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| author | Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> | 2018-02-05 12:54:33 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> | 2018-02-05 12:54:33 -0600 |
| commit | a6987219162e71eb8eb508a91474f633a42e96c9 (patch) | |
| tree | edac99a503bbbe162162293bed94daba761b9056 | |
| parent | 2a778f5d34d9096b454abea6b1b8e1a5d4fa91df (diff) | |
| download | kernel-a6987219162e71eb8eb508a91474f633a42e96c9.tar.gz kernel-a6987219162e71eb8eb508a91474f633a42e96c9.tar.xz kernel-a6987219162e71eb8eb508a91474f633a42e96c9.zip | |
Linux v4.15-10668-g35277995e179
34 files changed, 124 insertions, 1405 deletions
diff --git a/0001-tools-lib-subcmd-pager.c-do-not-alias-select-params.patch b/0001-tools-lib-subcmd-pager.c-do-not-alias-select-params.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..37c0f041e --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-tools-lib-subcmd-pager.c-do-not-alias-select-params.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 85721e6bfc5da3c8f7971c4acb1a0ad16fb2c16a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> +Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 13:29:38 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] tools/lib/subcmd/pager.c: do not alias select() params + +Use a separate fd set for select()-s exception fds param to fix the +following gcc warning: + +pager.c:36:12: error: passing argument 2 to restrict-qualified + parameter aliases with argument 4 [-Werror=restrict] + select(1, &in, NULL, &in, NULL); + ^~~ ~~~ + +Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180101105626.7168-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> +Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> +Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> +--- + tools/lib/subcmd/pager.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/tools/lib/subcmd/pager.c b/tools/lib/subcmd/pager.c +index 5ba754d17952..9997a8805a82 100644 +--- a/tools/lib/subcmd/pager.c ++++ b/tools/lib/subcmd/pager.c +@@ -30,10 +30,13 @@ static void pager_preexec(void) + * have real input + */ + fd_set in; ++ fd_set exception; + + FD_ZERO(&in); ++ FD_ZERO(&exception); + FD_SET(0, &in); +- select(1, &in, NULL, &in, NULL); ++ FD_SET(0, &exception); ++ select(1, &in, NULL, &exception, NULL); + + setenv("LESS", "FRSX", 0); + } +-- +2.14.3 + diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK b/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK new file mode 100644 index 000000000..36d49f582 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b0e62594c --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_DEBUG_WX b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_DEBUG_WX new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95e08f44b --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_DEBUG_WX @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR new file mode 100644 index 000000000..711cee4c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998 b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2650002f --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4665f7916 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/aarch64/CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_AXG b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/aarch64/CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_AXG new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fec409eb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/aarch64/CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_AXG @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_AXG=y diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/arm/armv7/armv7/CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC_V2 b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/armv7/armv7/CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC_V2 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..225594051 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/arm/armv7/armv7/CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC_V2 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC_V2=m diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_OCXL b/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_OCXL new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4f2a1a2ca --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_OCXL @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_OCXL=m diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG b/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG new file mode 100644 index 000000000..34e3d00fe --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG is not set diff --git a/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS b/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc57e86b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/fedora/generic/powerpc/CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS=y @@ -1 +1 @@ -4bf772b14675411a69b3c807f73006de0fe4b649 +35277995e17919ab838beae765f440674e8576eb diff --git a/kernel-aarch64-debug.config b/kernel-aarch64-debug.config index 343ede021..bec209c25 100644 --- a/kernel-aarch64-debug.config +++ b/kernel-aarch64-debug.config @@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM_PL172_MPMC=m CONFIG_ARM_PMU=y # CONFIG_ARM_PSCI_CHECKER is not set CONFIG_ARM_PSCI=y +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set # CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP is not set CONFIG_ARM_RK3399_DMC_DEVFREQ=m CONFIG_ARM_SBSA_WATCHDOG=m @@ -1835,6 +1836,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_REGS=y CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP=y @@ -2077,6 +2079,7 @@ CONFIG_I2C_DESIGNWARE_SLAVE=y CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m # CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set # CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set CONFIG_I2C_GPIO=m CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y CONFIG_I2C_HID=m @@ -4159,6 +4162,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_MAX77620=m # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MDM9615 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON8B is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON8 is not set +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_AXG=y # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_GXBB is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_GXL is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8660 is not set @@ -4166,6 +4170,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8916=y # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8960 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8994 is not set CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8996=y +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8X74 is not set CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM=y CONFIG_PINCTRL_MVEBU=y @@ -4581,6 +4586,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_ARMADA38X=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m # CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1302 is not set CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1305=m diff --git a/kernel-aarch64.config b/kernel-aarch64.config index 7847101e5..e3fd7f4b3 100644 --- a/kernel-aarch64.config +++ b/kernel-aarch64.config @@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM_PL172_MPMC=m CONFIG_ARM_PMU=y # CONFIG_ARM_PSCI_CHECKER is not set CONFIG_ARM_PSCI=y +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set # CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP is not set CONFIG_ARM_RK3399_DMC_DEVFREQ=m CONFIG_ARM_SBSA_WATCHDOG=m @@ -1816,6 +1817,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_REGS=y CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP=y @@ -2058,6 +2060,7 @@ CONFIG_I2C_DESIGNWARE_SLAVE=y CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m # CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set # CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set CONFIG_I2C_GPIO=m CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y CONFIG_I2C_HID=m @@ -4136,6 +4139,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_MAX77620=m # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MDM9615 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON8B is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON8 is not set +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_AXG=y # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_GXBB is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_GXL is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8660 is not set @@ -4143,6 +4147,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8916=y # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8960 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8994 is not set CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8996=y +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8X74 is not set CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM=y CONFIG_PINCTRL_MVEBU=y @@ -4557,6 +4562,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_ARMADA38X=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m # CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1302 is not set CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1305=m diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config b/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config index 17a610025..a25911c9d 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl-debug.config @@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM_PL172_MPMC=m CONFIG_ARM_PMU=y # CONFIG_ARM_PSCI_CHECKER is not set CONFIG_ARM_PSCI=y +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set # CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP is not set CONFIG_ARM_RK3399_DMC_DEVFREQ=m CONFIG_ARM_SCPI_CPUFREQ=m @@ -1237,6 +1238,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS=y CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU is not set # CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH is not set +CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y # CONFIG_DECNET is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_CFQ=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="(none)" @@ -1962,6 +1964,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_TWD=y @@ -2204,6 +2207,7 @@ CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m # CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set # CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set CONFIG_I2C_EXYNOS5=m +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set CONFIG_I2C_GPIO=m CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y CONFIG_I2C_HID=m @@ -4459,6 +4463,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8916=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8960=m # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8994 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8996 is not set +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8X74=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MVEBU=y CONFIG_PINCTRL_PALMAS=y @@ -4911,6 +4916,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_AS3722=y CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DA9052=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DA9055=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m @@ -4962,6 +4968,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MC13XXX=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MSM6242=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MV=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC=m +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC_V2=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_OMAP=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PALMAS=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF2123=m diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config index a62f85957..b9eacace7 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae-debug.config @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM_PL172_MPMC=m CONFIG_ARM_PMU=y # CONFIG_ARM_PSCI_CHECKER is not set CONFIG_ARM_PSCI=y +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set # CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP is not set CONFIG_ARM_RK3399_DMC_DEVFREQ=m CONFIG_ARM_SCPI_CPUFREQ=m @@ -1183,6 +1184,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS=y CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU is not set # CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH is not set +CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y # CONFIG_DECNET is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_CFQ=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="(none)" @@ -1856,6 +1858,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER=y @@ -2095,6 +2098,7 @@ CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m # CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set # CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set CONFIG_I2C_EXYNOS5=m +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set CONFIG_I2C_GPIO=m CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y CONFIG_I2C_HID=m @@ -4223,6 +4227,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_DOVE=y # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_GXL is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8994 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8996 is not set +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MVEBU=y CONFIG_PINCTRL_RK805=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_SAMSUNG=y @@ -4617,6 +4622,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_AS3722=y CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m # CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1302 is not set CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1305=m diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config index 17a6f64f3..45ae1a7bd 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl-lpae.config @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM_PL172_MPMC=m CONFIG_ARM_PMU=y # CONFIG_ARM_PSCI_CHECKER is not set CONFIG_ARM_PSCI=y +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set # CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP is not set CONFIG_ARM_RK3399_DMC_DEVFREQ=m CONFIG_ARM_SCPI_CPUFREQ=m @@ -1172,6 +1173,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU is not set # CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH is not set +CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y # CONFIG_DECNET is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_CFQ=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="(none)" @@ -1837,6 +1839,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER=y @@ -2076,6 +2079,7 @@ CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m # CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set # CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set CONFIG_I2C_EXYNOS5=m +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set CONFIG_I2C_GPIO=m CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y CONFIG_I2C_HID=m @@ -4200,6 +4204,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_DOVE=y # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MESON_GXL is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8994 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8996 is not set +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MVEBU=y CONFIG_PINCTRL_RK805=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_SAMSUNG=y @@ -4593,6 +4598,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_AS3722=y CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m # CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1302 is not set CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1305=m diff --git a/kernel-armv7hl.config b/kernel-armv7hl.config index 06728485b..6af2475ab 100644 --- a/kernel-armv7hl.config +++ b/kernel-armv7hl.config @@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM_PL172_MPMC=m CONFIG_ARM_PMU=y # CONFIG_ARM_PSCI_CHECKER is not set CONFIG_ARM_PSCI=y +# CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS is not set # CONFIG_ARM_PTDUMP is not set CONFIG_ARM_RK3399_DMC_DEVFREQ=m CONFIG_ARM_SCPI_CPUFREQ=m @@ -1226,6 +1227,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU is not set # CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH is not set +CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y # CONFIG_DECNET is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_CFQ=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="(none)" @@ -1943,6 +1945,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_ARCH_TIMER=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_TWD=y @@ -2185,6 +2188,7 @@ CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m # CONFIG_I2C_EG20T is not set # CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set CONFIG_I2C_EXYNOS5=m +# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO_FAULT_INJECTOR is not set CONFIG_I2C_GPIO=m CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y CONFIG_I2C_HID=m @@ -4436,6 +4440,7 @@ CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8916=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8960=m # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8994 is not set # CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8996 is not set +CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8998=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MSM8X74=m CONFIG_PINCTRL_MVEBU=y CONFIG_PINCTRL_PALMAS=y @@ -4887,6 +4892,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_AS3722=y CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CROS_EC=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DA9052=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DA9055=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m @@ -4938,6 +4944,7 @@ CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MC13XXX=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MSM6242=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MV=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC=m +CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MXC_V2=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_OMAP=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PALMAS=m CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF2123=m diff --git a/kernel-i686-PAE.config b/kernel-i686-PAE.config index 7d10ba4ec..79925a1fc 100644 --- a/kernel-i686-PAE.config +++ b/kernel-i686-PAE.config @@ -1685,6 +1685,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HD44780=m diff --git a/kernel-i686-PAEdebug.config b/kernel-i686-PAEdebug.config index a950b9ef5..4697804eb 100644 --- a/kernel-i686-PAEdebug.config +++ b/kernel-i686-PAEdebug.config @@ -1705,6 +1705,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HD44780=m diff --git a/kernel-i686-debug.config b/kernel-i686-debug.config index e90b5ec04..ba2d20855 100644 --- a/kernel-i686-debug.config +++ b/kernel-i686-debug.config @@ -1705,6 +1705,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HD44780=m diff --git a/kernel-i686.config b/kernel-i686.config index ab0623dc7..22342426e 100644 --- a/kernel-i686.config +++ b/kernel-i686.config @@ -1685,6 +1685,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HD44780=m diff --git a/kernel-ppc64-debug.config b/kernel-ppc64-debug.config index 7336dd59f..5a8977480 100644 --- a/kernel-ppc64-debug.config +++ b/kernel-ppc64-debug.config @@ -1608,6 +1608,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE=y @@ -3607,6 +3608,7 @@ CONFIG_OCFS2_FS=m CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB=m # CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_STATS is not set CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_USERSPACE_CLUSTER=m +CONFIG_OCXL=m # CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY is not set # CONFIG_OF_UNITTEST is not set # CONFIG_OMFS_FS is not set @@ -3842,7 +3844,9 @@ CONFIG_PPC_EMULATED_STATS=y # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_PID is not set # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_USE_SIGILL is not set CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX=y +# CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_PPC_MAPLE=y +CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS=y # CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE is not set # CONFIG_PPC_MPC5200_LPBFIFO is not set CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y diff --git a/kernel-ppc64.config b/kernel-ppc64.config index ba50e3e36..157814c02 100644 --- a/kernel-ppc64.config +++ b/kernel-ppc64.config @@ -1588,6 +1588,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE=y @@ -3583,6 +3584,7 @@ CONFIG_OCFS2_FS=m CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB=m # CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_STATS is not set CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_USERSPACE_CLUSTER=m +CONFIG_OCXL=m # CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY is not set # CONFIG_OF_UNITTEST is not set # CONFIG_OMFS_FS is not set @@ -3818,7 +3820,9 @@ CONFIG_PPC_EMULATED_STATS=y # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_PID is not set # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_USE_SIGILL is not set CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX=y +# CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_PPC_MAPLE=y +CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS=y # CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE is not set # CONFIG_PPC_MPC5200_LPBFIFO is not set CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y diff --git a/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config b/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config index 476766f12..225986bf0 100644 --- a/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config +++ b/kernel-ppc64le-debug.config @@ -1561,6 +1561,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE=y @@ -3551,6 +3552,7 @@ CONFIG_OCFS2_FS=m CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB=m # CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_STATS is not set CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_USERSPACE_CLUSTER=m +CONFIG_OCXL=m # CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY is not set # CONFIG_OF_UNITTEST is not set # CONFIG_OMFS_FS is not set @@ -3781,7 +3783,9 @@ CONFIG_PPC_EMULATED_STATS=y # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_PID is not set # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_USE_SIGILL is not set CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX=y +# CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG is not set # CONFIG_PPC_MAPLE is not set +CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS=y # CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE is not set # CONFIG_PPC_MPC5200_LPBFIFO is not set CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y diff --git a/kernel-ppc64le.config b/kernel-ppc64le.config index 49e4d8c78..e41398c7d 100644 --- a/kernel-ppc64le.config +++ b/kernel-ppc64le.config @@ -1541,6 +1541,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE=y @@ -3527,6 +3528,7 @@ CONFIG_OCFS2_FS=m CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB=m # CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_STATS is not set CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_USERSPACE_CLUSTER=m +CONFIG_OCXL=m # CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY is not set # CONFIG_OF_UNITTEST is not set # CONFIG_OMFS_FS is not set @@ -3757,7 +3759,9 @@ CONFIG_PPC_EMULATED_STATS=y # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_PID is not set # CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX_USE_SIGILL is not set CONFIG_PPC_ICSWX=y +# CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG is not set # CONFIG_PPC_MAPLE is not set +CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS=y # CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE is not set # CONFIG_PPC_MPC5200_LPBFIFO is not set CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y diff --git a/kernel-s390x-debug.config b/kernel-s390x-debug.config index 24bad8ad3..827778a79 100644 --- a/kernel-s390x-debug.config +++ b/kernel-s390x-debug.config @@ -1534,6 +1534,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HD44780=m # CONFIG_HDC100X is not set diff --git a/kernel-s390x.config b/kernel-s390x.config index 818270388..25570ad42 100644 --- a/kernel-s390x.config +++ b/kernel-s390x.config @@ -1514,6 +1514,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HD44780=m # CONFIG_HDC100X is not set diff --git a/kernel-x86_64-debug.config b/kernel-x86_64-debug.config index 6adbead50..81d63f0df 100644 --- a/kernel-x86_64-debug.config +++ b/kernel-x86_64-debug.config @@ -1747,6 +1747,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HAVE_MEMORY_PRESENT=y diff --git a/kernel-x86_64.config b/kernel-x86_64.config index 5611936b9..bff30d302 100644 --- a/kernel-x86_64.config +++ b/kernel-x86_64.config @@ -1727,6 +1727,7 @@ CONFIG_HAMACHI=m CONFIG_HAMRADIO=y CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m CONFIG_HAPPYMEAL=m +CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y CONFIG_HAVE_MEMORY_PRESENT=y diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index f8d29795b..8a5d8d428 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel # The rc snapshot level %global rcrev 0 # The git snapshot level -%define gitrev 4 +%define gitrev 5 # Set rpm version accordingly %define rpmversion 4.%{upstream_sublevel}.0 %endif @@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ Source5000: patch-4.