- */
--static __init int module_verify_init(void)
--{
--	pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n");
--
--	modsign_keyring = keyring_alloc(".module_sign",
--					KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
--					current_cred(),
--					((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
--					 KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
--					KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
--	if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
--		panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
--
--	return 0;
--}
--
--/*
-- * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
-- */
--device_initcall(module_verify_init);
--
--/*
-- * Load the compiled-in keys
-- */
--static __init int load_module_signing_keys(void)
--{
--	key_ref_t key;
--	const u8 *p, *end;
--	size_t plen;
--
--	pr_notice("Loading module verification certificates\n");
--
--	end = modsign_certificate_list_end;
--	p = modsign_certificate_list;
--	while (p < end) {
--		/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
--		 * than 256 bytes in size.
--		 */
--		if (end - p < 4)
--			goto dodgy_cert;
--		if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
--		    p[1] != 0x82)
--			goto dodgy_cert;
--		plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
--		plen += 4;
--		if (plen > end - p)
--			goto dodgy_cert;
--
--		key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
--					   "asymmetric",
--					   NULL,
--					   p,
--					   plen,
--					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
--					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
--					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
--		if (IS_ERR(key))
--			pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
--			       PTR_ERR(key));
--		else
--			pr_notice("MODSIGN: Loaded cert '%s'\n",
--				  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
--		p += plen;
--	}
--
--	return 0;
--
--dodgy_cert:
--	pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
--	return 0;
--}
--late_initcall(load_module_signing_keys);
-diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
-index 24f9247..915e123 100644
---- a/kernel/module-internal.h
-+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
-@@ -9,6 +9,4 @@
-  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-  */
- 
--extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
--
- extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
-diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
-index ee47640..0b6b870 100644
---- a/kernel/module_signing.c
-+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
- #include <crypto/public_key.h>
- #include <crypto/hash.h>
- #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
- #include "module-internal.h"
- 
- /*
-@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
- 
- 	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
- 
--	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
-+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
- 			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- 	if (IS_ERR(key))
- 		pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
-diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5cffe86
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S
-@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-+#include <linux/export.h>
-+
-+#define GLOBAL(name)	\
-+	.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name);	\
-+	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(name):
-+
-+	.section ".init.data","aw"
-+
-+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list)
-+	.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
-+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list_end)
-diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..51c3514
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
-+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
-+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/export.h>
-+#include <linux/kernel.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-+#include "module-internal.h"
-+
-+struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
-+
-+extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
-+extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list_end[];
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load the compiled-in keys
-+ */
-+static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
-+{
-+	pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
-+
-+	system_trusted_keyring =
-+		keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
-+			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
-+			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+			       KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
-+			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
-+	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
-+		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
-+ */
-+device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
-+ */
-+static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
-+{
-+	key_ref_t key;
-+	const u8 *p, *end;
-+	size_t plen;
-+
-+	pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
-+
-+	end = system_certificate_list_end;
-+	p = system_certificate_list;
-+	while (p < end) {
-+		/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
-+		 * than 256 bytes in size.
-+		 */
-+		if (end - p < 4)
-+			goto dodgy_cert;
-+		if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
-+		    p[1] != 0x82)
-+			goto dodgy_cert;
-+		plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
-+		plen += 4;
-+		if (plen > end - p)
-+			goto dodgy_cert;
-+
-+		key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
-+					   "asymmetric",
-+					   NULL,
-+					   p,
-+					   plen,
-+					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
-+					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
-+		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-+			pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
-+			       PTR_ERR(key));
-+		} else {
-+			pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
-+				  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
-+			key_ref_put(key);
-+		}
-+		p += plen;
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+
-+dodgy_cert:
-+	pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 5d862c1ec2e5e033527a5e6ac17042d8d7408f7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:07:37 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 14/18] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
-
-Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
-or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
-kernel already possessed.
-
-Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
-keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
----
- include/linux/key-type.h | 1 +
- include/linux/key.h      | 3 +++
- kernel/system_keyring.c  | 4 +++-
- security/keys/key.c      | 8 ++++++++
- security/keys/keyring.c  | 4 ++++
- 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
-index f58737b..a74c3a8 100644
---- a/include/linux/key-type.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
- 	const void	*data;		/* Raw data */
- 	size_t		datalen;	/* Raw datalen */
- 	size_t		quotalen;	/* Quota length for proposed payload */
-+	bool		trusted;	/* True if key is trusted */
- };
- 
- typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
-diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
-index 010dbb6..80d6774 100644
---- a/include/linux/key.h
-+++ b/include/linux/key.h
-@@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ struct key {
- #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE	5	/* set if key is negative */
- #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
- #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
-+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED	8	/* set if key is trusted */
-+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY	9	/* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
- 
- 	/* the key type and key description string
- 	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
-@@ -218,6 +220,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
- #define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA	0x0000	/* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
- #define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN	0x0001	/* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
- #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA	0x0002	/* not in quota */
-+#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED	0x0004	/* Key should be flagged as trusted */
- 
- extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
- extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
-diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
-index 51c3514..5296721 100644
---- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
-+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
- 	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
- 		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
- 
-+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -82,7 +83,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
- 					   plen,
- 					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- 					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
--					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
-+					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
-+					   KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
- 		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- 			pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
- 			       PTR_ERR(key));
-diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
-index a819b5c..d331ea9 100644
---- a/security/keys/key.c
-+++ b/security/keys/key.c
-@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
- 
- 	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
- 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
-+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
-+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
- 
- 	memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
- 
-@@ -813,6 +815,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	prep.data = payload;
- 	prep.datalen = plen;
- 	prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
-+	prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
- 	if (index_key.type->preparse) {
- 		ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
- 		if (ret < 0) {
-@@ -827,6 +830,11 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
- 	}
- 	index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
- 
-+	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+	if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
-+		goto error_free_prep;
-+	flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
-+
- 	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
- 	if (ret < 0) {
- 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
-diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
-index f7cdea2..9b6f6e0 100644
---- a/security/keys/keyring.c
-+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
-@@ -1183,6 +1183,10 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
- 	key_check(keyring);
- 	key_check(key);
- 
-+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) &&
-+	    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
- 	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
- 	if (ret == 0) {
- 		kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 6270395cb613c47a5ca459649c4d4ba6eeea2ce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 19:28:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 15/18] KEYS: Set the asymmetric-key type default search method
-
-The keyring expansion patches introduces a new search method by which
-key_search() attempts to walk directly to the key that has exactly the same
-description as the requested one.
