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authorJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>2015-11-30 09:46:14 -0500
committerJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>2015-11-30 09:48:43 -0500
commit572b17832b43b13dbe4784ca54c8e49b7ec1b9bb (patch)
treebc2add8e04aa1f7ece82024e40cb7d5b03d0f54f
parent5d464f8c5269f803888ab379e88335ec9f238895 (diff)
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Fix crash in add_key (rhbz 1284059)
-rw-r--r--KEYS-Fix-handling-of-stored-error-in-a-negatively-in.patch125
-rw-r--r--kernel.spec4
2 files changed, 129 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/KEYS-Fix-handling-of-stored-error-in-a-negatively-in.patch b/KEYS-Fix-handling-of-stored-error-in-a-negatively-in.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3837037e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/KEYS-Fix-handling-of-stored-error-in-a-negatively-in.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 3b34bea74e636583d34c8e472237a0bea1e3ba93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 21:36:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively
+ instantiated user key
+
+If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
+payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
+instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
+type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
+
+The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
+
+ keyctl request2 user user "" @u
+ keyctl add user user "a" @u
+
+which manifests itself as:
+
+ BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
+ IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
+ PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
+ Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
+ Modules linked in:
+ CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
+ task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
+ RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
+ [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
+ RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
+ RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
+ RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
+ RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
+ R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
+ R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
+ FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+ CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
+ CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
+ Stack:
+ ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
+ ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
+ ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
+ Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
+ [<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
+ [< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
+ [<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
+ [< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
+ [<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
+ [<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
+
+Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
+
+A similar bug can be tripped by:
+
+ keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
+ keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
+
+This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
+parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
+will crashes.
+
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+---
+ security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 ++
+ security/keys/trusted.c | 5 ++++-
+ security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 ++++-
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+index 7bed4ad7cd76..0a374a2ce030 100644
+--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
++++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+@@ -845,6 +845,8 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ int ret = 0;
+
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
++ return -ENOKEY;
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
+index c0594cb07ada..aeb38f1a12e7 100644
+--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
++++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
+@@ -984,13 +984,16 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+ */
+ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+ {
+- struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
++ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+ struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ char *datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
++ return -ENOKEY;
++ p = key->payload.data;
+ if (!p->migratable)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
+diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
+index 36b47bbd3d8c..7cf22260bdff 100644
+--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
++++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
+@@ -120,7 +120,10 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /* attach the new data, displacing the old */
+- zap = key->payload.data;
++ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
++ zap = key->payload.data;
++ else
++ zap = NULL;
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
+ key->expiry = 0;
+ }
+--
+2.5.0
+
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 5f18349c6..c861fd9bd 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -623,6 +623,9 @@ Patch558: netfilter-ipset-Fix-hash-type-expire-release-empty-h.patch
#CVE-2015-8374 rhbz 1286261 1286262
Patch565: Btrfs-fix-truncation-of-compressed-and-inlined-exten.patch
+#rhbz 1284059
+Patch566: KEYS-Fix-handling-of-stored-error-in-a-negatively-in.patch
+
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
%endif
@@ -2067,6 +2070,7 @@ fi
#
%changelog
* Mon Nov 30 2015 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+- Fix crash in add_key (rhbz 1284059)
- CVE-2015-8374 btrfs: info leak when truncating compressed/inlined extents (rhbz 1286261 1286262)
* Sun Nov 22 2015 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org>