%{base_sublevel}-git%{gitrev}.xz ## Patches needed for building this package ## compile fixes +Patch001: 0001-tools-lib-subcmd-pager.c-do-not-alias-select-params.patch # ongoing complaint, full discussion delayed until ksummit/plumbers Patch002: 0001-iio-Use-event-header-from-kernel-tree.patch @@ -607,9 +608,6 @@ Patch625: v3-2-2-Input-synaptics---Lenovo-X1-Carbon-5-should-use-SMBUS-RMI.patch # rhbz1514969, submitted upstream Patch640: 0001-platform-x86-dell-laptop-Filter-out-spurious-keyboar.patch -# Speculative Execution patches -Patch642: prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch - # CVE-2018-5750 rhbz 1539706 1539708 Patch651: ACPI-sbshc-remove-raw-pointer-from-printk-message.patch @@ -1871,6 +1869,9 @@ fi # # %changelog +* Mon Feb 05 2018 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.16.0-0.rc0.git5.1 +- Linux v4.15-10668-g35277995e179 + * Fri Feb 02 2018 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.16.0-0.rc0.git4.1 - Linux v4.15-9939-g4bf772b14675 diff --git a/prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch b/prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 890efc149..000000000 --- a/prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1399 +0,0 @@ -From 1d115042dde79e3c0fcc18af548342b172e749e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 17:14:24 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 01/19] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers - -Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus, -memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the -bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel. - -This patch adds helpers which can be used to inhibit the use of -out-of-bounds pointers under speculation. - -A generic implementation is provided for compatibility, but does not -guarantee safety under speculation. Architectures are expected to -override these helpers as necessary. - -Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> -Cc: Daniel Willams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - include/asm-generic/barrier.h | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/include/asm-generic/barrier.h b/include/asm-generic/barrier.h -index fe297b599b0a..91c3071f49e5 100644 ---- a/include/asm-generic/barrier.h -+++ b/include/asm-generic/barrier.h -@@ -54,6 +54,74 @@ - #define read_barrier_depends() do { } while (0) - #endif - -+/* -+ * Inhibit subsequent speculative memory accesses. -+ * -+ * Architectures with a suitable memory barrier should provide an -+ * implementation. This is non-portable, and generic code should use -+ * nospec_ptr(). -+ */ -+#ifndef __nospec_barrier -+#define __nospec_barrier() do { } while (0) -+#endif -+ -+/** -+ * nospec_ptr() - Ensure a pointer is bounded, even under speculation. -+ * -+ * @ptr: the pointer to test -+ * @lo: the lower valid bound for @ptr, inclusive -+ * @hi: the upper valid bound for @ptr, exclusive -+ * -+ * If @ptr falls in the interval [@lo, @i), returns @ptr, otherwise returns -+ * NULL. -+ * -+ * Architectures which do not provide __nospec_barrier() should override this -+ * to ensure that ptr falls in the [lo, hi) interval both under architectural -+ * execution and under speculation, preventing propagation of an out-of-bounds -+ * pointer to code which is speculatively executed. -+ */ -+#ifndef nospec_ptr -+#define nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof (ptr) __ret; \ -+ typeof (ptr) __ptr = (ptr); \ -+ typeof (ptr) __lo = (lo); \ -+ typeof (ptr) __hi = (hi); \ -+ \ -+ __ret = (__lo <= __ptr && __ptr < __hi) ? __ptr : NULL; \ -+ \ -+ __nospec_barrier(); \ -+ \ -+ __ret; \ -+}) -+#endif -+ -+/** -+ * nospec_array_ptr - Generate a pointer to an array element, ensuring the -+ * pointer is bounded under speculation. -+ * -+ * @arr: the base of the array -+ * @idx: the index of the element -+ * @sz: the number of elements in the array -+ * -+ * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns the pointer to @arr[@idx], -+ * otherwise returns NULL. -+ * -+ * This is a wrapper around nospec_ptr(), provided for convenience. -+ * Architectures should implement nospec_ptr() to ensure this is the case -+ * under speculation. -+ */ -+#define nospec_array_ptr(arr, idx, sz) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(*(arr)) *__arr = (arr); \ -+ typeof(idx) __idx = (idx); \ -+ typeof(sz) __sz = (sz); \ -+ \ -+ nospec_ptr(__arr + __idx, __arr, __arr + __sz); \ -+}) -+ -+#undef __nospec_barrier -+ - #ifndef __smp_mb - #define __smp_mb() mb() - #endif --- -2.14.3 - -From 0a9659964052448903985b38f08b3912ab65f1a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 19:47:06 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 02/19] Documentation: document nospec helpers - -Document the rationale and usage of the new nospec*() helpers. - -Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> -Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> -Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - Documentation/speculation.txt | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 166 insertions(+) - create mode 100644 Documentation/speculation.txt - -diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt -new file mode 100644 -index 000000000000..748fcd4dcda4 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt -@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ -+This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable -+effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs. -+ -+=========== -+Speculation -+=========== -+ -+To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs -+employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing -+work which may be discarded at a later stage. -+ -+Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state, -+such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to -+observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or -+absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be -+observed to extract secret information. -+ -+For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds -+checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the -+following code: -+ -+ int load_array(int *array, unsigned int idx) { -+ if (idx >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) -+ return 0; -+ else -+ return array[idx]; -+ } -+ -+Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as: -+ -+ CMP <idx>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS -+ B.LT less -+ MOV <returnval>, #0 -+ RET -+ less: -+ LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <idx>] -+ RET -+ -+It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and -+speculatively loads array[idx], even if idx >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This value -+will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect -+microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. -+ -+More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may result -+in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following code, building on -+the prior example: -+ -+ int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int idx) { -+ int val1, val2, -+ -+ val1 = load_array(arr1, idx); -+ val2 = load_array(arr2, val1); -+ -+ return val2; -+ } -+ -+Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value of an -+out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence microarchitectural -+state dependent on this value. This may provide an arbitrary read primitive. -+ -+==================================== -+Mitigating speculation side-channels -+==================================== -+ -+The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are respected -+even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by speculation-based -+side-channels are expected to implement these primitives. -+ -+The following helpers found in <asm/barrier.h> can be used to prevent -+information from being leaked via side-channels. -+ -+* nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi) -+ -+ Returns a sanitized pointer that is bounded by the [lo, hi) interval. When -+ ptr < lo, or ptr >= hi, NULL is returned. Prevents an out-of-bounds pointer -+ being propagated to code which is speculatively executed. -+ -+ This is expected to be used by code which computes pointers to data -+ structures, where part of the address (such as an array index) may be -+ user-controlled. -+ -+ This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example: -+ -+ int load_array(int *array, unsigned int idx) -+ { -+ int *elem; -+ -+ if ((elem = nospec_ptr(array + idx, array, array + MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS))) -+ return *elem; -+ else -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ This can also be used in situations where multiple fields on a structure are -+ accessed: -+ -+ struct foo array[SIZE]; -+ int a, b; -+ -+ void do_thing(int idx) -+ { -+ struct foo *elem; -+ -+ if ((elem = nospec_ptr(array + idx, array, array + SIZE)) { -+ a = elem->field_a; -+ b = elem->field_b; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ It is imperative that the returned pointer is used. Pointers which are -+ generated separately are subject to a number of potential CPU and compiler -+ optimizations, and may still be used speculatively. For example, this means -+ that the following sequence is unsafe: -+ -+ struct foo array[SIZE]; -+ int a, b; -+ -+ void do_thing(int idx) -+ { -+ if (nospec_ptr(array + idx, array, array + SIZE) != NULL) { -+ // unsafe as wrong pointer is used -+ a = array[idx].field_a; -+ b = array[idx].field_b; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ Similarly, it is unsafe to compare the returned pointer with other pointers, -+ as this may permit the compiler to substitute one pointer with another, -+ permitting speculation. For example, the following sequence is unsafe: -+ -+ struct foo array[SIZE]; -+ int a, b; -+ -+ void do_thing(int