-
-However, this causes inexact matching of asymmetric keys to fail.  The
-solution to this is to select iterative rather than direct search as the
-default search type for asymmetric keys.
-
-As an example, the kernel might have a key like this:
-
-	Magrathea: Glacier signing key: 6a2a0f82bad7e396665f465e4e3e1f9bd24b1226
-
-and:
-
-	keyctl search <keyring-ID> asymmetric id:d24b1226
-
-should find the key, despite that not being its exact description.
-
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
-index cf80765..b77eb53 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
-@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
- 	.match		= asymmetric_key_match,
- 	.destroy	= asymmetric_key_destroy,
- 	.describe	= asymmetric_key_describe,
-+	.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE,
- };
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric);
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From cf64858d1b141c9c7d3477f686a923eb8908b438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:36:26 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 16/18] KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by
- userspace
-
-Give the root user the ability to read the system keyring and put read
-permission on the trusted keys added during boot.  The latter is actually more
-theoretical than real for the moment as asymmetric keys do not currently
-provide a read operation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- kernel/system_keyring.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
-index 5296721..564dd93 100644
---- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
-+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
- 		keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
- 			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- 			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
--			       KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
-+			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
- 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
- 	if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
- 		panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
-@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
- 					   NULL,
- 					   p,
- 					   plen,
--					   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
--					   KEY_USR_VIEW,
-+					   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-+					   KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
- 					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
- 					   KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
- 		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From c8bbb1491c7be6193f502e4d1326f2bd23263616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:36:27 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 17/18] KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
-
-Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
-'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
-to a trusted keyring.  This patch adds support for verifying
-a certificate's signature.
-
-This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-index c1540e8..8761264 100644
---- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
-@@ -18,12 +18,60 @@
- #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
- #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
- #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
-+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
- #include <crypto/hash.h>
- #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
- #include "public_key.h"
- #include "x509_parser.h"
- 
- /*
-+ * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
-+ */
-+static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(
-+	struct key *keyring,
-+	const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
-+	const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
-+{
-+	key_ref_t key;
-+	char *id;
-+
-+	/* Construct an identifier. */
-+	id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!id)
-+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+
-+	memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
-+	id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
-+	id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
-+	memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
-+	id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
-+
-+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
-+
-+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
-+			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
-+	if (IS_ERR(key))
-+		pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
-+			 id, PTR_ERR(key));
-+	kfree(id);
-+
-+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
-+			/* Hide some search errors */
-+		case -EACCES:
-+		case -ENOTDIR:
-+		case -EAGAIN:
-+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-+		default:
-+			return ERR_CAST(key);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
-+	return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
-  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
-  */
-@@ -103,6 +151,33 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
- 
- /*
-+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
-+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
-+ * new certificate as being trusted.
-+ *
-+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
-+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
-+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
-+ */
-+static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
-+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
-+{
-+	const struct public_key *pk;
-+	struct key *key;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+
-+	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-+					  cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer),
-+					  cert->authority,
-+					  strlen(cert->authority));
-+	if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
-+		pk = key->payload.data;
-+		ret = x509_check_signature(pk, cert);
-+	}
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
-  */
- static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-@@ -155,9 +230,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- 	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- 	if (!cert->authority ||
- 	    strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
--		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
-+		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
- 		if (ret < 0)
- 			goto error_free_cert;
-+	} else {
-+		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, system_trusted_keyring);
-+		if (!ret)
-+			prep->trusted = 1;
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Propose a description */
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-
-From 40faeaee1ca7822dc39d24db4b04e4d6c2feba4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 13:26:22 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 18/18] KEYS: initialize root uid and session keyrings early
-
-In order to create the integrity keyrings (eg. _evm, _ima), root's
-uid and session keyrings need to be initialized early.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/process_keys.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-index 68548ea..0cf8a13 100644
---- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
-+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-@@ -857,3 +857,13 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
- 
- 	commit_creds(new);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.
-+ */
-+static int __init init_root_keyring(void)
-+{
-+	return install_user_keyrings();
-+}
-+
-+late_initcall(init_root_keyring);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index a01720c3b..61eb3f6a2 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 cc6ee608854e0da4b64f6c1ff8b6398c  linux-3.12.tar.xz
-36f4f0d251485587b5ce0a8ffb2fbd3c  patch-3.12-git10.xz
+3529c36703874a24203dcfca84cfa29b  patch-3.12-git11.xz