Add missing patch for signed modules rebase

2 files changed, 97 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch b/KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cc1e5370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From fb2ac204a70da565de9ef9a9d6d69a40c2d59727 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:21:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to
+ secondary keyring
+
+Allow keys to be added to the system secondary certificates keyring during
+kernel initialisation in an unrestricted fashion.  Such keys are implicitly
+trusted and don't have their trust chains checked on link.
+
+This allows keys in the UEFI database to be added in secure boot mode for
+the purposes of module signing.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+---
+ certs/internal.h       | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ certs/system_keyring.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 certs/internal.h
+
+diff --git a/certs/internal.h b/certs/internal.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5dcbefb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/certs/internal.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
++/* Internal definitions
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * system_keyring.c
++ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
++extern void __init add_trusted_secondary_key(const char *source,
++					     const void *data, size_t len);
++#endif
+diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
+index 6251d1b..5ac8ba6 100644
+--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
++++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+ #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+ #include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
++#include "internal.h"
+
+ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+@@ -265,3 +266,35 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
+
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
++/**
++ * add_trusted_secondary_key - Add to secondary keyring with no validation
++ * @source: Source of key
++ * @data: The blob holding the key
++ * @len: The length of the data blob
++ *
++ * Add a key to the secondary keyring without checking its trust chain.  This
++ * is available only during kernel initialisation.
++ */
++void __init add_trusted_secondary_key(const char *source,
++				      const void *data, size_t len)
++{
++	key_ref_t key;
++
++	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
++				   "asymmetric",
++				   NULL, data, len,
++				   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
++				   KEY_USR_VIEW,
++				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
++				   KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
++
++	if (IS_ERR(key))
++		pr_err("Problem loading %s X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
++		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
++	else
++		pr_notice("Loaded %s cert '%s' linked to secondary sys keyring\n",
++			  source, key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
+-- 
+2.9.3
+
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index d3e2fb9f7..a9dbf2e61 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -567,6 +567,8 @@ Patch472: crash-driver.patch
 
 Patch473: efi-lockdown.patch
 
+Patch486: KEYS-Allow-unrestricted-boot-time-addition-of-keys-t.patch
+
 Patch487: Add-EFI-signature-data-types.patch
 
 Patch488: Add-an-EFI-signature-blob-parser-and-key-loader.patch