idx) -+ { -+ struct foo *elem = nospec_ptr(array + idx, array, array + size); -+ -+ // unsafe due to pointer substitution -+ if (elem == &array[idx]) { -+ a = elem->field_a; -+ b = elem->field_b; -+ } -+ } -+ -+* nospec_array_ptr(arr, idx, sz) -+ -+ Returns a sanitized pointer to arr[idx] only if idx falls in the [0, sz) -+ interval. When idx < 0 or idx > sz, NULL is returned. Prevents an -+ out-of-bounds pointer being propagated to code which is speculatively -+ executed. -+ -+ This is a convenience function which wraps nospec_ptr(), and has the same -+ caveats w.r.t. the use of the returned pointer. -+ -+ For example, this may be used as follows: -+ -+ int load_array(int *array, unsigned int idx) -+ { -+ int *elem; -+ -+ if ((elem = nospec_array_ptr(array, idx, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS))) -+ return *elem; -+ else -+ return 0; -+ } -+ --- -2.14.3 - -From 2b98026ffeeb0b4a06c80fe39bfebd5cef4a8fa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 17:15:01 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 03/19] arm64: implement nospec_ptr() - -This patch implements nospec_ptr() for arm64, following the recommended -architectural sequence. - -Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> -Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h -index 77651c49ef44..b4819f6a0e5c 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h -+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h -@@ -40,6 +40,61 @@ - #define dma_rmb() dmb(oshld) - #define dma_wmb() dmb(oshst) - -+#define __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, cmpptr, w, sz) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(*ptr) __nln_val; \ -+ typeof(*ptr) __failval = \ -+ (typeof(*ptr))(unsigned long)(failval); \ -+ \ -+ asm volatile ( \ -+ " cmp %[c], %[l]\n" \ -+ " ccmp %[c], %[h], 2, cs\n" \ -+ " b.cs 1f\n" \ -+ " ldr" #sz " %" #w "[v], %[p]\n" \ -+ "1: csel %" #w "[v], %" #w "[v], %" #w "[f], cc\n" \ -+ " hint #0x14 // CSDB\n" \ -+ : [v] "=&r" (__nln_val) \ -+ : [p] "m" (*(ptr)), [l] "r" (lo), [h] "r" (hi), \ -+ [f] "rZ" (__failval), [c] "r" (cmpptr) \ -+ : "cc"); \ -+ \ -+ __nln_val; \ -+}) -+ -+#define __load_no_speculate(ptr, lo, hi, failval, cmpptr) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(*(ptr)) __nl_val; \ -+ \ -+ switch (sizeof(__nl_val)) { \ -+ case 1: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, w, b); \ -+ break; \ -+ case 2: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, w, h); \ -+ break; \ -+ case 4: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, w, ); \ -+ break; \ -+ case 8: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, x, ); \ -+ break; \ -+ default: \ -+ BUILD_BUG(); \ -+ } \ -+ \ -+ __nl_val; \ -+}) -+ -+#define nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(ptr) __np_ptr = (ptr); \ -+ __load_no_speculate(&__np_ptr, lo, hi, 0, __np_ptr); \ -+}) -+ - #define __smp_mb() dmb(ish) - #define __smp_rmb() dmb(ishld) - #define __smp_wmb() dmb(ishst) --- -2.14.3 - -From cedaed8d38108dc6b68c1418d9b942f64b2be488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 16:44:36 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 04/19] arm: implement nospec_ptr() - -This patch implements nospec_ptr() for arm, following the recommended -architectural sequences for the arm and thumb instruction sets. - -Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h -index 40f5c410fd8c..6384c90e4b72 100644 ---- a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h -+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h -@@ -37,6 +37,81 @@ - #define dmb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : : "memory") - #endif - -+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL -+#define __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, cmpptr, sz) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(*ptr) __nln_val; \ -+ typeof(*ptr) __failval = \ -+ (typeof(*ptr))(unsigned long)(failval); \ -+ \ -+ asm volatile ( \ -+ " cmp %[c], %[l]\n" \ -+ " it hs\n" \ -+ " cmphs %[h], %[c]\n" \ -+ " blo 1f\n" \ -+ " ld" #sz " %[v], %[p]\n" \ -+ "1: it lo\n" \ -+ " movlo %[v], %[f]\n" \ -+ " .inst 0xf3af8014 @ CSDB\n" \ -+ : [v] "=&r" (__nln_val) \ -+ : [p] "m" (*(ptr)), [l] "r" (lo), [h] "r" (hi), \ -+ [f] "r" (__failval), [c] "r" (cmpptr) \ -+ : "cc"); \ -+ \ -+ __nln_val; \ -+}) -+#else -+#define __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, cmpptr, sz) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(*ptr) __nln_val; \ -+ typeof(*ptr) __failval = \ -+ (typeof(*ptr))(unsigned long)(failval); \ -+ \ -+ asm volatile ( \ -+ " cmp %[c], %[l]\n" \ -+ " cmphs %[h], %[c]\n" \ -+ " ldr" #sz "hi %[v], %[p]\n" \ -+ " movls %[v], %[f]\n" \ -+ " .inst 0xe320f014 @ CSDB\n" \ -+ : [v] "=&r" (__nln_val) \ -+ : [p] "m" (*(ptr)), [l] "r" (lo), [h] "r" (hi), \ -+ [f] "r" (__failval), [c] "r" (cmpptr) \ -+ : "cc"); \ -+ \ -+ __nln_val; \ -+}) -+#endif -+ -+#define __load_no_speculate(ptr, lo, hi, failval, cmpptr) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(*(ptr)) __nl_val; \ -+ \ -+ switch (sizeof(__nl_val)) { \ -+ case 1: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, b); \ -+ break; \ -+ case 2: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, h); \ -+ break; \ -+ case 4: \ -+ __nl_val = __load_no_speculate_n(ptr, lo, hi, failval, \ -+ cmpptr, ); \ -+ break; \ -+ default: \ -+ BUILD_BUG(); \ -+ } \ -+ \ -+ __nl_val; \ -+}) -+ -+#define nospec_ptr(ptr, lo, hi) \ -+({ \ -+ typeof(ptr) __np_ptr = (ptr); \ -+ __load_no_speculate(&__np_ptr, lo, hi, 0, __np_ptr); \ -+}) -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_HEAVY_MB - extern void (*soc_mb)(void); - extern void arm_heavy_mb(void); --- -2.14.3 - -From d14a4150a2f74a068247cf3846405904e21a8d2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 14:51:58 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 05/19] x86: implement nospec_barrier() - -The new speculative execution barrier, nospec_barrier(), ensures -that any userspace controllable speculation doesn't cross the boundary. - -Any user observable speculative activity on this CPU thread before this -point either completes, reaches a state it can no longer cause an -observable activity, or is aborted before instructions after the barrier -execute. - -In the x86 case nospec_barrier() resolves to an lfence if -X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC is present. Other architectures can define -their variants. - -Note the expectation is that this barrier is never used directly, at -least outside of architecture specific code. It is implied by the -nospec_{array_ptr,ptr} macros. - -x86, for now, depends on the barrier for protection while other -architectures place their speculation prevention in -nospec_{ptr,array_ptr} when a barrier instruction is not available or -too heavy-weight. In the x86 case lfence is not a fully serializing -instruction so it is not as expensive as other barriers. - -Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> -Suggested-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> -Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com> -Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> -Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> -Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h -index 7fb336210e1b..1148cd9f5ae7 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h -@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ - #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory") - #endif - -+/* -+ * CPUs without LFENCE don't really speculate much. Possibly fall back to IRET-to-self. -+ */ -+#define __nospec_barrier() alternative("", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) -+#define nospec_barrier __nospec_barrier -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE - #define dma_rmb() rmb() - #else --- -2.14.3 - -From d077f11b7fcb697af0c9419cc2273d179e6f51ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> -Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 13:36:20 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 06/19] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok - -When access_ok fails we should always stop speculating. -Add the required barriers to the x86 access_ok macro. - -Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> -Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> -Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> -Cc: x86@kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 17 +++++++++++++---- - include/asm-generic/barrier.h | 6 +++--- - 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h -index 574dff4d2913..9b6f20cfaeb9 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h -@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) - /* - * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address. - * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise. -+ * -+ * We also disable speculation when a check fails. - */ - static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit) - { -@@ -53,14 +55,19 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un - * important to subtract the size from the - * limit, not add it to the address). - */ -- if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) -- return unlikely(addr > limit - size); -+ if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { -+ if (unlikely(addr > limit - size)) -+ return true; -+ nospec_barrier(); -+ return false; -+ } - - /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */ - addr += size; -- if (unlikely(addr < size)) -+ if (unlikely(addr < size || addr > limit)) - return true; -- return unlikely(addr > limit); -+ nospec_barrier(); -+ return false; - } - - #define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit) \ -@@ -94,6 +101,8 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un - * Note that, depending on architecture, this function probably just - * checks that the pointer is in the user space range - after calling - * this function, memory access functions may still return -EFAULT. -+ * -+ * Stops speculation automatically - */ - #define access_ok(type, addr, size) \ - ({ \ -diff --git a/include/asm-generic/barrier.h b/include/asm-generic/barrier.h -index 91c3071f49e5..a11765eba860 100644 ---- a/include/asm-generic/barrier.h -+++ b/include/asm-generic/barrier.h -@@ -59,7 +59,9 @@ - * - * Architectures with a suitable memory barrier should provide an - * implementation. This is non-portable, and generic code should use -- * nospec_ptr(). -+ * nospec_{array_ptr,ptr}. Arch-specific code should define and use -+ * nospec_barrier() for usages where nospec_{array_ptr,ptr} is -+ * unsuitable. - */ - #ifndef __nospec_barrier - #define __nospec_barrier() do { } while (0) -@@ -120,8 +122,6 @@ - nospec_ptr(__arr + __idx, __arr, __arr + __sz); \ - }) - --#undef __nospec_barrier -- - #ifndef __smp_mb - #define __smp_mb() mb() - #endif --- -2.14.3 - -From bb10d660be01a93f19d258260dd25444e14e5889 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:53:55 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 07/19] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via - speculative execution - -Static analysis reports that 'index' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency to read 'pin' from the -'selector->baSourceID' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of -kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction -stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'pin'. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> -Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> -Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c | 7 +++++-- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c -index 3e7e283a44a8..7442626dc20e 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c -+++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c -@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ - #include <linux/mm.h> - #include <linux/wait.h> - #include <linux/atomic.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - - #include <media/v4l2-common.h> - #include <media/v4l2-ctrls.h> -@@ -810,6 +811,7 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_enum_input(struct file *file, void *fh, - struct uvc_entity *iterm = NULL; - u32 index = input->index; - int pin = 0; -+ __u8 *elem; - - if (selector == NULL || - (chain->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_IGNORE_SELECTOR_UNIT)) { -@@ -820,8 +822,9 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_enum_input(struct file *file, void *fh, - break; - } - pin = iterm->id; -- } else if (index < selector->bNrInPins) { -- pin = selector->baSourceID[index]; -+ } else if ((elem = nospec_array_ptr(selector->baSourceID, index, -+ selector->bNrInPins))) { -+ pin = *elem; - list_for_each_entry(iterm, &chain->entities, chain) { - if (!UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(iterm)) - continue; --- -2.14.3 - -From 8a4e4e1e674b9aaf0d2ca95c3fa5117ab5aa2987 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:53:56 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 08/19] carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency to read from the 'ar9170_qmap' array. In -order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads -based on an invalid result of 'ar9170_qmap[queue]'. In this case the -value of 'ar9170_qmap[queue]' is immediately reused as an index to the -'ar->edcf' array. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com> -Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> -Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c | 6 ++++-- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c -index 988c8857d78c..0ff34cbe2b62 100644 ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c -@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ - #include <linux/module.h> - #include <linux/etherdevice.h> - #include <linux/random.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - #include <net/mac80211.h> - #include <net/cfg80211.h> - #include "hw.h" -@@ -1384,11 +1385,12 @@ static int carl9170_op_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, - const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *param) - { - struct ar9170 *ar = hw->priv; -+ const u8 *elem; - int ret; - - mutex_lock(&ar->mutex); -- if (queue < ar->hw->queues) { -- memcpy(&ar->edcf[ar9170_qmap[queue]], param, sizeof(*param)); -+ if ((elem = nospec_array_ptr(ar9170_qmap, queue, ar->hw->queues))) { -+ memcpy(&ar->edcf[*elem], param, sizeof(*param)); - ret = carl9170_set_qos(ar); - } else { - ret = -EINVAL; --- -2.14.3 - -From b2134ba6dc16b4e6a232e34179c3489c3e51ba89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:53:57 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 09/19] p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency to read from the 'priv->qos_params' array. -In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads -based on an invalid result of 'priv->qos_params[queue]'. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com> -Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> -Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c | 8 +++++--- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c -index ab6d39e12069..85c9cbee35fc 100644 ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c -@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ - #include <linux/firmware.h> - #include <linux/etherdevice.h> - #include <linux/module.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - - #include <net/mac80211.h> - -@@ -411,12 +412,13 @@ static int p54_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, - const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *params) - { - struct p54_common *priv = dev->priv; -+ struct p54_edcf_queue_param *p54_q; - int ret; - - mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex); -- if (queue < dev->queues) { -- P54_SET_QUEUE(priv->qos_params[queue], params->aifs, -- params->cw_min, params->cw_max, params->txop); -+ if ((p54_q = nospec_array_ptr(priv->qos_params, queue, dev->queues))) { -+ P54_SET_QUEUE(p54_q[0], params->aifs, params->cw_min, -+ params->cw_max, params->txop); - ret = p54_set_edcf(priv); - } else - ret = -EINVAL; --- -2.14.3 - -From addb69e8d90a79887aa369398e73b9b64fb9e910 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:53:58 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 10/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'handle' may be a user controlled value -that is used as a data dependency to read 'sp' from the -'req->outstanding_cmds' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of -kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction -stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'sp'. In this -case 'sp' is directly dereferenced later in the function. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com -Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> -Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> -Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c | 15 +++++++++------ - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c -index d5da3981cefe..128b41de3784 100644 ---- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c -+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c -@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ - #include <linux/ktime.h> - #include <linux/pci.h> - #include <linux/ratelimit.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - #include <linux/vmalloc.h> - #include <linux/bsg-lib.h> - #include <scsi/scsi_tcq.h> -@@ -2275,7 +2276,7 @@ qlafx00_ioctl_iosb_entry(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct req_que *req, - static void - qlafx00_status_entry(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct rsp_que *rsp, void *pkt) - { -- srb_t *sp; -+ srb_t *sp, **elem; - fc_port_t *fcport; - struct scsi_cmnd *cp; - struct sts_entry_fx00 *sts; -@@ -2304,8 +2305,9 @@ qlafx00_status_entry(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct rsp_que *rsp, void *pkt) - req = ha->req_q_map[que]; - - /* Validate handle. */ -- if (handle < req->num_outstanding_cmds) -- sp = req->outstanding_cmds[handle]; -+ if ((elem = nospec_array_ptr(req->outstanding_cmds, handle, -+ req->num_outstanding_cmds))) -+ sp = *elem; - else - sp = NULL; - -@@ -2626,7 +2628,7 @@ static void - qlafx00_multistatus_entry(struct scsi_qla_host *vha, - struct rsp_que *rsp, void *pkt) - { -- srb_t *sp; -+ srb_t *sp, **elem; - struct multi_sts_entry_fx00 *stsmfx; - struct qla_hw_data *ha = vha->hw; - uint32_t handle, hindex, handle_count, i; -@@ -2655,8 +2657,9 @@ qlafx00_multistatus_entry(struct scsi_qla_host *vha, - req = ha->req_q_map[que]; - - /* Validate handle. */ -- if (handle < req->num_outstanding_cmds) -- sp = req->outstanding_cmds[handle]; -+ if ((elem = nospec_array_ptr(req->outstanding_cmds, handle, -+ req->num_outstanding_cmds))) -+ sp = *elem; - else - sp = NULL; - --- -2.14.3 - -From 18e5e10139f6a04e00f6522c4b0091f167eb6c1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:00 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 11/19] cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency to read 'txq_params' from the -'priv->tx_queue_params.params' array. In order to avoid potential leaks -of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction -stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'txq_params'. -In this case 'txq_params' is referenced later in the function. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org> -Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> -Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c | 10 ++++++---- - drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h | 4 +--- - 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c -index 38678e9a0562..886942617f14 100644 ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c -@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ - #include <linux/firmware.h> - #include <linux/module.h> - #include <linux/etherdevice.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - - #include "cw1200.h" - #include "sta.h" -@@ -612,18 +613,19 @@ int cw1200_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, - u16 queue, const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *params) - { - struct cw1200_common *priv = dev->priv; -+ struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *txq_params; - int ret = 0; - /* To prevent re-applying PM request OID again and again*/ - bool old_uapsd_flags; - - mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex); - -- if (queue < dev->queues) { -+ if ((txq_params = nospec_array_ptr(priv->tx_queue_params.params, -+ queue, dev->queues))) { - old_uapsd_flags = le16_to_cpu(priv->uapsd_info.uapsd_flags); - -- WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(&priv->tx_queue_params, queue, 0, 0, 0); -- ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, -- &priv->tx_queue_params.params[queue], queue); -+ WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(txq_params, 0, 0, 0); -+ ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, txq_params, queue); - if (ret) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; -diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h -index 48086e849515..8c8d9191e233 100644 ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h -@@ -1099,10 +1099,8 @@ struct wsm_tx_queue_params { - }; - - --#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(queue_params, queue, ack_policy, allowed_time,\ -- max_life_time) \ -+#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(p, ack_policy, allowed_time, max_life_time) \ - do { \ -- struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *p = &(queue_params)->params[queue]; \ - p->ackPolicy = (ack_policy); \ - p->allowedMediumTime = (allowed_time); \ - p->maxTransmitLifetime = (max_life_time); \ --- -2.14.3 - -From 0096694093529628e2a855812a5111358d1e952d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:01 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 12/19] Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via - speculative execution - -Static analysis reports that 'trip' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency to read '*temp' from the 'd->aux_trips' -array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads -based on an invalid value of '*temp'. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> -Cc: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> -Cc: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c | 14 ++++++++------ - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c -index 145a5c53ff5c..442a1d9bf7ad 100644 ---- a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c -+++ b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c -@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ - #include <linux/init.h> - #include <linux/acpi.h> - #include <linux/thermal.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - #include "int340x_thermal_zone.h" - - static int int340x_thermal_get_zone_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *zone, -@@ -52,20 +53,21 @@ static int int340x_thermal_get_trip_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *zone, - int trip, int *temp) - { - struct int34x_thermal_zone *d = zone->devdata; -+ unsigned long *elem; - int i; - - if (d->override_ops && d->override_ops->get_trip_temp) - return d->override_ops->get_trip_temp(zone, trip, temp); - -- if (trip < d->aux_trip_nr) -- *temp = d->aux_trips[trip]; -- else if (trip == d->crt_trip_id) -+ if ((elem = nospec_array_ptr(d->aux_trips, trip, d->aux_trip_nr))) { -+ *temp = *elem; -+ } else if (trip == d->crt_trip_id) { - *temp = d->crt_temp; -- else if (trip == d->psv_trip_id) -+ } else if (trip == d->psv_trip_id) { - *temp = d->psv_temp; -- else if (trip == d->hot_trip_id) -+ } else if (trip == d->hot_trip_id) { - *temp = d->hot_temp; -- else { -+ } else { - for (i = 0; i < INT340X_THERMAL_MAX_ACT_TRIP_COUNT; i++) { - if (d->act_trips[i].valid && - d->act_trips[i].id == trip) { --- -2.14.3 - -From 2a5a165ff05df37c3f4d02ab70ddee1e9329401c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:03 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 13/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value -that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw6_frag_vec buffer. -In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further -reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> -Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> -Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - net/ipv6/raw.c | 9 +++++---- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c -index 761a473a07c5..384e3d59d148 100644 ---- a/net/ipv6/raw.c -+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c -@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ - #include <linux/skbuff.h> - #include <linux/compat.h> - #include <linux/uaccess.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - #include <asm/ioctls.h> - - #include <net/net_namespace.h> -@@ -725,17 +726,17 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd, - struct sk_buff *skb) - { - struct raw6_frag_vec *rfv = from; -+ char *rfv_buf; - -- if (offset < rfv->hlen) { -+ if ((rfv_buf = nospec_array_ptr(rfv->c, offset, rfv->hlen))) { - int copy = min(rfv->hlen - offset, len); - - if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) -- memcpy(to, rfv->c + offset, copy); -+ memcpy(to, rfv_buf, copy); - else - skb->csum = csum_block_add( - skb->csum, -- csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv->c + offset, -- to, copy, 0), -+ csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv_buf, to, copy, 0), - odd); - - odd = 0; --- -2.14.3 - -From f38cdd5d461ce686d201e41242fd626641e7253d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:02 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 14/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value -that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer. -In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further -reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> -Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> -Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - net/ipv4/raw.c | 9 +++++---- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c -index 125c1eab3eaa..f72b20131a15 100644 ---- a/net/ipv4/raw.c -+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c -@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ - #include <linux/in_route.h> - #include <linux/route.h> - #include <linux/skbuff.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - #include <linux/igmp.h> - #include <net/net_namespace.h> - #include <net/dst.h> -@@ -472,17 +473,17 @@ static int raw_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd, - struct sk_buff *skb) - { - struct raw_frag_vec *rfv = from; -+ char *rfv_buf; - -- if (offset < rfv->hlen) { -+ if ((rfv_buf = nospec_array_ptr(rfv->hdr.c, offset, rfv->hlen))) { - int copy = min(rfv->hlen - offset, len); - - if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) -- memcpy(to, rfv->hdr.c + offset, copy); -+ memcpy(to, rfv_buf, copy); - else - skb->csum = csum_block_add( - skb->csum, -- csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv->hdr.c + offset, -- to, copy, 0), -+ csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv_buf, to, copy, 0), - odd); - - odd = 0; --- -2.14.3 - -From 07a715cb9cd9e4e8bac7204a2462803bfe7ae259 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:04 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 15/19] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via - speculative execution - -Expectedly, static analysis reports that 'fd' is a user controlled value -that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In -order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads -based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +++-- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h -index 1c65817673db..4a147c5c2533 100644 ---- a/include/linux/fdtable.h -+++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h -@@ -81,9 +81,10 @@ struct dentry; - static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd) - { - struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); -+ struct file __rcu **fdp; - -- if (fd < fdt->max_fds) -- return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); -+ if ((fdp = nospec_array_ptr(fdt->fd, fd, fdt->max_fds))) -+ return rcu_dereference_raw(*fdp); - return NULL; - } - --- -2.14.3 - -From e5ef1fdb08b0d2ae0af3f725a6c4a3394af538fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:05 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 16/19] net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'index' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency reading 'rt' from the 'platform_label' -array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further -reads based on an invalid 'rt' value. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> -Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> -Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 12 +++++++----- - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c -index 8ca9915befc8..ebcf0e246cfe 100644 ---- a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c -+++ b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c -@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ - #include <linux/ipv6.h> - #include <linux/mpls.h> - #include <linux/netconf.h> -+#include <linux/compiler.h> - #include <linux/vmalloc.h> - #include <linux/percpu.h> - #include <net/ip.h> -@@ -77,12 +78,13 @@ static void rtmsg_lfib(int event, u32 label, struct mpls_route *rt, - static struct mpls_route *mpls_route_input_rcu(struct net *net, unsigned index) - { - struct mpls_route *rt = NULL; -+ struct mpls_route __rcu **platform_label = -+ rcu_dereference(net->mpls.platform_label); -+ struct mpls_route __rcu **rtp; - -- if (index < net->mpls.platform_labels) { -- struct mpls_route __rcu **platform_label = -- rcu_dereference(net->mpls.platform_label); -- rt = rcu_dereference(platform_label[index]); -- } -+ if ((rtp = nospec_array_ptr(platform_label, index, -+ net->mpls.platform_labels))) -+ rt = rcu_dereference(*rtp); - return rt; - } - --- -2.14.3 - -From 276b18c636de3afc89571198b22b518473ce2b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:07 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 17/19] udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'eahd->appAttrLocation' and -'eahd->impAttrLocation' may be a user controlled values that are used as -data dependencies for calculating source and destination buffers for -memmove operations. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory -values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could -issue further reads based on invalid 'aal' or 'ial' values. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - fs/udf/misc.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ - 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/fs/udf/misc.c b/fs/udf/misc.c -index 401e64cde1be..9403160822de 100644 ---- a/fs/udf/misc.c -+++ b/fs/udf/misc.c -@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ struct genericFormat *udf_add_extendedattr(struct inode *inode, uint32_t size, - int offset; - uint16_t crclen; - struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode); -+ uint8_t *ea_dst, *ea_src; -+ uint32_t aal, ial; - - ea = iinfo->i_ext.i_data; - if (iinfo->i_lenEAttr) { -@@ -100,33 +102,34 @@ struct genericFormat *udf_add_extendedattr(struct inode *inode, uint32_t size, - - offset = iinfo->i_lenEAttr; - if (type < 2048) { -- if (le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation) < -- iinfo->i_lenEAttr) { -- uint32_t aal = -- le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation); -- memmove(&ea[offset - aal + size], -- &ea[aal], offset - aal); -+ aal = le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation); -+ if ((ea_dst = nospec_array_ptr(ea, offset - aal + size, -+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr)) && -+ (ea_src = nospec_array_ptr(ea, aal, -+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr))) { -+ memmove(ea_dst, ea_src, offset - aal); - offset -= aal; - eahd->appAttrLocation = - cpu_to_le32(aal + size); - } -- if (le32_to_cpu(eahd->impAttrLocation) < -- iinfo->i_lenEAttr) { -- uint32_t ial = -- le32_to_cpu(eahd->impAttrLocation); -- memmove(&ea[offset - ial + size], -- &ea[ial], offset - ial); -+ -+ ial = le32_to_cpu(eahd->impAttrLocation); -+ if ((ea_dst = nospec_array_ptr(ea, offset - ial + size, -+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr)) && -+ (ea_src = nospec_array_ptr(ea, ial, -+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr))) { -+ memmove(ea_dst, ea_src, offset - ial); - offset -= ial; - eahd->impAttrLocation = - cpu_to_le32(ial + size); - } - } else if (type < 65536) { -- if (le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation) < -- iinfo->i_lenEAttr) { -- uint32_t aal = -- le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation); -- memmove(&ea[offset - aal + size], -- &ea[aal], offset - aal); -+ aal = le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation); -+ if ((ea_dst = nospec_array_ptr(ea, offset - aal + size, -+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr)) && -+ (ea_src = nospec_array_ptr(ea, aal, -+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr))) { -+ memmove(ea_dst, ea_src, offset - aal); - offset -= aal; - eahd->appAttrLocation = - cpu_to_le32(aal + size); --- -2.14.3 - -From e13d6b8e1e65dc93044b72a84990094bb4f7b94c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 13:54:09 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 18/19] userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative - execution - -Static analysis reports that 'pos' may be a user controlled value that -is used as a data dependency determining which extent to return out of -'map'. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block -speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further -reads based on an invalid speculative result from 'm_start()'. - -Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. - -Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> -Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> ---- - kernel/user_namespace.c | 10 ++++------ - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index 246d4d4ce5c7..e958f2e5c061 100644 ---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c -+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -648,15 +648,13 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos, - { - loff_t pos = *ppos; - unsigned extents = map->nr_extents; -- smp_rmb(); - -- if (pos >= extents) -- return NULL; -+ /* paired with smp_wmb in map_write */ -+ smp_rmb(); - - if (extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) -- return &map->extent[pos]; -- -- return &map->forward[pos]; -+ return nospec_array_ptr(map->extent, pos, extents); -+ return nospec_array_ptr(map->forward, pos, extents); - } - - static void *uid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos) --- -2.14.3 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ SHA512 (linux-4.15.tar.xz) = c00d92659df815a53dcac7dde145b742b1f20867d380c07cb09ddb3295d6ff10f8931b21ef0b09d7156923a3957b39d74d87c883300173b2e20690d2b4ec35ea -SHA512 (patch-4.15-git4.xz) = b0f0c2ab8c9f1748f530c05c836ec87970b2bfcc4626d1baeaa39b415b42d596208aab990b58ec786651fe15de2dfbe3013608065e940b714ca6eeb3c4393e03 +SHA512 (patch-4.15-git5.xz) = 0d49766b4e902828a3ec1655e51444ce8820ff9e944406e4261e275bbe2cc14a50e5174b46f19589d94c42f0f5f56a87b5b13259cb5ae58086ccc935a7366146 |